PRESIDENT Karzai’s recent threat to attack terrorists like Baitullah Mehsud who were attacking his countrymen has sent a wave of anger and indignation across Pakistan. The Afghan envoy to Pakistan has been duly chastised by our Foreign Office, and an editorial in this newspaper yesterday proclaimed: “Pakistan is doing its best to check the militants operating on its side of the Durand Line.”
But is it? This version of our efforts to contain the terrorist threat in our tribal areas was contradicted by Carlotta Gall, the New York Times correspondent. In a despatch from Afghanistan on June 17, she writes: “In Pakistan’s tribal areas of North and South Waziristan, Maulvi Haqqani and his son run a network of madressahs and training camps, and provide protection for foreign fighters and terrorist groups like Al Qaeda… Pakistani forces have been reluctant to move against the Haqqanis. According to European officials and one senior Pakistani official. Maulvi Haqqani has maintained his old links with Pakistani intelligence and still enjoys their protection. Asked in 2006 why the Pakistani military did not move against Maulvi Haqqani, a senior Pakistani intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that it was because he was a Pakistani asset…”
Pakistanis were justly furious when American forces accidentally killed several Pakistani soldiers in Momand Agency recently. Other incidents over the last seven years have seen a number of Pakistani civilians killed as a result of Afghan-based attacks on terrorist targets on our soil. The reaction has been swift and predictable, with Pakistanis taking to the streets to protest.
Given this understandable anger on our side of the border, why should we think the Afghans will react any differently to cross-border incursions from Pakistan in which lives are lost? Surely, respect for sovereignty is a two-way street. If we will not, or cannot, control the activities of the Taliban and their many supporters on our side of the border, can we really complain when our neighbours threaten to take care of these terrorists? The reality, of course, is that the Afghan army is not strong enough to mount an actual incursion into the tribal areas to try and kill or capture warlords like Baitullah Mehsud. Nevertheless, Karzai has powerful friends whose troops are taking casualties, partly due to our inability to halt the movement of Mehsud’s and Haqqani’s men across the Durand Line. And although many Western commanders recognise the difficulty of sealing the border, their political masters in Washington, Paris and London often see the problem lying more in Islamabad.
It is true that the Afghan-Pakistan border lies along some of the most difficult terrain in the world. It is also true that our army has taken heavy casualties whenever it has tried to confront the militants. Hence the attempt to negotiate with the terrorists. But as Baitullah Mehsud has openly declared, a truce with the Pakistan government does not mean peace with Kabul. Obviously, he intends to use the respite he will get from an evacuation of Pakistani forces to renew his fight against coalition and Afghan forces. This is equally true for Maulvi Haqqani and other tribals engaging in the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
Clearly, the answer lies in more, not less, cooperation between our forces and the Afghan and western troops across the border. Equally importantly, there must be an urgent review of our intelligence links with the Taliban and their supporters. Remaining in denial about this relationship is to adopt an ostrich-like attitude that has cost us dear in the past.
Thus far, Bush and Musharraf have been partners in the ‘war on terror’. Since 9/11, they have developed a personal relationship that has helped smooth over many of the difficulties in conducting operations along the Pak-Afghan border. But we are now in the twilight of both presidents. The next US president might well take a far more hard-line position than his predecessor. Already, Barack Obama has signalled his willingness to use American forces to attack Osama bin Laden if his whereabouts are established on Pakistani soil. If faced with a major attack on his troops from across the Durand Line, he may well choose to ignore the niceties of international relations and retaliate.
In the laws governing war between nations, the principle of hot pursuit is a well-established one. If a neutral state is not a combatant, but allows its territory to be used to mount attacks against a neighbouring country, the latter has the right to send troops after the intruders.
Should there be an actual clash between Pakistani troops and their coalition and Afghan counterparts, the biggest gainers would be the militants. Our relations with both Kabul and the West would suffer. Extremism would gain ground.
One problem with getting our act together is that there is no clarity on the issue among ourselves. If one watches talk shows on private TV channels, this confusion becomes evident. Many popular anchors seem to be espousing the cause of extremist ideology, while appearing to be virulently anti-West. This ambivalence is reflected in our armed forces and our intelligence agencies. Thus, even when it runs counter to official policy, elements sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda within the state offer our enemies aid and succour.
Before we can seriously take on people like Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Haqqani, we have to decide on who the enemy really is. In Pakistan’s long adversarial relations with India, there is little confusion, at least in the minds of our establishment, who the foe is. Partly, this is matter of faith: generations of schoolchildren have been fed on poisonous propaganda, and nurture hostility that can be easily exploited once they enter the armed forces. The Kashmir dispute is another factor.
However, there is no historical animosity against the militants based in the tribal areas. On the contrary, these tribals have been romanticized as wild and woolly figures from the past, much as cowboys are seen in America. The fact that they are viewed as good Muslims makes it even more difficult to demonise them.
The truth is that before you can fight somebody effectively, you have to hate him. What many Pakistanis do hate is Western culture, although their feelings are tinged with envy. As long as the Taliban and Al Qaeda are viewed as standing up to the West, feelings in Pakistan are bound to be mixed, and the task of fighting them will be that much harder.
