Book Review - THE INDIA DOCTRINE (1947-2007)

[Skies]

Our ideology should only be Islamic ideology.

No need this Hindu Bengali crap that already made some of people Hindu minded.

I suggest change the name back to East Pakistan and restore old national anthem as well as use Arabic/Persian script instead.

We have more than 8000 Farsi words in old Bangla which only will revive if we change this Hindu script. Understand.

1. I afraid and may be dislike one thing in Islam, that is, too much conservation for women like in hell-Afghan and hell-Saudi. Why Islam made so restrictions for women that even they cannot meet with their cousins and relatives without fully covered, though it has some benefits in context of social value? But I want moderate conservation for women. I do not want pure Islamic rule only for this reason. Also those countries have not any worthy contribution in this modern earth that follow pure Islamic rule like Saudi. I have no respect for Saudi People; and may be I’ll never go to Hajj for that reason. Do not tell me that they are selling oil and gold and running the wheels of this world.

2. Pure Islamic or Arabian culture does not go with Bangali ancient culture and history, so BD people will not cordially accept pure Islamic culture like hell-Saudi and Afghan ever. So it's only dream. But I do not want too much openness also which can lead people in wrong way like India. I believe their previous culture and social system is leading them to wrong path like allowing gay marriage or live together. We should aware that if our Bangladeshi culture will not lead to that path ever in future. So I suggest moderate Islamic rule but not 100% Islamic rule like Saudi.

3. Yah our anthem can be changed. It’s boring to hear same song always, lol. And about name: Bangladesh is okay but I do not like every Bangali/Bangladeshi culture. That’s why my mind is not confined in BD’s culture only.

4. May be I like Urdu language and literature and then Hindi more than Bangla. BTW, I did not know that we have more than 8000 Farsi words in old Bangla.

 

[Al-zakir]

1. I afraid and may be dislike one thing in Islam, that is, too much conservation for women like in hell-Afghan and hell-Saudi. Why Islam made so restrictions for women that even they cannot meet with their cousins and relatives without fully covered, though it has some benefits in context of social value? But I want moderate conservation for women. I do not want pure Islamic rule only for this reason. Also those countries have not any worthy contribution in this modern earth that follow pure Islamic rule like Saudi. I have no respect for Saudi People; and may be I’ll never go to Hajj for that reason. Do not tell me that they are selling oil and gold and running the wheels of this world.

You are too confused little brother. Do not mix Islamic ideology with Arabic culture. Arabs has some culture of their own which is not Islamic. Just stick to ways of our Rasul(S.W.S). I am also for modern Islamic republic where men and women can contribute equally from their own position.

You need to go to Hajj becasue it mandortory for you to perform if you can efford it. Do not become non-believer because you dislike Saudi.

2. Pure Islamic or Arabian culture does not go with Bangali ancient culture and history, so BD people will not cordially accept pure Islamic culture like hell-Saudi and Afghan ever. So it's only dream. But I do not want too much openness also which can lead people in wrong way like India. I believe their previous culture and social system is leading them to wrong path like allowing gay marriage or live together. We should aware that if our Bangladeshi culture will not lead to that path ever in future. So I suggest moderate Islamic rule but not 100% Islamic rule like Saudi.

You have the right mentality and align with my view.

3. Yah our anthem can be changed. It’s boring to hear same song always, lol. And about name: Bangladesh is okay but I do not like every Bangali/Bangladeshi culture. That’s why my mind is not confined in BD’s culture only.

Bangladesh is too Bangla confined.

4. May be I like Urdu language and literature and then Hindi more than Bangla. BTW, I did not know that we have more than 8000 Farsi words in old Bangla.

It used to be called Musalmani Bangla. You need to study our history from the time of Khilji.

 

[jeypore]

Gen. McChrystal in a report indicated Indian interference in Afghanistan. You couldn't have missed something that big.

Knowing me Mr. Munshi I might have missed such important information like that!!!

So, doubting myself against a great author as yourself, I googled the Gen. statement about Indian interfernce in Afgahanistan, the first thing that did pop up was my favorite Bill and AGNO hated Bill:

General McChrystal's report on Afghanistan and external influences

The Washington Post provides a good roundup of the report. In short, and it should come as no surprise, McChrystal calls for a change in strategy by ISAF, which has failed to properly implement a counterinsurgency program to defeat the Taliban and allied groups. ISAF must focus on securing the population, aiding in providing good governance, building and mentoring the Afghan security forces, and shifting itself away from an excessively defensive posture to enable the troops to engage with the Afghan people.

While McChrystal doesn't say so in this report, he wants more troops. He repeatedly describes the Afghan effort as "under-resourced." We won't know the numbers of troops requested until the next report is released. And it should be soon, as McChrystal is clear that the Taliban have the initiative and time is of the essence.

There are a couple of redacted sections of the report that would have made interesting reading, such as information on Taliban operations and the groups' command and control, and Taliban control throughout the country.

One part of the report that will get lost in the inevitable political debate on the Afghan surge will be McChrystal's assessment of "External Influences" on Afghanistan. The assessments are brief but reinforce the available information on the safe havens in Pakistan and the ISI's role in aiding the Taliban, as well as the role of Iran's Qods Force in training and arming elements of the Taliban. The paragraphs on Pakistan and Iran are excerpted in full below.

External Influences

Pakistan. Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's ISI. Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support. Al Qaeda's links with HUN [I assume this should be HQN, or Haqqani Network] have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control could create a favorable environment for AQAM to re-establish safe-havens in Afghanistan. Additionally, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is reliant on ground supply routes through Pakistan that remain vulnerable to these threats.
Stability in Pakistan is essential, not only in its own right, but also to enable progress in Afghanistan. While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee ISAF failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is predominantly Afghan. By defending the population, improving sub-national governance, and giving disenfranchised rural communities a voice in their government, GIRoA - with support from IsAF - can strengthen Afghanistan against both domestic and foreign insurgent penetration. Reintegrating communities and individuals into the political system can help reduce the insurgency's virulence to a point where it is no longer an existential threat to GIRoA....

Iran. Iran plays an ambiguous role in Afghanistan, providing developmental assistance and political support to GIRoA while the Iranian Qods Force is reportedly training fighters for certain Taliban groups and providing other forms of military assistance to insurgents. Iran's current policies and actions do not pose a short-term threat to the mission, but Iran has the capability to threaten the mission in the future. Pakistan may see Iranian economic and political initiatives as threats to their strategic interests, and may continue to address these issues in ways that are counterproductive to the ISAF effort.

General McChrystal's report on Afghanistan and external influences - Threat Matrix

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Trust you to be selective!

 

[Skies]

@Munshi Ji

What is Bangladesh Research Forum?

Who are the members in there?

And what are their research work?

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Bangladesh Research Forum was operated by Mr. Zainul Abedin from Mohammadpur and it compiled research papers on national and strategic issues. It is now closed down after Mr. Abedin emigrated to America two years ago. The new editions of the book are published by the Bangladesh Strategic and Development Forum.

 

[BanglaBhoot]

The India Doctrine (1947-2007) Bangla translation is now available at The Bookworm. Please see attachment.

 

[Skies]

I have already written a lengthy article on the subject just before the 2008 elections. It requires some changes now but the essence of the argument is there -

DeshCalling: A Nationalist Agenda for Bangladesh - By MBI Munshi Bar-at-Law

A Nationalist Agenda for Bangladesh

By MBI Munshi Bar-at-Law


The installation of the Caretaker Government after the proclamation of emergency on January 11, 2007 by military fiat provides an excellent opportunity for the conscientious citizen to thoroughly reappraise and also reassess our political ideals and national objectives prior to the return of democracy. While the political parties have been striving to reestablish their credibility and relevance to a disillusioned and apathetic public the issue of what ideological principles the nation should rest upon has been largely set aside although this is the most important question of all for the nation to tackle. This article is intended to provide an intellectual framework upon which nationalist debate may take place and covers the political arena occupied by the BNP, Jatiya Party and Jamaat-i-Islami and to some extent the now defunct Freedom Party and other smaller nationalist entities such as Gen. Fazlur Rahman’s newly established nationalist formation.

What is common to all these parties (except that of Gen. Fazlur Rahman which has only begun operations in Bangladesh) is that they have all failed miserably to uphold the nationalist ideal. The obvious reason for this failure is that there is no single accepted document or formal expression of the terms of the nationalist agenda for the 21st century (although there exists many outdated opinions on the subject) and the majority of the general public has largely relied on intuition to determine a party’s nationalist credentials in the modern era. There are several important books on the subject of Bangladeshi nationalism but they tend to over intellectualize the concepts and the basic principles put forward appear contradictory after closer examination. More often than not they involve matters that are subsidiary or ancillary to the main tenets of the ideology. This vagueness and ambiguity has allowed scope for the corrupt, opportunistic and mediocre to thwart and misuse the ideals of nationalism in favour of self-interest and greed. The main cause or reason behind this lack of ideological commitment is the absence of an objective standard or criterion for determining the legitimacy of decisions or actions approved by the party hierarchy when set against the requirements of nationalist ideology. A major consequence of this is that there exists an absolute minimum in ideological content and understanding within the party and an over reliance on charismatic leadership for guidance, however, misguided or irrational it might actually turn out to be for the country as a whole. It is due to this ideological failure that the Freedom Party and Jatiya party both fractured and then collapsed in quick succession during the early 1990’s and is also the cause of the BNP’s dramatic downfall after the 1/11 takeover by a military-civilian conglomerate.

The terms of the nationalist ideal according to this author may be explained through the use of the following four broad tenets or core elements of Bangladeshi nationalism–

1. Honouring the nation’s independence and sovereignty achieved through immense struggle, blood and sacrifice in the 1971 Liberation War.

2. Non-interference in the Islamic values and beliefs of the people as enshrined in the constitution [Art. 8 (1A) – Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions]. The emergence of Bangladesh is a direct consequence of the Two Nation Theory and the Lahore Resolution and the war of 1971 was not intended to negate either of these ideas. Bangladesh remains a majority Muslim nation and the nationalist creed requires the respecting of Islamic values with particular emphasis on the virtue of toleration which is a peculiar characteristic of the people of this region who generally abhor all forms of fanaticism It is for this reason that compared to the secularist approach the non-interference method can accommodate Muslims, non-Muslims and even people of no faith since none will be interfered with provided that all practice toleration towards each other and adopt the policy of mutual respect [i.e. Art. 2A – The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic] (see below).

3. Adherence to the inclusiveness of Bangladeshi nationalism which is based on territorial exclusivity rather than on ethnic exclusivity. In other words, a Bangladesh national should be appropriately described as Bangladeshi [i.e. Art. 6 (2) – The citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshi] rather than a Bengali which tends towards territorial inclusiveness with West Bengal which is a part of India and where the Bengali identity is subservient to the superior and universal Indian one. A Bangladeshi can never accept his identity to be subsumed into a larger Indian one which is an entirely separate nation as per the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 into three separate territorial parts and two political entities (India and Pakistan). This separate consciousness of Bengali Muslims began during the 1905-1911 partition of Bengal which was vehemently opposed by the upper-class Hindu landlords whose power and influence over their Muslim tenants dwindled during this period but Hindu dominance again reasserted itself once the partition was rescinded seven years later and the Muslims were returned to their former slavish existence.

4. Aggressive promotion and advancement of the national interest and an uncompromising attitude to national security.

While all the parties claiming to uphold the nationalist agenda have been more or less consistent in protecting Islamic values this has often been done opportunistically or exploitatively. All that this condition requires is non-interference as opposed to the ‘excessive’ or overt promotion of Islamic values which tends to have a negative effect (a major reason why Islamic parties do badly in elections) on public sentiment which is still very much influenced by the secularist/Indian propaganda about the 1971 war which illogically views Islam as responsible for the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army. Bangladeshis are by nature and temperament moderate in outlook and sentiment and are equally tolerant in matters personal and so a too rigid approach on religion normally gets a negative or unfavorable response. Non-interference in Islamic values is the least onerous of the conditions in the nationalist agenda since it is a negative requirement requiring virtually no action to implement. This is not the same as the secularist agenda favoured by the AL and other leftist parties since they have promoted interference in the Islamic values of the people with the objective of eroding religion from society and rendering the state totally neutral in matters of faith and have even gone so far as to undermining Islam through propaganda and ill-motivated government policies - this is the complete opposite of non-interference and is widely resented by the general public.

The third condition has usually been a problem for the anti-nationalists such as the Awami League party as the notion of Bengali nationhood became untenable when West Bengal showed no signs of seceding from India after 1971 and even more importantly - from a nationalist perspective - after the CHT insurgency when the tribal groups refused to adopt Bengali customs even after the vocal and uncompromising demand of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that they do so. This issue was resolved when President Ziaur Rahman amended the constitution and designated all citizens of Bangladesh as Bangladeshis emphasizing the territorial rather than the ethnic aspect of our nationhood.

It is, however, in the area of national interest and security that sharply differentiates the nationalists from the other ideological inclinations. In the past, too much emphasis has been placed on the dichotomies raised by faith vs. secularism or Bengali vs. Bangladeshi but these are only indications of attitude and the real test is whether a party is prepared to assert the national interest and aggressively ensure the security of the nation and state. If the answer is in the positive in both cases then by necessity the party in power is advancing the majority faith and Bangladeshi nationalism as well. All the nationalist parties (BNP, Jatiya and Freedom) were established on the twin pillars of national interest and security. The events of 1975 (both 15th August and 7th November) were attempts to reassert the national interest against encroachments and interference from India (this statement is not intended as approval or disapproval of either of these events but simply of their occurrence as a factual and important part of our history. The question, however, needs to be posed whether the nationalist agenda could have reasserted itself so forcefully without these violent incidents having taken place. Similarly the ruthless suppression of communist revolutionary forces after Gen. Ziaur Rahman ascension to power could be described as a dire necessity since Indian infiltration into Bangladesh had been so extensive and pervasive that a lesser response may have been easily defeated) and Ershad is claimed to have wanted to establish another army division to thwart any possible invasion by Bangladesh’s big neighbour. It is the AL and other leftist parties that have continually compromised on the national interest and security in order to serve their real masters in New Delhi.

The national interest and security involve by implication the most complex political, social, economic and military questions. It is for the country’s political leadership to determine which economic or political system best serves the national interest or which social policies should be implemented to advance overall national well-being. There is no easy answer to these questions but what is needed is a set of practical policies that can produce a dynamic and fast growing economy that will sustain an educated and healthy workforce and in turn finance the internal and external security needs of the country. Sectional interests must not be allowed under any circumstances to become an obstacle or hindrance to national development and economic prosperity.

Gen. Ziaur Rahman, Gen. H.M. Ershad and Col. Syed Farook Rahman when they formed their political parties had these objectives in mind but gradually overtime the ideological elements of their party program became diluted and the pursuit of money became more important. While Gen. Ziaur Rahman and Col. Syed Farook Rahman were personally incorruptible their followers and the subsequent generations of leaders were far less inclined to follow this lead and became addicted to the pursuit of wealth and indirectly compromised on the fourth tenet of nationalism – national interest and security. It was with this new generation (especially in the case of the BNP) which saw the sidelining of committed nationalists and the promotion of the most disreputable and corrupted elements of the party and this is the surest sign of internal decay and clearly indicates the disintegration of the party as a united political force.

In conclusion one should evaluate where Bangladeshi nationalism stands today and especially in the light of the 1/11 change over. It is grievously unfortunate that even without the anti-nationalist parties (i.e. AL, JSD, Workers Party etc) at the helm of power Bangladesh has drifted very far away from all the four core principles of Bangladeshi nationalism. The most obvious failure of the caretaker administration in securing our national objectives appears to be the appeasement of India and the adoption of their foreign policy as our own. This assimilationist agenda has adversely affected our national interest and security and must be reversed if Bangladesh is to remain an independent nation. It is in the area of national security that Bangladesh must concentrate and policy-makers should not be fearful of offending India (which will naturally be the target of any security policy) since India has no qualms about offending Bangladesh which it often describes as a sponsor of terrorism and a threat to its security. The countering of Indian propaganda will also necessarily take a high priority in Bangladesh’s security policy but New Delhi’s canards against its neighbour has unfortunately been embraced by anti-nationalist parties such as the AL, JSD and Workers Party who have described the country as a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism and an exporter of terrorism.

Bangladesh has yet to devise a security strategy even after almost 37 years of independence which is quite astonishing and at the same time completely unacceptable. One of the principal tasks of a government is to ensure the security of the nation from external threats and this can be best achieved if those responsible for the defense of the nation have a detailed security policy to guide them. National security in this broader sense refers to the requirement to maintain the survival of the nation-state through the use of economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. This may be accomplished on several different levels and should include the following –

• using diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats
• maintaining effective armed forces
• implementing civil defense and emergency preparedness measures
• ensuring the resilience and redundancy of critical infrastructure
• using intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage, and to protect classified information
• using counterintelligence services or secret police to protect the nation from internal threats

To implement these features effectively in Bangladesh would require a National Security Strategy to be devised. The first step would be to set up a National Security Council which will bring together in one place all the relevant agencies, bodies and experts on this vital issue. This would include the President, Chief Executive, Chiefs of the army, navy and air force, intelligence heads, other security officials belonging to law enforcement, diplomats and experts from various fields who will be called in as the need arises or be allotted to an advisory board attached to the NSC. The NSC would be assigned the responsibility for coordinating policy on national security issues and advising the chief executive on matters related to national security. At regular yearly intervals the NSC would prepare a National Security Strategy document that will guide all elements of our defence, security and intelligence apparatus and also influence the manner and conduct of our foreign policy. The advantages to such an approach would be consistency and comprehensiveness in our national security outlook. While I have tended to concentrate on the defence aspects of security the NSS would give equal priority to strengthening economic security, expansion of trade and investment, and promoting economic development. The NSS would provide guidelines and proposals on economic security, energy security, transport security and terrorism finance. This would involve the business community as stakeholders in the nation’s security with direct input in policy formulation.

Probably the only reason that a National Security Strategy and NSC have yet to be established in Bangladesh is the apprehension of the adverse reaction it might generate in New Delhi. A truly nationalist party would disregard such considerations and put the nation’s interest and security first. India has never compromised on its national security requirements which usually targets Bangladesh so there should not be any hesitation on this side of the border in doing the same in regard to our own defense needs. Critics may argue that this would undermine democracy and put too much power in the hands of the military. This ignores the fact that political parties have continuously undermined the national interest requiring occasional interventions by the army. To prevent such occurrences this paper argues for the institutionalization of the nationalist agenda so that each arm of the state apparatus and machinery works to fulfill that objective. It would, however, only work effectively under a democratic system as the people will be the final arbiters in determining if any particular government is actually living up to the nationalist ideal. An extended military role in state affairs should not be considered since the present army is not the same as the army of Gen. Ziaur Rahman, Col. Syed Farook Rahman and even Gen. H.M. Ershad which actually fought a war and understood the meaning of the words national interest and security (this statement will probably seem unpalatable to many because of certain actions taken by these individuals but those unfortunate but necessary incidents of our history constitute the basis of Bangladeshi nationalism and also its defence. There is some dispute whether the Jail Killing incident of November 3, 1975 falls into this category since many suspect that this was orchestrated by RAW to prevent a strong leadership emerging around Tajuddin Ahmed. The acquittal of 12 accused in the case by the High Court lends credence to this view). The present army although describing itself as modern and democratic is actually more a peacekeeping force having the mentality of compromisers. The army’s approach to the national crisis since 1/11 has been superficial and wholly unprofessional (What is the objective and plan for this intervention and where is the exit strategy?). Rather than seeking the advice of committed nationalists and experts they have resorted to taking assistance from various individuals of dubious backgrounds and qualifications. A democratic political party representing the nationalist ideal would serve the nation better provided the top leadership remains incorruptible and appoints statesman to the helm of government affairs rather than amateurs and opportunists.

MBI Munshi

September 1, 2008

Dhaka

1. It’s a meaningful, wise, informative and unbiased post. Members should read it to be aware of our faults in preserving our national interests, security and Indian ploys. I have doubt about them who will oppose you in this post.

2. I haven’t seen any problem since my birth with this present ideology of Bangladeshi Nationalism as you’ve explained about four tenets of Bangladeshi Nationalism which are non-interference in the Islamic values and respectful to other religions. I do not know for why and with what hell intention AL wants to change this peaceful constitution. May be AL is playing with people’s ideology to divide the nation easily to please the external agent.

I wonder; is AL trying to make our BD constitution like Indian constitution where there is no place for Muslim majority but equal right for every religion. Then why in 1947 Bangladeshis supported the PK-IN partition based on Muslim majority/non-interference in the Islamic values type ideology which is still present in BD from 47 to present peacefully? Once I said that if BD will merge with India then we will enjoy big land and big power, then LeonBlack2008 questioned about my nationality. Now I may suspect about their nationality who wants BD’s constitution like Indian’s constitution where there is no place for Muslim majority but equal right for every religion. If they want BD-constitution like India’s then AL-supporters should not have any problem to merge with India since they do not want Muslim majority type constitution anymore which was the basis of 47’s partition?

3. It seems you wrote this post in 2008 before the election and surprisingly AL is doing what you said before i.e. stooge activity.

4. We really need to implement our own Bangladeshi Nationalism (not Bangali Nationalism), Bangladeshi security and Interest policy to emerge as a real independent, sovereign and proud nation.

Thanks.

 

[BanglaBhoot]

'India's Current Policies Prompt China To Reassess South Asia Policy,' Says Chinese Scholar

D.S.Rajan

For experts analysing China’s South Asia policy, an article in Chinese language contributed by an authoritative Chinese academician in May 2010 ( noticed online only recently) may prove to be important. The write-up captioned “South Asia’s Position in the International Order and Choice Before China”, authored by Professor Zhao Gancheng, Director of South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies has alleged (???????????????-????????, dated 21 May 2010), that India’s current policies are absolutely aimed at realising ‘hegemony’ in South Asia; they do not address the ‘strategic autonomy’ requirements of other South Asian nations. This reason is prompting China to reassess its South Asia policy.

The article has declared that the goal of China’s South Asia policy will always be in favour of maintaining regional peace and stability and is related to the emergence of a regional balance of power and the gaining of ‘strategic autonomy’ by all South Asian nations. In this connection, it has demanded that India’s position in South Asia should be ‘redefined’ in the interest of a stable and peaceful regional order, adding that India’s strategic autonomy should not be detrimental to the corresponding autonomy of other regional powers and that India must rectify its periphery policy, which can enable other regional nations to accept its dominant position.

The article has also laid stress on the long-term need for factoring the security threats posed by international terrorist forces to China’s Southwest border, in China’s South Asia policy. It has further remarked that the policy should respond to the complicated situation arising in South Asia as a result of consolidation of its interests in the region by the US. In this connection, noting that the US has signed agreements with India covering the fields of nuclear cooperation etc and aid pacts with Pakistan and that President Obama could build a counter-terrorism front in the region, the article has felt that these are impacting on China’s South Asia policy. Without having any particular country in the region as a fulcrum of its South Asia policy, China should support the creation of sustainable South Asian security architecture to deal with both traditional and non-traditional security threats.

The prescription in the article that India’s role in South Asia should be ‘redefined’ appears to mark a new dimension in the thinking of Chinese academicians who in the past had backed China’s ties with India as per the status it had then, along with their assessment that such ties are not directed against any third party. In fact, Chinese observers seem more inclined now than before to approach the situation in South Asia through the prism of India vs. the rest. This stand would no doubt be welcome in countries like Pakistan, inimical towards India. Whether coincident or not, at government levels also, China has started showing at the same time a pro-Pakistan tilt on India-Pakistan issues like Kashmir. Illustrating these are Beijing’s ‘stapled visa’ procedure to Kashmiri Indians and undertaking of projects in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Also, there is no let up in China’s strategic presence in other parts of India’s neighbourhood. In all, a churning in China on relations with South Asia, which could have implications for the developing Sino-Indian ties, is becoming visible.

The opinion of the scholar that China’s reassessment of its South Asia policy is due to India’s current policies seems to be revealing only a partial picture of the reality. The scenario needs to be examined in a broader sense. China is undoubtedly showing a new assertiveness in Asia, dictated by its perceived need to protect its ‘core interests’. Accordingly, the direction of China’s foreign policy is changing, subordinating diplomatic interests to those concerning the country’s sovereignty. Examples are China’s uncompromising stand on its territorial issue with Japan and naval activism in South China Sea, even confronting the US power as well as its persistence in adopting a hard line on the Sino-Indian and the Dalai Lama issues.

Besides India’s policies, other reasons behind China’s apparent new approach towards South Asia could include US nod for China’s role in South Asia, as witnessed during Obama-Hu Jintao meeting at Beijing in November 2009 and China’s growing worries about threats to stability of the riot-hit Xinjiang and Tibet bordering provinces, which as seen by Beijing are coming from across the borders. A Chinese language Xinhua despatch from Chengdu dated 29 August 2009, referred to the remarks of China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie that India is a threat to China’s Southwest borders, just as what Vietnam is doing with respect to South China Sea. Deserving notice in this context is Professor Zhao’s emphasis that the security of China’s Southwest borders will determine China’s South Asia policy in a long term.

On India’s part, it is already showing awareness of China’s policy recalibration. The Indian Prime Minister has himself pointed out in September 2010 that China is seeking to expand its influence in South Asia at India’s expense. Logically, India’s awareness is expected to lead to its adoption of suitable counter-measures against China’s intentions. It is hoped India follows this logic in its own strategic interests.

In order to facilitate further discussions among scholars on the significance of opinions expressed by Professor Zhao, a translation of important portions of his article, done by this writer, is annexed below.

'India's Current Policies Prompt China To Reassess South Asia Policy,' Says Chinese Scholar

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Time to be a better neighbor, India. If you don't, China will.

President Obama's trip to India underscored India's importance in global security and global finances – a democratic counter to an aggressive China. But India's poor foreign policy and botched regional relations have been holding it back.

By Maha Rafi Atal
posted November 9, 2010 at 2:37 pm EST
New York —

On Sunday, President Obama met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi. They discussed opportunities for expanded Indo-American trade, and both leaders highlighted the strategic importance of a strong and prosperous India in the face of Chinese expansion. But Prime Minister Singh did not acknowledge, and President Obama did not bring up, the most important obstacle to India’s success: its poor regional relationships.

From the outset, India’s promise as a rival to China has been that it is a power apart. It could not beat Beijing in a race for pure growth or military might. But in a contest over principles, India’s democratic progress offers the region a model that China cannot match. India should be a partner for countries seeking a fair alternative to alliance with its authoritarian neighbor.

But India is losing this contest, and it is losing it close to home. Now, as President Obama leaves India, it is worth asking: Why isn’t South Asia’s richest country leading more effectively in South Asia?

Want to see it? Obama's trip to Asia in pictures
China is flexing its muscle

China is certainly flexing its muscle. Last month, it sought to restrict exports of rare earth minerals to Japan, made overtures to a secession movement in southern Sudan, and wrestled with the G20 over its currency and trade imbalance.

Nowhere has China been more assertive than in South Asia. In a strategy it calls the “string of pearls,” China is building ports and infrastructure in Bangladesh and Pakistan; digging up minerals in Pakistan and Afghanistan; and refining hydropower in Nepal and Afghanistan.

According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s trade with India’s neighbors totaled $16 billion in 2008, growing at 14 percent annually. India’s regional trade was barely holding steady at $11 billion.
India's overconfidence

Yet China’s success in the Subcontinent reflects India’s own foreign policy blunders.

First, India has been overconfident, assuming that regional neighbors would naturally choose it over Beijing without providing them with positive incentives to do so. That is the case in Bangladesh, a desperately poor country created with the assistance of Indian forces, whose multiple requests for economic aid and greater bilateral trade India has rebuffed. While Bangladeshis wonder why India does not do more, India wonders why Bangladesh is not more appreciative.

Beijing capitalizes on the gap between them.
Interfering and overbearing

Second, India has been overbearing, giving selective support to political movements inside neighboring states.

In Nepal, India backed a feudal aristocracy for four decades, reinstating the monarchy by force after repeated popular revolts. It trained the Nepalese military, and orchestrated political marriages between Nepalese aristocrats and wealthy Indian families. Pushing India out became the top priority of the Maoist guerilla movement that has majority support and an informal alliance with China.

As the UN peace mission holding Nepal together prepares to close in January, India is pitted against China to control the postwar settlement, with Nepal’s critical water resources (about 83,000 megawatts of hydropower) at stake. The confrontation is reminiscent of the situation in Burma (Myanmar), where China and India spent $10 billion last year to secure the support of a military junta guilty of abusing its own subjects.

As the weaker power, India has more to fear from these confrontations.
Shutting out the region

Third, India has been suspicious, choosing to shut out the region when relations go sour rather than addressing underlying tensions.

Earlier this year, the government announced an immigration regime that will restrict multiple entry visas. Multinationals have protested the move as a blow to business travelers from the West and the Persian Gulf, but its greatest victims are migrant laborers from Bangladesh and Nepal. Many will turn to China for employment instead; others will enter illegally, bringing crime with them.

Nowhere has suspicion been more crippling to Indian policy than in the case of Pakistan. So long as Kashmiri militants – with historic ties to Pakistan – continue to operate inside India, India maintains it cannot meet with Pakistan over the disputed border, or over critical resources like water and gas. But it is the ongoing dispute that creates the very basis for this militancy. In a country with porous mountain borders, such threats are virtually impossible to block out by force.

Yet New Delhi means to try.
US as accomplice to India's bad policy

Unfortunately, the United States has been an accomplice to India’s regional isolationism. In 2008, pressure from Washington shut down a natural gas project involving India, Pakistan, and Iran. Last year, Present Obama briefly considered appointing Amb. Richard Holbrooke as a regional envoy, with the authority to conduct dialogue between India and Pakistan, but narrowed his brief to Afghanistan and Pakistan over Indian opposition.

Asked about Pakistan at a town hall meeting in New Delhi on Sunday, the president reiterated that the United States would not intervene in the Kashmir dispute. Yet without an Indo-Pak peace, no strategy for Afghanistan can move forward.
The trappings of global status, without the substance

The West has lavished India with the trappings of global status: a seat at the G20, a temporary seat at the UN Security Council that may open the door to a permanent one, a controversial US-India nuclear deal, and two pending defense trades worth more than $15 billion dollars.

To read Indian newspapers or speak to diplomats is to believe that these gestures represent global influence. But in fact, they signal the rise of a Potemkin hegemon. If India is encircled by China’s string of pearls, and if migrants and militants compromise its borders, then it will be forced to waste its economic resources putting out local fires, unable to project power further afield.

Moreover, as they watch this regional saga, potential partners in Africa, the Middle East, or Central Asia see India as a country that treats its neighbors with contempt. Indian leaders can argue that other great powers have done the same, but the argument misunderstands the very nature and purpose of India’s rise, the unique role that ideals must play in India’s success.

To be sure there are steps India can take to reverse this course. If it accepts international mediation in Kashmir, if it becomes a neutral partner for peace in Burma and Nepal, and if it opens its markets to greater regional trade, it may yet salvage its position as the democratic counter-power to China. But these are long-term solutions, and the window to pursue them is shrinking.By Maha Rafi Atal
posted November 9, 2010 at 2:37 pm EST
New York —

On Sunday, President Obama met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi. They discussed opportunities for expanded Indo-American trade, and both leaders highlighted the strategic importance of a strong and prosperous India in the face of Chinese expansion. But Prime Minister Singh did not acknowledge, and President Obama did not bring up, the most important obstacle to India’s success: its poor regional relationships.

From the outset, India’s promise as a rival to China has been that it is a power apart. It could not beat Beijing in a race for pure growth or military might. But in a contest over principles, India’s democratic progress offers the region a model that China cannot match. India should be a partner for countries seeking a fair alternative to alliance with its authoritarian neighbor.

But India is losing this contest, and it is losing it close to home. Now, as President Obama leaves India, it is worth asking: Why isn’t South Asia’s richest country leading more effectively in South Asia?

Want to see it? Obama's trip to Asia in pictures
China is flexing its muscle

China is certainly flexing its muscle. Last month, it sought to restrict exports of rare earth minerals to Japan, made overtures to a secession movement in southern Sudan, and wrestled with the G20 over its currency and trade imbalance.

Nowhere has China been more assertive than in South Asia. In a strategy it calls the “string of pearls,” China is building ports and infrastructure in Bangladesh and Pakistan; digging up minerals in Pakistan and Afghanistan; and refining hydropower in Nepal and Afghanistan.

According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s trade with India’s neighbors totaled $16 billion in 2008, growing at 14 percent annually. India’s regional trade was barely holding steady at $11 billion.
India's overconfidence

Yet China’s success in the Subcontinent reflects India’s own foreign policy blunders.

First, India has been overconfident, assuming that regional neighbors would naturally choose it over Beijing without providing them with positive incentives to do so. That is the case in Bangladesh, a desperately poor country created with the assistance of Indian forces, whose multiple requests for economic aid and greater bilateral trade India has rebuffed. While Bangladeshis wonder why India does not do more, India wonders why Bangladesh is not more appreciative.

Beijing capitalizes on the gap between them.
Interfering and overbearing

Second, India has been overbearing, giving selective support to political movements inside neighboring states.

In Nepal, India backed a feudal aristocracy for four decades, reinstating the monarchy by force after repeated popular revolts. It trained the Nepalese military, and orchestrated political marriages between Nepalese aristocrats and wealthy Indian families. Pushing India out became the top priority of the Maoist guerilla movement that has majority support and an informal alliance with China.

As the UN peace mission holding Nepal together prepares to close in January, India is pitted against China to control the postwar settlement, with Nepal’s critical water resources (about 83,000 megawatts of hydropower) at stake. The confrontation is reminiscent of the situation in Burma (Myanmar), where China and India spent $10 billion last year to secure the support of a military junta guilty of abusing its own subjects.

As the weaker power, India has more to fear from these confrontations.
Shutting out the region

Third, India has been suspicious, choosing to shut out the region when relations go sour rather than addressing underlying tensions.

Earlier this year, the government announced an immigration regime that will restrict multiple entry visas. Multinationals have protested the move as a blow to business travelers from the West and the Persian Gulf, but its greatest victims are migrant laborers from Bangladesh and Nepal. Many will turn to China for employment instead; others will enter illegally, bringing crime with them.

Nowhere has suspicion been more crippling to Indian policy than in the case of Pakistan. So long as Kashmiri militants – with historic ties to Pakistan – continue to operate inside India, India maintains it cannot meet with Pakistan over the disputed border, or over critical resources like water and gas. But it is the ongoing dispute that creates the very basis for this militancy. In a country with porous mountain borders, such threats are virtually impossible to block out by force.

Yet New Delhi means to try.
US as accomplice to India's bad policy

Unfortunately, the United States has been an accomplice to India’s regional isolationism. In 2008, pressure from Washington shut down a natural gas project involving India, Pakistan, and Iran. Last year, Present Obama briefly considered appointing Amb. Richard Holbrooke as a regional envoy, with the authority to conduct dialogue between India and Pakistan, but narrowed his brief to Afghanistan and Pakistan over Indian opposition.

Asked about Pakistan at a town hall meeting in New Delhi on Sunday, the president reiterated that the United States would not intervene in the Kashmir dispute. Yet without an Indo-Pak peace, no strategy for Afghanistan can move forward.
The trappings of global status, without the substance

The West has lavished India with the trappings of global status: a seat at the G20, a temporary seat at the UN Security Council that may open the door to a permanent one, a controversial US-India nuclear deal, and two pending defense trades worth more than $15 billion dollars.

To read Indian newspapers or speak to diplomats is to believe that these gestures represent global influence. But in fact, they signal the rise of a Potemkin hegemon. If India is encircled by China’s string of pearls, and if migrants and militants compromise its borders, then it will be forced to waste its economic resources putting out local fires, unable to project power further afield.

Moreover, as they watch this regional saga, potential partners in Africa, the Middle East, or Central Asia see India as a country that treats its neighbors with contempt. Indian leaders can argue that other great powers have done the same, but the argument misunderstands the very nature and purpose of India’s rise, the unique role that ideals must play in India’s success.

To be sure there are steps India can take to reverse this course. If it accepts international mediation in Kashmir, if it becomes a neutral partner for peace in Burma and Nepal, and if it opens its markets to greater regional trade, it may yet salvage its position as the democratic counter-power to China. But these are long-term solutions, and the window to pursue them is shrinking.By Maha Rafi Atal
posted November 9, 2010 at 2:37 pm EST
New York —

On Sunday, President Obama met with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi. They discussed opportunities for expanded Indo-American trade, and both leaders highlighted the strategic importance of a strong and prosperous India in the face of Chinese expansion. But Prime Minister Singh did not acknowledge, and President Obama did not bring up, the most important obstacle to India’s success: its poor regional relationships.

From the outset, India’s promise as a rival to China has been that it is a power apart. It could not beat Beijing in a race for pure growth or military might. But in a contest over principles, India’s democratic progress offers the region a model that China cannot match. India should be a partner for countries seeking a fair alternative to alliance with its authoritarian neighbor.

But India is losing this contest, and it is losing it close to home. Now, as President Obama leaves India, it is worth asking: Why isn’t South Asia’s richest country leading more effectively in South Asia?

Want to see it? Obama's trip to Asia in pictures
China is flexing its muscle

China is certainly flexing its muscle. Last month, it sought to restrict exports of rare earth minerals to Japan, made overtures to a secession movement in southern Sudan, and wrestled with the G20 over its currency and trade imbalance.

Nowhere has China been more assertive than in South Asia. In a strategy it calls the “string of pearls,” China is building ports and infrastructure in Bangladesh and Pakistan; digging up minerals in Pakistan and Afghanistan; and refining hydropower in Nepal and Afghanistan.

According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s trade with India’s neighbors totaled $16 billion in 2008, growing at 14 percent annually. India’s regional trade was barely holding steady at $11 billion.
India's overconfidence

Yet China’s success in the Subcontinent reflects India’s own foreign policy blunders.

First, India has been overconfident, assuming that regional neighbors would naturally choose it over Beijing without providing them with positive incentives to do so. That is the case in Bangladesh, a desperately poor country created with the assistance of Indian forces, whose multiple requests for economic aid and greater bilateral trade India has rebuffed. While Bangladeshis wonder why India does not do more, India wonders why Bangladesh is not more appreciative.

Beijing capitalizes on the gap between them.
Interfering and overbearing

Second, India has been overbearing, giving selective support to political movements inside neighboring states.

In Nepal, India backed a feudal aristocracy for four decades, reinstating the monarchy by force after repeated popular revolts. It trained the Nepalese military, and orchestrated political marriages between Nepalese aristocrats and wealthy Indian families. Pushing India out became the top priority of the Maoist guerilla movement that has majority support and an informal alliance with China.

As the UN peace mission holding Nepal together prepares to close in January, India is pitted against China to control the postwar settlement, with Nepal’s critical water resources (about 83,000 megawatts of hydropower) at stake. The confrontation is reminiscent of the situation in Burma (Myanmar), where China and India spent $10 billion last year to secure the support of a military junta guilty of abusing its own subjects.

As the weaker power, India has more to fear from these confrontations.
Shutting out the region

Third, India has been suspicious, choosing to shut out the region when relations go sour rather than addressing underlying tensions.

Earlier this year, the government announced an immigration regime that will restrict multiple entry visas. Multinationals have protested the move as a blow to business travelers from the West and the Persian Gulf, but its greatest victims are migrant laborers from Bangladesh and Nepal. Many will turn to China for employment instead; others will enter illegally, bringing crime with them.

Nowhere has suspicion been more crippling to Indian policy than in the case of Pakistan. So long as Kashmiri militants – with historic ties to Pakistan – continue to operate inside India, India maintains it cannot meet with Pakistan over the disputed border, or over critical resources like water and gas. But it is the ongoing dispute that creates the very basis for this militancy. In a country with porous mountain borders, such threats are virtually impossible to block out by force.

Yet New Delhi means to try.
US as accomplice to India's bad policy

Unfortunately, the United States has been an accomplice to India’s regional isolationism. In 2008, pressure from Washington shut down a natural gas project involving India, Pakistan, and Iran. Last year, Present Obama briefly considered appointing Amb. Richard Holbrooke as a regional envoy, with the authority to conduct dialogue between India and Pakistan, but narrowed his brief to Afghanistan and Pakistan over Indian opposition.

Asked about Pakistan at a town hall meeting in New Delhi on Sunday, the president reiterated that the United States would not intervene in the Kashmir dispute. Yet without an Indo-Pak peace, no strategy for Afghanistan can move forward.
The trappings of global status, without the substance

The West has lavished India with the trappings of global status: a seat at the G20, a temporary seat at the UN Security Council that may open the door to a permanent one, a controversial US-India nuclear deal, and two pending defense trades worth more than $15 billion dollars.

To read Indian newspapers or speak to diplomats is to believe that these gestures represent global influence. But in fact, they signal the rise of a Potemkin hegemon. If India is encircled by China’s string of pearls, and if migrants and militants compromise its borders, then it will be forced to waste its economic resources putting out local fires, unable to project power further afield.

Moreover, as they watch this regional saga, potential partners in Africa, the Middle East, or Central Asia see India as a country that treats its neighbors with contempt. Indian leaders can argue that other great powers have done the same, but the argument misunderstands the very nature and purpose of India’s rise, the unique role that ideals must play in India’s success.

To be sure there are steps India can take to reverse this course. If it accepts international mediation in Kashmir, if it becomes a neutral partner for peace in Burma and Nepal, and if it opens its markets to greater regional trade, it may yet salvage its position as the democratic counter-power to China. But these are long-term solutions, and the window to pursue them is shrinking.

Time to be a better neighbor, India. If you don't, China will. - CSMonitor.com

 

[BanglaBhoot]

The India doctrine and the elimination of political
opposition in Bangladesh


The repression of the political opposition and the increasing intolerance of the ruling alliance headed by the Awami League should not be considered as politics as usual in Bangladesh. We are witnessing the final acts of a play that had been suspended in 1975 but has now been renewed under improved circumstances for the AL and its principal backer India. The forcible removal of Khaleda Zia from her cantonment residence and the decision of the BNP to call a hartal (shut down) for 30th November in reaction to the eviction should not be seen in isolation from the wider political undercurrents now influencing events in Bangladesh. The hartal is not simply about the dispossession of a single house but more precisely its symbolic meaning as the loss of sovereignty and independence of the entire nation. The BNP has presented the hartal call as a protest against the undignified and hasty dispossession of a former Prime Minister of her home of 40 years but the party should have found more courage to openly and directly challenge the real grievance of the nationalist forces in Bangladesh which is the Indian hold and domination over the country’s future. The objective simply put, is to implement the India doctrine of hegemony and control over Bangladesh (as described in the book The India Doctrine (1947-2007) and to give permanency to the Awami League as the governing party representing Indian interests in the country. None of this can be achieved, however, without the elimination of the political opposition. Once the opposition seizes to be a threat to the Awami League the agreements on transit, deep sea port and defense cooperation will be put into effect. For now everything is under suspension so as not to gift an issue to the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. Already one important piece in the nationalist and patriotic armour of Bangladesh has been broken and that is the army. The Peelkhana massacre was merely the last stage in the disintegration of the armed forces. The army had become rotten from within a decade ago when it decided to make peace keeping its primary mission and the defense of the nation a mere secondary concern. The primary actors in the 1/11 changeover, for example, were a mercenary and incompetent bunch but they represented the highest echelons of the armed forces. If the opposition were to also disintegrate or become obsolete due to government repression and violence then the gains of 1971 will eventually become erased and the country rendered a mere vassal State of India.

Sohail Taj

Postgraduate Student

University College London


Yahoo! Groups

 

[BanglaBhoot]

A provocative article in the Weekly Protichitra

There is an article which appears in the latest issue of the Weekly Protichitra with the title, 'Arak Shadinhota Judo? Akti Bektigota note'. It is actually a section from my book The India Doctrine (1947-2007) bangla translation (pg. 94). The article was published without my permission but my main concern is that the piece should not be taken out of context and should be read as part of a larger book.

DeshCalling: The India Doctrine (1947-2007) Bangla translation

Some who may read the article without knowing it came from a larger book may impute a meaning that I did not intend.

 

[BanglaBhoot]

The Indians have tried to block me from accessing PDF but it didn't work. I can't access certain sites from my home PC as my IP address appears to be blocked but I can use a friends computer. Sad the Indians have had to go to such lengths to restrict me.

 

[TopCat]

The Indians have tried to block me from accessing PDF but it didn't work. I can't access certain sites from my home PC as my IP address appears to be blocked but I can use a friends computer. Sad the Indians have had to go to such lengths to restrict me.

Huh.. LOL

WELCOME BACK MUNSHI JI.. We missed you.

 

[BanglaBhoot]

Missed being here but my opportunities to contribute regularly are limited. RAW has me on a tight leash.