Kyusuibu Honbu
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Certainly a good read
I "ve just posted part of the document ,for more refer the doc.
Even though its a 16 year old assessment(1995) ,
How much relevance does it have today and
Have the short coming of the IAF been addressed?
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHINESE AIR THREAT
TO INDIA IN THE YEAR 2000
TO INDIA IN THE YEAR 2000
Chinese Air Force: Structure and Modernization Plans
The Chinese Communist Party became involved in aviation in 1924, but the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) came formally into being in November 1949. The PLAAF’s primary mission is to defend China's land and air space as well as provide support to land forces. The Air Force has seven regional commands. Each command apart from its commander has a political commissioner. Lower down in the hierarchy, political positions are maintained within the service. The PLAAF is organized into five branches −aviation, anti aircraft artillery, SAM’s, radar and communications.
The PLAAF has 26 Air Force academies and schools carrying out various facets of training. Entry to these institutions is on selection basis. Pilot training is carried out in three phrases: undergraduate training, transition training and operational unit training. Once in an operational unit a typical fighter pilot does 100-110 hours flying per year, an A-5 ground attack pilot-150 hours/year. Apparently pilots in operational units do not get enough flying practice to maintain a high state of readiness. As a consequence, pilots do not have adequate opportunity to practice new tactics demanded by advanced aircraft9. Moreover, although pilots used simulators, these were of very basic design and did not compare to those used by modern Air Forces. Evidently the PLAAF’s training of logistics personnel also needs improvement. It was weak logistics that prevented utilization of air power in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict of 197910. The logistics system is still oriented towards support of less complex operations than those perceived by China.
Modernization Plans
The PLAAF has recently embarked on a goal of modernization. She has bought air superiority fighters from Russia and plans to induct more state of the art aircraft. Efforts are underway to import new technology to improve the product of domestic industry.
The PLAAF’s top priority is the acquisition of a nation wide air defense capability. This would mainly comprise Russian fighters. Besides, some force multiplier technologies are being sought from western aerospace and defense companies. The PLAAF has initially acquired 24
Su-27's. A further agreement was signed with the Russian Federation for six IL-76 transports. In May 1992 the Russian Federation agreed to supply China with an initial 24 MiG-31 long range interceptors and a further 48 Su-27’s equipped with KH-31P hypersonic anti radiation missiles11. The MiG -31's are expected to be assembled at a newly set up factory at Shenyang. This factory will eventually manufacture 200 MiG-31’s.12 Apart from the latest acquisitions the PLAAF comprises 3000 J-6’s (MiG-19’s), 250 J-7’s (MiG 21’s ), 200 J-8’s, 55 J-8 II, 500 Q-5’s (MiG 19 Interceptor) and 650 Bombers ( H5’s, H-6’s and Tu-4’s); these are basically reverse engineered Soviet aircraft with some having Western upgrades.
China has also acquired Sergeant Fletcher aerial refueling drogue systems from Iran. An Israeli firm Bedek Aviation is installing these on board the Xian B/H - 6 D bomber/refueling tankers. Sources have also reported that China has set up a training base in aerial refueling at Zhanjiang.13 Concurrently, China is also interested in procuring 115 ex-Iraqi Su-25s and MiG 27’s now in Iran for possible acquisition in exchange for Chinese built tanks, artillery pieces, tactical missiles and air defense weapons for the Iranian forces14.
There are also reports of Israel having illegally transferred sensitive US aviation technology to China. China is developing a fighter called the F10 that is reportedly based on the Lavi − A joint Israeli-US fighter jet project that was terminated in 198715. The most important Israeli developed equipment acquired by the PLA is the LAVI’s EI/M-2034 multi-mode fire control radar developed by ELTA. This radar is planned to be installed on a new derivative of the Shenyang J-8-2 Finback fighter currently under development.16 In addition, ELTA is helping the PRC develop an AEW version of the Yun-8 turboprop by a retrofit involving conformal active phased array radars.
China has shown an extremely high degree of skill in reverse engineering. When Soviet advisers withdrew in the early 1960’s, they left factories unfinished. The Chinese demonstrated considerable skill in reverse engineering MiG-19’s and later MiG-21’s and building a small export market. Another outcome of this was a heavy self reliant attitude. Of the four modernization’s that the country embarked upon, defense was on lowest priority. China all along has been a strong believer of 'Peoples War' − A war fought more biased towards numbers rather than quality of weapons. Consequently, she has produced vast numbers of weapons of average standard. There are two channels of arms procurement; the General Service Division run by the armed forces and the civilian aerospace industry. The two organizations generate their own foreign exchange reserves. As a result, not infrequently they work at cross purposes, with the civilian aerospace industry a poor second − Products not meeting defense specifications or, unable to meet laid down time schedules.
The Chinese aerospace companies want technology transfers. Quite understandably, Western firms are reluctant for fear of losing their dominance in the market. Furthermore technology transfers as the Peace Pearl program were terminated by US sanctions imposed after Beijing's crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Tianamen during June 89. Under such conditions, the Chinese defense corporations blatantly ignore copyright and patent laws. They copy the technology anyway.18
Likely Chinese Air Strategy
The PLA’s current strategy hinges on ' Peoples War under Modern Conditions'.19 The strategy basically relates to active defense and consists of taking tactically offensive action within a basically defensive strategy. It hinges on the land strategy of forward presence and perimeter defense. The defending forces undertake offensive operations in order to wear down the enemy while the enemy is strategically on the offensive and attacking. In this overall strategy the PLAAF’s two primary roles in the active defense strategy are to provide air defense for the nation and to support the ground forces. Though the ground support role was defined, the PLAAF did not have a strategic air defense strategy till as late as Mar 91. In 1988 the PLAAF’s SAM and AAA Applied Research Center published an article entitled “Exploration of An Air Defense Strategy." The article basically focused on three aspects of an air defense strategy, firstly, having a strong deterrent by way of effective SAM’s , interceptors, AAA and ECM. The second aspect was to lay priority on SAM’s, the weapon that is the most developed and popular air defense system. Counterattack against enemy bases formed the third part of this strategy.20 One of the impediments at that time in developing a full fledged strategy may be the outdated equipment that the PLAAF possessed. However, the strategy is likely to be much more aggressive by the year 2000. This is so because by that time the PLAAF would have a complement of 72 Su-27’s, 200 MiG -31’s, an unspecified number of J-8-2 Finback fighters along with aerial refueling capability that would provide her with enormous flexibility and punch. A reported development of cruise missiles would enhance this capability.
The PLAAF’s primary objectives in a future conflict with India would be to prevent the Indian Air Force (IAF) from interfering in the PLA’s ground campaign. A second objective would be to enhance the fire power of the PLA, in the Close Air Support (CAS) and Interdiction role. For the success of this strategy the PLAAF would focus on extensive offensive and defensive counter air.
China has shown an inclination to bargain her occupation of Aksai-Chin. The bargain involves a quid-pro-quo with the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh to which China also lays a claim. She also disputes some Indian territory in the central sector. During the last war in 1962 there was extensive ground action in both Aksai - Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. After the cease fire the Chinese withdrew in the Eastern sector to the position they were during the start of the war. In the Aksai Chin sector China still holds the areas captured during the 1962 war. In the central sector barring minor skirmishes, no large scale military action took place. China considers vital the retaining of the Line of Communication passing through Aksai-Chin that links Sinkiang with Tibet. Therefore she is likely to hold a defensive position in the Aksai-Chin sector and launch offensive operations in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. In any future conflict China will find it difficult to break through the present Indian defense positions in the two important sectors of Aksai-Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. This is because the mountain ranges in both sectors provide a formidable defense potential with critical choke points by way of high mountain passes. It is an accepted fact that to move and maintain large bodies of personnel in such terrain requires domination of these choke points. During the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict in the Eastern sector, the Chinese moved small bodies of soldiers via trekking routes to cut off the lines of communications of Indian troops. Though tactically sound and feasible, their success in this case was more as a result of poor leadership of the Indian forces rather than the maneuver itself.21 Consequently, other than air transported operations it would be very difficult for offensive land forces to move large bodies of supply and troops through mountainous terrain. A possibility in using maneuver to advantage would be to move heliborne forces that could sustain themselves for a short duration of time and could dominate vulnerable lines of communications in the rear areas. This facet of air land operations would see increasing application in such terrain.
Weather and terrain are other factors that would govern the intensity of air operations. The North East sector of India has heavy rainfall during the monsoons. If the pre monsoon and post monsoon seasons are included, then between March and October only restricted air operations can be done. Relatively, the Aksai-Chin region is a high altitude desert and gets meager rainfall. The Tibetan terrain poses severe limitations in aircraft operations. Aircraft operations from airfields with average elevations of 13000 feet would reduce the maximum weapon load. This problem could be offset to a large extent if strike aircraft take off with a combination of minimum fuel and maximum weapon load and are air refueled once airborne. China's procurement of this force multiplier would considerably offset such a limitation. Thus, not only would her strike forces be able to operate almost unencumbered from such bases, but they would also benefit by way of increased Radii Of Action (ROA). This would permit them to engage targets deep inside Indian territory. For air defense operations this would improve the already awesome capability of the vast numbers of Su-27's and MiG-31's that the PLAAF would be operating by the year 2000. Accordingly, were the PLAAF to use her strike and air defense elements in the role that she foresees she would have remarkable flexibility. Long term interdiction of targets in the plains of India bordering the Himalayas could prove very advantageous.
The PLAAF lays heavy weightage on CAS. However for most periods of the year in the North Eastern sector the weather would impose severe limitations on the ability of jet aircraft employed for CAS operations. Terrain would be another factor hampering operations in the mountains. Utilization of attack helicopters in such terrain could compensate the shortcomings of fixed wing aircraft. These could be employed not only in CAS operations but also short term interdiction. The forest cover in the Eastern sector provides ideal country for guerrilla type operations. Guerilla teams could be infiltrated/exfiltrated as well as re-supplied by helicopters.
China has a well-developed space program with a capability of putting satellites in geostationary orbit. She has also launched satellites in low earth orbit and sun synchronous orbits. This capability would provide her in another five years a fairly advanced Strategic Reconnaissance capability. Tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles would add to her punch.
Countermeasures by India
India at the cost of some of her social development programs has kept pace in modernizing her Air Force. The drive for this has been more because of a policy of brinkmanship from her Western neighbor Pakistan rather than China. As a result, the current threat perception of the Indian Air Force (IAF) is biased more towards countering a short term threat emanating from her Western borders.
India has 2 squadrons of Mirage-2000’s, 3 squadrons of MiG-29's, 5 squadrons of Jaguar's, 11 squadrons of MiG- 27/23's and 19 squadrons of MiG-21's22. The IAF has a large and modern transport and helicopter fleet mainly of Soviet origin. The transport and helicopter fleets have a major task of undertaking air supply for the troops located in the inaccessible areas of the Himalayan borders. The helicopter fleet also includes Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters.
India’s defense industrial base has a well established aircraft industry. MiG-21's, MiG-27's, Jaguars and Allouette helicopters have been license produced. The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) a state run enterprise is developing a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) that would replace the MiG-21's. The LCA is behind schedule and a prototype would in all likelihood undertake its first flight in 1996. Induction into front-line squadrons is planned in the beginning of the next decade. Because of the delay, an interim solution of the MiG-21 upgrade project has been approved. Consequently, the IAF would enter the twenty-first century with a large inventory of MiG-21's albeit with a fairly advanced look down shoot down radar, inertial navigation system, close combat and BVR missiles.
The IAF has always been weighted heavily towards offensive air operations. During any hostilities India cannot commit her entire Air Force on one front against China. She will perforce have to plan sufficient reserve forces to counter any moves by Pakistan. With the balance of the forces she would undertake to neutralize the important Chinese air fields in Tibet. It may be difficult to gain air superiority in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA), however it would be possible to achieve a Favorable Air Situation for limited periods of time.
The IAF in some respects would have a relative advantage over the PLAAF in regard to air operations. This is particularly so for aircraft operating from the plains of the Central and NE sectors bordering China. These aircraft would not have a maximum load penalty as compared to those operating from airfields at high elevations. In the Aksai Chin sector India faces such a limitation for offensive capability because of the high elevation of the launching bases. With a fairly potent striking power, the IAF could bring about meaningful results in her counter air operations. However, a relative disadvantage that she would face would be in finding suitable counter air targets within the ROA of her strike forces. This is particularly important in view of the fervent efforts underway in China to operationalise air to air refueling. China in all likelihood would base her strike elements in relatively secure locations well beyond the ROA of the IAF strike forces. The advantages of air to air refueling accruing to the PLAAF would degrade the effectiveness of IAF counter air operations. This would show up as a serious limitation for the IAF strike forces. Consequently in regard to CAO there may develop an asymmetry that favors China. India has viewed air to air refueling as unnecessary because in her threat perceptions, there did not exist a threat that required such a capability for neutralization. However, the situation has become totally different in countering a threat from the Chinese Air Force. India would therefore need to acquire an air to air refueling capability to negate the advantages that accrue on this count to a potential adversary.
The IAF has the latest interceptor aircraft and she would be able to prevent any domination of the Indian airspace. However, the IAF does not have any AEW at present and radar cover would be marginal over mountainous terrain. Degraded GCI performance in these areas could hamper the air defense of the Tactical Battle Area (TBA). At best the ground forces would have to increasingly rely on integral AAA and SAM’s. For the past few years, the defense industry in India has been developing an AEW aircraft. India would need to hasten this in view of reports that the PLAAF is negotiating with Russia for the acquisition of the IL-76 Mainstay.
Interdiction operations in the Tibetan plateau should pay good dividends. MiG23’s/27’s, MiG-21 and Jaguars could be effectively employed in this role by the IAF. CAS operations in the NE sector are likely to be hampered because of the terrain and the prevailing weather. In the Aksai Chin sector shortage of IAF airfields in the vicinity of the TBA would reduce the available effort, though attack helicopters would prove effective in both sectors. Heliborne operations could pay rich dividends in moving small forces for sabotage behind enemy lines.
India would also have to invest in more modern Electronic Warfare equipment and develop or purchase anti-radiation missiles. Her battlefield tactical missile Prithvi is a good addition to her offensive capability. India has also produced a pilotless target aircraft that could with more refinements be modified to a first generation cruise missile. Besides, she has recently launched a satellite in sunsynchronous orbit with a military reconnaissance capability; she must continue her efforts at improving her strategic reconnaissance expertise.
Nuclear Aspects
India has not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty. She considers the treaty discriminatory for the treaty allows the haves of the exclusive nuclear club to continue testing and arming themselves with nuclear weapons, whereas, the have-nots cannot do so. Moreover, by endorsing the treaty India foregoes her nuclear option and puts herself in a weak bargaining position to a future border settlement with China. China has adequate strategic and tactical nuclear weapons both ground and submarine launched to have a second strike capability against a superpower. Though China has stated that during any future conflict she will not be the first nation to employ nuclear weapons, yet, such statements cannot be taken totally on face value. Besides, the question of India’s strategic equation with China is linked to that it has with Pakistan. If because of Pakistani achievement of nuclear capability, India too decides to weaponise, then this would lead to a grossly inferior nuclear India as compared to China.23 The earlier Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif publicly declared that Pakistan has an atomic device. Under these circumstances, it would be a monumental folly on India’s part not to weaponise. India has no confirmed nuclear arsenal and even if she was to do so, she would not be able to bridge the gap with respect to China. Viewed from this standpoint India must shed her peaceful non violent Ahimsa image and achieve a minimum level of deterrence in respect to China. India also has a fairly successful space program going and she could certainly make use of parallel technologies in order to achieve a credible delivery system.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the present improvement of Sino-Indian relations India's border problem with China may not be easily resolved. With China's increasing economic and military might it would be wishful thinking on India's part to expect China to vacate Aksai-Chin. As a result China would constitute a long term threat to India and must worry her. Nonetheless, India can take satisfaction in the fact that her armed forces are considerably different in equipment, training and leadership than those encountered by the Chinese in 1962. The Himalayan range provides a unique and immense defense potential that was not fully exploited in the last war. If India was to adopt the Clausewitzian norm of ‘Defense is the stronger form of warfare’, she would stand in good stead.
Despite the routine modernization of the Indian Air Force the military leadership must urge the powers that be for more state of the art acquisitions so as to counter the likely threat that may emerge from her Northern frontier. India would also require to be more categorical on the nuclear issue. Quite clearly her two neighbors possess nuclear weapons and these can only be countered by achieving a minimum level of deterrence.
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I "ve just posted part of the document ,for more refer the doc.
Even though its a 16 year old assessment(1995) ,
How much relevance does it have today and
Have the short coming of the IAF been addressed?
We Chinese of course like such reports, basically you pay $$$ to let someone to fool you buy writing such high inaccurate reports. what a positive contribution to our military strength!!
