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Are We Underestimating China's Military?

It is good to be underestimated.

China can remain realistic about enemy's capabilities and prepare accordingly.

I wonder, if the US does not underestimate from tomorrow on, what can they do about China's rise? Don't they already play all the tricks available?

But it is always fun to watch adversary to be in doubt.


I don't think China is under-estimated. I think some aspects of her military are over-estimating its capability.
 
I don't think China is under-estimated. I think some aspects of her military are over-estimating its capability.

This is more about how foreigners (espcially the West) view China's capabilities. At home, I think most of Chinese leaders are quite realist about capabilities. Not that they boast a "we are an indispansable nation" rhetoric -- unlike your government's best partner. :)
 
I'm sure there are people in the Pentagon that can very accurately deduce what are capabilities are, let's give them a little credit, I mean, a lot of those men did get there based on their outstanding abilities and attention to detail.

But as I have said previously, military is only part of the equation, politics and general public matters. The Chinese saying of military actions should accommodate Politics is exactly this. During one of the campaigns against Japan, we could have eliminated a whole Japanese army, but instead, we let them go, because the national congress was gathering, and Chang needed a victory, the battle must end, so we let the rest escape and declared victory to the campaign.


The same is true in US, they don't want to hear the truth, the higher ups probably know it, but politics must come first, not because of personal reasons, but because politics is the more important of the two and nobody can have everything. I'm sure the white house is not made up of simpletons, and that is actually why they don't believe it, because they must look at this through every angle, and as it turns out, China must take a backseat to other more pressing matters.

It's not right or wrong, it's necessity.
If they are indeed have a very accurate picture of our capabilities, then they should at least make an accurate prediction and projection of our military buildup. Fact is they had been wrong, over and over. While the US is the only country in the world who can have the closest estimation of our capability, it is still in the dark. Like I said, our capability is measure through our confidence in our operation and how the US reacts to it.
 
This is more about how foreigners (espcially the West) view China's capabilities. At home, I think most of Chinese leaders are quite realist about capabilities. Not that they boast a "we are an indispansable nation" rhetoric -- unlike your government's best partner. :)

Precisely. It's best to be humble about one's capabilities. For example, the JSDF is , in my honest opinion, quite weak despite what western strategists saying. I personally believe that the JSDF has not even reached 20% of its full capability. We are restricted at best.

As for China's armed forces, i have no doubt they have quantitative punch, and even have developed qualitative capability, but i think that China's armed forces has not realized her full potential. And i personally think that some elements in the PLA , PLAN, PLAAF that boast too much of her capability should exercise restraint and humility.

I subsribe to the wise words of Lao Tzu who said,

“I have three precious things which I hold fast and prize. The first is gentleness; the second is frugality; the third is humility, which keeps me from putting myself before others. Be gentle and you can be bold; be frugal and you can be liberal; avoid putting yourself before others and you can become a leader among men.”

:tup:
 
Precisely. It's best to be humble about one's capabilities. For example, the JSDF is , in my honest opinion, quite weak despite what western strategists saying. I personally believe that the JSDF has not even reached 20% of its full capability. We are restricted at best.

As for China's armed forces, i have no doubt they have quantitative punch, and even have developed qualitative capability, but i think that China's armed forces has not realized her full potential. And i personally think that some elements in the PLA , PLAN, PLAAF that boast too much of her capability should exercise restraint and humility.

I subsribe to the wise words of Lao Tzu who said,

“I have three precious things which I hold fast and prize. The first is gentleness; the second is frugality; the third is humility, which keeps me from putting myself before others. Be gentle and you can be bold; be frugal and you can be liberal; avoid putting yourself before others and you can become a leader among men.”

:tup:
We boast? LOL I think our American friends did the boasting for us in their media. Remember, we didn't announce any of our secret toys. The American is the one ripping off leak images from netizen and announce to the world. LOL
 
Precisely. It's best to be humble about one's capabilities. For example, the JSDF is , in my honest opinion, quite weak despite what western strategists saying. I personally believe that the JSDF has not even reached 20% of its full capability. We are restricted at best.

As for China's armed forces, i have no doubt they have quantitative punch, and even have developed qualitative capability, but i think that China's armed forces has not realized her full potential. And i personally think that some elements in the PLA , PLAN, PLAAF that boast too much of her capability should exercise restraint and humility.

I subsribe to the wise words of Lao Tzu who said,

“I have three precious things which I hold fast and prize. The first is gentleness; the second is frugality; the third is humility, which keeps me from putting myself before others. Be gentle and you can be bold; be frugal and you can be liberal; avoid putting yourself before others and you can become a leader among men.”

:tup:

Yes, we need 10-20 more years to build up our capabilities, at the very least.

Though as @xunzi mentioned, most of the "hype" about China's military comes from the West. China's military is still quite closed in terms of information.
 
As for China's armed forces, i have no doubt they have quantitative punch, and even have developed qualitative capability, but i think that China's armed forces has not realized her full potential. And i personally think that some elements in the PLA , PLAN, PLAAF that boast too much of her capability should exercise restraint and humility.

I think it is natural for an armed institution as big as the PLA will have a diversity of opinion. I see militaries, including that of China and Japan, to be more prudent and realistic about their capabilities. Drawing at times a pink-er and at times a bleaker picture of the real situation is the by-product of Western democracy. That's probably why Obama has to talk the way he talks. Populations need to be held on the rope: Bush's "mushroom clouds over Washington DC" and Obama's "we are indispensable nation" ("others are dispensible?' one would ask) are typical cases of populism.

Japan's governance, despite all the US influence, seems to be holding the higher way. As for China, well, China's conceptualization of governance is very much different -- which I defend. Especially when it comes to inter-state relations, I am more to the fovor of elitist theory, rather than pluralist. Some areas of governance should not be left to the influence of the masses. This may sound like authoritarian. Having seen the result of too much responsivenes to public demand, I am firmly on the side of elitist foreign policy doctrine.

Military development could be seen from this direction. That's possibly why we do not see in China a similar "heroification" of the military unlike in the US in which Army and social life is almost impossible to separate as they appear almost in every social occassion. This is also the reason why the Chinese Army is one of the least predictable.
 
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I think it is natural for an armed institution as big as the PLA will have a diversity of opinion. I see militaries, including that of China and Japan, to be more prudent and realistic about their capabilities. Drawing at times a pink-er and at times a bleaker picture of the real situation is the by-product of Western democracy. That's probably why Obama has to talk like he talks. Populations need to be held on the rope: Bush's "mushroom clouds over Washington DC" and Obama's "we are indispensable nation" (others are dispensible?, one would ask) are typical cases of populism.

Japan's governance, despite all the US influence, seems to be holding the higher way. As for China, well, China's conceptualization of governance is very much different -- which I defend. Especially when comes to inter-state relations, I am more to the fovor of elitist theory, rather than plurist. Some areas of governance should not be left to the influence of the masses. This may sound like authoritarian. Having seen the result of too much responsivenes to public demand, I am firmly on the side of elitist foreign policy doctrine.

Military development could be seen from this direction. That's possibly why we do not see in China a similar "heorification" of the military unlike the US in which Army and social life is almost impossible to distinguish as they appear almost in every social occassion. This is also the reason why the Chinese Army is one of the least predictable.

In this context, China’s national interests are narrowly defined. According to my research, they include the promises the leadership has made to the Chinese people on eventual national unification as well as protecting the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty from external threats. Counter to conventional wisdom, China’s bureaucracy is not always run according to top-down decision-making by the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In cases where the leadership has made formal promises to the population, domestic sentiment is a formidable driver of policy. In other words, the domestic audience is not only part of the decision-making process but also has the power to hold the leadership accountable for failing to defend these assurances.I would like to make reference the Taiwan Strait Crisis , which prompted the CCP to promise to the domestic population of eventual reunification.

Owing to this assocation between national mandate / legitimacy in relation to provisions, one can predict the CCP's calculus. However, i do agree that its decision to concoct a response to regional developments can range in political, economic warnings to military provocation. That said, in regards to the latter, China also understands that strategic reigns of her regional partners and it will be to the interest of all partners to search for the realization of the antithesis of military adventurism.



I remain,
Humbly,
Kenji
 
In this context, China’s national interests are narrowly defined. According to my research, they include the promises the leadership has made to the Chinese people on eventual national unification as well as protecting the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty from external threats.

Certainly. That's in China's Constitution.

Counter to conventional wisdom, China’s bureaucracy is not always run according to top-down decision-making by the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In cases where the leadership has made formal promises to the population, domestic sentiment is a formidable driver of policy. In other words, the domestic audience is not only part of the decision-making process but also has the power to hold the leadership accountable for failing to defend these assurances.I would like to make reference the Taiwan Strait Crisis , which prompted the CCP to promise to the domestic population of eventual reunification.

There may certainly be mutual influence between the civil society and bureaucracy. But, as far as the larger foreign policy is concerned, the Chinese state is less bound by internal influence -- of course it would be hard to quantify it here. At times, it even provides certain blue-prints for the nation to adopt as a national goal. Unification is one of them. It predates the 1996 Taiwan Crisis. It is at the very heart of the Constitution. It is neither a modern creation nor a product of weaker conjectures. Many national goals that the average Chinese hold by heart is already embedded into the state ideology.

However, i do agree that its decision to concoct a response to regional developments can range in political, economic warnings to military provocation. That said, in regards to the latter, China also understands that strategic reigns of her regional partners and it will be to the interest of all partners to search for the realization of the antithesis of military adventurism.

China is not a military-adventurist nation. Other than its sovereign rights as it sees to be natural, China does respect national borders and others' sovereign decisions. This spirit has allowed China to create a very peaceful borderline with a few remaining obstacles to be sorted out. Compare this with, say, Turkey with fewer border neighbors and look at the situation there now.

Of course, probably, when it comes to maritime territories, there is a very little room for consensus. I have no clear answer to that other than that China should not sacrifice any territory for the sake of appeasing others. Probably, same goal applies to others. So, when you have two wills incompatible, the result should be fricition. You remember GM's famous ad (soon after they have been bailed-out and Japanese carmakers were subject to unfair treatment): "May the best car wins." I think same rule goes as far as SCS and ECS are concerned.
 
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Of course, probably, when it comes to maritime territories, there is a very little room for consensus. I have no clear answer to that other than that China should not sacrifice any territory for the sake of appeasing others. Probably, same goal applies to others. So, when you have two wills incompatible, the result should be fricition. You remember GM's famous ad (soon after they have been bailed-out and Japanese carmakers were subject to unfair treatment): "May the best car wins." I think same rule goes as far as SCS and ECS are concerned.

I think this is but an example of the Rules of Engagement among sovereign states. Thank you for your response @TaiShang .

Its a pleasure to discourse with you here.
 
I don't know, I think there is a reason that everyone quotes US analysis. While it can miss the mark like any other intelligence, they are in the ball park (very close) more often than not. Chinese citizens can find out more information regarding their future armed forces through such reports than through domestic sources.

This was from 2001, which revised a 1997 assessment on China's stealth air platform. I would say it was pretty close. ;)



April, 2001

getasset.aspx




Washington sources say the original information provided by the ONI in 1997, showing a design resembling the Boeing F-15 Eagle, has been superseded. The agency predicted the XXJ would be multirole, have stealth features and was expected to enter Chinese air force and navy service by around 2015.

This estimate has been revised to 2010. Both Chinese fighter companies - Chengdu and Shenyang - are thought to be working on advanced combat aircraft concepts.

Indications are that the XXJ will have a canard configuration and be equipped with twin thrust-vectoring engines. The design seems influenced by Sukhoi's advanced concepts such as the Su-37 and forward-swept wing S-37 Berkut, suggesting that Shenyang, which has a link with the Russian manufacturer dating from the early 1990s, is the developer. Combining a foreplane, a tailplane and thrust vectoring enhances manoeuvrability.

USA rethinks view of China's next generation XXJ fighter - 4/3/2001 - Flight Global
 
I don't know, I think there is a reason that everyone quotes US analysis. While it can miss the mark like any other intelligence, they are in the ball park (very close) more often than not. Chinese citizens can find out more information regarding their future armed forces through such reports than through domestic sources.

This was from 2001, which revised a 1997 assessment on China's stealth air platform. I would say it was pretty close. ;)



April, 2001

getasset.aspx






USA rethinks view of China's next generation XXJ fighter - 4/3/2001 - Flight Global

US intelligence heavily relied on Chinese Internet sources where the leaks, gossips, and fantasy are all mixed up. The XXJ image was a fanboy's drawings about the bigger "J-10". The present design of J-20 was officially picked out among four competing designs in Oct, 2007.
 
I don't know, I think there is a reason that everyone quotes US analysis. While it can miss the mark like any other intelligence, they are in the ball park (very close) more often than not. Chinese citizens can find out more information regarding their future armed forces through such reports than through domestic sources.

This was from 2001, which revised a 1997 assessment on China's stealth air platform. I would say it was pretty close. ;)



April, 2001

getasset.aspx






USA rethinks view of China's next generation XXJ fighter - 4/3/2001 - Flight Global

Present design looks like this, too.
 
US intelligence heavily relied on Chinese Internet sources where the leaks, gossips, and fantasy are all mixed up. The XXJ image was a fanboy's drawings about the bigger "J-10". The present design of J-20 was officially picked out among four competing designs in Oct, 2007.

So it just happens to look exactly like the 2001 image? Come on...
 

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