Baluchistan Insurgency

[Bushroda]

Normally i wouldnt expect you to come up with such remarks because conversation can always be construcitve and meaningful without getting into the annoying remarks.

I sincerely appreciate your remark if atall you were expecting some higher standards from me although I merely stated Pakistan's current position. But, I do hope you reserve the similar statement for your fellow compatriots who are dreaming of igniting fire in their neighborhood even though their own house is burning.

Apart from that well you are right we are facing these problems but also let me remind you on who's sponsporship BLA is working. How was Fazlullah tracking army signals, how did the chinese got killed and so on. Bottom line is when we are trying to establish peace, india is looking for every opportunity to somehow sabotage pakistan in the disguise of friendship often forgetting that we too can return the favour in the same way india is currently doing.

You would do well by referring to neutral sources & doing a bit of research before unnecessary finger pointing. Creation of BLA is Pakistan's own mess & India has got nothing to do with it.

Pakistan’s Baluch insurgency
A sophisticated armed fight for a province’s autonomy

Serious troubles have erupted in the Pakistan province of Baluchistan since the assassination of an opposition leader in August. Pressure for independence is growing in this region bordering Iran and Afghanistan, which challenges Pakistan’s authority.

By Selig S Harrison

THE slow-motion genocide being inflicted on Baluch tribesmen in the mountains and deserts of southwestern Pakistan does not yet qualify as a major humanitarian catastrophe compared with the slaughter in Darfur or Chechnya. “Only” 2,260 Baluch fled their villages in August to escape bombing and strafing by the US-supplied F-16 fighter jets and Cobra helicopter gunships of the Pakistan air force, but as casualty figures mount, it will be harder to ignore the human costs of the Baluch independence (1) struggle and its political repercussions in other restive minority regions of multi-ethnic Pakistan (2).

Already, in neighboring Sindh, separatists who share Baluch opposition to the Punjabi-dominated military regime of General Pervez Musharraf are reviving their long-simmering movement for a sovereign Sindhi state, or a Sindhi-Baluch federation, that would stretch along the Arabian Sea from Iran in the west to the Indian border. Many Sindhi leaders openly express their hope that instability in Pakistan will tempt India to help them, militarily and economically, to secede from Pakistan as Bangladesh did with Indian help in 1971.

Some 6 million Baluch were forcibly incorporated into Pakistan when it was created in 1947. This is the fourth insurgency they have fought to protest against economic and political discrimination. In the most bitter insurgency, from 1973 to 1977, some 80,000 Pakistani troops and 55,000 Baluch were involved in the fighting.

Iran, like Pakistan, was then an ally of the United States. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who feared that the insurgency would spread across the border to 1.2 million Baluch living in eastern Iran, sent 30 Cobra gunships with Iranian pilots to help Islamabad. But this time Iran is not a US ally, and Iran and Pakistan are at odds. Tehran charges that US Special Forces units are using bases in Pakistan for undercover operations inside Iran designed to foment Baluch opposition to the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Much of the anger that now motivates the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) is driven by memories of Pakistani scorched earth tactics in past battles. In a climactic battle in 1974, Pakistani forces, frustrated by their inability to find Baluch guerrilla units hiding in the mountains, bombed, strafed and burned the encampments of some 15,000 Baluch families who had taken their livestock to graze in the fertile Chamalang Valley, forcing the guerrillas to come out from their hideouts to defend their women and children.

‘Indiscrimate bombing’

In the current fighting, which started in January 2005, the independent Pakistan Human Rights Commission has reported that “indiscriminate bombing and strafing” by F-16s and Cobra gunships are again being used to draw the guerrillas into the open. Six Pakistani army brigades, plus paramilitary forces totalling some 25,000 men, are deployed in the Kohlu mountains and surrounding areas where the fighting is most intense.

Musharraf is using new methods, more repressive than those of his predecessors, to crush the insurgency. In the past Baluch activists were generally arrested on formal charges and sentenced to fixed terms in prisons known to their families. This time Baluch spokesmen have reported large-scale kidnappings and disappearances, charging that Pakistani forces have rounded up hundreds of Baluch youths on unspecified charges and taken them to unknown locations.

The big difference between earlier phases of the Baluch struggle and the present one is that Islamabad has so far not been able to play off feuding tribes against each other. Equally importantly, it faces a unified nationalist movement under younger leadership drawn not only from tribal leaders but also from an emergent, literate Baluch middle class that did not exist three decades ago. Another difference is that the Baluch have a better armed, more disciplined fighting force in the BLA. Baluch leaders say that rich compatriots and sympathisers in the Persian Gulf provide money needed to buy weapons in the flourishing black market along the Afghan frontier.

President Musharraf has repeatedly accused India of supplying weapons to the Baluch insurgents and funds to Sindhi separatist groups, but has provided no evidence to back up these charges. India denies the accusations. At the same time New Delhi has issued periodic statements expressing concern at the fighting and calling for political dialogue.

India brushes aside suggestions that it might be tempted to help Sindhi and Baluch insurgents if the situation in Pakistan continues to unravel. Indian leaders say that. on the contrary, India wants a stable Pakistan that will negotiate a peace settlement in Kashmir so that both sides can wind down their costly arms race. But many India media commentators appear happy to see Musharraf tied down in Baluchistan and hope that the crisis will force him to reduce Pakistani support for extremist Islamic insurgents in Kashmir.

Unlike India, Iran has its own Baluch minority and fears Baluch nationalism. The Baluchistan People’s party, one of the leading Baluch groups in Iran, said on 5 August that a radical Shia cleric, Hojatol Ibrahim Nekoonam, recently installed as the justice minister of Iran’s Baluchistan province, has launched a campaign of military and police repression spearheaded by the Mersad clerical secret police, in which hundreds of Baluch have been rounded up and, in many cases, executed on charges of collaborating with the US.

Apart from being smaller in number, the Baluch in Iran are not as politically conscious or as well organised as those in Pakistan, and their principal leaders dismiss the idea of secession or of union with the Baluch in Pakistan. The Baluchistan People’s party is part of a coalition with groups representing other disaffected minorities in Iran — the Kurds, Azeri Turks and Khuzestani Arabs — which is seeking a federal restructuring in which Iran would retain control over foreign affairs, defence, communications and foreign trade, but cede autonomy in other spheres to three minority autonomous regions.

Goal of the insurgency

In Pakistan, where the Baluch have been radicalised by their periodic military struggles with Islamabad, many Baluch leaders believe that the goal of the insurgency should be an independent Baluchistan, unless the military regime is willing to grant the provincial autonomy envisaged in the 1973 constitution, which successive military regimes, including the present one, have nullified. What the Baluch, Sindhis, and a third, more assimilated ethnic minority, the Pashtuns, want above all is an end to the blatant economic discrimination by the dominant Punjabis.

Most of Pakistan’s natural resources are in Baluchistan, including natural gas, uranium, copper and potentially rich oil reserves. Although 36% of the gas produced in Pakistan comes from the province, Baluchistan consumes only a fraction of production because it is the most impoverished area of the country. For decades, Punjabi-dominated central governments have denied Baluchistan a fair share of development funds and paid only 12% of the royalties due to it for its gas. Similarly, the Sindhi and Pashtun areas have consistently been denied fair access to the waters of the Indus River by dam projects that channel the lion’s share of the water to the Punjab.

In a television speech on 20 July, devoted mostly to Baluchistan, Musharraf dismissed Baluch charges of economic discrimination and announced a $49.8m development programme for the province, half for roads and other infrastructure projects. The “real exploiters” of the Baluch, he said, are the tribal chieftains, known as sardars, who “have stolen development funds for themselves”. He claimed that the armed forces have been sent into Baluchistan to protect the Baluch from their leaders while development proceeds. Musharraf blamed the insurgency on the sardars, principally Akbar Bugti, who was killed on 26 August when the army blew up a cave where he was hiding. But the current insurgency is not being led by the tribal elders but by a new generation of politically conscious Baluch nationalists.

What makes negotiations on autonomy difficult are the economic issues relating to taxation and to the terms for sharing the resulting revenues from the development of oil, gas and other natural resources. In most proposals for a devolution of power to the provinces, Baluch and Sindhi leaders have argued that taxes collected by the central government should not be allocated, as at present, solely on a population basis, which favours the Punjab; instead, it has been suggested, half should be allocated on a population basis, while the rest should be distributed in accordance with the amount collected in each province. Since the provinces have equal representation in the Senate, even under the 1973 constitution, the upper chamber should be given greater powers, with the Senate, rather than the president or prime minister, empowered to dissolve a provincial legislature or to declare an emergency.

A more extreme demand is that Baluch, Pashtuns, Sindhis and Punjabis should have complete parity in both chambers of the National Assembly as well as in civil service and military recruitment, irrespective of population disparities. All factions among the minorities give priority to radically upgraded representation in the civil service and the armed forces, and all want constitutional safeguards to prevent the central government from arbitrarily removing an elected provincial government, as Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did in 1973. The issue of safeguards against arbitrary central intervention is likely to be a non-negotiable one for the minorities, since they are seeking not only the substance, but also the feeling, of autonomy.

A tiny minority

The Baluch are only 3.57% of Pakistan’s 165.8 million people, and the three minorities combined claim only 33%. Yet they identify themselves with ethnic homelands that cover 72% of Pakistan’s territory. To the Punjabis, it is galling that the minorities should advance proprietary claims over such large areas. For this reason, the prospects for a restoration of the 1973 constitution appear bleak.

In the final analysis, the possibility of a constitutional compromise is inseparably linked with the overall course of the struggle for democratisation. With continued military rule, the Baluch insurgency and the growing movement for Sindhi rights will be radicalised. But it is unlikely that the Baluch could prevail militarily over Pakistani forces and establish an independent state, even with Sindhi help, unless India intervenes as part of a broader confrontation with Islamabad. The prospect in late 2006 is for a continuing, inconclusive struggle by the Baluch and Sindhis against Islamabad, that will debilitate Pakistan.

In the eyes of the Baluch and Sindhis, the US has a major share of the blame for the present crisis because US military hardware is being used to repress the Baluch insurgency, and a cornucopia of US economic aid to Islamabad since 11 September 2001 has kept Musharraf afloat. Military aid to Musharraf since 9/11, including the sale of 36 F-16s, recently approved by Congress, has totalled $900m so far, and another $600m is promised by 2009. Economic aid has not only included $3.6bn in US and US-sponsored multilateral aid but also the US-orchestrated postponement of $13.5bn in overdue debt repayments to aid donors.

Instead of pressing Musharraf for a political settlement with the minorities, as some European Union officials have done, the Bush administration has said that its ethnic tensions are an “internal matter” for Pakistan itself to resolve. Human rights organisations have called for international pressure on Musharraf to pursue a settlement, and critics in the US argue that the diversion of US-equipped Pakistani forces from the Afghan frontier to Baluchistan undermines even the limited operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban that Musharraf is pursuing in response to US pressure. Until Bush’s departure, however, the US commitment to Musharraf is likely to remain firm, barring the outside possibility that he will step down in the face of growing domestic pressure and permit former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to participate in the presidential elections scheduled for next year.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Bushroda:

A bit of a digression here, but that Selig Harrison article is a lot of hooey. Specifically this part right here:

Much of the anger that now motivates the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) is driven by memories of Pakistani scorched earth tactics in past battles. In a climactic battle in 1974, Pakistani forces, frustrated by their inability to find Baluch guerrilla units hiding in the mountains, bombed, strafed and burned the encampments of some 15,000 Baluch families who had taken their livestock to graze in the fertile Chamalang Valley, forcing the guerrillas to come out from their hideouts to defend their women and children.

Owen Bennet Jones mentions the events of those days in great detail in his book Pakistan: Eye of The Storm. Here is an excerpt:

By 1974 the insurgents had cut most of the main roads in the province. Their targeted attacks on survey teams forced Western oil companies to abandon their exploration projects in the area. In the largest single confrontation during the insurgency, in September 1974, 15,000 Baloch tribesmen fought a pitched battle with the Pakistan Army. The military had vastly superior equipment including Mirage fighter planes and Iranian supplied (and piloted helicopters). After three days of fighting, the Baloch ran out of ammunition and withdrew.

Now back to the thread, I think there needs to be a recognition of the futility and pain (often inflicted upon the very people the resistance is supposed to be fighting for - directly and indirectly) of violent resistance. Most modern nations have militaries that are simply far too strong to be overcome by such means, and most militarily strong nations are not going to give up territory because of a bunch of rebels. In the post 911 world, no such movement is going to gather international support and sympathy, and without such support there is no real hope for success in any situation.

The plight of the Palestinians is an excellent example of the harm a violent struggle can bring - in their case, it has provided the Israelis with an excellent argument against normalization and continuation of collective punishment and military operations. The amount of moral standing lost by the Palestinians is tragic. Would it have been possible for Israel to get away with starving millions in Gaza? Would it have been possible for them to continue building settlements on Arab land (1967 borders)? Now every move Israel makes is seen (right or wrong) in the context of suicide bombings and rocket attacks against civilians. The Palestinians continue to suffer, Israel progresses...

If the Sikhs in India want Khalistan, they have a right to pursue that movement in a peaceful fashion - and Pakistan has no business interfering with internal Indian affairs (unlike Kashmir, we do not have any dispute over Indian Punjab). Even in Kashmir the GoP needs to limit its support to political activity and organizations that favor its position on the disputed territory,

 

[Bushroda]

Bushroda:

A bit of a digression here, but that Selig Harrison article is a lot of hooey. Specifically this part right here:

Owen Bennet Jones mentions the events of those days in great detail in his book Pakistan: Eye of The Storm. Here is an excerpt:

AM, I am only a ringside observer so I would choose not be dismissive of any article. Also, I find it seriously hard to believe that a research scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy would enlist a fabricated or unsubstantiated event. I don't think too many people would choose a news correspondent's argument over his.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

AM, I am only a ringside observer so I would choose not be dismissive of any article. Also, I find it seriously hard to believe that a research scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy would enlist a fabricated or unsubstantiated event. I don't think too many people would choose a news correspondent's argument over his.

The article smacks of anti-Pakistan propoganda - staring with the "slow genocide claims". Scholar or not, his objectivity is seriously compromised when he resorts to statements like that, along with drivel like this:

"What the Baluch, Sindhis, and a third, more assimilated ethnic minority, the Pashtuns, want above all is an end to the blatant economic discrimination by the dominant Punjabis."

I would have agreed with the above statement if had been accompanied with qualifiers such as "perceived discrimination" and "some"...

For me its hard to believe that a research scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy would indeed resort to "stretching the truth", but the tone and manner of the article suggest nothing but that he did.

Also, being a "scholar" doesn't give him a monopoly on the truth - Jones had to do his research to write the book as well, however, unlike Selig, his accounts are narrated from a far more objective POV.

 

[Bushroda]

AM,

I told you before.. I am merely a ringside observer & there is no way for me to know the truth other than refering to neutral articles. Now, how do I know that the Benett Jones' account of events are not fabricated? Why would a respected scholar try to contort the truth when clearly his knowledge of events would be far more than that of any news correspondent? Tone or manner of presentation itself is never a baritone of truth. By any account nobody can say that an article is a hogwash simply because it uses some harsh tone against a state machinery. It is true that being a scholar doesn't give him a monopoly over truth but to a neutral eye an article from an author with over 60 years of experience in the field would hold far more weightage than any news correspondant who isn't even 60 years old.

 

[Neo]

The article smacks of anti-Pakistan propoganda - staring with the "slow genocide claims". Scholar or not, his objectivity is seriously compromised when he resorts to statements like that, along with drivel like this:

"What the Baluch, Sindhis, and a third, more assimilated ethnic minority, the Pashtuns, want above all is an end to the blatant economic discrimination by the dominant Punjabis."

I would have agreed with the above statement if had been accompanied with qualifiers such as "perceived discrimination" and "some"...

For me its hard to believe that a research scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy would indeed resort to "stretching the truth", but the tone and manner of the article suggest nothing but that he did.

Also, being a "scholar" doesn't give him a monopoly on the truth - Jones had to do his research to write the book as well, however, unlike Selig, his accounts are narrated from a far more objective POV.

Well said mate, I second that.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Moving some posts from another thread over

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Bushroda:

I did some research, and made an interesting find - Owen Bennet Jones's commnets about the events in 1974 are actually attributed to a book by Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow written in 1981.

I checked out the book from the University library last night and reading through the related chapters, I found that Harrison is far more objective in it. There is no resort to demagoguery in presenting the facts around the events - I'll try and post excerpts later during the week, but some quick observations from it:

- The PA claimed they killed 125 militants, and the militants disputed that. There is no mention of wide scale civilian deaths during the operation, and given Harrison's own claimed contacts with most of the militant and nationalist leaders mentioned in the book, I find it surprising that he would leave out that information (He may mention it later in the book, and if so I'll post a correction).

- One condemnable action (IMO) was the confiscation of several thousand heads of livestock from what were ostensibly the families of the militants, as a sort of collective punishment. But then that whole issue is arguable given the Tribal nature and customs of the region.

- The army operations were reactive, a result of military and economic interests coming under attack from the militants.

- According to him, the rebels were drawn out by giving the impression of attacking the camp. Initially the PA had skirmishes with militants in the areas surrounding the camp, and then moved towards it.

- Harrison mentions that the militants surrounded the camp in a "ring" to defend it, and left when they ran out of ammunition. That would not have been possible if the PA had already attacked the camp and had it surrounded.

Now, about his "slow genocide" claim - I decided to check out the Baloch nationalist websites to see what was being claimed there, even if the figures might be inflated, and this is what I found in terms of civilian casualties allegedly by the PA.

- From 1973-77 Baloch suffered 5,000. casualties
- And Military suffered some 3,500 casualties.

Casualties in Current Military Operation​

�� KILLED; Around 700 Seven Hundred People Have been killed from 17th
December 2005 to 20th April 2006.
�� Around 900, people have been killed so far in last Five year by the recent
conflict.
�� More then 150 people Killed by Landmine Incidents.
�� Around 200 have been killed by Bomb blasts.
�� DISPLACED: 140,000. People have been displaced so far by the aggressive
use of force against civilians in Dera Bugti and Kolu Districts.
�� DISAPPEARED: Four Hundred and Fifty (450) Political Activists are
missing and have disappeared.
�� AREESTS: According to Federal Minister for Interior (Pakistan) statement,
4000 Political Activists and Leaders are Arrested and they are detained with
out trial from Last Five Years.

The excerpt above mentions 900 people killed in the last five years, 350 of which died in bomb blasts and land mine explosions (which are tactics used by the militants) - so even by their account, the PA has allegedly killed 550 people in the last five years. There is no mention of any "atrocities" in the period between 1977 and 2002. These figures do not justify Harrisons "slow genocide" accusation.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Some more doubts about Selig Harrison's credibility and objectivity as it relates to Pakistan, but first an excerpt form his book in 1981 about the events at Chamalang:

Every summer, the Marri nomads converge on the broad pasture lands of the Chamalang valley, one of the few rich grazing areas in all of Balochistan. In 1974, many of the men stayed in the hills to fight with the guerillas, but the women, children, and older men streamed down from the mountains with their flocks and set up their black tents in a sprawling, fifty-square mile area. Chamalang, they thought, would be a haven from the incessant bombing and strafing attacks in the highlands. As the fighting gradually reached a stalemate, however, the army decided to take advantage of this concentration of Marri families as means of luring the guerrillas down from the hills. The Pakistani officers calculated-correctly-that attacks on the tent villages would compel guerillas to come out in the open in defense of their families.

After a series of preliminary skirmishes in surrounding areas, the army launched Operation Chamalang on September 3rd, 1974, using a combined assault by ground and air forces. Interviews with Pakistani officers and Baluch participants indicate that some 15,000 Marris were massed at Chamalang. Guerrilla units formed a huge protective circle around their families and livestock. They fought for three days and nights, braving artillery fire and occasional strafing attacks by F-86 and Mirage fighter planes and Huey Cobras. Finally, when the Baluch ran out of ammunition, they did what they could to regroup and escape.

This excerpt is from Pakistan's Security Under Zia, 1977-1988 by Robert Wirsing

"More common, however, was the view that Pakistan had never been a viable state, that brute force was all that held it together, and that the United States, in supplying its governmant with the arms to repress dissent, was exposing itself t considerable risk of guilt by association. No one more tirelessly advanced these themes than the Carnegie Endowment's long time South Asia-watcher, Selig Harrison. "As the Bengali's still bitterly recall," Harrison reminded his listeners in congressional hearings on the Reagan administrations proposed aid package in 1981, "it was American weaponry that the Pakistan Army used against them. Similarly, when the Baluch staged and insurgency of their own in 1973, Islamabad once again turned its US Equipment not against invading Communist forces, but against its own people. It took 80,000 Pakistani trops four years to subdue the Baluch, despite repeated strafing attacks on the Baluch villages by US fighter planes received under the military aid program and by Huey-Cobra helicopters borrowed from the Shah of Iran." In an articel published in 1978, Harrison had written that " at the height of the fighting in late 1974, American supplied Iranian combat helicopters provided the key to victory in a crucial battle at Chamalang in early September when a force of some 17000 guerrillas of the Marri tribe, was decimated."

Harrison's claim was factually inaccurate and highly misleading. By 1970, Chinese-supplied aircaft made up "33 percent of the Pakistan Air Force's 270 planes, 65 percent of all the interceptor-bombers, and 90 percent of the first-line modern fighter planes at its disposal." These percentages rose even higher in the first few years of the 1970's (prior to the outbreak of the Baloch insurgency) with large Chinese transfers to Pakistan of the Shanyang F-6 (mig 19). The sinification of PAF's inventory was clearly in an advanced stage when the insurgency broke out in Baluchistan in 1973. To the extent that the air force was involved at all in the fighting in Baluchistan, the probability was slight that it would have used its Korean War vintage F-86 Sabre jets and not its newer and far more numerous Chinese aricraft. AS for the Huey-Cobra helicopter gunships, no armed helicopters of any kind were used by the Pakistan army against the Baluch insurgents. Pakistan had none of its own at that time, and the Shah loaned Pakistan only a small number (most sources say ten, but estimates range as high as thirty) of unarmed, Iranian piloted Chinook transport helicopters. These, according to well infromed sources, played an extremely minor role in the fighting and were returned to Iran in may 1974 after only eight months or so in Baluchistan. They played absolutely no role, incidentally, in the battle at Chamalang, which took place months after the Iranian helicopters had been withdrawn.

Though its authenticity was questionable at best, Harrison's evocative tale of the gunship helicopters was picked up and repeated for years thereafter by a wide variety of commentators on Pakistan. The picture he painted of the dread American killer cobras raining death upon the practically defenseless Baluch insurgents inevitably made a powerful impression in a population that had only a few years earlier forced its government that abandoned a much bloodier counterinsurgency war in Vietnam....

The lack of gunships is also validated by Musharraf's warning recently to the militants that this time they wouldn't be able to hide in the hills because Pakistan did have gunships.

Almost every reference to the events in 1974 that I have found in some way are attributed to Selig Harrison's comments - from his book or his various articles - and it is unfortunate that he has painted a misleading account about those events. His own account does nto seem to add up. The Pakistan Army apparently attacked the camp at Chamalang first, but somehow 17,000 Baluch militants (his figure as quoted by Wirsing above) managed to sneak in and form a ring around the site (from his book). The obvious answer is that the camp already had militants in it, perhaps drawn by the "skirmishes" with militants around the camp, which then led to the camp becoming a legitimate target.

I am not suggesting that there was no collateral damage at all, nor that the PA never used brutal tactics, but Selig Harrison's accounts are over the top.

 

[BATMAN]

Now, I see a sudden concentration of Indians and their media towards Baluchistan!!!!!
It is a clear cut indicator that evil plans are being hatched as we speak.
Indians want to divert the army from Afghan border to Baluchistan in an effort to irk US, hoping to bag some big contracts in the same sweep.
Pak Army should formulate a stratgey to counter any conspiracy on Baluchistan at any cost.
What ever they do they need to secure Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi first because it’s a classic game plan to tire the opponent. Now we have to chalk out our priorities as we can not run here and there as exactly planned by our enimies.
Pakistan Army should call its reserves, immediately.
We need to use commandos and do classic covert operations and taking out the Indian agents.

 

[Mubashar_ali]

One Pak Govt. Official accused India for insurgency and then later said that it is not a Govt. Statement. It was only personal views.
What is Happening???

 

[Spring Onion]

One Pak Govt. Official accused India for insurgency and then later said that it is not a Govt. Statement. It was only personal views.
What is Happening???

His statement was about US not india.

 

[Spring Onion]

Now, I see a sudden concentration of Indians and their media towards Baluchistan!!!!!
It is a clear cut indicator that evil plans are being hatched as we speak.
Indians want to divert the army from Afghan border to Baluchistan in an effort to irk US, hoping to bag some big contracts in the same sweep.
Pak Army should formulate a stratgey to counter any conspiracy on Baluchistan at any cost.
What ever they do they need to secure Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi first because it’s a classic game plan to tire the opponent. Now we have to chalk out our priorities as we can not run here and there as exactly planned by our enimies.
Pakistan Army should call its reserves, immediately.
We need to use commandos and do classic covert operations and taking out the Indian agents.

BATMAN India has already started toooo many fake websites in the name of Balochis and also in the name of Pukhtuns.
These sites are spreading propoganda and the people who are used for writting Di.rty stuff against Pakistan are non-other than Indians themselves.

Interstingly i come across a website with one word Baloch and that ends with another word which at first sounded strange to me but when i did some research i came to know it was a pure Hindi word.

As now with growing incidents of terrorism inside Pakistan by dirty rats terrorists, India has found the time suitable for launching a fresh propoganda over Balochistan along with fanning terrorism inside Balochistan.

 

[salman nedian]

The previous government did a good job by giving Balochs their rights and just a week before I met with a Baloch and he said that he was a nationalist but now he has realized that some one cares about them. All the mega projects will surely benefit them and will improve their lives and living standards.

 

[araz]

The previous government did a good job by giving Balochs their rights and just a week before I met with a Baloch and he said that he was a nationalist but now he has realized that some one cares about them. All the mega projects will surely benefit them and will improve their lives and living standards.

Salman
It is a question of proper education and propaganda. we are doing all the right things and development of Gwadar is going to provide a lot of jobs to the locals. But they should have the training and the knowhow to take up and keep those jobs. we also need to highlight all the things that we are doing for the province. I think the Sardars are really afraid of losing their fiefdoms and their absolute control over the masses and to some extent the insurgency is about conservation of their interests.
Araz