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Navy Seizes 1,700 Iranian Weapons Bound For Yemen’s Houthi Rebels
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on April 04, 2016 at 11:20 AM
81 Comments
160331-N-KL526-359-1024x683.jpg

Some of the 1,500 AK-47 assault rifles seized by the Navy on Friday, believed to be an Iranian shipment for Yemen’s Houthi rebels

We write a lot on this site about high-tech, high-cost weapons. But it’s worth remembering that most of the killing around the world, an estimated 200,000 deaths a year, takes place with low-tech tools, like these AK-47 assault rifles the Navy seized Friday in the Arabian Sea. All told, the small cargo ship carried 21 fifty-caliber machineguns, 200 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, and a staggering 1,500 AK-47s.

Their origin, according to the US Navy? Iran. Their destination? The Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Dhow-and-USS-Sirocco-PC-6-300x200.jpg

The vessel that carried the weapons, with the intercepting USS Sirocco in the distance.

The Houthis have hit the Saudi army’s US-made M1 tanks with sophisticated guided missiles. They’ve even fired short-ranged ballistic missiles — cousins of Saddam Hussein’s Scuds — at Saudi targets to deadly effect. The Saudis have responded with the famous Patriot missile defense system, sometimes shooting down the incoming Houthi missiles and sometimes not. (See the graphic timeline below by Tom Karako & co. of CSIS).

This confounding combination of low-tech and high, of irregular militias with weapons once reserved for states, is known to many military theorists as a “hybrid” threat. Vladimir Putin’s use of separatist proxies and deniable “little green men” is arguably a case of hybrid warfare practiced by a major power. And Daesh, the self-proclaimed Islamic State, presents a threat that combines transnational terrorism, a popular (Sunni Arab) insurgency, and conventional fighting for territory.

Missile_Yemen_timeline-01-1024x602.png

CSIS graphic courtesy Tom Karako & Iain Williams

The US is struggling to adapt to this ambiguity. A military largely organized and equipped during the Cold War for state-on-state conflict, but consumed for the last 15 years by counterinsurgency, is trying to figure out how to respond to adversaries who blur those categories.

USS-SIrrocco-PC-Cyclone-class-150206-N-KB426-023-300x214.jpg

The patrol craft USS Sirocco, which seized the weapons.

Certainly the US Navy and its partners have been vigilant. The small smuggling craft was seized by one of the US Navy’s own smaller vessels, the 380-ton Cyclone-class coastal patrol craft Sirocco, but the 9,000-ton destroyer Gravelymoved in as backup. The need for pinch-hitter warships — larger than the Cyclones but less expensive than destroyers, able to either conduct patrols in peacetime or support the battle fleet in wartime — is one of the major arguments for the controversial Littoral Combat Ship.

“This seizure was the third time in recent weeks international naval forces operating in the waters of the Arabian Sea seized a shipment of illicit arms which the United States assessed originated in Iran and was likely bound for Houthi insurgents in Yemen,” said a Navy statement.

What else do the Iranians think will help the Houthis? The Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin stopped a boat Feb. 27 that was carrying nearly 2,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 100 RPG launchers, 49 PKM machine guns, 39 PKM machine gun barrels and 20 60mm mortar tubes. And the French Navy destroyer FS Provence intercepted a cargo on March 20 that included about 2,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 64 Dragunovsniper rifles, nine anti-tank missiles and other gear, the US Navy said.

Whatever you think of the Iranian nuclear deal, this small-arms traffic at sea is a reminder that Tehran has other lethal ways to achieve its objectives. It should remind us that our adversaries are persistent, flexible, and inventive — and that we need to be, too.



SPONSORED CONTENT

Forward-Operating Defense

Raytheon systems continually evolve to employ the latest technologies.

RAYTHEON

160331-N-KL526-362-683x1024.jpg

Seized RPG launchers.

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Iranian Arms Shipments to Yemen Violate U.N. Resolutions
November 3, 2016

Jerrica Goodson, Simon Chin, and Valerie Lincy

The United States and its allies have interdicted five separate weapons shipments from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen since April 2015—shipments that violate U. N. Security Council resolutions. According to U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin Donergan, “We know they came from Iran and we know the destination.”[1] The U.S. State Department has also criticized Iranian arms smuggling to Yemen, including the provision of missiles to the Houthis.[2]

This lethal aid violates an arms embargo that was imposed as part of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 implementing the nuclear agreement with Iran and the resolutions it replaced.[3] It also violates U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015, which imposes an arms embargo against the leadership of the Houthi rebels.[4] However, no action has been taken at the United Nations to punish these violations. In a little noticed report released this summer, the Secretary General raised concern over one Iranian arms shipment interdicted by the United States but concluded only that the U.N. was "still reviewing the information provided by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran" and that he would "provide an update on this arms seizure to the Security Council in due course." [5]

Despite the interdictions, some Iranian arms shipments are clearly making it into Yemen. The U.S. State Department has publicly linked Iran to the ballistic missiles used by the Houthis to strike targets in Saudi Arabia. Last month, Saudi officials reported two separate interceptions of ballistic missiles launched from Yemen: one near the city of Taif on October 10, the other near the city of Mecca on October 28.[6] In an October 11 press briefing, U.S. State Department spokesperson John Kirby stated, “In the Saudis’ case, their cities, their citizens are under very real, darn-near daily threat from missiles being launched on the Yemeni side of their border, missiles that are provided by Iran to the Houthi rebels.”[7] Another State Department official later told IHS Jane’s that “Iran has provided critical capability and assistance to the Houthis in their campaign to attack Saudi Arabian territory with ballistic missiles and rockets.” [8]

The two failed attacks on U.S. Navy ships last month by cruise missiles launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen have also grabbed headlines, though the Pentagon has not yet officially commented on the type or origin of these missiles.[9] Some naval analysts believe that the most likely missile used by the Houthis in this attack is the Noor, an Iranian variant of the Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missile.[10] Iran has officially denied involvement in the failed missile attacks on the U.S. ships, with a foreign ministry spokesperson saying, “The vague and contradictory remarks by American officials these past days are false, paranoid and inappropriate.”[11]

12] After examining the weapons, the U.N. Panel noted that the equipment bore “the markings bearing the names of Iranian industrial companies” and that the “Konkurs missiles had markings with characteristics similar to Russian and Iranian markings, indicating that they were likely to have been maintained or overhauled in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[13] Photos from the Panel's report reveal the stamps of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) and Shiraz Electronics Industries, both of which are Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) subsidiaries and still subject to U.S. and EU sanctions.[14] The Panel also registered the presence of instructions written in Persian for the TOW system.[15]

February 2016: [16] Australia’s HMAS Darwin intercepted a small fishing vessel 170 nautical miles off the coast of Oman and discovered some 2,000 AK-47s, 100 RPGs, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels, and 20 60mm mortar tubes onboard.[17] The U.S. Navy has assessed that the arms originated in Iran, and U.S. military sources say the shipment was likely intended for Houthi rebels in Yemen.[18] Jane’s reports that the seized RPGs had green heat-resistant covers, a feature most often seen on RPG-7s manufactured by Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), an entity subject to U.N. sanctions.[19] One of the photos included in the report also shows that some of the machine guns found were North Korean Type 73s. This weapon is only in use by the North Korean and Iranian militaries, according to Jane's.[20]

March 20, 2016: A helicopter operating with the French Navy's frigate Provence encountered a suspicious dhow off the coast of the Yemeni island of Socotra. French forces boarded the craft and found a cache of arms hidden under fishing nets.[21] The U.S. Navy later confirmed the find to include almost 2,000 Ak-47s, 64 Dragunov sniper rifles, 9 anti-tank missiles, and other equipment.[22] An analysis by Jane’s again notes the presence of Type 73 machine guns in one of the photos provided by the French Ministry of Defense.[23]

24] Iran has denied the allegation and claims it “has never engaged in such delivery.”[25]

Despite mounting public evidence of continued Iranian arms transfers to Yemen in violation of two U.N. Security Council resolutions, little appears to have been done at the United Nations. In a July 25 report, the U.N. official in charge of overseeing implementation of U.N. resolution 2231 stated that he “look[ed] forward to a formal reply in due course” from Iran about the report of the March 28 arms seizure.[26] However, no formal action has been taken. The other confirmed interdictions have not been raised publicly at the United Nations.

Under prior U.N. resolutions, a dedicated U.N. panel of experts was charged with monitoring the implementation of sanctions against Iran. This independent panel investigated possible violations and proposed sanctions designations in response. It played a valuable role in scrutinizing and publicizing a number of illicit Iranian arms exports. Unfortunately, in response to Iranian demands, the U.N. panel on Iran was dissolved when the nuclear agreement took effect at the beginning of this year. Now, it appears, officially documented reports of repeated Iranian violations face a dead-end diplomatic process at the United Nations, in which the absence of consensus among Security Council members stalls any action.



Footnotes:
1 Courtney Kube, “U.S. Officials: Iran Supplying Weapons to Yemen's Houthi Rebels,” NBC News, October 27, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news...pplying-weapons-yemen-s-houthi-rebels-n674181

2 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm; Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 24, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/go...n-kirby-comments-irans-supply-weapons-houthis

3 “Resolution 2231,” United Nations, S/RES/2231 (2015), Annex B paragraph 5.

4 “Resolution 2216,” United Nations, S/RES/2216 (2015), paragraph 14

5 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section I paragraph 9.

6 Jeremy Binnie, “Saudi coalition confirms longest-range Yemeni ballistic missile attack to date,” Jane’s Defenec Weekly, October 11, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com); “Yemen’s Houthis Launch Missile Toward Saudi Holy City,” Reuters, October 28, 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-missiles-idUSKCN12S016

7 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm

8 Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: US spokesman says Iran supplying missiles to Yemen,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 13, 2016.

9 Dan Lamothe, “Navy launches Tomahawk missiles at rebel sites in Yemen after attacks on U.S. ships,” Washington Post, October 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...el-held-territory-in-yemen-at-u-s-navy-ships/

10 Megan Eckstein and Sam LaGrone, “Admiral: Attacks Like Those on USS Mason Will Become More Common,” USNI News, October 27, 2016, available at https://news.usni.org/2016/10/27/22246; Sam LaGrone, “Destroyer USS Mason Unsuccessfully Attacked from Yemen,” USNI, October 10, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/10/destroyer-uss-mason-attacked-yemen

11 “Iran denies role in attacks on US navy from Yemen,” AFP via Al-Monitor, October 20, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2016/10/yemen-conflict-iran-us.html

12 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 12.

13 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Section III paragraph 82.

14 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

15 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

16 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

17 “HMS Darwin Seizes Large Weapons Cache,” Combined Maritime Forces, March 6, 2016, available at https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2016/03/06/hmas-darwin-seizes-large-weapons-cache/, accessed September 23, 2016.

18 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, April 4, 2016, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990; Joshua Berlinger, “French seize weapons cache in Indian Ocean that may have come from Iran,” CNN, March 30, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/30/middleeast/weapons-seizure-indian-ocean/

19 Jens Kastner,“Combined Maritime Forces seize weapons shipment off Oman,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 3, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

20 Jeremy Binnie, “US Navy seizes another Iranian weapons shipment in Arabian Sea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 4, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

21 “Combined Task Force 150: the frigate Provence carries out an important arms seizure off the coast of Somalia,” French Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2016, available (in French) at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operatio...ortante-saisie-d-armes-au-large-de-la-somalie, accessed September 23, 2016.

22 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

23 Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: Third Arabian Sea arms shipment seized in six months,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

24 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex II “Report dated 7 June 2016 from the United States of America regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015).

25 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex I paragraph 3.1.

26 “Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), United Nations, S/2016/649, paragraph 24.
 
.
Navy Seizes 1,700 Iranian Weapons Bound For Yemen’s Houthi Rebels
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on April 04, 2016 at 11:20 AM
81 Comments
160331-N-KL526-359-1024x683.jpg

Some of the 1,500 AK-47 assault rifles seized by the Navy on Friday, believed to be an Iranian shipment for Yemen’s Houthi rebels

We write a lot on this site about high-tech, high-cost weapons. But it’s worth remembering that most of the killing around the world, an estimated 200,000 deaths a year, takes place with low-tech tools, like these AK-47 assault rifles the Navy seized Friday in the Arabian Sea. All told, the small cargo ship carried 21 fifty-caliber machineguns, 200 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, and a staggering 1,500 AK-47s.

Their origin, according to the US Navy? Iran. Their destination? The Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Dhow-and-USS-Sirocco-PC-6-300x200.jpg

The vessel that carried the weapons, with the intercepting USS Sirocco in the distance.

The Houthis have hit the Saudi army’s US-made M1 tanks with sophisticated guided missiles. They’ve even fired short-ranged ballistic missiles — cousins of Saddam Hussein’s Scuds — at Saudi targets to deadly effect. The Saudis have responded with the famous Patriot missile defense system, sometimes shooting down the incoming Houthi missiles and sometimes not. (See the graphic timeline below by Tom Karako & co. of CSIS).

This confounding combination of low-tech and high, of irregular militias with weapons once reserved for states, is known to many military theorists as a “hybrid” threat. Vladimir Putin’s use of separatist proxies and deniable “little green men” is arguably a case of hybrid warfare practiced by a major power. And Daesh, the self-proclaimed Islamic State, presents a threat that combines transnational terrorism, a popular (Sunni Arab) insurgency, and conventional fighting for territory.

Missile_Yemen_timeline-01-1024x602.png

CSIS graphic courtesy Tom Karako & Iain Williams

The US is struggling to adapt to this ambiguity. A military largely organized and equipped during the Cold War for state-on-state conflict, but consumed for the last 15 years by counterinsurgency, is trying to figure out how to respond to adversaries who blur those categories.

USS-SIrrocco-PC-Cyclone-class-150206-N-KB426-023-300x214.jpg

The patrol craft USS Sirocco, which seized the weapons.

Certainly the US Navy and its partners have been vigilant. The small smuggling craft was seized by one of the US Navy’s own smaller vessels, the 380-ton Cyclone-class coastal patrol craft Sirocco, but the 9,000-ton destroyer Gravelymoved in as backup. The need for pinch-hitter warships — larger than the Cyclones but less expensive than destroyers, able to either conduct patrols in peacetime or support the battle fleet in wartime — is one of the major arguments for the controversial Littoral Combat Ship.

“This seizure was the third time in recent weeks international naval forces operating in the waters of the Arabian Sea seized a shipment of illicit arms which the United States assessed originated in Iran and was likely bound for Houthi insurgents in Yemen,” said a Navy statement.

What else do the Iranians think will help the Houthis? The Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin stopped a boat Feb. 27 that was carrying nearly 2,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 100 RPG launchers, 49 PKM machine guns, 39 PKM machine gun barrels and 20 60mm mortar tubes. And the French Navy destroyer FS Provence intercepted a cargo on March 20 that included about 2,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 64 Dragunovsniper rifles, nine anti-tank missiles and other gear, the US Navy said.

Whatever you think of the Iranian nuclear deal, this small-arms traffic at sea is a reminder that Tehran has other lethal ways to achieve its objectives. It should remind us that our adversaries are persistent, flexible, and inventive — and that we need to be, too.


SPONSORED CONTENT

Forward-Operating Defense

Raytheon systems continually evolve to employ the latest technologies.

RAYTHEON

160331-N-KL526-362-683x1024.jpg

Seized RPG launchers.

logo.png


Iranian Arms Shipments to Yemen Violate U.N. Resolutions
November 3, 2016

Jerrica Goodson, Simon Chin, and Valerie Lincy

The United States and its allies have interdicted five separate weapons shipments from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen since April 2015—shipments that violate U. N. Security Council resolutions. According to U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin Donergan, “We know they came from Iran and we know the destination.”[1] The U.S. State Department has also criticized Iranian arms smuggling to Yemen, including the provision of missiles to the Houthis.[2]

This lethal aid violates an arms embargo that was imposed as part of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 implementing the nuclear agreement with Iran and the resolutions it replaced.[3] It also violates U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015, which imposes an arms embargo against the leadership of the Houthi rebels.[4] However, no action has been taken at the United Nations to punish these violations. In a little noticed report released this summer, the Secretary General raised concern over one Iranian arms shipment interdicted by the United States but concluded only that the U.N. was "still reviewing the information provided by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran" and that he would "provide an update on this arms seizure to the Security Council in due course." [5]

Despite the interdictions, some Iranian arms shipments are clearly making it into Yemen. The U.S. State Department has publicly linked Iran to the ballistic missiles used by the Houthis to strike targets in Saudi Arabia. Last month, Saudi officials reported two separate interceptions of ballistic missiles launched from Yemen: one near the city of Taif on October 10, the other near the city of Mecca on October 28.[6] In an October 11 press briefing, U.S. State Department spokesperson John Kirby stated, “In the Saudis’ case, their cities, their citizens are under very real, darn-near daily threat from missiles being launched on the Yemeni side of their border, missiles that are provided by Iran to the Houthi rebels.”[7] Another State Department official later told IHS Jane’s that “Iran has provided critical capability and assistance to the Houthis in their campaign to attack Saudi Arabian territory with ballistic missiles and rockets.” [8]

The two failed attacks on U.S. Navy ships last month by cruise missiles launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen have also grabbed headlines, though the Pentagon has not yet officially commented on the type or origin of these missiles.[9] Some naval analysts believe that the most likely missile used by the Houthis in this attack is the Noor, an Iranian variant of the Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missile.[10] Iran has officially denied involvement in the failed missile attacks on the U.S. ships, with a foreign ministry spokesperson saying, “The vague and contradictory remarks by American officials these past days are false, paranoid and inappropriate.”[11]

12] After examining the weapons, the U.N. Panel noted that the equipment bore “the markings bearing the names of Iranian industrial companies” and that the “Konkurs missiles had markings with characteristics similar to Russian and Iranian markings, indicating that they were likely to have been maintained or overhauled in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[13] Photos from the Panel's report reveal the stamps of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) and Shiraz Electronics Industries, both of which are Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) subsidiaries and still subject to U.S. and EU sanctions.[14] The Panel also registered the presence of instructions written in Persian for the TOW system.[15]

February 2016: [16] Australia’s HMAS Darwin intercepted a small fishing vessel 170 nautical miles off the coast of Oman and discovered some 2,000 AK-47s, 100 RPGs, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels, and 20 60mm mortar tubes onboard.[17] The U.S. Navy has assessed that the arms originated in Iran, and U.S. military sources say the shipment was likely intended for Houthi rebels in Yemen.[18] Jane’s reports that the seized RPGs had green heat-resistant covers, a feature most often seen on RPG-7s manufactured by Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), an entity subject to U.N. sanctions.[19] One of the photos included in the report also shows that some of the machine guns found were North Korean Type 73s. This weapon is only in use by the North Korean and Iranian militaries, according to Jane's.[20]

March 20, 2016: A helicopter operating with the French Navy's frigate Provence encountered a suspicious dhow off the coast of the Yemeni island of Socotra. French forces boarded the craft and found a cache of arms hidden under fishing nets.[21] The U.S. Navy later confirmed the find to include almost 2,000 Ak-47s, 64 Dragunov sniper rifles, 9 anti-tank missiles, and other equipment.[22] An analysis by Jane’s again notes the presence of Type 73 machine guns in one of the photos provided by the French Ministry of Defense.[23]

24] Iran has denied the allegation and claims it “has never engaged in such delivery.”[25]

Despite mounting public evidence of continued Iranian arms transfers to Yemen in violation of two U.N. Security Council resolutions, little appears to have been done at the United Nations. In a July 25 report, the U.N. official in charge of overseeing implementation of U.N. resolution 2231 stated that he “look[ed] forward to a formal reply in due course” from Iran about the report of the March 28 arms seizure.[26] However, no formal action has been taken. The other confirmed interdictions have not been raised publicly at the United Nations.

Under prior U.N. resolutions, a dedicated U.N. panel of experts was charged with monitoring the implementation of sanctions against Iran. This independent panel investigated possible violations and proposed sanctions designations in response. It played a valuable role in scrutinizing and publicizing a number of illicit Iranian arms exports. Unfortunately, in response to Iranian demands, the U.N. panel on Iran was dissolved when the nuclear agreement took effect at the beginning of this year. Now, it appears, officially documented reports of repeated Iranian violations face a dead-end diplomatic process at the United Nations, in which the absence of consensus among Security Council members stalls any action.



Footnotes:
1 Courtney Kube, “U.S. Officials: Iran Supplying Weapons to Yemen's Houthi Rebels,” NBC News, October 27, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news...pplying-weapons-yemen-s-houthi-rebels-n674181

2 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm; Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 24, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/go...n-kirby-comments-irans-supply-weapons-houthis

3 “Resolution 2231,” United Nations, S/RES/2231 (2015), Annex B paragraph 5.

4 “Resolution 2216,” United Nations, S/RES/2216 (2015), paragraph 14

5 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section I paragraph 9.

6 Jeremy Binnie, “Saudi coalition confirms longest-range Yemeni ballistic missile attack to date,” Jane’s Defenec Weekly, October 11, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com); “Yemen’s Houthis Launch Missile Toward Saudi Holy City,” Reuters, October 28, 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-missiles-idUSKCN12S016

7 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm

8 Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: US spokesman says Iran supplying missiles to Yemen,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 13, 2016.

9 Dan Lamothe, “Navy launches Tomahawk missiles at rebel sites in Yemen after attacks on U.S. ships,” Washington Post, October 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...el-held-territory-in-yemen-at-u-s-navy-ships/

10 Megan Eckstein and Sam LaGrone, “Admiral: Attacks Like Those on USS Mason Will Become More Common,” USNI News, October 27, 2016, available at https://news.usni.org/2016/10/27/22246; Sam LaGrone, “Destroyer USS Mason Unsuccessfully Attacked from Yemen,” USNI, October 10, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/10/destroyer-uss-mason-attacked-yemen

11 “Iran denies role in attacks on US navy from Yemen,” AFP via Al-Monitor, October 20, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2016/10/yemen-conflict-iran-us.html

12 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 12.

13 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Section III paragraph 82.

14 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

15 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

16 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

17 “HMS Darwin Seizes Large Weapons Cache,” Combined Maritime Forces, March 6, 2016, available at https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2016/03/06/hmas-darwin-seizes-large-weapons-cache/, accessed September 23, 2016.

18 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, April 4, 2016, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990; Joshua Berlinger, “French seize weapons cache in Indian Ocean that may have come from Iran,” CNN, March 30, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/30/middleeast/weapons-seizure-indian-ocean/

19 Jens Kastner,“Combined Maritime Forces seize weapons shipment off Oman,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 3, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

20 Jeremy Binnie, “US Navy seizes another Iranian weapons shipment in Arabian Sea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 4, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

21 “Combined Task Force 150: the frigate Provence carries out an important arms seizure off the coast of Somalia,” French Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2016, available (in French) at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operatio...ortante-saisie-d-armes-au-large-de-la-somalie, accessed September 23, 2016.

22 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

23 Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: Third Arabian Sea arms shipment seized in six months,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

24 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex II “Report dated 7 June 2016 from the United States of America regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015).

25 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex I paragraph 3.1.

26 “Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), United Nations, S/2016/649, paragraph 24.

Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.

Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

  • Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled.

  • Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.
  • Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
  • Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.

How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.


  • If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.
  • Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.
  • Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.
  • Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.

Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX
. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

  • Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.
  • The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds.

All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf wa
r.

  • Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.
  • Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.


  • Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
  • Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit.
  • Baghdad's UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.
  • Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.
 
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i think missile is fired by israel to provoke iran and saudia war
 
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Too much expensive dude
Saudis soon going to bankrupt themselves.

Iranian intelligence in action.:lol:

Not only does KSA have the best missile defense system in the region alongside Israel, KSA will soon get not only THAAD but the S-400 missile system at well.

Not to mention Saudi Arabian-Ukrainian cooperation in regard to GROM.

So keep dreaming while the Houthi terrorist cultists are being slaughtered and their firecrackers shot down as usual.


Great work as usual. Good that nothing occured in Khamis Mushayt. A very beautiful city located almost 2500 meter above sea level.
 
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Iranian intelligence in action.:lol:

Not only does KSA has the best missile defense system in the region alongside Israel, KSA will soon get not only THAAD but the S-400 missile system at well.

Not to mention Saudi Arabian-Ukrainian cooperation in regard to GROM.

So keep dreaming while the Houthi terrorist cultists are being slaughtered and their firecrackers shot down as usual



Great work as usual. Good that nothing occured in Khamis Mushayt. A very beautiful city located almost 2500 meter above sea level.
They are fighting Saleh forces now in Sanaa..90% of Yemeni territory is now in the hands of the government.. now Houthis will have to fight both the Alliance and Saleh troops.. the end is near..

i think missile is fired by israel to provoke iran and saudia war
The missile was detected coming from Yemen..

Great work as usual. Good that nothing occured in Khamis Mushayt. A very beautiful city located almost 2500 meter above sea level.
It was a close shot though..missile destroyed just on the outskirts of the city..we can see other air defences used too apart from the patriot interceptor missile.. great work..but these Houthi missiles are still quite dangerous..
 
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American warships have intercepted five shipments of weaponry to the Houthis in Yemen from Iran in the past year and a half, according to US Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan, who is in charge of American naval operations in the Middle East.

The first intercepted shipment was in April 2015 and since then, American ships have intercepted an additional four shipments, Donegan said.

The shipments included thousands of AK-47 automatic rifles, as well as anti-tank missiles and sniper rifles.


The US Navy determined that the ships carrying the weapons came from Iran based on an examination of the GPS data on board the five vessels as well as from interrogations of their crews...
Did us navy provided evidence of its achievement ?
Or its just like when unearthed some old rusty Saddam era weapons in Iraq and claimed that's evidence of Iran supplying weaponry to Iraqi insurgent.

Navy Seizes 1,700 Iranian Weapons Bound For Yemen’s Houthi Rebels
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on April 04, 2016 at 11:20 AM
81 Comments
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Some of the 1,500 AK-47 assault rifles seized by the Navy on Friday, believed to be an Iranian shipment for Yemen’s Houthi rebels

We write a lot on this site about high-tech, high-cost weapons. But it’s worth remembering that most of the killing around the world, an estimated 200,000 deaths a year, takes place with low-tech tools, like these AK-47 assault rifles the Navy seized Friday in the Arabian Sea. All told, the small cargo ship carried 21 fifty-caliber machineguns, 200 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, and a staggering 1,500 AK-47s.

Their origin, according to the US Navy? Iran. Their destination? The Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Dhow-and-USS-Sirocco-PC-6-300x200.jpg

The vessel that carried the weapons, with the intercepting USS Sirocco in the distance.

The Houthis have hit the Saudi army’s US-made M1 tanks with sophisticated guided missiles. They’ve even fired short-ranged ballistic missiles — cousins of Saddam Hussein’s Scuds — at Saudi targets to deadly effect. The Saudis have responded with the famous Patriot missile defense system, sometimes shooting down the incoming Houthi missiles and sometimes not. (See the graphic timeline below by Tom Karako & co. of CSIS).

This confounding combination of low-tech and high, of irregular militias with weapons once reserved for states, is known to many military theorists as a “hybrid” threat. Vladimir Putin’s use of separatist proxies and deniable “little green men” is arguably a case of hybrid warfare practiced by a major power. And Daesh, the self-proclaimed Islamic State, presents a threat that combines transnational terrorism, a popular (Sunni Arab) insurgency, and conventional fighting for territory.

Missile_Yemen_timeline-01-1024x602.png

CSIS graphic courtesy Tom Karako & Iain Williams

The US is struggling to adapt to this ambiguity. A military largely organized and equipped during the Cold War for state-on-state conflict, but consumed for the last 15 years by counterinsurgency, is trying to figure out how to respond to adversaries who blur those categories.

USS-SIrrocco-PC-Cyclone-class-150206-N-KB426-023-300x214.jpg

The patrol craft USS Sirocco, which seized the weapons.

Certainly the US Navy and its partners have been vigilant. The small smuggling craft was seized by one of the US Navy’s own smaller vessels, the 380-ton Cyclone-class coastal patrol craft Sirocco, but the 9,000-ton destroyer Gravelymoved in as backup. The need for pinch-hitter warships — larger than the Cyclones but less expensive than destroyers, able to either conduct patrols in peacetime or support the battle fleet in wartime — is one of the major arguments for the controversial Littoral Combat Ship.

“This seizure was the third time in recent weeks international naval forces operating in the waters of the Arabian Sea seized a shipment of illicit arms which the United States assessed originated in Iran and was likely bound for Houthi insurgents in Yemen,” said a Navy statement.

What else do the Iranians think will help the Houthis? The Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin stopped a boat Feb. 27 that was carrying nearly 2,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 100 RPG launchers, 49 PKM machine guns, 39 PKM machine gun barrels and 20 60mm mortar tubes. And the French Navy destroyer FS Provence intercepted a cargo on March 20 that included about 2,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 64 Dragunovsniper rifles, nine anti-tank missiles and other gear, the US Navy said.

Whatever you think of the Iranian nuclear deal, this small-arms traffic at sea is a reminder that Tehran has other lethal ways to achieve its objectives. It should remind us that our adversaries are persistent, flexible, and inventive — and that we need to be, too.



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Seized RPG launchers.

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Iranian Arms Shipments to Yemen Violate U.N. Resolutions
November 3, 2016

Jerrica Goodson, Simon Chin, and Valerie Lincy

The United States and its allies have interdicted five separate weapons shipments from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen since April 2015—shipments that violate U. N. Security Council resolutions. According to U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin Donergan, “We know they came from Iran and we know the destination.”[1] The U.S. State Department has also criticized Iranian arms smuggling to Yemen, including the provision of missiles to the Houthis.[2]

This lethal aid violates an arms embargo that was imposed as part of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 implementing the nuclear agreement with Iran and the resolutions it replaced.[3] It also violates U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015, which imposes an arms embargo against the leadership of the Houthi rebels.[4] However, no action has been taken at the United Nations to punish these violations. In a little noticed report released this summer, the Secretary General raised concern over one Iranian arms shipment interdicted by the United States but concluded only that the U.N. was "still reviewing the information provided by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran" and that he would "provide an update on this arms seizure to the Security Council in due course." [5]

Despite the interdictions, some Iranian arms shipments are clearly making it into Yemen. The U.S. State Department has publicly linked Iran to the ballistic missiles used by the Houthis to strike targets in Saudi Arabia. Last month, Saudi officials reported two separate interceptions of ballistic missiles launched from Yemen: one near the city of Taif on October 10, the other near the city of Mecca on October 28.[6] In an October 11 press briefing, U.S. State Department spokesperson John Kirby stated, “In the Saudis’ case, their cities, their citizens are under very real, darn-near daily threat from missiles being launched on the Yemeni side of their border, missiles that are provided by Iran to the Houthi rebels.”[7] Another State Department official later told IHS Jane’s that “Iran has provided critical capability and assistance to the Houthis in their campaign to attack Saudi Arabian territory with ballistic missiles and rockets.” [8]

The two failed attacks on U.S. Navy ships last month by cruise missiles launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen have also grabbed headlines, though the Pentagon has not yet officially commented on the type or origin of these missiles.[9] Some naval analysts believe that the most likely missile used by the Houthis in this attack is the Noor, an Iranian variant of the Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missile.[10] Iran has officially denied involvement in the failed missile attacks on the U.S. ships, with a foreign ministry spokesperson saying, “The vague and contradictory remarks by American officials these past days are false, paranoid and inappropriate.”[11]

12] After examining the weapons, the U.N. Panel noted that the equipment bore “the markings bearing the names of Iranian industrial companies” and that the “Konkurs missiles had markings with characteristics similar to Russian and Iranian markings, indicating that they were likely to have been maintained or overhauled in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[13] Photos from the Panel's report reveal the stamps of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) and Shiraz Electronics Industries, both of which are Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) subsidiaries and still subject to U.S. and EU sanctions.[14] The Panel also registered the presence of instructions written in Persian for the TOW system.[15]

February 2016: [16] Australia’s HMAS Darwin intercepted a small fishing vessel 170 nautical miles off the coast of Oman and discovered some 2,000 AK-47s, 100 RPGs, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels, and 20 60mm mortar tubes onboard.[17] The U.S. Navy has assessed that the arms originated in Iran, and U.S. military sources say the shipment was likely intended for Houthi rebels in Yemen.[18] Jane’s reports that the seized RPGs had green heat-resistant covers, a feature most often seen on RPG-7s manufactured by Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), an entity subject to U.N. sanctions.[19] One of the photos included in the report also shows that some of the machine guns found were North Korean Type 73s. This weapon is only in use by the North Korean and Iranian militaries, according to Jane's.[20]

March 20, 2016: A helicopter operating with the French Navy's frigate Provence encountered a suspicious dhow off the coast of the Yemeni island of Socotra. French forces boarded the craft and found a cache of arms hidden under fishing nets.[21] The U.S. Navy later confirmed the find to include almost 2,000 Ak-47s, 64 Dragunov sniper rifles, 9 anti-tank missiles, and other equipment.[22] An analysis by Jane’s again notes the presence of Type 73 machine guns in one of the photos provided by the French Ministry of Defense.[23]

24] Iran has denied the allegation and claims it “has never engaged in such delivery.”[25]

Despite mounting public evidence of continued Iranian arms transfers to Yemen in violation of two U.N. Security Council resolutions, little appears to have been done at the United Nations. In a July 25 report, the U.N. official in charge of overseeing implementation of U.N. resolution 2231 stated that he “look[ed] forward to a formal reply in due course” from Iran about the report of the March 28 arms seizure.[26] However, no formal action has been taken. The other confirmed interdictions have not been raised publicly at the United Nations.

Under prior U.N. resolutions, a dedicated U.N. panel of experts was charged with monitoring the implementation of sanctions against Iran. This independent panel investigated possible violations and proposed sanctions designations in response. It played a valuable role in scrutinizing and publicizing a number of illicit Iranian arms exports. Unfortunately, in response to Iranian demands, the U.N. panel on Iran was dissolved when the nuclear agreement took effect at the beginning of this year. Now, it appears, officially documented reports of repeated Iranian violations face a dead-end diplomatic process at the United Nations, in which the absence of consensus among Security Council members stalls any action.



Footnotes:
1 Courtney Kube, “U.S. Officials: Iran Supplying Weapons to Yemen's Houthi Rebels,” NBC News, October 27, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news...pplying-weapons-yemen-s-houthi-rebels-n674181

2 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm; Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 24, 2016, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/go...n-kirby-comments-irans-supply-weapons-houthis

3 “Resolution 2231,” United Nations, S/RES/2231 (2015), Annex B paragraph 5.

4 “Resolution 2216,” United Nations, S/RES/2216 (2015), paragraph 14

5 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Section I paragraph 9.

6 Jeremy Binnie, “Saudi coalition confirms longest-range Yemeni ballistic missile attack to date,” Jane’s Defenec Weekly, October 11, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com); “Yemen’s Houthis Launch Missile Toward Saudi Holy City,” Reuters, October 28, 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-missiles-idUSKCN12S016

7 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, October 11, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/263001.htm

8 Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: US spokesman says Iran supplying missiles to Yemen,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 13, 2016.

9 Dan Lamothe, “Navy launches Tomahawk missiles at rebel sites in Yemen after attacks on U.S. ships,” Washington Post, October 12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...el-held-territory-in-yemen-at-u-s-navy-ships/

10 Megan Eckstein and Sam LaGrone, “Admiral: Attacks Like Those on USS Mason Will Become More Common,” USNI News, October 27, 2016, available at https://news.usni.org/2016/10/27/22246; Sam LaGrone, “Destroyer USS Mason Unsuccessfully Attacked from Yemen,” USNI, October 10, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/10/destroyer-uss-mason-attacked-yemen

11 “Iran denies role in attacks on US navy from Yemen,” AFP via Al-Monitor, October 20, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2016/10/yemen-conflict-iran-us.html

12 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 12.

13 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Section III paragraph 82.

14 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

15 “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations, S/2016/73, Annex 13.

16 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

17 “HMS Darwin Seizes Large Weapons Cache,” Combined Maritime Forces, March 6, 2016, available at https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2016/03/06/hmas-darwin-seizes-large-weapons-cache/, accessed September 23, 2016.

18 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, April 4, 2016, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990; Joshua Berlinger, “French seize weapons cache in Indian Ocean that may have come from Iran,” CNN, March 30, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/30/middleeast/weapons-seizure-indian-ocean/

19 Jens Kastner,“Combined Maritime Forces seize weapons shipment off Oman,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 3, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

20 Jeremy Binnie, “US Navy seizes another Iranian weapons shipment in Arabian Sea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 4, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

21 “Combined Task Force 150: the frigate Provence carries out an important arms seizure off the coast of Somalia,” French Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2016, available (in French) at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operatio...ortante-saisie-d-armes-au-large-de-la-somalie, accessed September 23, 2016.

22 “Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea,” United States Navy, NNS160404-01, April 4, 2016, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=93990, accessed on September 23, 2016.

23 Jeremy Binnie, “Analysis: Third Arabian Sea arms shipment seized in six months,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2016, available via Jane’s Information Group (www.janes.com).

24 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex II “Report dated 7 June 2016 from the United States of America regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015).

25 “Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” United Nations, S/2016/589, Annex I paragraph 3.1.

26 “Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), United Nations, S/2016/649, paragraph 24.
Are you aware Iranian made ak47 are made of plastic not wood ?
 
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Iranian intelligence in action.:lol:

Not only does KSA have the best missile defense system in the region alongside Israel, KSA will soon get not only THAAD but the S-400 missile system at well.

Not to mention Saudi Arabian-Ukrainian cooperation in regard to GROM.

So keep dreaming while the Houthi terrorist cultists are being slaughtered and their firecrackers shot down as usual.
Good for you but my post was about cost-effective of such policy.
collecting many expensive and diverse systems to oppose cheap Yemenis missiles.
Anyway good luck with your toys.
 
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...

It was a close shot though..missile destroyed just on the outskirts of the city..we can see other air defences used too apart from the patriot interceptor missile.. great work..but these Houthi missiles are still quite dangerous..

To avoid this risk. It is necessary THAAD.




See to 1 : 37



...
 
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Good for you but my post was about cost-effective of such policy.
collecting many expensive and diverse systems to oppose cheap Yemenis missiles.
Anyway good luck with your toys.

The THAAD might be costly (not really for KSA of all countries but whatever) but how costly do you think it will be if oil and gas plants will be targeted, military bases, major cities in KSA, ports, desalination plants etc.? Money is secondary when talking about the safety of the nation and people and all its assets. I should not really be explaining this to you.

Patriots are not expensive and if you believe that the existing system, THAAD and the S-400 missile defense system and possibly GROM, is only for Houthis then you are out of your mind.:lol:

Well, when you don't mean it, you rather should not say "good luck".

To avoid this risk. It is necessary THAAD.




See to 1 : 37



...

I agree. We should not compromise on our security in this messed up neighborhood.

BTW bro, what is your view of GROM? Do you think that KSA is involved as strongly rumored?
 
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I think Saudis has no need for THAAD the Saudi bought S-400 from Russia will solve these issues. Secondly S-400 will arrive much earlier than THAAD new purchase.
 
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Iran is a crazy country pressing on with Zoroastrian Anti Arab ideology despite converting to Islam, their Persian Zoroastrian roots make them hate Arabs.
Instead of sending missiles to Houthis send food. Houthis cannot fight Saudia . They will only die of bombs or hunger and disease. Iran should fight Sauduis directly if they so much hate them or stop using poor Yemenis as their proxy.
 
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Iran is a crazy country pressing on with Zoroastrian Anti Arab ideology despite converting to Islam, their Persian Zoroastrian roots make them hate Arabs.
Instead of sending missiles to Houthis send food. Houthis cannot fight Saudia . They will only die of bombs or hunger and disease. Iran should fight Sauduis directly if they so much hate them or stop using poor Yemenis as their proxy.

Someone should tell them that there were Zoroastrians in Arabia (albeit a minority) as well and that their religion is based upon a non-historical personality (no evidence of his existence, no evidence of even when he was supposedly born and where) whose teachings mirror pre-Abrahamic Semitic pagan religions and philosophies.

Well, they are unable to fight KSA directly hence the proxy inferno since 1979. Supposedly they blame the Iraq-Iran war (lol) on KSA.

As for Yemen, Houthis, non-Houthis, Iran could not care less of course. Before this conflict the Mullah's could probably not even locate Yemen on a map. Houthis and their likes (cultists) serve as useful canon fodder similar to the 1000's of Shia Afghans and Pakistanis that have been sent by them to die in Syria and Iraq.

Can you for a second imagine KSA sending illegal Pakistani and Afghan migrants and refugees to die in Syria on behalf of the Syrian opposition?
 
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