China: Seizing the Moment in Afghanistan
16 October 2012
Afghanistan is on its way to recovering from a decade-long occupation. As NATO gets ready to withdraw from the country by 2014, others are coming in. China, in this regard, appears to be one of the major actors getting ready to fill in the space soon to be emptied. Obviously, China will not engage in nation building, a task that the U.S. has failed in. China’s engagement is likely going to be largely geopolitical and economic.
The approaching the drawdown will not completely phase out the U.S. presence in the country. According to the plan, a considerable number of troops will continue to be stationed to provide training for the Afghan Army. Yet this is in no way an obstacle to Beijing’s strategy. As a matter of fact, it assists China in two ways: First, the U.S. presence will keep the insurgency occupied and the further spread of extremist ideologies across the Chinese borders relatively in check. Second, being a military entity, it will provide a legitimate target for the warring factions. Beijing, in this case, will be able to remain concentrated on concrete economic gains without worrying much about an armed insurgency.
Recent moves by China have indeed rendered a stark contrast with the way the country handled its Afghanistan policy in the past decade. Throughout the eleven years of U.S. occupation, China practically kept the 46-mile-long border with Afghanistan impoverished. The Wakhan Corridor remained inaccessible with no modern road or railroad connection. Although there were several reciprocal visits over the years, no breakthrough has been achieved. This was due to China’s unwillingness to provide to a country under U.S. occupation.
In 2007, China became the biggest investor in Afghanistan with the state-owned China Metallurgical Group Corporation winning a bid worth $3.5 billion (the largest foreign investment in the history of the nation) to develop the Aynak copper mine in Logar province. However, given Afghanistan’s geographical proximity and untapped deposits of natural resources (copper, iron, gold, coal, and oil), China would have been much more active if it had not kept the relations to a minimum because of strategic considerations.
China did not want a prosperous country on its Western border while it was under U.S. occupation. A stable Afghanistan would invite a longer and deeper U.S. engagement. By keeping Kabul at arm’s length yet not making big commitments, China effectively undermined U.S. efforts through inactivity. Initially, Beijing had two options: On the one hand, it could have tried to further destabilize Afghanistan to make the country a deeper hole for the NATO forces. On the other hand, China could have jumped onto the wagon to take part in the post-invasion nation building efforts, possibly gobbling up a sizeable political and economic share. However, in the first case, China would have been seen as an unfriendly neighbor by Kabul, which would have strained their historical friendship and reduced the likelihood of future cooperation. In the second case, the glory of establishing stability and ensuring political and economic development in Afghanistan would have put the U.S.-led coalition in a positive light and bolstered NATO’s credibility.
Hence, it is of little surprise that the first comprehensive agreement between Beijing and Kabul was not signed until NATO announced that it would drastically reduce its military imprint in Afghanistan. The document, called the Joint Declaration between The People's Republic of China and The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Establishing Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, was signed at the 12th Summit of the Council of State Heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 8, 2012 during President’s Karzai’s bilateral meeting with President Hu Jintao. The Declaration is important in that it lays out the framework for post-2014 Beijing-Kabul relations.
Having recognized the history of peaceful coexistence since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1955, the declaration expands upon the nature of the future relationship. The two sides propose a strategic and cooperative partnership in the diverse fields of politics, economy, culture and security. Furthermore, the parties recognize each other’s sovereignty: Whereas the Afghan side affirms the One China Policy, the Chinese side reiterates the policy of nonintervention and recognizes the Afghan people’s choice of national development.
On security, the declaration emphasizes the two sides’ commitment to the rejection of the three forces of terrorism, extremism, and separatism. The document also stresses the importance of Afghanistan’s participation, along with Iran, India, and Pakistan, in the SCO as an observer. It stresses that the greater participation of Afghanistan in the regional decision making processes will further promote peace, stability, and development in the region.
Just as important as the declaration was the four-hour visit by Zhou Yongkang, top security official and a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, to Kabul on September 22. Being the first high-level official visit to Afghanistan since 1966, it was dubbed “an adventurous diplomatic leap for the cautious Chinese government.” Although the details of the meeting were not publicized, a number of agreements relating to economics and security were likely to be signed.
China’s geopolitical and economic interest in Afghanistan is clear in these two recent strategic moves. Having kept the country at a secure distance for over a decade, Beijing is now beginning to get actively involved in Afghanistan’s post-invasion development, which is an example of masterful foreign diplomacy. It is expected that Beijing-Kabul relations will further improve as China assumes a greater role as a global power while remaining respectful toward its neighbor’s internal dynamics.
It follows that the looming NATO drawdown offers China a unique opportunity to develop a constructive Afghanistan policy through economic instruments such as loans, grants, large-scale infrastructure investments and mineral resource exploration, development, and production. It is safe to argue that as the frozen relations between Beijing and Kabul continue to thaw, the Chinese side will maintain a pragmatic approach, and a policy of mutual respect for territorial and political sovereignty will prove to be rather attractive to the Afghan government.
Policymakers in Beijing are aware that a secure and stable Afghanistan can pave the way for stable and constructive strategic cooperation. China will not want to miss out on the opportunities that lie ahead. Partnership with the Afghan government will enable China to be more deeply engaged in the region, secure its Western province from threats that have been multiplied since the occupation, and, also by utilizing its key alliance with Pakistan, project power in Central Asia and beyond. Furthermore, with its untapped natural resources and underdeveloped infrastructure, Afghanistan offers numerous opportunities for China’s public and private enterprises. Finally, through constructive Afghan diplomacy, China will reinforce its image of a great power rising peacefully. Consequently, the revival of China-Afghanistan relations will contribute immensely to both sides and help create a sea of stability in a region that long suffered from outside intervention.
