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From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, By Farooq Bajwa
page 173-174
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Military planning by the Pakistani forces was meant to have ensured that all such major bridges were wired for demolition in the event of an Indian attack, but this bridge's demolition charges were not ready on 6 September. Pakistani sappers had begun work frantically up on news of the attack but Indian forces managed to get close to the bridge on the morning of 6 September when the explosive charges were not yet complete.The result was that the first demolition attempt failed to blow up the bridge, but it was rendered unfit for armoured crossing. In any event, the Indian troops were met by fierce shelling under the command of 114 Brigade and were said to have shown 'an inexplicably lathargic attitude to command'. 13 Punjab's performance was judged to have been 'depressing and deplorable' especially in comparison to the more daring moves of 3 Jat regiment (H. Singh, 91).
In this sector (Batapur), therefore, Riddle forces were now facing some determined defensive fighting by the defending 10 Division, and by the late afternoon the initial assault has resulted in the Indian troops not only being halted but also giving up some of the main gains of the offensive, including Dograi. The afternoon reverses seem to have dented the morale of the GOC 15 Infantry as Prasad reported at 1300 hours that 'his position was desperate on account of heavy casulties and no further offensive action was possible'. Harbaksh Singh says that he found this account hard to believe and so we went to see with his own eyes the military state of affairs on the fround, and concluded that the only thing seriously damaged was the will to fight of General Prasad. Harbaksh Singh said of Prasad that 'there was the unmistakable air of the defeatist about him'. but he decided to give Prasad an opportunity to pull himself together and redeem himself (H. Singh, 92).
Another attack was ordered on the afternoon of 6 September by the Indian 38 Infantry to capture the bridge near Bhasin - which, unknown to the Indian forces, had already been blown up by the Pakistani sappers. 38 Brigade began its move around 2030 hours, 6 September but was soon bogged down by accurate Pakistani artillery fire and took up defensive positions and was unable to advance at all. During the fighting 38 Brigade lost contact with the headquarters of 15 Division and so Prasad set out himself in the afternoon of 7 September to try and locate its whereabouts with a small group. Unfortunately for the hapless Prasad, Pakistani forces ambushed the team and not only captured twelve men and four jeeps but also, even more embarrasingly for the Indians, captured Prasad's briefcase and notebook and then broadcast the contents on Pakistan Radio (Chakravorty, 151).
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@senses
page 173-174
__________________________________________________________________________
Military planning by the Pakistani forces was meant to have ensured that all such major bridges were wired for demolition in the event of an Indian attack, but this bridge's demolition charges were not ready on 6 September. Pakistani sappers had begun work frantically up on news of the attack but Indian forces managed to get close to the bridge on the morning of 6 September when the explosive charges were not yet complete.The result was that the first demolition attempt failed to blow up the bridge, but it was rendered unfit for armoured crossing. In any event, the Indian troops were met by fierce shelling under the command of 114 Brigade and were said to have shown 'an inexplicably lathargic attitude to command'. 13 Punjab's performance was judged to have been 'depressing and deplorable' especially in comparison to the more daring moves of 3 Jat regiment (H. Singh, 91).
In this sector (Batapur), therefore, Riddle forces were now facing some determined defensive fighting by the defending 10 Division, and by the late afternoon the initial assault has resulted in the Indian troops not only being halted but also giving up some of the main gains of the offensive, including Dograi. The afternoon reverses seem to have dented the morale of the GOC 15 Infantry as Prasad reported at 1300 hours that 'his position was desperate on account of heavy casulties and no further offensive action was possible'. Harbaksh Singh says that he found this account hard to believe and so we went to see with his own eyes the military state of affairs on the fround, and concluded that the only thing seriously damaged was the will to fight of General Prasad. Harbaksh Singh said of Prasad that 'there was the unmistakable air of the defeatist about him'. but he decided to give Prasad an opportunity to pull himself together and redeem himself (H. Singh, 92).
Another attack was ordered on the afternoon of 6 September by the Indian 38 Infantry to capture the bridge near Bhasin - which, unknown to the Indian forces, had already been blown up by the Pakistani sappers. 38 Brigade began its move around 2030 hours, 6 September but was soon bogged down by accurate Pakistani artillery fire and took up defensive positions and was unable to advance at all. During the fighting 38 Brigade lost contact with the headquarters of 15 Division and so Prasad set out himself in the afternoon of 7 September to try and locate its whereabouts with a small group. Unfortunately for the hapless Prasad, Pakistani forces ambushed the team and not only captured twelve men and four jeeps but also, even more embarrasingly for the Indians, captured Prasad's briefcase and notebook and then broadcast the contents on Pakistan Radio (Chakravorty, 151).
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@senses
