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Army to induct 'offensive' corps along China border

When we analyse the METT-T of this particular theatre, we do not see it to permit rapid advancement as far as offensive operations are concerned. Please correct me if I am wrong. What I believe to be the right approach, is the Retrograde Operations or a combination of both. The reason is that the METT-T is certainly at the favour of the Chinese than the Indian forces in this theatre. Retrograde Operations will force the Chinese to engage in an undesirables conditions.

Continuing from my previous post consider the new forces that are planned for the eastern theater. 2 new mountain divisions to add to the existing 8 already deployed there. These will be essentially a part of the holding 3 and 4 corps and therefore defensive. The new "offensive" or strike corp that is being talked about we need to understand its structure and force components. These are planned to be rapid formations with brigade strength components. The 145 M777 light howitzers will be a significant part of this strike corp - a concentration of firesupport. The existing divisions are not suitably equipped for rapid force projection in the mountainous terrain. The new corp will therefore be heavily equipped with choppers for mobility - airborne cavalry. The 197 WSI - Dhruvs are an example of the direction in which the brass is thinking. Again the terrain is not suitable tank country what is needed are light tanks / ICVs in greater numbers. The recent RFIs for 300 light tanks and consideration of Stryker ICVs are further examples of the likely composition of the new strike corp. All in all if these plans materialize there could be a significant highly mobile force in the far - eastern theater with a lot of teeth. How will this instrument be used? So far every war game considered for this theater has battles being fought on Indian ground. If so does the greater manoeuvrability provide options to outflank the invading forces especially in the Brahmaputra valley and the Tezpur - Tinsukia corridor or to launch counter strikes into enemy territory once a Chinese offensive has materialized?
 
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Continuing from my previous post consider the new forces that are planned for the eastern theater. 2 new mountain divisions to add to the existing 8 already deployed there. These will be essentially a part of the holding 3 and 4 corps and therefore defensive. The new "offensive" or strike corp that is being talked about we need to understand its structure and force components. These are planned to be rapid formations with brigade strength components. The 145 M777 light howitzers will be a significant part of this strike corp - a concentration of firesupport. The existing divisions are not suitably equipped for rapid force projection in the mountainous terrain. The new corp will therefore be heavily equipped with choppers for mobility - airborne cavalry. The 197 WSI - Dhruvs are an example of the direction in which the brass is thinking. Again the terrain is not suitable tank country what is needed are light tanks / ICVs in greater numbers. The recent RFIs for 300 light tanks and consideration of Stryker ICVs are further examples of the likely composition of the new strike corp. All in all if these plans materialize there could be a significant highly mobile force in the far - eastern theater with a lot of teeth. How will this instrument be used? So far every war game considered for this theater has battles being fought on Indian ground. If so does the greater manoeuvrability provide options to outflank the invading forces especially in the Brahmaputra valley and the Tezpur - Tinsukia corridor or to launch counter strikes into enemy territory once a Chinese offensive has materialized?

I understand and before I answer to the last question, how about the force projection ( joint operational) on the Chinese side giving the highly secretive nature of the Chinese ? I did have the rare chance to observe a Chinese war game. As I observed, the biggest weakness in a Chinese war game is the failure to simulate the enemy COA to the nearest proximity of reality. They are still relying on vertical detailed command like the Russians.
 
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Very good point. US assistance is required.

US assistance is not a given. If given what will be the form and quantum of assistance? Will the US go the whole hog and provide boots on the ground or will it be more material support? In the latter case India's MI complex is sufficiently large to cope with numbers required. For example the manufacture of tanks today is done only at one location and with an ability to produce about 200 tanks in a year. This can easily be uprated with private industry participation. Again in a dire situation India is unlikely to refuse material support. Again it depends upon the "direness" of the situation on whether India will accept US forces. Again the US will weigh her assistance against her principal trading partner and geo-political realities. What about China? Is she ready to expand the spectrum of her offensive from a tactical theater war to a strategic one? Consider China's responses in the Korean war, the Sino-Vietnam war of 79 and the continuing standoff with ROC-Taiwan. The case with Taiwan is a good example of Chinese thought process. With perhaps 10% of India's conventional strength Chiang Kai Shek's military has kept the PLA away from the tiny island. The Chinese leadership may make a lot of smoke and noise about the "oneness" of China however they haven't dared in the last 60 years to strike across the Taiwan straits. Chinese claims on Taiwan are far greater and with more prestige attached to it than a Tawang. American retaliation is only part of the deterrence. Chinese losses and more importantly the perception of Chinese loss is unacceptable to the mandarins. The mandarins want Taiwan and will keep the pressure up and wait for easy victories. Contrast the situation with India.
 
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You cannot win a war against China. This is not even a possibility with Pakistan. Nowadays no war is winnable specially when the adversary has more than enough capability to deny victory to you.

Strike corps in the context of Mountain warfare is a non-starter. If anything, you can throw more infantry, mobility and mountain artillery at it but its nothing different than what is being done right now.

Its about military victory in a low intensive conflict than a full scale war , simply becoz chinese love there economy more than there people and a full scale war will have a good deal of impact on them , as well as india , i guess u have seen the state of US economy and there country after two unfinished wars with an enemy far too week compared to them , the total cost of war in iraq and afganistan is upward of 3 trillion $ and counting , i am also sure that china will not do such a mistake simply becoz india might not be able to defeat china but it can definitely cause some serious damage

As far as pakstan is concerned u can again read the above para and replace china with india and india with pak

And for those planning or have already posted a detailed list of military inventory of china and then comparing them with india , let me tell u something very logical in conflict , that is no one will deploy there entire strength in a war ie no one will want its entire arsenal to be destroyed while facing a strong adversary or even a weaker one ,
I dont know about the figure of previous wars but i know what was deployed by both sides during the military standoff in 2001 which are as follows

INDIA PAKISTAN
TANKS 2000 1300
FIGHTERS 270 200
ARTILERY 2700 1800
SHIPS 100 29
TROOPS 550000 300000
 
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US assistance is not a given. If given what will be the form and quantum of assistance? Will the US go the whole hog and provide boots on the ground or will it be more material support? In the latter case India's MI complex is sufficiently large to cope with numbers required. For example the manufacture of tanks today is done only at one location and with an ability to produce about 200 tanks in a year. This can easily be uprated with private industry participation. Again in a dire situation India is unlikely to refuse material support. Again it depends upon the "direness" of the situation on whether India will accept US forces. Again the US will weigh her assistance against her principal trading partner and geo-political realities. What about China? Is she ready to expand the spectrum of her offensive from a tactical theater war to a strategic one? Consider China's responses in the Korean war, the Sino-Vietnam war of 79 and the continuing standoff with ROC-Taiwan. The case with Taiwan is a good example of Chinese thought process. With perhaps 10% of India's conventional strength Chiang Kai Shek's military has kept the PLA away from the tiny island. The Chinese leadership may make a lot of smoke and noise about the "oneness" of China however they haven't dared in the last 60 years to strike across the Taiwan straits. Chinese claims on Taiwan are far greater and with more prestige attached to it than a Tawang. American retaliation is only part of the deterrence. Chinese losses and more importantly the perception of Chinese loss is unacceptable to the mandarins. The mandarins want Taiwan and will keep the pressure up and wait for easy victories. Contrast the situation with India.

If a real war break out between China and India, then a lot of escalading events had occured for that to happen. This is a less likely scenario. India should put more focus and publicized on the more immediate security needs. They are

1. Internal strife. India has a lot of internal rebellion. the Indians in here can name them more than me.
2. External extreme element penetrating borders to perform terrorist attacks such as what happened in Bombay a couple of years back.

Publicizing about putting "offensive" corps, what ever that may mean, sound good to the public. But it doesn't address the most pressing security needs of India. Why not use this offensive corps to quell the internal rebellion.
 
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If a real war break out between China and India, then a lot of escalading events had occured for that to happen. This is a less likely scenario. India should put more focus and publicized on the more immediate security needs. They are

1. Internal strife. India has a lot of internal rebellion. the Indians in here can name them more than me.
2. External extreme element penetrating borders to perform terrorist attacks such as what happened in Bombay a couple of years back.

Publicizing about putting "offensive" corps, what ever that may mean, sound good to the public. But it doesn't address the most pressing security needs of India. Why not use this offensive corps to quell the internal rebellion.

A simple term to define your post = "silly troll"
 
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A simple term to define your post = "silly troll"

its not trolling as my response is a proper as compare to the title. To you, anything that doesn't praise your country is a troll. Especially a truthful discussion of your country
 
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If a real war break out between China and India, then a lot of escalading events had occured for that to happen. This is a less likely scenario. India should put more focus and publicized on the more immediate security needs. They are

1. Internal strife. India has a lot of internal rebellion. the Indians in here can name them more than me.
2. External extreme element penetrating borders to perform terrorist attacks such as what happened in Bombay a couple of years back.

Publicizing about putting "offensive" corps, what ever that may mean, sound good to the public. But it doesn't address the most pressing security needs of India. Why not use this offensive corps to quell the internal rebellion.

A strike corp for COIN ops? Guess thats typical in Urumqi and Han responses to Tiananmen. Ignoramus.
 
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A strike corp for COIN ops? Guess thats typical in Urumqi and Han responses to Tiananmen. Ignoramus.

It is always a strategic mistake ( if not tactical) to use regular military in COIN . Military ops must consider strategic , tactical and operational aspects before determining any COA. Pakistan made a big mistake deploying regular army in COIN . This is also why I support my IA colleagues not to get indulged into Maoist mess. I support your view on this regard.
 
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A strike corp for COIN ops? Guess thats typical in Urumqi and Han responses to Tiananmen. Ignoramus.

True, it should not be strike corp for COIN. But it shows lack of insight on creating resources as COIN is the #1 priority of a country. How can a country grow and have stability when insurgents are running rampant inside the country.
 
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@faithful guy...stop making stupid posts....China is fearful of India right now...and in another 5-6 years India will be better then China in all aspects of armed forces....so worry about China...they surely need Pak assistance in future. more then even now....
 
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True, it should not be strike corp for COIN. But it shows lack of insight on creating resources as COIN is the #1 priority of a country. How can a country grow and have stability when insurgents are running rampant inside the country.

Between India and China , China is the country that was overrun by insurgents in 1949. Those who preferred to fight against their own government rather than the Japanese are the ones sitting in power. India has insurgencies but none have even come close to achieving a repeat of 49. India could perhaps deal with those such as kashmir by forcibly relocating the 4 million or changing the local demographics but it has chosen not to unlike China - consider the Han infestation in Xinjiang.
 
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If a real war break out between China and India, then a lot of escalading events had occured for that to happen. This is a less likely scenario. India should put more focus and publicized on the more immediate security needs. They are

1. Internal strife. India has a lot of internal rebellion. the Indians in here can name them more than me.
2. External extreme element penetrating borders to perform terrorist attacks such as what happened in Bombay a couple of years back.

Publicizing about putting "offensive" corps, what ever that may mean, sound good to the public. But it doesn't address the most pressing security needs of India. Why not use this offensive corps to quell the internal rebellion.

so this is ur best possible reply, Maoists and Mumbai attacks will help china to win again India

in a simple way that means....china need external assistance to defeat India
 
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If a real war break out between China and India, then a lot of escalading events had occured for that to happen. This is a less likely scenario. India should put more focus and publicized on the more immediate security needs.
India is much more secure than all of its neighbors. Example just see the failed state list. China ranks way higher than India.

And get thing clear, China also improving their capabilities along Indian borders so we should be prepared.

They are

1. Internal strife. India has a lot of internal rebellion. the Indians in here can name them more than me.
2. External extreme element penetrating borders to perform terrorist attacks such as what happened in Bombay a couple of years back.
1. China is much more internally unstable than India and among the most unstable country in east Asia. Chinese communists are trying their best not to show that out side but if a war escalates than there must be a huge revelation against one party rule in China.

2. External extremists always trying to enter many countries including India. See what they did to US in 9/11 but after that they have strengthen than security so as India.

Publicizing about putting "offensive" corps, what ever that may mean, sound good to the public. But it doesn't address the most pressing security needs of India.
India as a democratic country whether its ASAT or offensive corps, our people have rights to know that. Govt has to announce these in public before they go ahead.

Somehow publicity helps to restrain enemy.

Why not use this offensive corps to quell the internal rebellion.
We don't need offensive corps for internal problems but for enemy only. Because outsiders need some tough punch.
 
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