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On his visit to India in March 2023, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese boarded INS Vikrant, India’s massive new indigenously built aircraft carrier. Ascending the gangway from the pier to the deck, he took in the sheer size of the vessel, which stretches across the area of three football fields. Albanese posed for photos with naval personnel and climbed into the cockpit of an Indian light fighter jet on the deck. He was the first foreign leader to set foot on the Indian navy’s new jewel, an invitation that affirms New Delhi’s growing defence ties with Canberra.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese aboard the INS VikrantCREDIT:ALEX ELLINGHAUSEN
At its commissioning ceremony six months earlier, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Today, INS Vikrant has filled the country with a new confidence and has created a new confidence in the country.” He called Vikrant “a floating city” and declared it a symbol of ‘India’s efforts to become Atmanirbhar [self-sufficient] in the defence sector’.
Albanese was quick to use his presence on INS Vikrant to bolster the bilateral defence relationship. “My visit reflects my government’s commitment to place India at the heart of Australia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific and beyond,” he said. He announced from the carrier’s deck that Australia would host Exercise Malabar for the first time.
The defence relationship that exists today between Australia and India would have been unimaginable a few decades ago. When India purchased an aircraft carrier from the United Kingdom and leased a nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union in the 1980s as part of a naval build-up, Australia was alarmed. One member of the Australian parliament warned that India’s naval expansion posed “a very real direct threat to Australia and our trade routes”.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese climbs into the cockpit of the LCA (light combat aircraft) during a visit to INS Vikrant in Mumbai, India in March 2023.CREDIT:ALEX ELLINGHAUSEN
Three decades later, Australia’s reaction to India’s maritime capability is now almost entirely positive, thanks to an increasing convergence of interests in the maritime realm. Australia is no longer threatened by India; Australia wants to partner with India.
On his visit to India in 2022, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles stated his overwhelming priority to “ensure Australia has the capability necessary to defend itself in the toughest strategic environment we’ve encountered in over 70 years”. Marles recognised that Australia cannot develop this capability on its own, and will need to find partners to “pool [our] resources and combine [our] strengths [to create] decisive competitive advantage”. Australia is building precisely those partnerships. “When I look out at the world, India stands out,” Marles said.
India’s military power has grown rapidly in the last decade. India was the world’s fourth-largest military spender in 2022, with its defence spending increasing by around 6 per cent annually. With over 1.4 million active personnel, it is the world’s second-largest military force and has the world’s largest volunteer army.
Self-sufficiency in defence has been one of the hallmarks of India’s aspiration for the future. India used to be the biggest importer of arms, but now nearly three-quarters of defence production is domestic. In the last eight years, it has upped its defence exports by eight times.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, often referred to as the Quad, is an important strategic partnership between Australia, the United States, Japan and India. Established to promote regional security and co-operation, the Quad aims to maintain a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.
The idea for the Quad stemmed from the co-operation shown in the aftermath of the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, where Australia, the US, Japan and India were able to co-ordinate their emergency response. Some efforts were made in the following years to institutionalise the co-operation, although it was not intended initially as a military partnership.
The Quad was first tentatively proposed in 2006 when India’s then-prime minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan and noted in a joint statement with then-prime minister Shinzo Abe “the usefulness of having dialogue among India, Japan and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest”.
After receiving support from the Bush administration in the US, an exploratory meeting took place between the four countries in May 2007 on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila.
Exercise Malabar was the first tangible security activity of the Quad. It also proved to be the last, as the grouping was effectively disbanded for the next 10 years. Pressure from China was the immediate catalyst to dissolve the grouping. Fearing the group was established to contain it, China officially asked each of the participants to withdraw from the group.
Navy chiefs from Australia, India, US and Japan ahead of Exercise Malabar at Garden Island.CREDIT:AFR
Australia also hesitated to advance the Quad. In July 2007, then-defence minister Brendan Nelson visited Beijing and “reassured China that so-called quadrilateral dialogue with India is not something that we are pursuing”. Subsequently, in India, he reiterated that Australia “doesn’t want to do anything unnecessarily that upsets any other country”. In late 2007, the newly elected Rudd government also formed the view that it would be wiser to invest further in a direct relationship with China before burdening that relationship with baggage from the many historical Sino–Japanese and Sino–Indian conflicts.
The day after the 2022 election, just hours after they were sworn in, Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong were on a plane to Tokyo to attend the Quad leaders’ meeting with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, President Joe Biden and Modi. The new government was clearly showing that its commitment to the Quad was strong. At the National Press Club in 2023, Wong recognised “the power, weight and influence of Japan and India, which in their own right are contributing to strategic balance”.
The restoration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, ‘Quad 2.0’, began in 2017. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono confirmed in October 2017 that Japan would officially propose a revival. Both the Trump and Biden administrations saw the Quad as key to a move towards the Indo-Pacific region.
The Quad leaders held their first formal summit in 2021, which produced a declaration of intent: “We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.”
India’s interest in a defence relationship with Australia is also growing. The Indian Ocean is critical to India’s economic security, with vital shipping lanes and significant natural resources. Australia, being an Indian Ocean rim country, can contribute to the maritime security of the region. Australia also has a role in supporting India’s ambitious military modernisation, including by sharing defence technology, intelligence and expertise.
Australia’s defence relationship took a step forward in 2023 when it hosted – and India took part in – the Malabar exercise. Malabar initially began as a joint naval exercise of the United States and India in 1992.
Japan’s inclusion became permanent in 2015, transforming it into a trilateral affair. In 2020, Australia joined, demonstrating the significance of the Quad as a platform for promoting a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in front of the sails of the Sydney Opera House illuminated in the colors of the Indian flag, May 24, 2023.CREDIT:AAP
Malabar is complemented by a range of other co-operative exercises, including AUSINDEX, which has been conducted regularly since 2015 by the Royal Australian Navy and the Indian Navy, focusing on anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol and surface warfare; Exercise Pitch Black, a multinational air combat exercise hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force; and Exercise Austra-Hind, which enhances co-operation on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures. These exercises have not only improved interoperability between the two nations but have also helped build trust and understanding. They reflect considerable alignment in strategic interests and prove that the ambivalence of the past is fading.
These exercises have been complemented by a range of forums for strategic dialogue and interaction between defence personnel. The most recent significant development came with inaugural 2+2 dialogue of foreign and defence ministers. There are only two nations in the world with which India has a 2+2 dialogue, an annual leaders’ meeting and a trade agreement. Japan is one, Australia is the other.
Each year, Australia sends two officers to attend Indian military educational institutions: one officer attends India’s Defence Services Staff College, while another attends its National Defence College. Sir Peter Cosgrove, former Australian chief of the defence force and former governor-general, is an alumnus of the National Defence College exchange program, graduating in 1994. India also sends two officers to study in Australia annually, with one attending Australia’s Command and Staff College and the other attending the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
There remains much scope to increase defence ties, including longer-term reciprocal arrangements to access and co-ordinate capability. There is also great potential for additional defence industrial co-operation – to collaborate on artificial intelligence, cyber and space capabilities, quantum and other emerging technologies.
Another useful area of co-operation between Australia and India would be to build upon shared interests in the Antarctic. The Antarctic Treaty System has governed affairs in Antarctica since 1961, but it is now struggling to cope with environmental threats and great power competition.
Together, India and Australia could work to preserve Antarctica as a region devoted to peace and science, and reduce the potential for strategic competition. Australia recognises India as a ‘rising Indo-Pacific great power and an increasingly significant security partner for Australia, particularly in the maritime domain’.
Amid the dynamic geopolitical environment, India and Australia have a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries are committed to contributing to a stable multipolar regional order based on the rule of law, which facilitates growing trade, expanded diplomatic engagement and continued peace.
This is an extract from Pivot to India by Andrew Charlton who is the Federal Labour MP for Parramatta (published by Black Inc. on Wednesday 27 September).
www.theage.com.au
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese aboard the INS VikrantCREDIT:ALEX ELLINGHAUSEN
At its commissioning ceremony six months earlier, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Today, INS Vikrant has filled the country with a new confidence and has created a new confidence in the country.” He called Vikrant “a floating city” and declared it a symbol of ‘India’s efforts to become Atmanirbhar [self-sufficient] in the defence sector’.
Albanese was quick to use his presence on INS Vikrant to bolster the bilateral defence relationship. “My visit reflects my government’s commitment to place India at the heart of Australia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific and beyond,” he said. He announced from the carrier’s deck that Australia would host Exercise Malabar for the first time.
The defence relationship that exists today between Australia and India would have been unimaginable a few decades ago. When India purchased an aircraft carrier from the United Kingdom and leased a nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union in the 1980s as part of a naval build-up, Australia was alarmed. One member of the Australian parliament warned that India’s naval expansion posed “a very real direct threat to Australia and our trade routes”.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese climbs into the cockpit of the LCA (light combat aircraft) during a visit to INS Vikrant in Mumbai, India in March 2023.CREDIT:ALEX ELLINGHAUSEN
Three decades later, Australia’s reaction to India’s maritime capability is now almost entirely positive, thanks to an increasing convergence of interests in the maritime realm. Australia is no longer threatened by India; Australia wants to partner with India.
On his visit to India in 2022, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles stated his overwhelming priority to “ensure Australia has the capability necessary to defend itself in the toughest strategic environment we’ve encountered in over 70 years”. Marles recognised that Australia cannot develop this capability on its own, and will need to find partners to “pool [our] resources and combine [our] strengths [to create] decisive competitive advantage”. Australia is building precisely those partnerships. “When I look out at the world, India stands out,” Marles said.
India’s military power has grown rapidly in the last decade. India was the world’s fourth-largest military spender in 2022, with its defence spending increasing by around 6 per cent annually. With over 1.4 million active personnel, it is the world’s second-largest military force and has the world’s largest volunteer army.
Self-sufficiency in defence has been one of the hallmarks of India’s aspiration for the future. India used to be the biggest importer of arms, but now nearly three-quarters of defence production is domestic. In the last eight years, it has upped its defence exports by eight times.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, often referred to as the Quad, is an important strategic partnership between Australia, the United States, Japan and India. Established to promote regional security and co-operation, the Quad aims to maintain a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.
The idea for the Quad stemmed from the co-operation shown in the aftermath of the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, where Australia, the US, Japan and India were able to co-ordinate their emergency response. Some efforts were made in the following years to institutionalise the co-operation, although it was not intended initially as a military partnership.
The Quad was first tentatively proposed in 2006 when India’s then-prime minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan and noted in a joint statement with then-prime minister Shinzo Abe “the usefulness of having dialogue among India, Japan and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest”.
After receiving support from the Bush administration in the US, an exploratory meeting took place between the four countries in May 2007 on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila.
Exercise Malabar was the first tangible security activity of the Quad. It also proved to be the last, as the grouping was effectively disbanded for the next 10 years. Pressure from China was the immediate catalyst to dissolve the grouping. Fearing the group was established to contain it, China officially asked each of the participants to withdraw from the group.
Navy chiefs from Australia, India, US and Japan ahead of Exercise Malabar at Garden Island.CREDIT:AFR
Australia also hesitated to advance the Quad. In July 2007, then-defence minister Brendan Nelson visited Beijing and “reassured China that so-called quadrilateral dialogue with India is not something that we are pursuing”. Subsequently, in India, he reiterated that Australia “doesn’t want to do anything unnecessarily that upsets any other country”. In late 2007, the newly elected Rudd government also formed the view that it would be wiser to invest further in a direct relationship with China before burdening that relationship with baggage from the many historical Sino–Japanese and Sino–Indian conflicts.
The day after the 2022 election, just hours after they were sworn in, Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong were on a plane to Tokyo to attend the Quad leaders’ meeting with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, President Joe Biden and Modi. The new government was clearly showing that its commitment to the Quad was strong. At the National Press Club in 2023, Wong recognised “the power, weight and influence of Japan and India, which in their own right are contributing to strategic balance”.
The restoration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, ‘Quad 2.0’, began in 2017. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono confirmed in October 2017 that Japan would officially propose a revival. Both the Trump and Biden administrations saw the Quad as key to a move towards the Indo-Pacific region.
The Quad leaders held their first formal summit in 2021, which produced a declaration of intent: “We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.”
India’s interest in a defence relationship with Australia is also growing. The Indian Ocean is critical to India’s economic security, with vital shipping lanes and significant natural resources. Australia, being an Indian Ocean rim country, can contribute to the maritime security of the region. Australia also has a role in supporting India’s ambitious military modernisation, including by sharing defence technology, intelligence and expertise.
Australia’s defence relationship took a step forward in 2023 when it hosted – and India took part in – the Malabar exercise. Malabar initially began as a joint naval exercise of the United States and India in 1992.
Japan’s inclusion became permanent in 2015, transforming it into a trilateral affair. In 2020, Australia joined, demonstrating the significance of the Quad as a platform for promoting a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in front of the sails of the Sydney Opera House illuminated in the colors of the Indian flag, May 24, 2023.CREDIT:AAP
Malabar is complemented by a range of other co-operative exercises, including AUSINDEX, which has been conducted regularly since 2015 by the Royal Australian Navy and the Indian Navy, focusing on anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol and surface warfare; Exercise Pitch Black, a multinational air combat exercise hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force; and Exercise Austra-Hind, which enhances co-operation on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures. These exercises have not only improved interoperability between the two nations but have also helped build trust and understanding. They reflect considerable alignment in strategic interests and prove that the ambivalence of the past is fading.
These exercises have been complemented by a range of forums for strategic dialogue and interaction between defence personnel. The most recent significant development came with inaugural 2+2 dialogue of foreign and defence ministers. There are only two nations in the world with which India has a 2+2 dialogue, an annual leaders’ meeting and a trade agreement. Japan is one, Australia is the other.
Each year, Australia sends two officers to attend Indian military educational institutions: one officer attends India’s Defence Services Staff College, while another attends its National Defence College. Sir Peter Cosgrove, former Australian chief of the defence force and former governor-general, is an alumnus of the National Defence College exchange program, graduating in 1994. India also sends two officers to study in Australia annually, with one attending Australia’s Command and Staff College and the other attending the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
There remains much scope to increase defence ties, including longer-term reciprocal arrangements to access and co-ordinate capability. There is also great potential for additional defence industrial co-operation – to collaborate on artificial intelligence, cyber and space capabilities, quantum and other emerging technologies.
Another useful area of co-operation between Australia and India would be to build upon shared interests in the Antarctic. The Antarctic Treaty System has governed affairs in Antarctica since 1961, but it is now struggling to cope with environmental threats and great power competition.
Together, India and Australia could work to preserve Antarctica as a region devoted to peace and science, and reduce the potential for strategic competition. Australia recognises India as a ‘rising Indo-Pacific great power and an increasingly significant security partner for Australia, particularly in the maritime domain’.
Amid the dynamic geopolitical environment, India and Australia have a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries are committed to contributing to a stable multipolar regional order based on the rule of law, which facilitates growing trade, expanded diplomatic engagement and continued peace.
This is an extract from Pivot to India by Andrew Charlton who is the Federal Labour MP for Parramatta (published by Black Inc. on Wednesday 27 September).
A passage to military accord with India
The defence relationship that exists today between Australia and India would have been unimaginable a few decades ago.
