Good to see ASEAN moving ahead. If they can bring China-Korea & Japan in the bloc, that would be a formidable economic force to reckon with. Pax Americana will be in it's twilight era then. Otherwise Washington will continue to dominate world economy in the foreseeable future. EU's economic model has worked but still a long way to go to counter uncle Sam.
ASEAN Affairs Forum
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chathrapathi
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China will never go into a bloc thats competing with America. Without America, China will fall immediately.
pr1v4t33r
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ASEAN+3 = ASEAN + China, Japan, and Korea. They are already become important ASEAN dialogue partner.
link : ASEAN +3
link : ASEAN +3
pr1v4t33r
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Indonesia Earning Respect through Leadership within ASEAN
Indonesia’s experience within ASEAN has been that leadership in a world of sovereign states must be earned and nurtured, not imposed at will.
Geographically, demographically and economically speaking, Indonesia constitutes a significant part of ASEAN. However, these elements do not automatically translate on their own into influence and leadership. The geopolitics and geo-economics of the Southeast Asia region depend on skills of statecraft and diplomacy: these are the qualities, which translate the potential for leadership into reality. Indonesia’s approach has been to apply smart power — namely, a combination of soft power and hard power, together with a readiness to provide intellectual and policy leadership.
Drawing lessons from the past, and driven not least by a keen interest not to repeat the shortcomings of larger countries, recent Indonesian foreign policy has crafted a more nuanced, calibrated and deft approach to leadership within ASEAN. This is an approach, which places primacy on the promotion of trust and confidence in Indonesia within ASEAN. Rather than being a country that throws its weight around, Indonesia’s diplomacy follows the maxim that ‘less is more’ and so is often more effective in influencing outcomes. Indonesia’s approach is that of a country entrusted to promote the common interests of the region. In ASEAN parlance, it seeks to be a country that works at the ‘comfort level’ of its regional peers.
At the risk of oversimplification, three themes at the national, regional, and global levels illustrate Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN over the recent years.
The first is the introduction of the subjects of democracy and human rights in ASEAN discourse through the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community (the others being the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Communities). The discourse was adopted in 2003 during Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN as part of the Bali Concord II platform.
While there is clearly, a fair way to go to attain the kind of democratic community envisaged in the APSC, it is not possible to exaggerate the fundamental significance of the APSC vision. No longer can there be a blanket disregard of developments within each individual member state given that ASEAN now constitutes a ‘community’ or even a ‘family’. For Indonesia, the ‘democratisation’ of ASEAN, while naturally occurring at different speeds, has been essential to ensure that there is no ‘disconnect’ between regional level developments and Indonesia’s national level democratisation since 1998.
Indonesia’s leadership in strengthening ASEAN’s democratic architecture has not been limited to the building of norms and principles, through documents such as the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, as well as institutions such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Indonesia has also made significant strides in promoting certain practices, such as transparency around internal sovereign developments at ASEAN meetings, in the hope that they will generate a ‘demonstrative spill-over effect’ elsewhere. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the acceleration of reform in Myanmar in 2011 took place during Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN. This was the result of, among other things, a judicious combination of policies, formal and informal, regional and bilateral, which in total helped create conditions conducive for further reform.
A second illustration of Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN has been on the issue of regional architecture. In recent years, Indonesia has been at the forefront in ensuring that the group’s much-cited principle of being in the ‘driving seat’ of regional integration is tangibly realised in the association’s engagement with its external partners. In this way, Indonesia has, in a judicious and consensus-building manner, sought to provide leadership in ASEAN. Hence, its vision of an East Asia Summit that included India, Australia and New Zealand, rather than one that was limited to the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), came to fruition in 2005. In the subsequent evolution of the EAS, Indonesia was able to achieve the concurrent admission of Russia and the United States in 2011, representing the realisation of its ‘dynamic equilibrium’ policy. Indonesia has also been successful in having the EAS adopt the so-called Bali Principles in 2011 that inter alia provide for peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force among EAS members.
Indonesia’s leadership on regional security has clearly extended beyond regional architecture building. A case in point was its role in managing the real potential for conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in 2011 over the disputed Preah Vihear temple in the border region. Another was its unprecedented ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in 2012 that helped restore ASEAN unity on the issue of the South China Sea through the adoption of the so-called ‘Six Point Principles’.
In addition, Indonesia’s leadership took ASEAN cooperation to a higher level through the Bali Concord III of 2011. The ‘ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations’ envisions a common ASEAN approach to addressing global issues. Much like the Bali Concord II, the Bali Concord III aims to ensure synergy between Indonesia’s increasing global reach and the region’s own global-level ambitions and aspirations. This is a true reflection of Indonesia as a regional power with global interests.
For Indonesia, leadership in ASEAN has had to be earned through sound policies. To successfully navigate, and indeed lead, the dynamic ASEAN framework has more often-required quiet rather than megaphone diplomacy; an ability to master informal rather than formal channels of communication; and an emphasis on common rather than narrow interests. Last but not least, embracing a leadership role in ASEAN demands the capacity to be forward-looking — to shape and mould — rather than just react to developments.
Leadership in ASEAN is a process, not an event. It is one quite distinct from ASEAN chair alone. It must be nurtured, and above all, it must be earned.
Indonesia Earning Respect through Leadership within ASEAN | Economy Watch
Indonesia’s experience within ASEAN has been that leadership in a world of sovereign states must be earned and nurtured, not imposed at will.
Geographically, demographically and economically speaking, Indonesia constitutes a significant part of ASEAN. However, these elements do not automatically translate on their own into influence and leadership. The geopolitics and geo-economics of the Southeast Asia region depend on skills of statecraft and diplomacy: these are the qualities, which translate the potential for leadership into reality. Indonesia’s approach has been to apply smart power — namely, a combination of soft power and hard power, together with a readiness to provide intellectual and policy leadership.
Drawing lessons from the past, and driven not least by a keen interest not to repeat the shortcomings of larger countries, recent Indonesian foreign policy has crafted a more nuanced, calibrated and deft approach to leadership within ASEAN. This is an approach, which places primacy on the promotion of trust and confidence in Indonesia within ASEAN. Rather than being a country that throws its weight around, Indonesia’s diplomacy follows the maxim that ‘less is more’ and so is often more effective in influencing outcomes. Indonesia’s approach is that of a country entrusted to promote the common interests of the region. In ASEAN parlance, it seeks to be a country that works at the ‘comfort level’ of its regional peers.
At the risk of oversimplification, three themes at the national, regional, and global levels illustrate Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN over the recent years.
The first is the introduction of the subjects of democracy and human rights in ASEAN discourse through the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community (the others being the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Communities). The discourse was adopted in 2003 during Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN as part of the Bali Concord II platform.
While there is clearly, a fair way to go to attain the kind of democratic community envisaged in the APSC, it is not possible to exaggerate the fundamental significance of the APSC vision. No longer can there be a blanket disregard of developments within each individual member state given that ASEAN now constitutes a ‘community’ or even a ‘family’. For Indonesia, the ‘democratisation’ of ASEAN, while naturally occurring at different speeds, has been essential to ensure that there is no ‘disconnect’ between regional level developments and Indonesia’s national level democratisation since 1998.
Indonesia’s leadership in strengthening ASEAN’s democratic architecture has not been limited to the building of norms and principles, through documents such as the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, as well as institutions such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Indonesia has also made significant strides in promoting certain practices, such as transparency around internal sovereign developments at ASEAN meetings, in the hope that they will generate a ‘demonstrative spill-over effect’ elsewhere. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the acceleration of reform in Myanmar in 2011 took place during Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN. This was the result of, among other things, a judicious combination of policies, formal and informal, regional and bilateral, which in total helped create conditions conducive for further reform.
A second illustration of Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN has been on the issue of regional architecture. In recent years, Indonesia has been at the forefront in ensuring that the group’s much-cited principle of being in the ‘driving seat’ of regional integration is tangibly realised in the association’s engagement with its external partners. In this way, Indonesia has, in a judicious and consensus-building manner, sought to provide leadership in ASEAN. Hence, its vision of an East Asia Summit that included India, Australia and New Zealand, rather than one that was limited to the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), came to fruition in 2005. In the subsequent evolution of the EAS, Indonesia was able to achieve the concurrent admission of Russia and the United States in 2011, representing the realisation of its ‘dynamic equilibrium’ policy. Indonesia has also been successful in having the EAS adopt the so-called Bali Principles in 2011 that inter alia provide for peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force among EAS members.
Indonesia’s leadership on regional security has clearly extended beyond regional architecture building. A case in point was its role in managing the real potential for conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in 2011 over the disputed Preah Vihear temple in the border region. Another was its unprecedented ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in 2012 that helped restore ASEAN unity on the issue of the South China Sea through the adoption of the so-called ‘Six Point Principles’.
In addition, Indonesia’s leadership took ASEAN cooperation to a higher level through the Bali Concord III of 2011. The ‘ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations’ envisions a common ASEAN approach to addressing global issues. Much like the Bali Concord II, the Bali Concord III aims to ensure synergy between Indonesia’s increasing global reach and the region’s own global-level ambitions and aspirations. This is a true reflection of Indonesia as a regional power with global interests.
For Indonesia, leadership in ASEAN has had to be earned through sound policies. To successfully navigate, and indeed lead, the dynamic ASEAN framework has more often-required quiet rather than megaphone diplomacy; an ability to master informal rather than formal channels of communication; and an emphasis on common rather than narrow interests. Last but not least, embracing a leadership role in ASEAN demands the capacity to be forward-looking — to shape and mould — rather than just react to developments.
Leadership in ASEAN is a process, not an event. It is one quite distinct from ASEAN chair alone. It must be nurtured, and above all, it must be earned.
Indonesia Earning Respect through Leadership within ASEAN | Economy Watch
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OMG, Vietnam is the poorest one, Even Little Phili is doing better than Vietnam!
I think I get the reason why Vietnam is so high in the SCS these days!
Looking for Cash Aid ,huh?
Vietnam's leader always went to China for begging some Financial Aid between year of 2008-2015.
Traitor will always be Traitor.
I think I get the reason why Vietnam is so high in the SCS these days!
Looking for Cash Aid ,huh?
Vietnam's leader always went to China for begging some Financial Aid between year of 2008-2015.
Traitor will always be Traitor.
Last edited:
pr1v4t33r
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ASEAN police urged to strengthen ties
The government has urged Southeast Asian police forces to forge closer links in the fight against transnational crime with the advent of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at the end of this year. Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla said on Tuesday that police forces should work together to share their skills and experience in order to create a safe environment for the people of Southeast Asia.
“The ASEAN Economic Community will soon be implemented. Although [the AEC] will affect [the region], [police forces] must continue to protect and serve the public in terms of problems that we would all like to solve,” Kalla said in an opening speech at the 35th ASEANAPOL conference in Central Jakarta.
“A country’s stability can only be ensured if there is security in the region and a country’s security can only be guaranteed if there is stability in the region.”
The AEC, which will be officially launched on Dec. 31, 2015, will provide freer movement of goods, services and skilled labor among ASEAN member countries.
Kalla noted that Indonesia was experienced in the field of terrorism, but said that the country could not work alone, as experience had taught the National Police that militant groups received much of their equipment from abroad.
“Terrorists in Indonesia have also trained others in the region, which may have contributed to similar conflicts abroad,” he said.
Meanwhile, National Police chief Gen. Badrodin Haiti explained that ASEANAPOL had already decided on several crimes that they would like to focus their cooperation on, including illegal fishing, drug trafficking, human trafficking, economic crimes and wildlife crimes. The cooperation for the past 35 years, Badrodin said, had proved fruitful for investigations and increasing the skills of officers.
However, he acknowledged that different laws in each ASEAN member country sometimes presented an obstacle to tackling transnational crime.
“There are always certain technical difficulties when cooperating in the field to solve a transnational crime. The different laws in each country can get in the way,” Badrodin said.
He added that he hoped that through the conference — with all 10 ASEAN member states in attendance, along with dialogue partners from six countries, two international organizations and four observer countries — regional police forces could find ways to overcome legal differences.
“Although we have different legal systems, we also have good relations and we can cooperate to overcome the differences,” he said.
The most recent high-profile transnational crime was a case of slavery in Benjina, Maluku, with more than a thousand foreigners and Indonesians allegedly forced and tricked into working long hours for little pay for fishing firm PT Pusaka Benjina Resources (PBR).
Police officials claim that many of the slaves had been trafficked from Thailand. Seven men have been named suspects in Indonesia.
Badrodin said, though, that the Benjina case was not scheduled for discussion during the conference.
“However, we may speak about similar cases in bilateral meetings,” he said.
ASEAN police urged to strengthen ties | The Jakarta Post
The government has urged Southeast Asian police forces to forge closer links in the fight against transnational crime with the advent of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at the end of this year. Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla said on Tuesday that police forces should work together to share their skills and experience in order to create a safe environment for the people of Southeast Asia.
“The ASEAN Economic Community will soon be implemented. Although [the AEC] will affect [the region], [police forces] must continue to protect and serve the public in terms of problems that we would all like to solve,” Kalla said in an opening speech at the 35th ASEANAPOL conference in Central Jakarta.
“A country’s stability can only be ensured if there is security in the region and a country’s security can only be guaranteed if there is stability in the region.”
The AEC, which will be officially launched on Dec. 31, 2015, will provide freer movement of goods, services and skilled labor among ASEAN member countries.
Kalla noted that Indonesia was experienced in the field of terrorism, but said that the country could not work alone, as experience had taught the National Police that militant groups received much of their equipment from abroad.
“Terrorists in Indonesia have also trained others in the region, which may have contributed to similar conflicts abroad,” he said.
Meanwhile, National Police chief Gen. Badrodin Haiti explained that ASEANAPOL had already decided on several crimes that they would like to focus their cooperation on, including illegal fishing, drug trafficking, human trafficking, economic crimes and wildlife crimes. The cooperation for the past 35 years, Badrodin said, had proved fruitful for investigations and increasing the skills of officers.
However, he acknowledged that different laws in each ASEAN member country sometimes presented an obstacle to tackling transnational crime.
“There are always certain technical difficulties when cooperating in the field to solve a transnational crime. The different laws in each country can get in the way,” Badrodin said.
He added that he hoped that through the conference — with all 10 ASEAN member states in attendance, along with dialogue partners from six countries, two international organizations and four observer countries — regional police forces could find ways to overcome legal differences.
“Although we have different legal systems, we also have good relations and we can cooperate to overcome the differences,” he said.
The most recent high-profile transnational crime was a case of slavery in Benjina, Maluku, with more than a thousand foreigners and Indonesians allegedly forced and tricked into working long hours for little pay for fishing firm PT Pusaka Benjina Resources (PBR).
Police officials claim that many of the slaves had been trafficked from Thailand. Seven men have been named suspects in Indonesia.
Badrodin said, though, that the Benjina case was not scheduled for discussion during the conference.
“However, we may speak about similar cases in bilateral meetings,” he said.
ASEAN police urged to strengthen ties | The Jakarta Post
Zero_wing
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Typical chinese troll your not doing so well yourselves typical cant even respect a country enough to spell the name right arrogant jerk
Laos is a Key Country in Russia's Pivot to Asian Integration
Southeast Asia is one of the economic powerhouses of the world, and its prized position in the global economy is only expected to grow in the coming future. This is why all the Great Powers are racing to (re)develop and reinforce their ties with the region, Russia being foremost among them.
Ever since the onset of the New Cold War, Russia has been compelled to rapidly reorient its strategic focus eastward after witnessing firsthand how flimsy its friendship with the West really was. While most commentators rightfully draw attention to Russia’s growing full-spectrum relations with China , many of them neglect the fact that the country isn’t its sole partner or interest in the Asia-Pacific.
Vietnam also forms a key lynchpin of Russia’s strategy there, and it’s through adroitly managing its social assets in the country that Russia can make its presence felt in the heartland of mainland ASEAN, Laos.
Land-Linking Laos
The author wrote an in-depth expose back in April about the strategic importance of Laos in forming the principal conduit of China’s ASEAN Silk Road , and the analysis holds just as firm today as it did then.
The centrally positioned country connects to all the other mainland members of ASEAN and accordingly provides Beijing with an opening to extend its influence throughout the rest of the region. Not only is the country becoming land-linked through its pivotal transit relationship with China, however, but it’s also capitalizing on its historical ties with Vietnam to draw in trade and investment from the east. In fact, Vientiane and Hanoi just signed a border trade agreement at the end of last month stipulating that “import tax rates for goods made in Vietnam and Laos, as well as various products made by Vietnamese investors in Laos, will be reduced to zero.”
What this basically means is that tariffs will be eliminated between both countries and a de-facto free trade zone will take its place. This is extremely beneficial for both parties, but interestingly also opens up some exciting opportunities that Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union could utilize in the coming future.
Russia’s ASEAN Pivot
In order to fully understand how Vietnam and Laos’ de-facto forthcoming free trade agreement can directly benefit Russia and appreciate the way in which this serendipitously came to be, a concise review of the country’s ASEAN pivot needs to be commenced first:
Vietnam:
Moscow has had privileged ties with Hanoi ever since the US War on Vietnam, and despite undergoing a rough patch of relative neglect during the 1990s, they still remained among Russia’s strongest post-Cold War relationships (alongside the one with Syria ). The reason that bilateral ties managed to survive that troubling decade is because of the tourism and arms trade sectors that continued to thrive during the period, and correspondingly formed the basis for exploring the expansion of trade links even further in the past years. The result of this has been the signing of the Vietnam-Eurasian Union free trade agreementthat symbolically (and substantially) shows that Russia’s Asian Pivot is about more than just China, and that Moscow has intentions to establish a more robust presence in ASEAN.
Thailand:
After Vietnam, ties with Thailand have also been on the upswing, especially since the change of government last year that swept Yingluck Shinawatra out of power. Prayut Chan-o-cha, the new leader of Thailand, has been much more pragmatic than his predecessor and exceptionally more eager to diversify his country’s partnerships. During Prime Minister Medvedev’s visit to the country in April, the two spoke about the possibility of a free trade agreement between the Southeast Asian state and the Eurasian Union, which set the stage for Trade and Industry Minister Denis Manturov’s recent announcement that Thailand’s formal application for such is expected to be submitted by year’s end. Taken together with the agreement already concluded with Vietnam, Russia would then be in a free trade area with the two largest mainland ASEAN economies and become anchored to Indochina’s most economically productive coastland areas.
Myanmar:
Somewhat unexpectedly to some, Russia signaled at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum in June that it plans to become a major actor in Myanmar, signing a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with the country and even giving its Vice President the honor of presenting a keynote plenary speech alongside President Putin. More than likely, the country’s role has been elevated in the view of Russian diplomacy due to its enormous economic potential (despite the astounding political risks ), and it’s probable that Moscow envisions adding Naypyidaw to its list of free trade partners sometime in the future. If this comes to pass, alongside the clinching of a free trade agreement with Thailand, then it’s very probable that Russia could attempt to seal a free trade deal with all of ASEAN, or at the very least, the last two remaining mainland states, Cambodia and Laos.
* * *
Doing so with Cambodia wouldn’t be that difficult, since China’s entrenched interests in the new SCO dialogue partner and its implicit global cooperation with Moscow via the Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership would see to it that Phnom Penh takes the natural and swift decision in this direction when the appropriate time arrives. As regards Laos, it will be described in the next section how the country is about to be in a quasi-free trade zone with Russia, whether or not this is even recognized at the moment by either side. To sum it all up beforehand, though, the reader should understand that Russia’s ultimate goal in ASEAN is to enter into a bloc-to-bloc free trade area between it and the Eurasian Union, which would then see the employment of China’s land and maritime Silk Road networks to facilitate the transit of goods between both sides. Under this vision, all sides stand to achieve major benefits, and as for Russia, one of the principal ones would be the extension of its Eurasian reach to the furthest extremity points of the supercontinent.
Getting Lucky In Laos
Having acquired a brief understanding of Russia’s grand strategy towards ASEAN, it’s now possible for the reader to adequately follow how Russia’s forthcoming quasi-free trade zone with Laos came to be. Vietnam, as it was initially mentioned, signed a border trade agreement with its neighbor that will essentially create a free trade zone between the two, and specifically give certain privileges to Vietnamese investors in Laos. At the same time, however, it was also noted how Vietnam just recently entered into a formal free trade agreement with the Eurasian Union. Connecting the threads, and considering the presence of certain strategic Russian business interests in Vietnam (most notably in this case, the tourism sector, which will be expanded upon soon), it’s conceivable to suggest that Vietnamese-based Russian businesses will be granted the same privileges in Laos as their ethnic Vietnamese counterparts in the country, the effect of which would be to open up a semi-official (albeit limited) free trade zone between Laos and Russia (or theoretically any of the other Eurasian Union member states) that transits through Vietnam.
The implications pertaining to this realization are huge, since it means that Russia can gain a strategic foothold in Laos via the overlapping free trade agreements. On the surface, mainland Southeast Asia’s least populous and most undeveloped country doesn’t seem like much of an economic opportunity for anyone, but upon closer examination (as was discussed in an earlier-cited piece ), there’s a wealth of untapped mineral and other natural resources there, to say nothing of the logistics edge that the country will have in being the pivotal connector between the Chinese and Thai components of the ASEAN Silk Road. The country also plans to amend its Constitution shortly in order to make it more business-friendly, meaning that if Vietnamese-based Russian companies can be ‘grandfathered’ into the legislation, then they’d be in a prime advantage vis-à-vis their competitors. The thing, is however, that Russia’s lost a lot of its soft power and overall influence in the country since the heyday of the Soviet era , meaning that it’s currently not in the best position to flex its economic muscle there, no matter the legal loopholes that presently work to its advantage or the constitutional urgency in doing so as soon as possible.
An innovative solution does present itself, however, and that’s the utilization of Russia’s established tourism industry network in Vietnam to serve as the vanguard for penetrating the Laotian market. Individuals employed in this field obviously have some degree of knowledge of the Vietnamese language (which is a given if they’re locals), and therein lies the first step in facilitating the return of Russian influence into Laos. According to official statistics released from February of this year, around 25% of the more than 4 million tourists that visited Laos last year were from Vietnam, and seeing as how the two languages are dissimilar, it’s reasonable to conclude that a sizeable segment of the Laotian population speaks Vietnamese to a working capacity. This means that the Vietnamese-speaking employees of Vietnam-based Russian companies can engage in market assessment operations to ascertain the social, material, and investment needs of the country, which would give their bosses valuable economic knowledge that they could either profit from themselves in diversifying their business portfolios or sell to other Russian companies interested in making inroads there. Even if Russian companies aren’t aware of or totally interested in Laos just yet, the discussion to start direct or charter flights between the two countries could make this investment (and tourist) destination much more attractive and convenient in the near future, so it’s therefore in the best interest of any Russian-owned entrepreneurial company in Vietnam to take the lead in this before others catch on.
Concluding Thoughts
All in all, Russia needs to be aware of the manner in which it can apply its already existing Vietnamese-based tourist industry in advancing strategic objectives in Laos. The promotion of robust business interests in the land-linked country (be they tourist, mineral, or other) via the exploitation of the overlapping free trade legislations centered on Vietnam can further Moscow’s ultimate goal of formalizing a free trade agreement with Laos and using such a development as a launching pad for promoting a pan-regional free trade area sometime in the future. As a result of such a lucky legal arrangement, Russia has a sizeable opportunity to deepen, as well as accelerate, its Pivot to ASEAN, but it must use its presently available human capital in Vietnam to bring this about. Russian-owned tourist companies in the country have the valuable language skills needed to communicate with Laotians (a significant portion of whom speak Vietnamese for historical and practical reasons), so they can form the vanguard in spearheading renewed Russian investment in the country, either through their own market discoveries or by selling such information to interested compatriots. Looked at from this perspective, Russia does in fact have a realistic possibility of expanding its economic interests into Laos, provided of course that it can harness the motivational will to take the initiative in the first place.
Laos is a Key Country in Russia's Pivot to Asian Integration
- The Vietnamese and Laotians love Russia for coming to their defense and literally saving them during the Vietnam war
- Between 1964 and 1973, US bombing raids made Laos the “most heavily bombed country on earth,” where American B-52s dropped an average of one bomb-load every eight minutes, 24 hours a day, totaling more ordinance than was dropped during the whole of WWII. (Wikipedia)
Southeast Asia is one of the economic powerhouses of the world, and its prized position in the global economy is only expected to grow in the coming future. This is why all the Great Powers are racing to (re)develop and reinforce their ties with the region, Russia being foremost among them.
Ever since the onset of the New Cold War, Russia has been compelled to rapidly reorient its strategic focus eastward after witnessing firsthand how flimsy its friendship with the West really was. While most commentators rightfully draw attention to Russia’s growing full-spectrum relations with China , many of them neglect the fact that the country isn’t its sole partner or interest in the Asia-Pacific.
Vietnam also forms a key lynchpin of Russia’s strategy there, and it’s through adroitly managing its social assets in the country that Russia can make its presence felt in the heartland of mainland ASEAN, Laos.
Land-Linking Laos
The author wrote an in-depth expose back in April about the strategic importance of Laos in forming the principal conduit of China’s ASEAN Silk Road , and the analysis holds just as firm today as it did then.
The centrally positioned country connects to all the other mainland members of ASEAN and accordingly provides Beijing with an opening to extend its influence throughout the rest of the region. Not only is the country becoming land-linked through its pivotal transit relationship with China, however, but it’s also capitalizing on its historical ties with Vietnam to draw in trade and investment from the east. In fact, Vientiane and Hanoi just signed a border trade agreement at the end of last month stipulating that “import tax rates for goods made in Vietnam and Laos, as well as various products made by Vietnamese investors in Laos, will be reduced to zero.”
What this basically means is that tariffs will be eliminated between both countries and a de-facto free trade zone will take its place. This is extremely beneficial for both parties, but interestingly also opens up some exciting opportunities that Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union could utilize in the coming future.
Russia’s ASEAN Pivot
In order to fully understand how Vietnam and Laos’ de-facto forthcoming free trade agreement can directly benefit Russia and appreciate the way in which this serendipitously came to be, a concise review of the country’s ASEAN pivot needs to be commenced first:
Vietnam:
Moscow has had privileged ties with Hanoi ever since the US War on Vietnam, and despite undergoing a rough patch of relative neglect during the 1990s, they still remained among Russia’s strongest post-Cold War relationships (alongside the one with Syria ). The reason that bilateral ties managed to survive that troubling decade is because of the tourism and arms trade sectors that continued to thrive during the period, and correspondingly formed the basis for exploring the expansion of trade links even further in the past years. The result of this has been the signing of the Vietnam-Eurasian Union free trade agreementthat symbolically (and substantially) shows that Russia’s Asian Pivot is about more than just China, and that Moscow has intentions to establish a more robust presence in ASEAN.
Thailand:
After Vietnam, ties with Thailand have also been on the upswing, especially since the change of government last year that swept Yingluck Shinawatra out of power. Prayut Chan-o-cha, the new leader of Thailand, has been much more pragmatic than his predecessor and exceptionally more eager to diversify his country’s partnerships. During Prime Minister Medvedev’s visit to the country in April, the two spoke about the possibility of a free trade agreement between the Southeast Asian state and the Eurasian Union, which set the stage for Trade and Industry Minister Denis Manturov’s recent announcement that Thailand’s formal application for such is expected to be submitted by year’s end. Taken together with the agreement already concluded with Vietnam, Russia would then be in a free trade area with the two largest mainland ASEAN economies and become anchored to Indochina’s most economically productive coastland areas.
Myanmar:
Somewhat unexpectedly to some, Russia signaled at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum in June that it plans to become a major actor in Myanmar, signing a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with the country and even giving its Vice President the honor of presenting a keynote plenary speech alongside President Putin. More than likely, the country’s role has been elevated in the view of Russian diplomacy due to its enormous economic potential (despite the astounding political risks ), and it’s probable that Moscow envisions adding Naypyidaw to its list of free trade partners sometime in the future. If this comes to pass, alongside the clinching of a free trade agreement with Thailand, then it’s very probable that Russia could attempt to seal a free trade deal with all of ASEAN, or at the very least, the last two remaining mainland states, Cambodia and Laos.
* * *
Doing so with Cambodia wouldn’t be that difficult, since China’s entrenched interests in the new SCO dialogue partner and its implicit global cooperation with Moscow via the Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership would see to it that Phnom Penh takes the natural and swift decision in this direction when the appropriate time arrives. As regards Laos, it will be described in the next section how the country is about to be in a quasi-free trade zone with Russia, whether or not this is even recognized at the moment by either side. To sum it all up beforehand, though, the reader should understand that Russia’s ultimate goal in ASEAN is to enter into a bloc-to-bloc free trade area between it and the Eurasian Union, which would then see the employment of China’s land and maritime Silk Road networks to facilitate the transit of goods between both sides. Under this vision, all sides stand to achieve major benefits, and as for Russia, one of the principal ones would be the extension of its Eurasian reach to the furthest extremity points of the supercontinent.
Getting Lucky In Laos
Having acquired a brief understanding of Russia’s grand strategy towards ASEAN, it’s now possible for the reader to adequately follow how Russia’s forthcoming quasi-free trade zone with Laos came to be. Vietnam, as it was initially mentioned, signed a border trade agreement with its neighbor that will essentially create a free trade zone between the two, and specifically give certain privileges to Vietnamese investors in Laos. At the same time, however, it was also noted how Vietnam just recently entered into a formal free trade agreement with the Eurasian Union. Connecting the threads, and considering the presence of certain strategic Russian business interests in Vietnam (most notably in this case, the tourism sector, which will be expanded upon soon), it’s conceivable to suggest that Vietnamese-based Russian businesses will be granted the same privileges in Laos as their ethnic Vietnamese counterparts in the country, the effect of which would be to open up a semi-official (albeit limited) free trade zone between Laos and Russia (or theoretically any of the other Eurasian Union member states) that transits through Vietnam.
The implications pertaining to this realization are huge, since it means that Russia can gain a strategic foothold in Laos via the overlapping free trade agreements. On the surface, mainland Southeast Asia’s least populous and most undeveloped country doesn’t seem like much of an economic opportunity for anyone, but upon closer examination (as was discussed in an earlier-cited piece ), there’s a wealth of untapped mineral and other natural resources there, to say nothing of the logistics edge that the country will have in being the pivotal connector between the Chinese and Thai components of the ASEAN Silk Road. The country also plans to amend its Constitution shortly in order to make it more business-friendly, meaning that if Vietnamese-based Russian companies can be ‘grandfathered’ into the legislation, then they’d be in a prime advantage vis-à-vis their competitors. The thing, is however, that Russia’s lost a lot of its soft power and overall influence in the country since the heyday of the Soviet era , meaning that it’s currently not in the best position to flex its economic muscle there, no matter the legal loopholes that presently work to its advantage or the constitutional urgency in doing so as soon as possible.
An innovative solution does present itself, however, and that’s the utilization of Russia’s established tourism industry network in Vietnam to serve as the vanguard for penetrating the Laotian market. Individuals employed in this field obviously have some degree of knowledge of the Vietnamese language (which is a given if they’re locals), and therein lies the first step in facilitating the return of Russian influence into Laos. According to official statistics released from February of this year, around 25% of the more than 4 million tourists that visited Laos last year were from Vietnam, and seeing as how the two languages are dissimilar, it’s reasonable to conclude that a sizeable segment of the Laotian population speaks Vietnamese to a working capacity. This means that the Vietnamese-speaking employees of Vietnam-based Russian companies can engage in market assessment operations to ascertain the social, material, and investment needs of the country, which would give their bosses valuable economic knowledge that they could either profit from themselves in diversifying their business portfolios or sell to other Russian companies interested in making inroads there. Even if Russian companies aren’t aware of or totally interested in Laos just yet, the discussion to start direct or charter flights between the two countries could make this investment (and tourist) destination much more attractive and convenient in the near future, so it’s therefore in the best interest of any Russian-owned entrepreneurial company in Vietnam to take the lead in this before others catch on.
Concluding Thoughts
All in all, Russia needs to be aware of the manner in which it can apply its already existing Vietnamese-based tourist industry in advancing strategic objectives in Laos. The promotion of robust business interests in the land-linked country (be they tourist, mineral, or other) via the exploitation of the overlapping free trade legislations centered on Vietnam can further Moscow’s ultimate goal of formalizing a free trade agreement with Laos and using such a development as a launching pad for promoting a pan-regional free trade area sometime in the future. As a result of such a lucky legal arrangement, Russia has a sizeable opportunity to deepen, as well as accelerate, its Pivot to ASEAN, but it must use its presently available human capital in Vietnam to bring this about. Russian-owned tourist companies in the country have the valuable language skills needed to communicate with Laotians (a significant portion of whom speak Vietnamese for historical and practical reasons), so they can form the vanguard in spearheading renewed Russian investment in the country, either through their own market discoveries or by selling such information to interested compatriots. Looked at from this perspective, Russia does in fact have a realistic possibility of expanding its economic interests into Laos, provided of course that it can harness the motivational will to take the initiative in the first place.
Laos is a Key Country in Russia's Pivot to Asian Integration
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