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BD's Fear of Sikkimization?

asad71

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1.BD has never been comfortable with a huge neighbor breathing down its neck. Except for the English / British all invasions into the Brahmaputra-Gangetic delta has been from the direction of west. Bo wonder then that the threat perception held by the people of BD is quite clear.Tat includes all the people - military, civilian, farmers, industrial workers, menial labor, rickshaw pullers, Muslims, Lower Cast Hindus, Buddhists or Christians.
2. In recent times there as been disturbing reports circulating in BD that in 2019, India will Sikkimise Bhutan. BD will follow soon thereafter. In the light of these let us recall how India had annexed the small kingdom of Sikkim.

https://blog.com.np/2013/01/31/the-pain-of-losing-a-nation-story-of-lhendup-dorji-and-sikkim/
The Pain of Losing a Nation. Story of Lhendup Dorji and Sikkim
January 31, 2013 UWB 16 Comments
In his Op-Ed article published in today’s Kantipur (See below or here, former minister and RPP leader Dr Prakash Chandra Lohani compares Prime Minister Dr Baburam Bhattarai with Kazi Lhendup Dorji. For those who don’t know who Lhendup Dorji is, here is his obit written (title: The Pain of Losing a Nation) in 2007. [सिक्किम विलयबारे नेपालीमा यहाँ पढ्न पाइन्छ। अनि यो कान्तिपुर लेख- माओवादी-भारत सम्बन्ध: पहिले विस्तारवाद, अहिले अवसरवाद]

By Sudheer Sharma

(September 2007) The last Prime Minister of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, Kazi Lhendup Dorji, met an ignominious Death.

On the northern corner of West Bengal state of India, there is a hill station – Kalimpong, which once hosted celebrities from all over the world. The hill town, where most of the settlers are of Nepali origin, no longer retains its old charm. But until a few weeks ago the last prime minister of a country – that has lost its independence – used to live here. Kazi Lhendup Dorji, who died on 28 July this year [2007] at the ripe old age of 103, had played a pivotal role in the merger of Sikkim into India.

Dorji is seen as a ‘traitor’ in the contemporary history. He lived, and died, with the same ignominy. “Everybody accuses me of selling the country. Even if it is true, should I alone be blamed?” he asked me, when I met him in Kalimpong in November 1996. But the allegation of ‘betrayal’ towards one’s own motherland was so powerful that Dorji could no more lead an active political life. He spent his solitary life at the ‘Chakung House’ in Kalimpong for several decades. Few people chose to remember Kazi when he passed away nor took pain to recall his life and times.

So much so that the Kazi was ignored even by Delhi. “I went out of my way to ensure the merger of Sikkim into India but after the work was done, the Indians just ignored me”, Kazi told me during an interview for Jana Astha weekly, nearly 11 years ago. “Earlier, I used to be given a ‘Red Carpet’ welcome. Now I have to wait for weeks even to meet second grade leaders.”

When I visited Kalimpong for the second time in 2000, Lhendup’s anger towards Delhi had reached new heights. At one time, he was received warmly by Indian leaders including Jawaharlal Nehru and Mrs Indira Gandhi. But later he became a political actor whose utility had been finished and thrown away into the dustbin.

The Origin of Crisis

After India got independence in 1947, the Sikkim State Congress, which was established as per the advice of Nehru, launched anti-King movement. Sikkim managed to overcome the crisis then but after Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister of India, the tiny Himalayan kingdom found itself in a crisis from which it could never escape. The anti-King movement, launched by the Sikkim National Congress (SNC) under the leadership of Lhendup Dorji in 1973, led to the demise of a sovereign nation.

India openly supported the movement against King (Chogyal) Palden Thondup Namgyal. The then ADC to the King, Captain Sonam Yongda, claimed that soldiers of Indian Army in civil dress used to take part in the protests. Some of the protesters were brought from Darjeeling and the surrounding areas. The number of Sikkimese who took part in the protest was quite small. But that was enough.

Lhendup’s protest movement depended mainly on Indian financial assistance. The money was made available through Intelligence Bureau (IB). “The people from IB used to visit me twice or thrice a year. An IB agent, Tejpal Sen, used to handover money to me personally”, Dorji had told me in a recorded interview.

In fact, the main actor behind the ‘Mission Sikkim’ was India’s external intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). Set up in 1968, RAW was able to disintegrate Pakistan (and form Bangladesh) within three years. The annexation of Sikkim was their other ‘historic’ success. The strategists of RAW didn’t want to repeat a Bhutan in Sikkim. Bhutan managed to acquire the membership of the United Nations in 1968. So, they launched a movement under the leadership of Lhendup, which is described at great length by Ashok Raina in his book Inside RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service.

Raina writes that New Delhi had taken the decision to annex Sikkim in 1971, and that the RAW used the next two years to create the right conditions within Sikkim to make that happen. The key here was to use the predominantly-Hindu Sikkimese of Nepali origin who complained of discrimination from the Buddhist king and the elite to rise up. “What we felt then was that the Chogyal was unjust to us”, said CD Rai, editor of Gangtok Times and ex-minister. “We thought it may be better to be Indian than to be oppressed by the king.”

Lhendup – who belonged to the Kazi family – had a historic enmity with Sikkim’s ruling Chogyals. He said he wanted to pressurise the King through public protests but lamented that the King never came forward for reconciliation.

Under pressure from Delhi, the Sikkimese King was forced to hold tripartite talks with SNC and India. The talks not only curtailed royal powers, it also turned Sikkim into an Indian ‘protectorate’. In the elections held in 1974, Lhendup’s SNC got overwhelming majority in the parliament. The government and the king saw each other as enemies. Ultimately, the cabinet meeting, on 27th March 1975, decided to abolish monarchy. The Sikkimese parliament endorsed it and decided to hold a referendum on the future of monarchy. Four days later, the outcome of the poll in 57 stations across the country was: ‘Abolition of the monarchy’.

In an interview, then Agriculture Minister of Sikkim KC Pradhan recalled that the referendum was nothing but a charade. “Indian soldiers rigged the polls by pointing rifles at the hapless voters”, he said. Immediately after the referendum, Kazi Lhendup moved a motion in the parliament proposing that Sikkim be annexed to India. The 32-member parliament, which had 31 members from Lhendup’s SNC – passed the motion without a blink. Needless to say that the entire episode was being orchestrated by India. The then Indian envoy to Sikkim (known as ‘political officer’) BS Das wrote in his book The Sikkim Saga, “Sikkim’s merger was necessary for Indian national interest. And we worked to that end. Maybe if the Chogyal had been smarter, and played his cards better, it wouldn’t have turned out the way it did.”

But Chogyal didn’t play his cards well. When Sikkim was undergoing turmoil, the Chogyal visited Kathmandu in 1974 to attend the coronation ceremony of King Birendra. According to insiders, King Birendra, Chinese deputy premier Chen Li Yan and Pakistan’s envoy advised Chogyal not to return to Sikkim. “They narrated a ‘master plan’ to save Sikkim from Indian hands but the King didn’t accept”, said Captain Yongda. “It was because the King couldn’t think even in his dreams that India could use force to annex Sikkim.”

A “Double Game”

In fact, India was playing a “double game”. On one hand, it was supporting Lhendup in whatever way possible against the King. On the other hand, it was assuring the king that monarchy would survive in Sikkim. The Chogyal was also an honorary Major General of the Indian Army. He never thought that his ‘own army’ would act against him. It was only an illusion.

The Chogyal of Sikkim was in his palace on the morning of 6 April 1975 when the roar of army trucks climbing the steep streets of Gangtok brought him running to the window. There were Indian soldiers everywhere, they had surrounded the palace, and short rapid bursts of machine gun fire could be heard. Basanta Kumar Chhetri, a 19-year-old guard at the palace’s main gate, was struck by a bullet and killed – the first casualty of the takeover. The 5,000-strong Indian force didn’t take more than 30 minutes to subdue the palace guards who numbered only 243. By 12:45 pm it was all over, Sikkim ceased to exist as an independent kingdom.

The Chogyal also lost the second opportunity. The Sikkim Guards had the capacity to stop the Indian Army for two hours. If the Chogyal had informed Beijing and Islamabad about the Indian invasion from the transmitter set up at his palace, both the countries had assured him – during the Kathmandu meeting – that they would instruct their security forces to open fire along the borders with India. Chinese army could even travel to Gangtok to rescue the Chogyal.

Captured palace guards, hands raised high, were packed into trucks and taken away, singing: “Dela sil, li gi, gang changka chibso” (May my country keep blooming like a flower). But by then, the Indian tri-colour had replaced the Sikkimese flag at the palace where the 12th king of the Namgyal dynasty was held prisoner. “The Chogyal was a great believer in India. He had huge respect for Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Not in his wildest dreams did he think India would ever gobble up his kingdom”, recalls Captain Sonam Yongda, the Chogyal’s aide-de-camp. Nehru himself had told journalist Kuldip Nayar in 1960: “Taking a small country like Sikkim by force would be like shooting a fly with a rifle.” Ironically it was Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi who cited ‘national interest’ to make Sikkim the 22nd state of the Indian union.

During a meeting, former Chief Minister of Sikkim BB Gurung told me that the King and Lhendup were just fighting a proxy war. “The real battle was between an American and a Belgian lady.” If that was true, the real victor was the third lady – Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Two foreign Ladies

Chogyal Palden met the 24-year-old New Yorker, Hope Cooke, in Darjeeling in 1963 and married her. For Cooke, this was a dream come true: to become the queen of an independent kingdom in Shangri-la. She started taking the message of Sikkimese independence to the youth, and the allegations started flying thick and fast that she was a CIA agent. These were the coldest years of the Cold War, and there was a tendency in India to see a ‘foreign hand’ behind everything so it was not unusual for the American queen to be labelled a CIA agent. However, as Hope Cooke’s relations with Delhi deteriorated, so did her marriage with the Chogyal. In 1973, she took her two children and went back to New York. She hasn’t returned to Sikkim since.

Then there was Elisa-Maria, daughter of a Belgian father and German mother who left her Scottish husband in Burma and married Kazi Lhendup Dorji in Delhi in 1957. The two couldn’t have been more different. Elisa-Maria wanted to be Sikkim’s First Lady, but Hope Cooke stood in the way. “She didn’t just want to be the wife of an Indian chief minister; she wanted to be the wife of the prime minister of an independent Sikkim.” With that kind of an ambition, it was not surprising that with annexation, neither Hope Cooke nor Elisa-Maria got what they wanted.

Meanwhile, in New Delhi Indira Gandhi was going from strength to strength, and India was flexing its muscles. The 1971 Bangladesh war and the atomic test in 1974 gave Delhi the confidence to take care of Sikkim once and for all. Indira Gandhi was concerned that Sikkim may show independent tendencies and become a UN member like Bhutan did in 1971, and she also didn’t take kindly to the three Himalayan kingdoms, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, getting too cosy with each other.

When the Indian troops moved in there was general jubilation on the streets of Gangtok. It was in fact in faraway Kathmandu that there were reverberations. Beijing expressed grave concern. But in the absence of popular protests against the Indian move, there was only muted reaction at the United Nations in New York. It was only later that there were contrary opinions within India – (Former Indian Prime Minister) Morarji Desai said in 1978 that the merger was a mistake. Even Sikkimese political leaders who fought for the merger said it was a blunder and worked to roll it back.* But by then, it was already too late.

Lhendup Dorji became the first chief minister of the Indian state of Sikkim and retained the post until 1979. The Indian government conferred on him ‘Padma Bhusan’ in 2002 and he was also awarded the ‘Sikkim Ratna’ by the state government in 2004.

Despite such ‘rewards’, Lhendup and his wife Elisa spent their last years in Kalimpong repenting their past deeds. After the death of his wife in 1990, Lhendup was forced to lead a solitary life. He neither had any children nor relatives to take care of him. He cut himself off from his own people to avoid their wrath and hatred.

In the elections held in 1979, Lhendup’s SNC failed to bag even a single seat in the Sikkim’s legislature. This effectively brought to an end to his political career. At one time, when he had gone to file his nomination, his name was missing from the electoral roll. In his resolve to dethrone the Chogyal dynasty that had 400-year-old history in Sikkim, Lhendup ended up delivering his motherland into the lap of India. In return, all he got was a life haunted from the shadow of the past and an ignominious death.

Sudheer Sharma, currently the editor-in-chief of ‘Kantipur’, wrote this article in September 2007 in Nepal Magazine. He was the editor of Nepal Magazine then.
 
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Kissinger Cables Comment
The Sikkim saga, through an American lens
Prashant Jha
NEW DELHI: April 15, 2013 00:19 IST
Updated: July 01, 2016 13:18 IST
15SIKKIM

FURTHERING LINKS: Kewal Singh, Foreign Secretary, Government of India (left), with Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal (centre) who gave his assent to the Sikkim Government Act 1974, in Gangtok on July 4, 1974. Photo: The Hindu Photo Archives | Photo Credit: THE HINDU ARCHIVES

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op-ed
From confidently predicting that India would not incorporate Sikkim to reporting on its merger in 1975, the U.S. watched events closely but adopted a hands-off approach
When protests first broke out in Sikkim in 1973, India stepped in and took over the internal administration of the then kingdom. This went beyond the 1950 India-Sikkim treaty, which had given Delhi control only over Gangtok’s external affairs, defence and communication.

Many saw it as an instance of Indian “expansionism,” but the United States believed that the protests were “spontaneous,” and India had not engineered the troubles but only “taken advantage of it.” It predicted Sikkim would remain an Indian protectorate. A year-and-a-half later, when India first made Sikkim an associate state, the Americans were taken aback. By the middle of 1975, the U.S. had come around to accepting Sikkim’s integration into India as “natural.”

In those two years, U.S. representatives in New Delhi, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Kathmandu, London, Washington and New York exchanged over 250 diplomatic cables on Sikkim. These are as a part of the “Kissinger Cables,” now made available by WikiLeaks. From these cables, The Hindu has pieced together the fascinating picture of the troubles in Sikkim, as seen through American eyes.

The 1973 spring

On April 9, 1973, the Government told the Lok Sabha that a polarisation had developed between “the Maharaja of Sikkim on one side and the popularly elected political leaders and masses on the other.” The Chogyal, as the monarch was known, had then requested India “to take over the administration of the whole of Sikkim.”

The next day, Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote in a cable ( >1973NEWDE04127_b, confidential) that “basic elements for discontent” were already there. The Indians, he said, were unlikely to allow the Chogyal to “take back even the limited internal administrative responsibility.” But the long-term problem for India would be to devise a “representational system that will satisfy the 75 percent Nepali majority, protect rights of indigenous minority, and preserve Chogyal as titular chief of state.” The Ambassador predicted India would “prefer to preserve” the existing treaty relationship rather than incorporate Sikkim, as it provides them “ample defense and administrative flexibility,” while avoiding adding “new troubled tribal/linguistic element” to the polity. In another cable, two days later, ( >1973NEWDE04291_b, confidential), the Ambassador argued that Indian action may have “saved the position of the Chogyal,” and urged that charges against India not be taken “at face value.”

But others were sceptical. A Sikkimese princess blamed “low-level Indian intelligence agents” for stirring up trouble ( >1973HONGK03595_b, limited official use). An Indian journalist said he had heard from a West Bengal MP, who was told by an MEA official, that Indian action was also a “deliberate message to Nepal and Bhutan” ( >1973NEWDE04833_b, limited official use).

The power-shift

An agreement in May between India, the Chogyal, and Sikkim parties committed to a “fully responsible government in Sikkim with a more democratic constitution...elections based on adult suffrage which will give equitable representation to all sections.” In January 1974, India’s Election Commission proposed a 32-member Assembly for Sikkim. Elections in April resulted in an overwhelming mandate for the pro-India Sikkim Congress, led by Kazi Lhendup Dorji. In June, the elected Assembly passed a new constitution and a resolution on economic integration with India.

In a cable on June 21, 1974 ( >1974NEWDE08298_b, confidential), U.S. diplomats noted that the constitution reduced the Chogyal to a titular role, and endorsed India’s “extensive authority” in internal Sikkim affairs. The Chogyal now had few options left — to abdicate, to leave the country without formally abdicating, to remain a constitutional monarch, or organise clandestine opposition from among minorities. “Prospects for the long-term survival of the Royal House do not look good.”

The Chogyal rejected the constitution, sparking protests from both sides. The U.S. now felt India would not hesitate to “invoke power” to declare the constitution if the Chogyal did not consent ( >1974NEWDE08366_b, confidential). U.S. diplomats in India, in communication with the State Department, hoped the “U.S. government can avoid any official comment” since Sikkim had “no international status,” and elections reflected the will of the Nepali-majority. These developments, it noted, would have taken place 25 years ago “had Nehru, in a fit of sentiment, not decided against Vallabhai Patel’s advice to provide a special status for the mountain kingdom.”

After failed attempts to stall the constitution, and a strong message by India to pay heed to the majority wishes, the Chogyal signed on to the new arrangement.


From associate ...

The next twist in the Sikkim saga happened in September. The government introduced a Constitution Amendment Bill in the Parliament which declared Sikkim shall be “associated with India”; and give the State two seats in Parliament.

This marked a rupture. In a cable on September 4 ( >1974NEWDE11760_b, secret), the Embassy in New Delhi said it shared the “general uncertainty” about why India was moving so “swiftly”, given that an MEA official had told the U.S. they had no intention of “altering the protectorate relationship with Sikkim”, and Chogyal had done little to prompt India to “degrade his status” further. Perhaps, the cable speculated, India had come across “less conspicuous evidence that Chogyal and his supporters are secretly plotting against Indian authorities, perhaps with Chinese encouragement”.

The next day, on September 5 ( >1974NEWDE11835_b, confidential), the U.S. said that while Indian motivations were “murky”, “Sikkim was now a part of India”.

The State Department chose not to publicly comment when asked about developments in Sikkim the following week. This was noted by the MEA, which appreciated that the U.S. had been sensitive to “GOI concerns on the issue” ( >1974NEWDE12115_b, confidential).

…to India’s 22nd state

On April 10, 1975, the U.S. Embassy in Delhi reported that India had “disbanded” the Chogyal’s palace guard in Gangtok, and he was under “house arrest” ( >1975NEWDE04815_b, confidential). The Sikkim Congress had “proposed what appeared to be full integration of Sikkim into the Indian Union of States” and called for abolition of the “oppresive and undemocratic institution of the Chogyal for all times”.

In a cable the next day ( >1975NEWDE04921_b, confidential), U.S. diplomats reported that the Sikkim Assembly had now abolished the institution of the Chogyal and declared itself to be a “constituent unit” of India. The U.S. continued to feel that India “was being forced into taking actions it would rather not take”, but if it had to choose between the Kazi and Chogyal, it would “opt for the people”. A referendum on April 14 supported the Sikkim Congress stand.

Through the endgame, the U.S. stuck to its “hands-off” approach. On April 16, 1975, a signed cable from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, reiterated the position ( >1975STATE086460_b, confidential), explaining that criticism of India may be welcomed in “Nepal, Pakistan or China” but would not be “productive” and only create “new and serious bilateral problems” and potentially heighten “tensions in the Himalayas”.

On May 16, with presidential assent, Sikkim became India’s 22nd State. In a thoughtful cable the same day ( >1975NEWDE06554_b, confidential), U.S. diplomats noted the immediate factors that had led to the merger, but emphasised that it was the outcome of a “century-long historical process” and had an element of “geographic inevitability”.

prashant.j@thehindu.co.in
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-sikkim-saga-through-an-american-lens/article4617433.ece
 
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It is everyone's nightmare for being the neighbor of India or even for being near India.
 
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We will never accept bongledesh as a part of India. We hate that country.
 
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Well thats good to hear.

That India will never accept Bangladesh.

They used to be a part of your country so you are very familiar with their behaviour and thinking that's why you broke ties with them. All Indians, what ever our feeling about Pakistan, are sympathetic towards Pakistan and how much of a burden it must have been being in a country with them.

Yeah as much as you hate Sikkim, you love the land and soil of Sikkim.

Don't quote me ever again. You're on my ignore list.
 
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We will never accept bongledesh as a part of India. We hate that country.

Why does India hate BD? i thought you guys actually have a very good relationship with them, especially when Modi just recently visited BD
 
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Why does India hate BD? i thought you guys actually have a very good relationship with them, especially when Modi just recently visited BD

There are 20 million illegal bengledeshis in India committing all sorts of crime and prostitution. Just as you dislike illegal Afghans we dislike them. They are the most ungrateful lot I've ever experienced. Our relationship with their government is from Master to worker.
 
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There are 20 million illegal bengledeshis in India committing all sorts of crime and prostitution. Just as you dislike illegal Afghans we dislike them. They are the most ungrateful lot I've ever experienced. Our relationship with their government is from Master to worker.

20 Million is a huge number, are you sure if thats accurate? In Pakistan we had around 5-6 million Afghans
 
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