S-2
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I've been among those who've argued that the threat posed to Afghanistan and Pakistan by the "good" and "bad" taliban differ not at all.
I've argued that the functional behavior of both entities are more than similar. They are exactly parallel. My examples would include the governance of Afghanistan between 1996-2001 by the Afghan Taliban and what we've been able to witness within both FATAville (particularly S. Waziristan) as well as SWAT/Buner.
Here is an article that argues otherwise from the conservative Washington Times. It does so carefully, noting that this emerging view isn't universally accepted and the possible reasons why its acceptance is impossible-
Afghan, Pakistani Taliban Diverge On Goals-Washington Times Nov. 18, 2009
Two points of view-
"Afghan Taliban commander Abdul Manan (also known as the Mullah Toor) condemned the Pakistani Taliban for targeting innocent civilians as 'un-Islamic and wrong.'
He also denied that al Qaeda influences the Afghan Taliban, a stark change from the 1990s when the Afghan group hosted Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda training camps and became the base for the Sept. 11 attacks."
Naturally, there is reason to question these sentiments. Yesterday's rocket attack on an afghan marketplace causing the deaths of 10 and wounding 28 more afghan civilians and the accumulated statistical evidence offered by both UNAMA and HRW show that the afghan taliban harbor no reluctance to target civilians and that terror remains a critical element of their psychological tactics and operational procedures.
That aside, though, afghan taliban spokesmen suggest that the end-goal of a taliban takeover in Afghanistan would be markedly different from that which is the aspiration of both the Pakistani taliban and Al Qaeda-
"Ashraf Ali, a specialist on the Afghan Taliban movement, told The Washington Times that some former Taliban leaders, such as Afghanistan's former foreign minister, have been allowed to live freely in the Afghan capital, Kabul, to represent the Taliban in negotiations with other Afghan factions and potentially the U.S.
Mr. Ali noted that Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the former foreign minister, also has stated that the Afghan Taliban does not share al Qaedas global agenda of terrorism and that his Taliban was not a threat to the world peace."
'Afghan Taliban know well that it would be very difficult for the Americans to negotiate with them unless they clearly distance themselves from al Qaeda and its new allies, the Pakistani Taliban,' Mr. Ali said."
Another Pakistani analyst reinforces Asraf Ali's analysis-
"Rifatullah Orakzai, a Peshawar-based analyst, said the Afghan Taliban is trying to create good will by showing its differences with al Qaeda. For example, Mr. Muttawakil recently stated "that if the Taliban came into power, girls would be allowed to pursue education in segregated institutions," Mr. Orakzai said."
In contrast, Bruce Riedel offers this pointed assessment-
"The U.S. has to be careful not to be 'suckered in' by relatively moderate statements by former and current Afghan Taliban officials, said Bruce Riedel, a specialist on South Asia who headed a policy review of Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Obama administration last spring. 'A lot of smoke is being thrown up to confuse people.'
Mr. Riedel said that such figures as Mr. Muttawakil 'speak for no one but themselves.'
Yet even Mr. Riedel recognizes growing tensions between the two camps.
'The Pakistani Taliban are attacking the ISI, which threatens the Afghan Taliban's cozy relationship with the ISI,' he said, referring to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.
So has anything really been solved here? Most of these issues have already been pointed to by those of us here. I've personally stated numerous times that the afghan taliban leadership within Pakistan has been assiduous in maintaining good behavior on Pakistani lands for EXACTLY the same reasons as Mr. Riedel has observed. Self-preservation is at stake for that leadership and it can ill-afford a break in the harmonious relations it currently enjoys.
Further, there is the question of attaining near goals first. Neither the afghan nor the Pakistani taliban have yet achieved their objectives. Do we really know, based upon a few offered carrots by Mr. Muttawakil, to what extent the afghan taliban would adhere to a peaceful (if xenophobic and self-isolated) existence were they successful?
I don't. Rocket attacks on public market places suggest that there's no uniformity of views within the afghan taliban.
Secondly, do we know that the Pakistani taliban are adamant about spreading a pan-islamic ummah throughout S. Asia and then globally?
I'm reminded of the philosophical struggle between utopian communists like Trotsky and the european communists of France during the 1930s and those like Iosef Stalin who insisted that the preservation of the Soviet Union against all comers took precedent. It really was no more than suggesting one shouldn't over-reach one's objectives before proper consolidation of temporal gains were made permanent.
Would SWAT today be a taliban bastion had not raiding parties been sent forth nearly immediately into Buner? Clearly, most in Pakistan saw this as an affront of their recently stated intent and also as an attempt to crudely expand their influence. What if they'd very carefully played the game?
I offer these thoughts because the analysis in favor of viewing a kinder, gentler afghan taliban was forwarded by a Pakistani journalist and used the thoughts of two Pakistani analysts to support the contention.
The opposing view was led (at least in this article) by Bruce Riedel, an American. This schism may be coincidental. I know of Pakistanis here who largely adhere to my view. OTOH, it may not be. I haven't yet read supporting arguments by westerners to the views expressed by Mr. Ali and Mr. Orakzai but can easily imagine that such may be embraced by those in the west seeking an acceptable rationale for our departure.
I can also easily see Pakistanis here and elsewhere, to include analysts, who'll cling to the perspective that THIS afghan taliban ain't your daddy's afghan taliban. It fits nicely with holding your cards, all of them, and playing them one card at a time. That view also ties into my (and others') concerns about Pakistani support for the afghan taliban.
That rationale would be couched in a new benevolence within the afghan taliban hierarchy. I'm dubious because, naturally, I'm S-2...
...but more so because rocket attacks upon civilian targets contradicts the comforting words offered. Actions always speak louder than words.
I've argued that the functional behavior of both entities are more than similar. They are exactly parallel. My examples would include the governance of Afghanistan between 1996-2001 by the Afghan Taliban and what we've been able to witness within both FATAville (particularly S. Waziristan) as well as SWAT/Buner.
Here is an article that argues otherwise from the conservative Washington Times. It does so carefully, noting that this emerging view isn't universally accepted and the possible reasons why its acceptance is impossible-
Afghan, Pakistani Taliban Diverge On Goals-Washington Times Nov. 18, 2009
Two points of view-
"Afghan Taliban commander Abdul Manan (also known as the Mullah Toor) condemned the Pakistani Taliban for targeting innocent civilians as 'un-Islamic and wrong.'
He also denied that al Qaeda influences the Afghan Taliban, a stark change from the 1990s when the Afghan group hosted Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda training camps and became the base for the Sept. 11 attacks."
Naturally, there is reason to question these sentiments. Yesterday's rocket attack on an afghan marketplace causing the deaths of 10 and wounding 28 more afghan civilians and the accumulated statistical evidence offered by both UNAMA and HRW show that the afghan taliban harbor no reluctance to target civilians and that terror remains a critical element of their psychological tactics and operational procedures.
That aside, though, afghan taliban spokesmen suggest that the end-goal of a taliban takeover in Afghanistan would be markedly different from that which is the aspiration of both the Pakistani taliban and Al Qaeda-
"Ashraf Ali, a specialist on the Afghan Taliban movement, told The Washington Times that some former Taliban leaders, such as Afghanistan's former foreign minister, have been allowed to live freely in the Afghan capital, Kabul, to represent the Taliban in negotiations with other Afghan factions and potentially the U.S.
Mr. Ali noted that Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the former foreign minister, also has stated that the Afghan Taliban does not share al Qaedas global agenda of terrorism and that his Taliban was not a threat to the world peace."
'Afghan Taliban know well that it would be very difficult for the Americans to negotiate with them unless they clearly distance themselves from al Qaeda and its new allies, the Pakistani Taliban,' Mr. Ali said."
Another Pakistani analyst reinforces Asraf Ali's analysis-
"Rifatullah Orakzai, a Peshawar-based analyst, said the Afghan Taliban is trying to create good will by showing its differences with al Qaeda. For example, Mr. Muttawakil recently stated "that if the Taliban came into power, girls would be allowed to pursue education in segregated institutions," Mr. Orakzai said."
In contrast, Bruce Riedel offers this pointed assessment-
"The U.S. has to be careful not to be 'suckered in' by relatively moderate statements by former and current Afghan Taliban officials, said Bruce Riedel, a specialist on South Asia who headed a policy review of Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Obama administration last spring. 'A lot of smoke is being thrown up to confuse people.'
Mr. Riedel said that such figures as Mr. Muttawakil 'speak for no one but themselves.'
Yet even Mr. Riedel recognizes growing tensions between the two camps.
'The Pakistani Taliban are attacking the ISI, which threatens the Afghan Taliban's cozy relationship with the ISI,' he said, referring to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.
So has anything really been solved here? Most of these issues have already been pointed to by those of us here. I've personally stated numerous times that the afghan taliban leadership within Pakistan has been assiduous in maintaining good behavior on Pakistani lands for EXACTLY the same reasons as Mr. Riedel has observed. Self-preservation is at stake for that leadership and it can ill-afford a break in the harmonious relations it currently enjoys.
Further, there is the question of attaining near goals first. Neither the afghan nor the Pakistani taliban have yet achieved their objectives. Do we really know, based upon a few offered carrots by Mr. Muttawakil, to what extent the afghan taliban would adhere to a peaceful (if xenophobic and self-isolated) existence were they successful?
I don't. Rocket attacks on public market places suggest that there's no uniformity of views within the afghan taliban.
Secondly, do we know that the Pakistani taliban are adamant about spreading a pan-islamic ummah throughout S. Asia and then globally?
I'm reminded of the philosophical struggle between utopian communists like Trotsky and the european communists of France during the 1930s and those like Iosef Stalin who insisted that the preservation of the Soviet Union against all comers took precedent. It really was no more than suggesting one shouldn't over-reach one's objectives before proper consolidation of temporal gains were made permanent.
Would SWAT today be a taliban bastion had not raiding parties been sent forth nearly immediately into Buner? Clearly, most in Pakistan saw this as an affront of their recently stated intent and also as an attempt to crudely expand their influence. What if they'd very carefully played the game?
I offer these thoughts because the analysis in favor of viewing a kinder, gentler afghan taliban was forwarded by a Pakistani journalist and used the thoughts of two Pakistani analysts to support the contention.
The opposing view was led (at least in this article) by Bruce Riedel, an American. This schism may be coincidental. I know of Pakistanis here who largely adhere to my view. OTOH, it may not be. I haven't yet read supporting arguments by westerners to the views expressed by Mr. Ali and Mr. Orakzai but can easily imagine that such may be embraced by those in the west seeking an acceptable rationale for our departure.
I can also easily see Pakistanis here and elsewhere, to include analysts, who'll cling to the perspective that THIS afghan taliban ain't your daddy's afghan taliban. It fits nicely with holding your cards, all of them, and playing them one card at a time. That view also ties into my (and others') concerns about Pakistani support for the afghan taliban.
That rationale would be couched in a new benevolence within the afghan taliban hierarchy. I'm dubious because, naturally, I'm S-2...
...but more so because rocket attacks upon civilian targets contradicts the comforting words offered. Actions always speak louder than words.
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