THE GERMAN GREAT GENERAL STAFF
''If we arrrest and shoot every german general staff officer we will have peace for 50 years'' - Winston Churchill
In the late 19th and early 20thcenturies there was a running joke that there existed five perfect institutions in europe(meaning they perform their function exactly as intended) - The french opera house(paris),the british parliament(london),the papal curia(vatican),the russian ballet(st petersburg) and the german great general staff(berlin).
''For Germany's enemies, the Prussian-German General Staff was an object of fear and revulsion, an organization which was considered to represent the kernel of professional militarism in which a selected group of officers worked in monkish isolation on the preparation of war plans.They suspected the German General Staff to be one of those "dark forces," which was weaving the threads of the destiny of nations behind the scenes.''
The
German General Staff, originally the
Prussian General Staff and officially
Great General Staff (
Großer Generalstab), was a full-time body at the head of the Prussian army and later, the german army, responsible for the
continuous study of all aspects of war, and for drawing up and reviewing plans for mobilization or campaign. It existed unofficially from 1806, and was formally established by law in 1814, the
first modern general staff in existence. It was
distinguished by the formal selection of its officers by intelligence and merit rather than patronage or wealth, and by the exhaustive and rigorously structured training which its staff officers undertook. Its rise and development gave the German armed forces a
decisive strategic advantage over their adversaries for nearly a century and a half.
''Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz created the General Staff and gave this instrument its objective and direction; the great Chiefs of Staff, Moltke and Schlieffen, developed the General Staff to high perfection; their successors Seeckt, Beck and Halder preserved their heritage. They personified the typical General Staff officerwho is the first adviser of his commander, the 'Fuehrergehilfe.'' - General Brandt
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF:
CREATION - SCHARNHORST,GNEISENAU AND CLAUSEWITZ
Before the nineteenth century, success on the battlefield was largely the result of the military competence of whichever king was in power. While frederick the great brought success in battle to Prussian arms, his successors did not have his talent, and this led to an inevitable decline in the generalship of the Army. Without competent operational and logistical planning, no amount of individual soldierly discipline or battlefield bravery could save the army from the combination of superior generalship and staff work of a talented adversary.
The need for a trained body of General Staff officers was the result of the
increase in the size of the 19th century armies and their organization into separate divisions and corps. For both logistical and strategic reasons these formations usually marched separately and united only to do battle. The
complex management of these forces required professionally trained General Staff officers.The country could no longer afford to wait until a war started to gather military staff talent. One carefully selected professional staff would do the work of planning logistics and training the Army in peace as well as in war.
In 1807 prussia was crushed by napoleon in a national humiliation,in the aftermath of this the prussians cleared house. King Frederick william III appointed Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,Stein and several promising young officers to his Military Reorganization Commission.
(Advice hitler didn't bother to follow in ww2)
.Himself coming from a humble background and having advanced on merit alone,he wanted to open up all positions within the renewed Prussian Army for scientifically trained officers, without regard to their social background.However, he was realistic enough to realize that it was not possible in Prussia to
do away with a system that continued to select military leaders according to class and birth,and were consequently not trained for their tasks.Scharnhorst wanted to
diminish the weakness of this system by providing these army commanders with General Staff officers as their advisers. This, then, served as the decisive root to support the need for a "commander's first adviser,"Although Prussian commanders of forces were still appointed by rigid seniority or royal patronage, each Army, Korps and Division commander had a staff-trained officer assigned as his Adjutant. Scharnhorst intended that they
"support incompetent Generals, providing the talents that might otherwise be wanting among leaders and commanders".The unlikely pairing of the erratic but popular Blucher as Commander in Chief with Gneisenau as his Chief of Staff showed this system to its best advantage in the final years of the napoleonic wars.This succesful example institutionalized the general staff officer's role as the commander's first advisor.
That is, to
advise their commanders and assume joint responsibility for their actions. This resulted in
joint responsibility for commanders' decisions and the exercise of command and control of General Staff chiefs from army corps level upwards. Up to 1938, it was an unwritten law that army corps Chiefs of General Staffs were permitted to enter in the war diaries their opinions when they differed from the responsible commander's decision.
As part of its measures,
introductory military schools in Berlin, Königsberg and Breslau, and the
Academy for Young Officers (later kriegsakademie), open to all applicants of merit, were founded for the intellectual training of staff officers. In most non-Prussian military academies of the time, the emphasis of the training syllabus was the preparation of junior artillery and engineering officers, not strategic planners and as such this marked an important development.
Scharnhorst died in 1813,but his creation lived on and expanded.One of the early directors of the
Kriegsakademie was Clausewitz, a Reformer on the Military Reorganization Commission. From his studies and experiences of the , he provided a syllabus which became the central doctrine from which the staff worked. This standardisation of doctrine (which itself was an attempt to grasp the philosophy underlying warfare, rather than a narrow prescribed set of rules or tactical directives) was one of the distinguishing features of the Prussian General Staff model.
In 1816, the staff organised the Staff into the Eastern (Russia), Southern (Austria) and Western (France and possibly West German states) Divisions, which continually planned for likely and unlikely scenarios. As early as 1843, when Europe had been largely at peace for nearly thirty years and most major nations had no plans for war, observers noted sheaves of orders at the Prussian War Ministry, already
made out to cover all foreseeable contingencies and requiring only a signature and a date stamp to be put into effect.
EXPANSION - MOLTKE
Moltke was chief of the general staff for 31 years.He oversaw a massive expansion of it and 3 succesful wars against denmark,austria and france.These
successes elevated the the general staff to an autonomous body on par with the war ministry and independent of it.
Moltke further streamlined the officer selection process.Each year, the Prussian Army's top 120 junior officers were selected by competitive examination to attend the
Kriegsakademie. The academic standards at this institution were so high that fewer than half the entrants graduated successfully. From this elite,
Moltke selected the best twelve for his personal training as General Staff officers. They attended theoretical studies, annual manoeuvres, "war rides'' (a system of tactical exercises without troops in the field) under Moltke himself, and war games and map exercises.Although these officers subsequently alternated between regimental and staff duties, they could be relied upon to think and act exactly as Moltke had taught them when they became the Chiefs of Staff of major formations. Moltke himself referred to them as the
"nervous system" of the Prussian Army.
Moltke needed only to issue brief directives to the main formations, leaving the staffs at the subordinate headquarters to implement the details according to the doctrines and methods he had laid down, while the Supreme Commands of his opponents became bogged down in a mountain of paperwork and trivia as they tried to control the entire army from a single overworked headquarters.
''Build railroads ,not fortresses'' - Moltke.
Moltke's wide experience also prompted the General Staff to consider fields of study outside the purely military, and rapidly adapt them to military use. Immediately upon his appointment, he established the
Abteilung (section or department) which studied and
promoted the development of railway networks within Prussia and incorporated them into its deployment plans. He also formed telegraphic, and other scientific and technical departments within the General Staff and a Historical division, which analysed past and current conflicts and published accounts of them and lessons learned.The General Staff reformed by Moltke was the
most effective in Europe, an autonomous institution dedicated solely to the efficient execution of war, unlike in other countries, whose staffs were often fettered by meddling courtiers, parliaments and government officials
.
FIRST WORLD WAR - Deficiencies exposed
Already in Prussia under Moltke, the General Staff had achieved a special political significance. Since 1883, its head (and the commanding generals and commanders-in-chief) had the right of access to the Emperor, and it could therefore effectively make military decisions without the oversight of the Chancellor or the Reichstag. This was one of the seeds of the mass destruction of the First World War, as
military planning was not subject to political control.
Thus, the Schlieffen Plan developed into the only war plan and into a kind of dogma, without many of the leading politicians being informed. Nor was the German Navy's high command informed.To an extent, the General Staff became obsessed with perfecting the methods which had gained victory in the late nineteenth century.The Schlieffen Plan committed Germany to an early outright offensive against France while Russia was still mobilising(so as soon as russia mobilized in response to austrian actions in the balkans,germany had to implement the schliffen plan before russia could finish it-thus locking germany into a single solution with
no flexibility), and also required an unprovoked invasion of neutral Belgium, to make it possible to rapidly surround and annihilate the French army.
The rigidity of the plan, based around a minutely detailed mobilisation schedule and railway timetable, prevented any political moves which might have averted hostilities, as Kaiser discovered on the eve of the war when he considered not invading France in order to avoid Great Britain joining Germany's enemies.
''War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means .... war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different .... war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense .... if war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief (ie. 'he Chief of the General Staff in the German system) a member of the Cabinet, so that the Cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.'' - Von clausewitz.
(Failure to heed this advice cost the general staff dear in WW1)
Additionally, it
failed to take adequate account of logistics.Nor had the General Staff, before the war, considered the use of potential allies such as Turkey, or dissident factions within the French, British and Russian empires, to distract or weaken the Allied war effort.
"A swift victory over the main armies in the main theatre of war was the German General Staff's solution for all outside difficulties, and absolved them from thinking of war in its wider aspects.",Typical napoleonic thinking though it was the same combination of
failure at grand strategy/realpolitik and logistics that had proven to be napoleon's downfall.
The General Staff was divided between the central Großer Generalstab in Berlin and the general staffs of the corps and division HQs. The head of the Großer Generalstab was the "Chief of the General Staff" and was also the technical superior of all general staff officers.The General Staff under Schlieffen, and subsequently under Moltke, did not compensate for logistic flaws nor provide contingencies in case of the failure of their original plan to achieve quick success. Although superior German staff work at division, corps and army level throughout the First World War contributed to their continuous run of successes until very near the end of the war, the German Homefront collapsed under the strain.Thus the German General Staff
lost the war of attrition against the allies in part due to logistical/material reasons.
Focusing exclusively on military aspects of the war, the General Staff ignored political needs.
Sheer military virtuosity cannot compensate for the lack of political direction and national strategic objectives.
Another serious deficiency of the ww1 era was the excess of the 'chief system'.
In the course of the First World War, the General Staff became the strongest political power in Germany.Supreme Army Command under Field Marshal von Hindenburg and his first General Staff officer,Ludendorff, not only directed the operations at all fronts, but also increasingly determined the political destiny of the German Empire relegating the kaiser and the reichstag to figureheads.
Prussian German General Staff system encourages a powerful adviser to the responsible superior. It was necessary to appoint strong personalities as Chiefs of the General Staff of World War I army commanders of high nobility.They in fact commanded the armies of the princes.
Generals von Falkenhayn and Ludendorff extended the powers of the Chiefs of General Staffs and
increasingly dealt directly with them, and not with their responsible commanders. The Supreme Army Command increasingly called the first advisers to account for mistakes in the command and control of major formations, and not the commanders in chief of the army groups and armies.
REICHSWEHR : RESURRECTION.
We have already seen how seeckt resurrected the german army in secret.He
further strengthened the training procedure into by far the most difficult in the world.
Every Reichwehr officer had to take part in
military district examinations. The best 10 candidates then underwent a 2-year training course for "commander's staff officers" in the group commands.In the third year of training, the officers attended an obligatory training course in Berlin. Applied tactics was regarded as the most important subject of the military district examination. It also included papers on tactical theory, weapons, field craft, engineering and eight general subjects including a foreign language. Three or four problems had to be answered in a period of 6 to 10 hours. They were usually based on the tactics of an infantry regiment reinforced with elements of other arms, and involved the presentation of the regimental commander's estimate of the situation and his orders to follow. Together with his examination results, the character of each candidate was assessed from the annual reports of his superiors.
The process of selection extended throughout the 3 years of training. Of approximately 70, only some 15 went to the third year's course. It ended with a 2-week tactical field exercise which was passed finally by 8 to 10 students. The objective of the program was to train assistants for the senior field commanders and the central command structure, and to produce officers to be advisers, assistants and executors of leaders' decisions. The curriculum was much broader in scope than in the prewar War Academy.
HITLER YEARS :
The years leading upto the war saw a
gradual decline in the power of the 'demigods' of the general staff.First the luftwaffe and kriegsmarine created their own general staffs.Then the new OKW general staff emerged as a parallel command structure to the army general staff(OKH).Hitler curtailed the power of the army once he had consolidated his position by purges.Beck,the chief of staff resigned and was succeded by Hlader in 1938,who remained one of the most important german war planners till late 1942 when he was forced to step out,from the on OKW gradually came to eclipse the general staff -both being controlled by hitler who was now supreme commander and army chief.Halder made one significant change to the general staff.With noble commanders no longer an issue after ww1,
Halder, explicitly dropped the joint responsibility of General Staff officers for command and control when the new manual for the General Staff in Wartime was written. He decreed that the commander alone was responsible externally and internally, and that the General Staff officer had to take a share in everything and deal with the problems as if he had to bear the responsibility himself. However, the General Staff officer would only be internally responsible.While the traditional German staff administration and planning was to contribute greatly to the early German successes, many of these triumphs were the result of the initiative of comparatively junior officers who were opposed to the restraint of the General Staff.
(Von Manstein - a product of the general staff)
The head of the
Großer Generalstab was the "Chief of the General Staff" and was also the technical superior of all general staff officers.
The field staffs were responsible for operations,mobilization plans,logistics,transportation,exercises and intelligence for their respective divisions and corps and acted on broad objectives set from the great general staff in berlin.
The Chief of the General Staff's chief deputy held the title of
Generalquartiermeister. Beneath them were the five
Oberquartiermeisters,
who supervised the heads of the General Staff departments. The Railroad Department had the largest number of officers assigned, while the Second Department(Operational planning) was the most important.(Some small changes were made during war)
- Chief of the General Staff
- Central Department
- 6th Department: Annual Maneuver
- Military History Department II: Older wars
- Oberquartiermeister I
- 2nd Department: Operations
- Railroad Department
- 4th Department: Foreign Fortifications
- Oberquartiermeister II
- 3rd Department: France and Great Britain
- 9th Department: Netherland, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy
- Oberquartiermeister III
- 5th Department: Operational studies
- 8th Department: Kriegsakademie
- Oberquartiermeister IV
- 1st Department: Scandinavia, Russia, Turkey
- 10th Department: Austria-Hungary,Poland and the Balkans
Oberquartiermeister V
- Military History Department I: Recent wars
- Archives and Library
UNIQUE FEATURES :
Powerful Role of Staff Officer :
He has a dual responsibility; specifically, as is the case in other armies, the
General Staff officer relieves his commander from the technical details of staff work.However, in the German system,
his main task is to advise his commander in all matters, and he is entitled to the commander's attention. The General Staff officer
bears the shared responsibility for the relevance of his advice. Thus the General Staff officer has a position that makes him stand out from the rest of the staff officers. While all staff officers give advice to their senior officers, the General Staff officer additionally provides advice to his commander in all relevant matters.
He has the right to urge the commander to make a decision, and the commander must listen to him. The General Staff officer is entitled to articulate diverging opinions.
he bears joint responsibility because he is accountable for the relevance of his advice. The first General Staff officer of a major unit or command has an especially elevated position. He
actively participates in all stages of command and control. Together with his commander, he evaluates the mission, estimates the situation and develops the decision. After this process it is no longer possible to say who made the individual contributions. The commander alone, however, has the authority to make decisions on his own.
Once a decision has been made, the General Staff officer loyally carries out his orders.
''The decision is taken in private, and when the two men come out,there is only one decision. They have amalgamated it; they share one mind with each other. Should the opinions have differed, in the evening of this happy day in a military marriage the two halves will no longer know who gave in.The competence of command and control is based on this fusion of the two personalities. It does not matter if the order bears the commander's signature, or if the Chief of Staff has signed it for the High Command (today 'For the commander') according to our old custom. The commander always issues his orders through his Chief of Staff, and even the most senior subordinate leader must submit himself to his orders without objection, because his orders will always be given on behalf of the supreme commander'' -Von Seeckt
The
powerful role of the staff officer in the german system was unique.In anglo-american armies of the era the commander was supreme and staff officers largely concerned themselves with technical and logistical details and had no institutionalized right to give advice.The french system was closest.
But even the French General Staff system does not provide for a jointly responsible adviser.
The general devises and directs his operations with his cosast advisers including one or several tactically trained officers who take up his thoughts and cooperate in the closest way. (In France, these officers are called 'adjoints'.) The Chief of Staff is responsible for feeding resources to the battle. He immediately directs all supply operations and issues orders to the respective agencies.
The adjoints in the French staff system are integrated in the organization of the French commander's Cabinet. They work exclusively for him. They are personal staff officers who supply original ideas to their commanders and fulfill functions which are done within the German General Staff System by the General Staff officers. They are, however, not advisers to their commanders in the German sense.However this powerful role of the staff officer had inherent potential for weakness as well as seen in ww1.
Superior Training Procedures:
The training procedure of the german system was the
most extensive and exhaustive in the world as already described.It also followed an
open staff system,meaning.After passing the gauntlet and entering actual general staff service an officer was
alternated between field staffs with the corps and divisional HQs,academic service with the actual great general staff in berlin and regimental command in districts for practical experience.
The
total number of german general staff officer active rarely exceeded 200-300.This small elite cadre just enabled unity of thought and could quickly disseminate new doctrinal practices throughout the army.
Mission Oriented Command & Control :
''Resolute action is a must in war.... Commanders who merely wait for orders cannot seize favorable opportunities. They must always keep in mind that indecision and the failure to act might be just as fatal as action based on a wrong decision'' - Moltke.
The cornerstone of the German leadership philosophy in peace and war was mission-oriented command and control(Auftragstaktik) keeping in line with Moltke's maxim 'no plan survives contact with the enemy'..It is described thus -
'Mission-oriented command and control is the first and foremost command and control principle in the Army of relevance in war even more than in peace. It affords the subordinate commander freedom of action in the execution of his mission, the extent depending on the type of mission to be accomplished. The superior commander informs his subordinates of his intentions, designates clear objectives and provides the assets required. He gives orders concerning the details of mission execution only for the purpose of coordinating actions serving the same objective. Apart from that, he only intervenes if failure to execute the mission endangers the realization of his intentions. The subordinate commanders can thus act on their own in accordance with the superior commander's intentions; they can immediately react to developments in the situation and exploit favorable opportunities''.
The principle of mission-oriented command and control grants commanders at all levels a maximum of freedom of action and was a major cause for german success at tactical and operational levels particularly in fast flowing mobile warfare against rigid centralized enemies .
NEXT: WEHRKRIES -THE MILITARY DISTRICTS & MANPOWER MOBILIZATION
