according to the National Intelligence Council 2017 report, nobody.... or someone invisible....
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-trends-home
The actions of the United States and Japan vis-à-vis China, as well as those of emerging powers like India and Indonesia, will also shape the assessment of risks and opportunities by countries in the region.
India is likely to insert itself further into East and Southeast Asian economic and security matters, especially if its relationship with Japan continues to strengthen. China’s ambitions and disregard for India’s interests fuel New Delhi’s inclination—along with Japan and the United States—to balance and hedge. Although rising Western concern about free trade is limiting the options, a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)-like agreement that included India could turn India into an economic wildcard, potentially deepening its economic integration with the United States and other major Pacific economies, helping to propel domestic economic reform and growth, and bolstering India’s ability to take a more assertive regional economic role.
India, Indonesia, and
Vietnam will become far more prominent players in Asia than in the past several decades, in part due to their own development achievements, rapidly growing trade relationships, and favorable demographic profiles relative to many of their competitors. The blueprint for economic integration in the region will be the ASEAN economic community and its goals of trade liberalization, harmonization, and improved customs procedures; trade in services; investment and capital market liberalization; and infrastructure connectivity.
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/the-next-five-years/east-and-southeast-asia
Tremendous internal and external changes will shape security and political stability in South Asia in the next five years as the planned drawdown of international forces in Afghanistan; the deepening relationship between the United States and India; China’s westward-facing development objectives under its One Belt, One Road initiative; and inroads by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist groups all have their impact. South Asia also will face continuing challenges from political turmoil—particularly Pakistan’s struggle to maintain stability—as well as violent extremism, sectarian divisions, governance shortfalls, terrorism, identity politics, mounting environmental concerns, weak health systems, gender inequality, and demographic pressures.
These factors almost certainly will prolong the delays of economic integration and political reforms that the region needs to capitalize on development gains of the past several decades.
Geopolitically, the region’s greatest hope is India’s ability to use its economic and human potential to drive regional trade and development. At the same time, Afghanistan’s uncertain prospects, extremism and violence in Pakistan, and the ever-present risk of war between India and Pakistan probably represent the greatest challenge to unlocking the region’s potential.
Geopolitical Relevance of Region in Next Five Years: Competition. Despite persistent problems like violent extremism and tension between its two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, the region’s global relevance is changing, as Iran opens up economically after sanctions relief and China turns its focus westward. India is also an increasingly important factor in the region as geopolitical forces begin to reshape its importance to Asia, and the United States and India will grow closer than ever in their history.
New Delhi will be a victim of its own success as India’s growing prosperity complicates its environmental challenges. For example, providing electricity to 300 million citizens who now lack it will substantially increase India’s carbon footprint and boost pollution if done with coal- or gas-fired plants. New Delhi will reinforce its cooperation in regional trade and infrastructure investment with Bangladesh, Burma, Iran, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Such cooperation could encourage stability and prosperity across much of the region, particularly if India enlists the support of political parties in the region.
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/the-next-five-years/south-asia
Correct on all points. However regarding AShM's I remember The Argentinian Falklands war situation as well as the Iraqi Mirage situation - both exocets I believe? If I remember correctly? Ships weren't sunk in either case but were badly damaged as I remember.....
The ships damaged due to Exocet were HMS Sheffield and stuft ship Atlantic Conveyor.
The latter has no defensive armament whatsoever, no antiship missile hard- or soft-kill equipment. The ship did't sink due to the explosion of the warheads of the two missiles that hit her in may 25, 1982: due to the presence of both fuel and ammunition that were stored below decks, the incendiary effect of the unburnt propellant from the missiles caused an uncontrollable fire and when the fire had burnt out, the ship was boarded but nothing was recovered. While under tow by the requisitioned tug
Irishman,
Atlantic Conveyor sank in the early morning of 28 May 1982.
The Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield did carry armament but the Sea Dart wasn't particularly suited to killing sea skimming antiship missiles (unlike the much shorter range Sea Wolf carried by the Type 22s). There was no Phalanx CIWS (this was installed only later in the 1980s). Critically, the Sheffield did not have an ECM jammer fitted and lacked other critical ECM equipment. It did have decoy launchers
Sheffield had assessed the Exocet threat overrated for the previous two days, and assessed another as a false alarm.
Sheffield apparently did not hear the incoming Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles, detect them on its electronic support measures (ESM) sets, or see a radar contact on its screens swept by its own radar. No detections were reported via data link from
Glasgow.
Sheffield failed to go to action stations, launch chaff, prepare the 4.5" gun and Sea Dart missiles, or indeed take any action or even inform the captain
Sheffield picked up the incoming missiles on her type 965 radar (an interim fitting until the Type 1022 set was available); the operations officer informed the missile director, who queried the contacts in the ADAWS 4 fire control system. Critically, the Sheffield lacked ECM equipment, and failed to go to action stations or a heightened state of readiness, or to do anything to prepare weapons or the decoy system. The launch aircraft had not been detected as the British had expected, and it was not until smoke was sighted that the target was confirmed as sea skimming missiles. Five seconds later, an Exocet hit
Sheffield amidships, approximately 8 feet (2.4 m) above the waterline on deck 2, tearing a gash in the hull. The other missile splashed into the sea a half mile off her port beam.
Such was the lack of warning that there was no time to engage in defensive manoeuvres, leading to a change in British policy whereby any Royal Navy vessel that suspected it might be under missile attack would turn toward the threat, accelerate to maximum speed and fire chaff to prevent a ship being caught defenceless again.
The impact of the missile and the burning rocket motor set
Sheffield ablaze. Some accounts suggest that the initial impact of the missile immediately crippled the ship's onboard electricity generating systems, but this only affected certain parts of the ship, which caused ventilation problems. The missile strike also fractured the water main, preventing the anti-fire mechanisms from operating effectively, and thereby dooming the ship to be consumed by the raging fire.
The Royal Navy Court of Inquiry suggested the critical factors leading to loss of
Sheffield were:
- Failure to respond to HMS Glasgow's detection and communication of two approaching Super Etendards by immediately going to action stations and launching chaff decoys;
- Lack of ECM jamming capability;
- Lack of a point defense system;
- Inadequate operator training, in particular simulated realistic low-level target acquisition.
Slow response of the available 909 Sea Dart tracking radar and its operator limited the possible response.
The spread of the fire was not adequately controlled due to the presence of ignitable material coverings and lack of adequate curtains and sealing to restrict smoke and fires. Captain Salt's handing of the ship during the four hours over which the fires were fought were not faulted, nor was his decision to abandon ship due to the risk of fires igniting the Sea Dart magazine, the exposed position to air attack of HMS
Arrow and
Yarmouth assisting the firefighting, and fact that the combat capability of the destroyer was irredeemably lost.
Over the six days from 4 May 1982, five inspections were made to see if any equipment was worth salvaging. Orders were issued to shore up the hole in
Sheffield's starboard side and tow the ship to South Georgia. Before these orders were effected, however, the burnt-out hulk had already been taken in tow by the
Rothesay-class frigate
Yarmouth. The high seas that the ship was towed through caused slow flooding through the hole in the ship's side, which eventually sank her.
So again, it was fire and inadequate damage control, as well as towing ultimately that lead to the ships being lost.
The older County class destroyer Glamorgan was damaged by an Exocet but continuted to function.
Glamorgan was steaming at about 20 knots (37 km/h) some 18 nautical miles (33 km) off shore. The first attempt to fire a missile from an improvised landbased Exocet launcher on the islands did not result in a launch. At the second attempt a missile was launched, but it did not find the target. The third attempt resulted in a missile tracking the target. The incoming Exocet missile was being tracked on both the bridge and operations room radar by the Principal Warfare Officer and Navigation Officer.
Before the missile impact, the ship was moving at high speed. After the ship executed a rapid turn away from the missile in the limited time available, a few seconds, the Exocet struck the port side adjacent to the hangar near the stern. The turn had prevented the missile from striking the ship's side perpendicularly and penetrating; instead it hit the deck coaming at an angle, near the port Seacat launcher, skidded on the deck, and exploded. This made a 10 by 15 feet (3.0 m × 4.6 m) hole in the hangar deck and a 5 by 4 feet (1.5 m × 1.2 m) hole in the galley area below, where a fire started.
The blast travelled forwards and down, and the missile body, still travelling forwards, penetrated the hangar door, causing the ship's fully fuelled and armed Wessex helicopter (HAS.3 XM837) to explode and start a severe fire in the hangar. Fourteen crew members were killed and more wounded. The ship was under way again with all fires extinguished by 10:00.
On the following day, repairs were made at sea and, after the Argentinian surrender on 14 June, more extensive repairs were undertaken in the sheltered bay of San Carlos Water She sailed for home on 21 June, and re-entered Porthsmouth on 10 July 1982 after 104 days at sea
Note that two Exocets didn't sink USS Stark in 1987:
The frigate did not detect the missiles with radar; warning was given by the lookout only moments before the missiles struck. The first penetrated the port-side hull and failed to detonate, but left flaming rocket fuel in its path. The second entered at almost the same point, and, leaving a 3-by-4-meter (9.8 by 13.1 ft) gash, exploded in crew quarters. 37 sailors were killed and 21 were injured.
No weapons were fired in defense of
Stark. The Phalanx CIWS remained in standby mode, Mark 36 SRBOC countermeasures were not armed until seconds before the missile hit. The attacking Exocet missiles and Mirage aircraft were in a blindspot of the STIR fire control director (Separate tracking and illumination Radar, part of the Mk 92 Guided Missile Fire Control System), and the Oto Melara Mk 75 76 mm/62 caliber naval gun, but in the clear for the MK 92 CAS (Combined Antenna System, primary search and tracking radar of the Mk 92 Guided Missile Fire Control System) and the Mk 13 Mod 4 single-arm launcher. The ship failed to maneuver to bring its Mk 75 to bear before the first missile hit.
On fire and listing, the frigate was brought under control by its crew during the night. The ship made its way to Bahrain where, after temporary repairs by the destroyer tender USS
Acadia to make her seaworthy, she returned to her home port of Naval Station Mayport, under her own power. The ship was eventually repaired at Ingalls Shipbuilding in Mississippi for $142 million.
Note also that INS Hanit wasn't sunk by anti-ship missiles launches at her off Lebanon in 2006.
It was damaged on 14 July 2006 on the waterline, under the aft superstructure by a missile (likely a Chinese-designed C-802) fired by Hezbollah that reportedly set the flight deck on fire and crippled the propulsion systems inside the hull. However, INS
Hanit stayed afloat, extricated itself and made the rest of the journey back to Ashdod port for repairs on its own power. Four crew members were killed during the attack
According to the Israeli Navy, the ship's sophisticated automatic missile defense system was not deployed, even though the early warning system is usually deployed during peace-time wargames.
Note that none of these warship responded with arms or electronic countermeasures.
The UAE vessel hit off Yemen didn't sink but burned out. Like Atlantic Conveyor, it didn't have any weapons or ECM potentially usefull against antiship missiles. It didn't have military standard damage control facilities. Lack of appropriate armament and ECM also hampered Sheffield.
Finally, in all these cases, the ships were not expecting missiles strikes (faulty intel, or faulty threat assesments). So they were closer to the threat that they would otherwise have been and their defensive systems were not 'on' and on full alert. Therefor, these may not be representative cases for a situation in which missile exchanges are expected and ships are well equipped and on full alert.
....it must be literally out of this world 
