Arunachal in China? That is not the reality, says PM Manmohan Singh

[Gene]

its china who is getting more assertive & belligerent day by day with its economic progress,not india.
china's recent days behaviour with it's neighbour proves this.

 

[MINK]

The longer the issue remains unsettled, the more it is to China's advantage. The more belligerent Indians get, the less likely the issue will be settled.

What are the 'advantages' for China and 'disadvantages' for India if it remains unsettled?

 

[Tractor]

Ok then please visit arunachal with ur family without visa...
then we can know u have air in u or not

I know I have no chance to go there to see whether I can take arunachal in china and bring it back home.

 

[tallboy123]

I know I have no chance to go there to see whether I can take arunachal in china and bring it back home.

no,ur cordially welcomed to arunachal pradesh..ur always welcome,u dont need any pass port or visa..
u can just come by walk,there is no border at all...

please visit with ur friends

 

[GUNS-N- ROSES]

if u hav to settle the border dispute both sides will have to make compromises and i m not sure if china is ready to do that. china has so far successfully settled all disputes in its favour (recently in case of tajikistan). but i think this thing will have to stop at arunachal. we indians wont cede and inch of our land to chineese.

 

[chinapakistan]

lol
belligerent..who bangladesh,pakistan,sri lanka..lol

u have US and india and japan to worry..and also Russia...

We sure have US and Japan to worry, but india...... so to dispoint you, you are not in our sight.

 

[RoYaL~GuJJaR]

Arunachal paradesh is our integral part of India and will remain so..Anyone who have guts please come and take it away from us

One simple line.....

If you want some, come and get some....

 

[tallboy123]

We sure have US and Japan to worry, but india...... so to dispoint you, you are not in our sight.

Then why u cant ur army can't step into arunachal pradesh...

Internet arm chair general..

 

[chinapakistan]

Arunachal paradesh is our integral part of India and will remain so..Anyone who have guts please come and take it away from us

One simple line.....

If you want some, come and get some....

First step, send army there and we are doing so. What you did? What can you do?Dont just talk, do something.
According to indian media, PLA soldiers visit south tibet thousand times per year, more than the times to go to toilet. Do you guys really have army?

 

[CardSharp]

The longer the issue remains unsettled, the more it is to China's advantage. The more belligerent Indians get, the less likely the issue will be settled.

What are the 'advantages' for China and 'disadvantages' for India if it remains unsettled?

I'm glad you asked. The explanation can be found here.

In a nutshell, without going into a detailed narrative of the number of times met, the places and the personnel concerned, it might be said that the history of India-China talks on the border dispute after 1962 is a story of missed opportunities.

Throughout the 70s through the 90s, the PRC side was more or less agreeable to a compromise solution where the Aksai Chin wilderness would be ceded to China permanently by India; on the other hand, Arunachal Pradesh would be permanently recognised by China as integral part of India.

India failed to take advantage of this very convenient solution. As has already been discussed, because of its arid and unpopulated nature, there is no Indian interest in Aksai Chin, while China finds it a convenient plain through which to run its strategic highway between Lanzhou and Xigatse. It is of vital strategic interest to China, of no strategic or cultural interest to India.

India also failed to take advantage of the flexibility of the Chinese position on Arunachal Pradesh, which is a legitimate area of Indian sovereignty, for a variety of reasons, vitiated only by lack of precision in defining boundaries and in identifying viable landmarks or topological divisions.

Arunachal Pradesh is inhabited by the following tribes, from west, the borders of Bhutan, to the east - the Monpa, the Aka or Hrusso, in two clans, the Kutsun and Kovatsun, the Dafla or Bangni or Ni, in two classes, the Gute and the Guchi, the Apa Tani, and the Abor or Adi, divided into Padam, Minyong, Pangi, Shimong and others. Further east than this is the large confederation of the Mishmi. In all cases, the names of the tribes have been used as commonly accepted by them; the alternative names that they call themselves have been indicated next to those.

None of these tribes are ethnically Tibetan, or even close, with the possible exception of the Monpas. In the case of the Monpas, it is the consensus of scholars, mainly the British, that they are closely allied to the eastern Bhutanese and any influence of Tibetan culture is due to the dominance of the Tawang monastery and its former feudal grip over this tribe.

In all other cases, there is greater affinity with tribes living south of the Brahmaputra than with the Tibetans. There are no cultural similarities, and the spread of Buddhism is not uniform here, as it was north of the Himalayas, or even to the west, in Bhutan. Even the residual matter of their folk-memories of migration has been handled academically by the great Christoph von Fuehrer-Haimendorff: ...these memories can only relate to the last stages of a population movement which may well have changed its course more than once."

Further proof of their distinction from Tibetans comes from Bailey, discoverer of the Bailey Trail which the PLA used with such devastating effect to achieve complete tactical surprise in 1962, who said, writing about the term lopa used by the Tibetans for these southern tribesmen,"The term Lopa meant to the Tibetans what barbarian meant to the Greeks..."

Quite clearly, we should have come to terms with the PRC while they were favourably inclined to deal with the matter on conditions that were perfectly acceptable and coincided with the primary interests of the two sides. Unfortunately, the dilatory nature of bureaucratic decision-making on the Indian side, and the huge difficulties constituted by political fear, by both major national parties, the Congress and the BJP, of acceptance of cession of land by India to China, (leaving aside the constitutional difficulty of this step, which probably requires an amendment to the constitution) stood in the way of a solution.

Today, these favourable conditions for a peace no longer exist. China has now some medium-term reasons to delay a settlement, as it causes tension and anxiety within Indian decision-making circles. There is clearly a distinction between the authority with which Mao and Deng chaired the Military Commission, and that which their successors brought to the same position. There was a marked difference between the veterancs of the Long March and their followers. As a result, today the PLA as well as the PLA AF and the PLAN have a far more aggressive attitude towards neighbouring countries than does the Foreign Ministry.

It is my personal evaluation that we may have to wait for the successor of Hu Jin Tao, the successor being a man with some authority among the military circles himself, greater than the influence of HU, or even for an efflux of time until China is markedly ahead of India in all metrics, for a lasting peace to be settled, and for boundaries to be settled.

I hope you found this note useful.

Wow thanks, your knowledge on stuff like continues to astonish and it is indeed a sad story.

As a follow up can you elaborate on "China's medium-term reasons to delay a settlement, as it causes tension and anxiety within Indian decision-making circles. "?

The assumption here is that the more aggressive, the military faction within the PrC leadership, is motivated to reduce the Indian leadership to a humiliated, bewildered and indecisive state, incapable of taking any actions that challenge China's complete freedom of action within Asia.

It is clear that if such a faction exists, and its existence is as yet a matter of conjecture, it will have a wide range of options at its disposal to achieve its ends. While a brief armed conflict, of short duration, begun and ended by the PLA according to its own timetable, is at one end of the spectrum of action, the violent end, there are other options. Threatening moves at the borders, for instance, by Chinese border guards threatening Indian contractors working on local infrastructural projects (road-works, for instance), would be one option. Other possibilities are

• Replacement of border markers, or their displacement to indicate a greater extent of territory held than actually the case;
• Military manoeuvres near the borders;
• Construction of infrastructural works in combination with neighbouring countries, with a clear dual-use option;
• Printing and publishing maps that uphold major territorial claims, and encouraging adoption of these maps by all international map-makers who can be influenced by the PRC;
• Statements in publications, learned papers and the publication of expert analyses proclaiming the existing border disputes to be serious in nature and violently expressed sentiments at international seminars;

It is possible that while Chinese supremacy in Asia is still in doubt, that is, for a period of another ten to fifteen years, while the economic, international and military gaps widen increasingly, this kind of pressure tactic will be used to unsettle the Indian decision-making apparatus.

It is likely to be combined with warm and fraternal exchanges of a cultural, sporting and people-to-people kind, which will thoroughly confuse the opposing leadership, and which will create a 'peace' constituency within India to oppose any hard stand or overt resistance to China.

The general effect will be to enhance and strengthen the divided nature of a democratic polity, and to keep the services and administration completely bewildered over the intentions of the Chinese leadership. Such a situation will inevitably lead to lack of long-term planning, lack of short-term responses and a generally ad-hoc incoherent foreign policy which fails to build any confidence in India's capability to offer leadership to Asia.

It will be of interest to see if any of these factors are perceived to exist today by various members of the forum, and if they are so perceived, is it the opinion of those members that these events are concerted centrally?

 

[Agnostic_Indian]

I even don't know present realities are not good to Indian people.You have all good things,this condition even makes you people ignoring poor grassless northern tibet, please give chinese a pity,they need some good thing at least to have a look,really.

for your kind information arunachal and it's people are indian and they have a democratic govt there.so population exchange or large scale land exchange is not practical..that's what i said present realities..a solution is possible only if we accept actual line of control.good for both parties.

 

[Tractor]

for your kind information arunachal and it's people are indian and they have a democratic govt there.so population exchange or large scale land exchange is not practical..that's what i said present realities..a solution is possible only if we accept actual line of control.good for both parties.

What a pity!I see the word we is not refer to Indian people but including chinese.Actual line of control maybe not good for chinese as they considered.

 

[Agnostic_Indian]

What a pity!I see the word we is not refer to Indian people but including chinese.Actual line of control maybe not good for chinese as they considered.

you mean it is not good for chinese ? why ?

 

[IND151]

I'm glad you asked. The explanation can be found here.

Originally Posted by Joe Shearer
In a nutshell, without going into a detailed narrative of the number of times met, the places and the personnel concerned, it might be said that the history of India-China talks on the border dispute after 1962 is a story of missed opportunities.

Throughout the 70s through the 90s, the PRC side was more or less agreeable to a compromise solution where the Aksai Chin wilderness would be ceded to China permanently by India; on the other hand, Arunachal Pradesh would be permanently recognised by China as integral part of India.

India failed to take advantage of this very convenient solution. As has already been discussed, because of its arid and unpopulated nature, there is no Indian interest in Aksai Chin, while China finds it a convenient plain through which to run its strategic highway between Lanzhou and Xigatse. It is of vital strategic interest to China, of no strategic or cultural interest to India.

India also failed to take advantage of the flexibility of the Chinese position on Arunachal Pradesh, which is a legitimate area of Indian sovereignty, for a variety of reasons, vitiated only by lack of precision in defining boundaries and in identifying viable landmarks or topological divisions.

Arunachal Pradesh is inhabited by the following tribes, from west, the borders of Bhutan, to the east - the Monpa, the Aka or Hrusso, in two clans, the Kutsun and Kovatsun, the Dafla or Bangni or Ni, in two classes, the Gute and the Guchi, the Apa Tani, and the Abor or Adi, divided into Padam, Minyong, Pangi, Shimong and others. Further east than this is the large confederation of the Mishmi. In all cases, the names of the tribes have been used as commonly accepted by them; the alternative names that they call themselves have been indicated next to those.

None of these tribes are ethnically Tibetan, or even close, with the possible exception of the Monpas. In the case of the Monpas, it is the consensus of scholars, mainly the British, that they are closely allied to the eastern Bhutanese and any influence of Tibetan culture is due to the dominance of the Tawang monastery and its former feudal grip over this tribe.

In all other cases, there is greater affinity with tribes living south of the Brahmaputra than with the Tibetans. There are no cultural similarities, and the spread of Buddhism is not uniform here, as it was north of the Himalayas, or even to the west, in Bhutan. Even the residual matter of their folk-memories of migration has been handled academically by the great Christoph von Fuehrer-Haimendorff: ...these memories can only relate to the last stages of a population movement which may well have changed its course more than once."

Further proof of their distinction from Tibetans comes from Bailey, discoverer of the Bailey Trail which the PLA used with such devastating effect to achieve complete tactical surprise in 1962, who said, writing about the term lopa used by the Tibetans for these southern tribesmen,"The term Lopa meant to the Tibetans what barbarian meant to the Greeks..."

Quite clearly, we should have come to terms with the PRC while they were favourably inclined to deal with the matter on conditions that were perfectly acceptable and coincided with the primary interests of the two sides. Unfortunately, the dilatory nature of bureaucratic decision-making on the Indian side, and the huge difficulties constituted by political fear, by both major national parties, the Congress and the BJP, of acceptance of cession of land by India to China, (leaving aside the constitutional difficulty of this step, which probably requires an amendment to the constitution) stood in the way of a solution.

Today, these favourable conditions for a peace no longer exist. China has now some medium-term reasons to delay a settlement, as it causes tension and anxiety within Indian decision-making circles. There is clearly a distinction between the authority with which Mao and Deng chaired the Military Commission, and that which their successors brought to the same position. There was a marked difference between the veterancs of the Long March and their followers. As a result, today the PLA as well as the PLA AF and the PLAN have a far more aggressive attitude towards neighbouring countries than does the Foreign Ministry.

It is my personal evaluation that we may have to wait for the successor of Hu Jin Tao, the successor being a man with some authority among the military circles himself, greater than the influence of HU, or even for an efflux of time until China is markedly ahead of India in all metrics, for a lasting peace to be settled, and for boundaries to be settled.

I hope you found this note useful.
Quote:
Originally Posted by CardSharp
Wow thanks, your knowledge on stuff like continues to astonish and it is indeed a sad story.

As a follow up can you elaborate on "China's medium-term reasons to delay a settlement, as it causes tension and anxiety within Indian decision-making circles. "?


Quote:

Originally Posted by Joe Shearer
The assumption here is that the more aggressive, the military faction within the PrC leadership, is motivated to reduce the Indian leadership to a humiliated, bewildered and indecisive state, incapable of taking any actions that challenge China's complete freedom of action within Asia.

It is clear that if such a faction exists, and its existence is as yet a matter of conjecture, it will have a wide range of options at its disposal to achieve its ends. While a brief armed conflict, of short duration, begun and ended by the PLA according to its own timetable, is at one end of the spectrum of action, the violent end, there are other options. Threatening moves at the borders, for instance, by Chinese border guards threatening Indian contractors working on local infrastructural projects (road-works, for instance), would be one option. Other possibilities are
Replacement of border markers, or their displacement to indicate a greater extent of territory held than actually the case;
Military manoeuvres near the borders;
Construction of infrastructural works in combination with neighbouring countries, with a clear dual-use option;
Printing and publishing maps that uphold major territorial claims, and encouraging adoption of these maps by all international map-makers who can be influenced by the PRC;
Statements in publications, learned papers and the publication of expert analyses proclaiming the existing border disputes to be serious in nature and violently expressed sentiments at international seminars;
It is possible that while Chinese supremacy in Asia is still in doubt, that is, for a period of another ten to fifteen years, while the economic, international and military gaps widen increasingly, this kind of pressure tactic will be used to unsettle the Indian decision-making apparatus.

It is likely to be combined with warm and fraternal exchanges of a cultural, sporting and people-to-people kind, which will thoroughly confuse the opposing leadership, and which will create a 'peace' constituency within India to oppose any hard stand or overt resistance to China.

The general effect will be to enhance and strengthen the divided nature of a democratic polity, and to keep the services and administration completely bewildered over the intentions of the Chinese leadership. Such a situation will inevitably lead to lack of long-term planning, lack of short-term responses and a generally ad-hoc incoherent foreign policy which fails to build any confidence in India's capability to offer leadership to Asia.

It will be of interest to see if any of these factors are perceived to exist today by various members of the forum, and if they are so perceived, is it the opinion of those members that these events are concerted centrally?

all these factors are the reason why India is increasing its economic and military strength. when India will rise as economic superpower of Asia (next only to japan and china), along with tremendous military strength, it will be difficult for china to settle arunachal issue according to their will.

 

[CardSharp]

all these factors are the reason why India is increasing its economic and military strength. when India will rise as economic superpower of Asia (next only to japan and china), along with tremendous military strength, it will be difficult for china to settle arunachal issue according to their will.

SUPA POWER!!!