Opinion
Azadi March
Dr Farrukh Saleem
Sunday, August 10, 2014
Capital suggestion
Of the fifty-two playing cards in the deck, our politicians have handed over four aces to the GHQ. The generals will now play those aces in the best interest of the GHQ or what the GHQ considers the best national interest. General Raheel Sharif is now the undisputed chief arbitrator of the entire political game and he will play each and every one of the four aces whenever and wherever he deems fit. The GHQ must have already designed its ‘conflict and cooperation matrix’ in a way that maximizes what the GHQ considers the best national interest.
The success of the Azadi March depends on two things: number of protesters and the intensity of violence. If the protesters are in the tens of thousands then PM Nawaz Sharif would be negotiating from a position of strength. If the protesters are in the hundreds of thousands then Imran Khan will have an upper hand. If the protesters moving towards Islamabad are in the hundreds of thousands then General Raheel Sharif would be inclined to exercise the Kayani Option (whereby Kayani forced Zardari to bring about the restoration of the chief justice).
The success of the Azadi March depends on two factors: the moral battle and the street fight. To be certain, violence by the police will weaken Nawaz Sharif’s hands and hasten the process of unseating the perpetrators of violence. Imran Khan would have to win both the moral battle and the street fight.
The Azadi March revolves around three things: money, street power and the power of incumbency. Imran Khan will be using both money and street power at his disposal while PM Nawaz Sharif has the added advantage of incumbency to counter Imran Khan. The Azadi March will be a dynamic process and the interaction of the police and the protesters will determine the final price that would have to be paid by the PML-N.
In the current scenario, individual frustration is widespread – and individual frustration is turning into collective aggression. Collective aggression can lead to one of three things: anarchy, change of government or a revolution.
In the current scenario, there are powerful political, economic and social drivers that could drive the protestors to violence. In case of extreme violence, the GHQ will be forced into exercising the Kakar Option (whereby Kakar pressurised both Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif into resigning).
In March 2009, the GHQ’s job was easier as the only demand was the restoration of the judges. In the current scenario, there’s a whole set of demands: early elections, interim government, election reforms and accountability.
It is all up to the guns now. The guns have the politicians exactly where they want them to be. The guns can make Nawaz Sharif give some or give it all. The guns can make Imran Khan accept some or lose it all.
Brinkmanship is the “practice of pushing dangerous events to the brink of disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome”. The two most crucial elements in brinkmanship are the ‘limits of safety’ and the ‘measures in place to avoid complete disaster’. Have the guns set the limits of safety? Do the guns have measures in place to avoid complete disaster?
The billion dollar question is: do the guns just want to weaken Nawaz Sharif or actually pull the plug on him?
The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. Email:
farrukh15@hotmail.com
Twitter: @saleemfarrukh
