Analyzing North Waziristan

[F86 Saber]

What is the guarantee that when the operation starts the top leadership wouldn't run to Afghanistan and wouldn't regroup and come back because lets face it, PA cannot remain their forever. Also what is the solution of the Balochistan problem? Will the PA have to conduct similar operations there too?

 

[Bill Longley]

What is the guarantee that when the operation starts the top leadership wouldn't run to Afghanistan and wouldn't regroup and come back because lets face it, PA cannot remain their forever. Also what is the solution of the Balochistan problem? Will the PA have to conduct similar operations there too?

top leadership is shifting to Afghanistan as reports in Dawn and Express tribune suggest.
those who say after north Waziristan militancy will end are plain stupids.

Militery solution is always short term. Bajor is the best example. Until we defeat militants ideologically and un less we defeat ignorance and poverty in effected areas militancy will remain

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

Threads should be merged

http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/46193-analyzing-north-waziristan-5.html

 

[Janbaz]

First clear Shaktoi region where its been mentioned by either Mr. Fatman somwhere that Hakimullah's men are migrating.
The forested ridges there as mentioned earlier have to be cleansed

 

[sonicboom]

Operation North Waziristan: Delayed but not abandoned

Posted on 06. Jun, 2010 by Raja Mujtaba in War on Terrorism

By Brig Asif Haroon Raja


In the wake of weak governance, rampant corruption, weak economy, messy political situation and growing incidence of terrorism, Pakistan is being described as a failed state incapable of protecting the nukes. Western and Indian media publish stories based on half-truths and lies regularly to create an impression that everything is topsy-turvy in Pakistan and its fragmentation under the burgeoning weight of problems is a forgone conclusion. The world has been conditioned through an orchestrated media campaign that Pakistan is the epicenter of terrorism, FATA the most dangerous place on earth, Afghan Taliban Shura is housed in Balochistan and Al-Qaeda leadership in FATA, segments of Pak Army and ISI are in cahoots with Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, ISI is the chief sponsor of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Pak nukes are unsafe and vulnerable to theft by militants, Pak nuclear facilities have become vulnerable to sympathizers of religious extremists working in atomic plants.

Fresh allegations are arbitrarily added to the lengthy concocted list at the cost of ignoring real challenges. Hillary Clinton has further upped the ante by saying that some elements in Pak Army have all along known the whereabouts of Osama and Omar. During her last visit to Pakistan she had stated that Al-Qaeda leadership had shifted to FATA in 2002 and it was inconceivable that Pakistan didn’t know about it.

If true, why the US kept quiet about it for so long and why it has been stating all these years that Osama is probably somewhere along the region of Pak-Afghan border belt? FATA was penetrated by CIA and FBI agents in 2002 and later by RAW agents; umpteen numbers of outposts were established. Spy drones had started surveying the area from 2004 onwards and after sometime Blackwater also became operative. FATA was put under microscopic scrutiny of satellites and imagery. Massive hunt had been launched by multiple intelligence agencies all along the border belt to hunt Osama. Al-Qaeda operatives and anti-US elements in Waziristan are being targeted by drones based on intelligence provided by their own sources.

So how come, Osama allegedly residing in FATA could not be located by USA for all these years? The only possibilities are that either the most wanted man was dead and kept alive out of expediency, or was in the basement of Whitehouse for George Bush’s convinience; was being used to keep Pakistan on the leash and to justify its continued stay in Afghanistan, or US intelligence agencies are inept.

Going by the logic of Hillary Clinton that it is difficult to believe that Pakistan military leadership didn’t know the existence of Al-Qaeda leadership in FATA since 2002, how should Pakistanis get convinced that RAW is undertaking covert operations from Afghan soil without the knowledge of USA. Why should we accept the tainted logic of USA that India is no threat to Pakistan when over 70% of Indian military might is poised against Pakistan and both civil and military leaders do not miss an opportunity to hurl threatening statements? Is it not true that TTP was CIA’s creation and is being fed by CIA, RAW, RAAM and Mossad from Kandahar-Jalalabad?

It will be recalled that once Pak Army gained complete success in Swat and was busy consolidating its gains, intense pressure was applied on Pakistan to start another operation in South Waziristan (SW). No sooner operation Rah-e-Nijat was launched in SW; ISAF promptly removed all its border check posts to allow safe movement to Afghan Taliban across the border. When the latter didn’t come to the rescue of Mehsuds it caused immense frustration to the plot makers.

Soon after successful operation in SW launched in October last, drummed up as mother of all battles and main bastion of militants, the US lost interest in that region and started focusing on North Waziristan (NW). Intense pressure was mounted on Pakistan to launch another major operation in NW but it was warded off by Gen Kayani on the plea that his forces had already got overstretched and had employed 150000 troops in Malakand Division, Swat, and several tribal agencies of FATA at the peril of lowering combat strength on eastern border.

It was argued that unless gains made in Swat and SW were consolidated, political administration installed and rehabilitation and development works accelerated, it would be unwise to open another front. He said that notwithstanding that back of TTP had been broken, but runaways had taken refuge in Orakzai, NW, Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber Agencies wherefrom they were still carrying out random attacks and that troops were keeping all the trouble spots in check. He added that while Kurram Agency was rife with sectarian war, even SW had not been fully neutralized since displaced persons housed in Tank and DIK were yet to return to their homes to resume normal activities.

Pentagon and NATO commanders understood the logic given and expressed satisfaction over spectacular gains made, but hawks within US Administration, Congress and State Department mostly influenced by Jewish and Indian lobbies in pursuit of their sinister designs kept up the pressure on Pakistan by reminding that aid under Kerry-Lugar Bill will be conditional to progress achieved on terrorism. They ignored Pakistan’s economic and human losses and that Pakistan urgently needed financial resources and military equipment to fight the war.

CIA, RAW and Blackwater kept up with their secret games to fuel terrorism particularly in NW to provoke Pakistan to jump the gun. Apart from intensifying drones attacks, several shady groups like Asian Tigers comprising mostly Punjabi militants were instigated to make efforts to break peace accord between Gul Bahadur and security forces and to keep instigating TTP elements. Presence of some elements belonging to Haqqani group in NW and its tacit understanding with Pakistan also irked US and were targeted by drones. It was in the backdrop of their keenness to overstretch Pak Army and to let it get pinned down in several regions that kidnapping of two former ISI officers and British journalists by Asian Tigers and beheading of Khalid Khwaja together with Times Square incident and attack on Ahmadi worship places and Jinnah hospital in Lahore fitted into the scheme of things.

Hopes are now being pinned on the hypothesis that operation in NW will antagonize Gul Bahadur led Othmanzai Wazirs, Dawars, Haqqani group, Punjabi Taliban and will propel Afghan Taliban to join the fray. They also hope that Maulvi Nazir leading Ahmadzai Wazirs in SW which has so far remained neutral will also join in, thus easing pressure on Mehsuds and enabling them to regroup and put up a joint front against the Army. Such a development will be ideal for the club of wicked in Kabul. India having again worn the mask of friendship will instantly heat up the eastern front to pose a dilemma on Pak armed forces.

Presently Pakistan Armed Forces are well balanced to fight war on terror as well as cater for Indian threat. Recently concluded largest ever exercises Azm-e-Nau in which army and air force took part was an indicator that operational fitness and resolve of armed forces are on a very high level. Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat operations involved almost corps size forces in each sector. It will require another corps effort to mount an operation in NW where reportedly militants belonging to several groups are operating. Already 70,000 troops have been shifted from the east towards western regions to fight militants. Pulling out two more divisions will be at the cost of weakening our defensive effort along eastern border.

Notwithstanding US verbal assurances, which have always proved illusive, Indian threat cannot be overlooked. Armed forces operational readiness and capability to repel Indian aggression deters India from undertaking any venture. It has therefore impelled Pakistan’s adversaries to weaken its armed forces from within, which also stand guard on nukes. Ways are being devised to keep almost three corps in northwest and a corps in Balochistan fixed and render eastern front weak.

Our leaders in the grip of Washington can only delay operation in NW for a while but cannot abandon it. I am sure Gen Kayani has a plan up his sleeve to tackle NW his own way without compromising Pakistan’s security.


Brig Asif Haroon Raja is Member Board of Advisors, Opinion Maker. He has been a Directing Staff, Command and Staff Collge Quetta. He did his MSc in War Studies and been Director Phsy-Ops. Was also Defence Attache to Egypt and Sudan.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

US push for final assault deadly for Pakistan
Wednesday, 09 June 2010 17:41
Written by Tahir Ali


After successful campaigns in the tribal frontier bordering Afghanistan where the Taliban is based, the US has pressured Pakistan to invade their final stronghold in North Waziristan. Given Pakistan’s financial and political dependence on the US, an attack on NorthWaziristan looks to be a forgone conclusion. But for Pakistan, military operations would unite the Taliban’s divided commanders and provoke an even deadlier wave of bombings than those it has already faced.



Pakistan appears to have agreed, in-principle, to launch a full-fledged military operation against Taliban in North Waziristan. But it will be an uphill task for Pakistani forces to take on militants in this particular area, a stronghold of all kinds of militants including Arabs, central Asians, Pashtuns and Punjabis.


The decision came after US National Security Adviser Gen James Jones and CIA chief Leon Panetta recently held a meeting with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Chief of the Army Staff Gen Parvez Kayani in Islamabad.

The military operation could result in more American financial aid but for Pakistan the security implications will be dire. North Waziristan is the most important stronghold for insurgents fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and plotting attacks beyond the region, making for a particularly hard fought battle.



Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the head of all Taliban factions in North Waziristan is one of the most influential Taliban commanders in Pakistan, having local, non-local and foreign fighters under his built. Currently he is in a peace agreement with the Pakistani military, an agreement that enables Pakistan forces unmolested access to neighboring areas in this remote and rugged part of the country. If Pakistan were to break the peace accord, the reaction would undoubtedly take the form of increased bombings in major Pakistani cities. Bahadar’s is an independent fighting force that is more powerful than the Pakistan Taliban Movement, but as he rarely attacks Pakistani forces so little is known about his strength.



Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a 50 year old Madda Khel clansman of the Utmanzai Wazir tribe of North Waziristan, first entered a peace agreement with Pakistan in September 2006. A number of times his men violated the agreement but Pakistan turned a blind eye. It broke down in July 2007 only to be immediately followed by another peace deal. That agreement broke down in 2008 but the arrangement was again reenacted by the government.



Bahadar’s men are well organized and, due to continuous US drone attacks in the area, ordinary tribesmen are ready to fight for him, whether American or Pakistani forces.



Al-Qaeda and other foreigners in North Waziristan have always been against any peace deal with Pakistan. They would be happy if the operation starts and would fight till the very end to defeat Pakistani forces as a matter of survival. Although they have only a few Arab fighters, Uzbeks are great in number. Along with those already there, over 2000 others migrated from South Waziristan to Bahadur’s territory following Pakistan operations last year.



If Pakistan invades North Waziristan, it will also have to contend with the Haqqani network. Bahadar is Haqqani’s deputy in the area and he reliant on it financially. The network also finances the Pakistan Taliban Movement. When Baitullah Mehsud was in charge, the group received round Rs 20 million per month, according to reports. Haqqani stopped funding the Pakistan Taliban when Hakimullah Mehsud became its leader, but now once again the funding has continued. Paradoxically, maintaining good relations with Haqqani is important for Pakistan, particularly after foreign forces leave neighbouring Afghanistan. For that reason also, Pakistan is averse to invading North Waziristan.

But what of the Pakistan Taliban Movement? Following Army operations in South Waziristan, most of its fighters and key leaders - Qari Hussain, Waliur Rehman, Commander Shamim and Madhu Mehsud – are reportedly now reside in North Waziristan. The mysterious Punjabi Taliban, which includes the Amjad Farooqi network, Chief Al-Qaeda commander Ilyas Kashmiri, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi cadres, are also based in North Waziristan, although many of them have fled to the Punjab owing to the escalation of US drone strikes. Those that remain, believed to be a large number, would undoubtedly fight alongside local militants against Pakistani forces.



If North Waziristan is invaded by Pakistan, there will be a new, deadly surge of suicide bombings in the urban areas of the country. When Pakistani forces started a military assault against the Pakistan Taliban Movement in South Waziristan, cities like Peshawar, Lahore, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan witnessed the worst form of suicide bombing and other explosions killing hundreds and injuring several more. This time not only Pakistan Taliban, which claims to have 2800 trained suicide bombers, but also the Haqqani network that specializes in suicide car bombings and Bahadur’s men will seek to infiltrate the urban areas in an attempt to demoralise ordinary Pakistanis in response to their military forces’ operations in the tribal areas that are widely perceived as being waged at the behest of the United States.

US push for final assault deadly for Pakistan

 

[fatman17]

Where Have All The Big Bads Gone?

June 10, 2010:

In Pakistan's tribal territories, the army's biggest day-to-day problem is operating some kind of government. Since before Pakistan was founded in 1948, the tribal territories were run by tribal authorities. Over the last sixty years, the government police and bureaucrats have taken control of urban areas in the tribal territories (cities and large towns), but that still leaves over ten million people out in the countryside, ruled by centuries old tribal custom and whim. This is where the Taliban emerged, and where over three million people still live under the control of pro-Taliban tribal leaders. As the army drives Taliban gunmen out of an area, it is faced with the problem of finding pro-government tribesmen willing to work with army or civilian bureaucrats to run the area. Since the Taliban like to stick around, passing as regular folks, and terrorize their tribal opponents, this is asking a lot.

The Pakistani Army is preparing to move into North Waziristan, the last area where a large concentration of Taliban can be found. North Waziristan is small (only 4,700 square kilometers, and 365,000 people). But most of the adult men have guns, and using them is considered both an obligation and something of an outdoor sport. Despite its smaller population, North Waziristan is considered a tougher objective than South Waziristan, Orakzai, Bajaur and Swat. The North Waziristan tribes can put over 30,000 armed (if not very well trained or equipped) men into action. Like Bajaur, a river runs through it (the Tochi, and into Afghanistan via the Tochi pass.) Most tribal leaders in North Waziristan can see where this is going, and are trying to work out deals that will spare them attacks by the army or the Taliban (who like to murder disloyal tribal leaders). The army wants to keep down the civilian casualties, as the families of such victims have long memories. Blood feuds are a major obsession up in those hills. Thus the effort to get the North Waziristan tribes to drive out the Taliban gunmen in their territory, or at least identify them and where they are. The pro-government tribes are willing to do this, and apparently are already providing information.

The army wants to go in quick, and round up the remaining Taliban before too many others get hurt. During this planning process, it's become apparent that many of the al Qaeda and Taliban (and other terror group) leaders that have long hid out in places like North Waziristan, are no longer there. Where have these guys gone? Some believe they have gone to Afghanistan. But that is not a safe place for terrorist big shots, and there's little evidence that new ones are coming in (many already there are known to be recently dead, or fled.) Fleeing to Yemen or Somalia is not much of an option, as both places are now hard to get into, and stay hidden. Both those areas are under intense scrutiny by Western counter-terrorism forces. Iran is not hospitable to Sunni Islamic radicals (who are big fans of killing Shia *******, which is what Iranians are). It seems more likely that these terrorist leaders have fled to the more populous parts of Pakistan (Punjab, Sind and major cities like Karachi). Pakistani officials do not like this outcome, but it appears to be what is happening. Local police in Punjab and Sind are dealing with it, after years of blaming terrorist violence on outsiders. It's now obvious to all that Islamic groups have been operating in Punjab and Sind for quite some time, with little assistance from outsiders.

 

[EjazR]

Pakistan nods affirmative for North Waziristan operation

by Syed Moazzam Hashmi

ISLAMABAD, June 10 (Xinhua) -- In the fast developing scenario where the certain subsequent events have boiled the mercury in Obama administration once again to insist on Pakistan hitting terrorists strongholds in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan's top officials have given an affirmative nod to the start of operation in North Waziristan.

"Our next priority is going to be North Waziristan, but we have to time our operations in line with our resources," Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said on Wednesday.

"At the moment we are consolidating our position in South Waziristan," he stated during a visit to Turkey while emphasizing that Pakistan's next priority in the fight against the insurgent Taliban is North Waziristan.

"The cat is out of the bag," Arshi Saleem, senior research analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad, told Xinhua on Thursday while commenting on the long rumored myth of the possibility of a military operation in North Waziristan.

Pakistani military chief General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani in his recent visit to the tribal areas had declared victory in some parts of the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan against insurgent militants in continuing operations in South Waziristan tribal areas.

Analysts believe that the victory declaration mean an affirmative nod to the imminent operation in the North Waziristan' s tribal areas as much desired by the United States for long while winding up the chapter in South Waziristan.

"Certainly, it will give another reason to think fast about cleaning up of the mess in North Waziristan," Arshi Saleem, an Afghan Affairs and Counter Terrorism expert with IRS, commented while referring to Tuesday midnight terror attack on a NATO supply convoy near Pakistani capital Islamabad that killed eight and destroyed 60 trucks.

Punjabi Taliban, a splinter group of disbanded Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which is associated with Al-Qaeda, had claimed the responsibility for the attack. On May 28, nearly 100 people including worshippers, policemen and others, were killed in twin suicide attacks in the eastern city of Lahore. Punjabi Taliban and another Al-Qaeda-affiliated group had accepted the responsibility for these terror attacks.

"We might see some explosions here and there that would be justification enough to start the operation and convince the tribals as well as the media," said Arshi Saleem, who is also on the faculty of the National Defense University (NDU) in Islamabad.

Pakistani military has already been badly stretched conducting an operation in South Waziristan in the restive Pakistani tribal belt bordering Afghanistan while keeping a massive presence on the eastern border with India.

According to reports, among the total 19 divisions of some 500, 000-plus armed forces of Pakistan, seven to eight divisions are currently engaged in counter-terrorism. Its two divisions are in South Waziristan, one in North Waziristan, two in Swat and Dir and other areas of the Islamic state that has long been experiencing extremist militancy.

Putting aside the possibility of an imminent full-scale operation in North Waziristan while supporting his former colleagues, the defense and security analyst Major General ( retired) Jamshed Ayaz told Xinhua, "No, I doubt it. The army chief does not want it."

Pakistani military Genreal Kayani told Obama administration in end-March that Pakistani will not launch a "stream roller" operation in North Waziristan.

Analysts believe that it would not be possible for Pakistan to absolutely prevent incidents of terrorism, which could be individuals in nature or involving the unbridled non-state actors, from terrorizing the 170 million Pakistanis with off-and-on suicide bombings across the South Asian nuclear state, thus, providing all reasons to the U.S. side, the most important ally of Pakistan in the war against terror, to switch on a massive offensive in North Waziristan.

North Waziristan is known to be unconquered due to its difficult terrain and resultant poor economy which make its war lords vulnerable to moneyed foreign and local militants that have been seeking refuge there after escaping from South Waziristan.

Miranshah, the headquarters of North Waziristan, and Mir Ali are reported to be the strongholds of Al- Qaeda that include TTP, Punjabi Talibans from south Punjab province, who mainly work under the flag of "Lashkar-e-Jhangvi" (a disbanded Sunni extremist outfit), and foreign militants including Chechens, Uzbeks and Arabs.

North Waziristan is inhabited by Wazir and Dawar tribes. Both Siraj Haqqani and Hafiz Gul Bahadur are Wiziris while another militant Maulana Sadiq Noor who is allied to TTP is from Dawar tribe.

Analysts believe that it would be quite interesting to watch this mercurial situation with the following questions: What would be the operation aimed at in North Waziristan? What would happen if the possible operation would be directed against Al-Qaeda and the Punjabi Taliban? And how their comrades would react within Pakistani cities if the fugitive Punjabi and sectarian militants were targeted in the tribal areas? Why the strongholds of Punjabi Taliban so far have not been raided? It might lead to some debate and conclusions as the events unfold in the days to come.

 

[ajpirzada]

North Waziristan operation to be "selective"

Sunday, 13 Jun, 2010


"Security forces don't want to lose the gains made in South Waziristan and northwestern regions, including Swat." – (File Photo)
PAKISTAN
US missile strikes kill three in North Waziristan
US missile strikes kill three in North Waziristan
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan is buying time in North Waziristan - gathering intelligence, building alliances and insisting any assault into the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fortress take place at its own time and choosing.

Part of the tribal belt on the Afghan border, North Waziristan is home to 350,000 people but considered a stronghold for the most dangerous militants in the world and largely impenetrable.

It is also a rumoured hiding place of Osama bin Laden.

Commanders are walking a tightrope, balancing US pressure for action against fears that a major push into the hornet's nest would make enemies they cannot beat and drag Pakistan into a new wave of violence.

“The army is already over-stretched after carrying out offensives in other tribal regions,” one Pakistani security official told AFP.

“Security forces got in touch with local tribesmen in a policy of dialogue and asked them not to harbour any insurgents, and this policy has worked,” he said.

As well as the bin Laden connection, North Waziristan's mountains are also a refuge for Pakistani Tehreek-e-Taliban who escaped an offensive in neighbouring South Waziristan and networks fighting US forces in Afghanistan.

Among those using bases in North Waziristan are the Haqqani network, created by Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and run by his son Sirajuddin; Afghan Taliban; Pakistani warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his ally Maulvi Sadiq Noor.

They are blamed by the United States for fuelling the nearly nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan, for attacking the 142,000 US-led Nato troops there and for working to destabilise the Western-backed government in Kabul.

But they are also men whom the Pakistani security establishment believes pose no direct risk to the homeland because their activities are targeted across the border, while homegrown Taliban pose a more immediate threat.

“There are problems in North Waziristan where Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has established a presence,” another senior security official told AFP. “The issue is how to handle these problems.”

"Security forces don't want to lose the gains made in South Waziristan and northwestern regions, including Swat,” he said, warning that any hasty relocation of troops could lead to a deterioration in those areas.

Opening a new front against the likes of Haqqani and Gul Bahadur would, Pakistani officials believe, make enemies out of well-trained, well-financed groups that are potentially valuable allies when US troops leave Afghanistan.

Given the risks involved and strain on Pakistani troops, with forces actively engaged in six of the seven tribal districts, analysts say fears of a backlash, including attacks on civilians, are holding the army back.

“Fears of a fierce reaction by Punjab-based militants, because of their links with Tehreek-e-Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud, the Haqqani and Bahadur networks might be one reason holding the army back,” analyst Imtiaz Gul said.

Last year saw a huge surge in attacks in retaliation for military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan, followed this year by a relative decline.

Instead of a major assault, Gul said a North Waziristan operation would be “selective” - at a time and on a scale of the military's choosing.

For example, troops may try and “shrink the space” for local facilitators of Al-Qaeda, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

Around 140,000 troops are deployed along the western border, leaving 100,000 in the east, where Pakistan meets India, and commanders are wary of leaving that frontier more exposed.

“The army and paramilitary are busy in at least four tribal regions and have not been able to withdraw fully from Swat and Malakand,” said defence analyst Hasan Askari.

“It seems that the army would ultimately take specifically targeted action there, but at a time of its choosing,” he said.

DAWN.COM | Pakistan | North Waziristan operation to be "selective"

 

[Awesome]

Osama Bin Laden was initially rumored in Wana, South Waziristan
Then in north of South Waziristan, then in Quetta, then in Karachi, in between he popped up in Orakzai, Bajaur and Swat too... now in North Waziristan.

He's worse than the disappearing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

 

[fatman17]

Osama Bin Laden was initially rumored in Wana, South Waziristan
Then in north of South Waziristan, then in Quetta, then in Karachi, in between he popped up in Orakzai, Bajaur and Swat too... now in North Waziristan.

He's worse than the disappearing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

look at the 'free miles' he has clocked - he cld go round-the-world-free!

 

[GUNNER]

North Waziristan is the final frontier

Sherry Rehman

There is a saying in Pakistan that if you can’t defeat your enemy, befriend him. This is particularly true in the tribal areas that border Afghanistan, where, in six agencies, there’s an unprecedented military offensive against militants. Despite many tactical alliances and ceasefire pacts in Waziristan, Pakistan has gone in with firepower backed by US drones. The cornerstone of the security policy here is to attack militants close to the al-Qaida, but spare armed syndicates that protect Pakistan’s flanks.

The turbulence in the ****** border zone has led Washington to put out strategic leaks about possible military intervention inside Pakistan. The heart of the problem is what could alter the dynamics of declining US-Nato successes in the Afghan theatre. North Waziristan agency (NWA), and what the Pakistan army is able to do there, seems to have become the litmus test for US-Pakistan relations. After Faisal Shahzad’s attempted bomb attack in Times Square, the pressure on Islamabad to act against anti-US Taliban in NWA has increased. Islamabad pleads capacity constraints; the US cites commitment gaps.

The stakes are high. After failing to build institutional structures in Afghanistan, the test for Washington is linking US-Nato ground offensives in the south and Loya Paktiya to Pakistan’s push on the militant Haqqani-led groups from NWA. The Obama presidency needs a game-changer in a theatre where success is elusive despite a COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy that focuses on population safety. The expected Taliban reversals have not happened despite a massive offensive in Marjah. In Washington’s view, Pakistan is pulling its punches as it may need the Taliban when the US exits Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, this is a battle for its stability and survival. Action is overdue against terrorist and sectarian groups in Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. There is a compelling need to act against extremist groups after the massacre of nearly a hundred Ahmadiyas in Lahore recently. The Punjab government needs to do a counter-terror sweep of its cities. The federal government must back up this action with pro-minority legislation. None of this requires the military to act, but such actions will see heightened terrorist attacks on civilians and military alike. This is something that the government will have to brace itself for.

The challenge in NWA is that Islamabad does not have the military or civilian capacity to open all fronts at the same time. Enmeshed in a blighted strategic endgame, with a growing terrorist threat, tanking economy and India posturing to the east, the military option in NWA cannot be a hair-trigger decision. The terrain has sobered the ambitions of several imperial powers, including the British, Russians and now perhaps the Americans. Despite impressive successes in other agencies, the army now faces 50,000 massed armed guerrillas in NWA. Hardened groups such as the Tehrik-I-Taliban, the Haqqani-group and jihadist outfits such as LeT and Lashkar-I-Jhangvi, Lashkar Zil, al-Qaida veterans and Salafists have sought sanctuary there after resisting army operations in surrounding areas. Islamabad’s fear is that if it shoves a fist into this hornet’s nest, maintaining the fragile consensus against terrorists at home would be difficult, as well as protecting its cities from further attacks.

This can be no “shock and awe” exercise that can be switched off by remote control. Pakistan has already lost over 3,000 people in two years as a result of the terrorist backlash; the economy has taken a $35 billion hit. The question is, will the US be around to help hold down Pakistan’s fist when its army swoops on al-Qaida strongholds such as Mir Ali? The military’s tactic in any counterinsurgency initiative in mountainous terrain is ‘pincer and choke’ the enemies’ escape routes. The 8,000-feet high mountainous trails in NWA are legendary for providing escape routes to Afghanistan. So, if these routes are not blocked, the whole exercise will lead to the enemy escaping to hospitable terrain. Given the unequal number of border checkposts on either side of the Durand Line, it is unlikely that any permanent flush-out of Waziristan is possible. If the NWA is grand central for terrorists, then the Afghan border provinces provide strategic depth. While the US-Nato forces in Afghanistan need to do their bit, Pakistan will have to step up border checks and review unwritten peace deals with tribal leaders who change sides too often.

The other question is: how long can the Pakistani army stay in the agencies it has secured? Is there a civilian ‘build, hold and transition’ component to the project? Once again, before putting pressure Pakistan with an escalating war, huge governance commitments such as ROZ (reconstruction opportunity zones) assistance will have to roll off the US machine. Why should Pakistan be expected to do more than reverse the Taliban tide in some areas, when US has not been able even to broker a new post-insurgency model for Afghanistan? Pakhtun alienation is not a concern for exiting nations, but it has huge blowback potential for Pakistan — Karachi is host to five million Pakhtuns.

What will help is a phase-by-phase plan for securing the area, holding it until the tribes that have been terrorized by the Taliban are able to return and do business. Second, though the elites in Waziristan’s tribal areas have been marginalized by the Taliban, they will resist governance models that diminish their pre-Taliban political powers. The military will have to stay in Waziristan until the police and frontier corps in that area is strengthened, and the tribal leadership prepares for critical reforms and political activity by mainstream parties. FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) reform will only work if introduced incrementally, and the government’s recent announcements, if implemented, will be a brave start. At the federal level, security sector reform is critical because peace deals with militants who promised not to attack government installations have almost always failed. As a temporary tactical move, there is some use in neutralizing militants to focus on the main enemy, but not in the long-run. The state must start assuming charge of security.

The politics of a military operation are never easy. No military relishes fighting inside its own borders, and no civilian, elected government embraces the use of force as a first, or even second option. The government has thrown its full weight behind the operations, despite the costs that accrue from such initiatives. As a result, Pakistan now has its own generation of lost people, human tragedies, economic crises, internal strife and political instability.

While the military presses on with an offensive in Orakzai agency, there will be little room to divert forces for anything more than strategic strikes on NWA areas where the terrorists cluster. Pakistan must dismantle al-Qaida as well as India-centric jihadist outfits as a priority. It also must allow Kabul to form its own stable government and hope for a friendly partner. But it will need Pakhtuns to maintain stability in Afghan border provinces after the expected US troop withdrawal in 2011. Seeking more than surgical raids in NWA is asking for too much. Pakistan must act decisively against terrorists, but using its own gameplan.

Sherry Rehman is a member of the National Security Committee in Pakistan’s Parliament

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

Pakistan drags feet on new offensive in tribal belt
2010-06-13 16:00:00

Pakistan is buying time in North Waziristan -- gathering intelligence, building alliances and insisting any assault into the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fortress take place at its own time and choosing.

Part of the tribal belt on the Afghan border, North Waziristan is home to 350,000 people but considered a stronghold for the most dangerous militants in the world and largely impenetrable.

It is also a rumoured hiding place of Osama bin Laden.

Commanders are walking a tightrope, balancing US pressure for action against fears that a major push into the hornet's nest would make enemies they cannot beat and drag Pakistan into a new wave of violence.

"The army is already over-stretched after carrying out offensives in other tribal regions," one Pakistani security official told AFP.

"Security forces got in touch with local tribesmen in a policy of dialogue and asked them not to harbour any insurgents, and this policy has worked," he said.

As well as the bin Laden connection, North Waziristan's mountains are also a refuge for Pakistani Tehreek-e-Taliban who escaped an offensive in neighbouring South Waziristan and networks fighting US forces in Afghanistan.

A US drone campaign already trained on North Waziristan has been stepped up since Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad was charged in the United States for plotting an attempted May 1 bomb attack on New York. Shahzad told interrogators he had been to the region for bomb training.

Among those using bases in North Waziristan are the Haqqani network, created by Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and run by his son Sirajuddin; Afghan Taliban; Pakistani warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his ally Maulvi Sadiq Noor.

They are blamed by the United States for fuelling the nearly nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan, for attacking the 142,000 US-led NATO troops there and for working to destabilise the Western-backed government in Kabul.

But they are also men whom the Pakistani security establishment believes pose no direct risk to the homeland because their activities are targeted across the border, while homegrown Taliban pose a more immediate threat.

"There are problems in North Waziristan where Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has established a presence," another senior security official told AFP. "The issue is how to handle these problems."

"Security forces don't want to lose the gains made in South Waziristan and northwestern regions, including Swat," he said, warning that any hasty relocation of troops could lead to a deterioration in those areas.

Opening a new front against the likes of Haqqani and Gul Bahadur would, Pakistani officials believe, make enemies out of well-trained, well-financed groups that are potentially valuable allies when US troops leave Afghanistan.

Given the risks involved and strain on Pakistani troops, with forces actively engaged in six of the seven tribal districts, analysts say fears of a backlash, including attacks on civilians, are holding the army back.

"Fears of a fierce reaction by Punjab-based militants, because of their links with Tehreek-e-Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud, the Haqqani and Bahadur networks might be one reason holding the army back," analyst Imtiaz Gul said.

Last year saw a huge surge in attacks in retaliation for military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan, followed this year by a relative decline.

But some of this year's worst bombings have been in Lahore, capital of Punjab and playground of the elite, where attacks on the Ahmadi community slaughtered 82 people on May 28 -- blamed by the government on Punjabi Taliban.

Instead of a major assault, Gul said a North Waziristan operation would be "selective" -- at a time and on a scale of the military's choosing.

For example, troops may try and "shrink the space" for local facilitators of Al-Qaeda, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

The government reached an undeclared understanding with Bahadur in early 2008, following bouts of fighting in North Waziristan in 2006 and 2007, calling a halt to mutual conflict.

Pakistan's other old fear is India. Around 140,000 troops are deployed along the western border, leaving 100,000 in the east, where Pakistan meets India, and commanders are wary of leaving that frontier more exposed.

"The army and paramilitary are busy in at least four tribal regions and have notbeen able to withdraw fully from Swat and Malakand," said defence analyst Hasan Askari.

"It seems that the army would ultimately take specifically targetedaction there, but at a time of its choosing," he said.

Pakistan drags feet on new offensive in tribal belt

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

North Waziristan is the final frontier

Sherry Rehman

There is a saying in Pakistan that if you can’t defeat your enemy, befriend him. This is particularly true in the tribal areas that border Afghanistan, where, in six agencies, there’s an unprecedented military offensive against militants. Despite many tactical alliances and ceasefire pacts in Waziristan, Pakistan has gone in with firepower backed by US drones. The cornerstone of the security policy here is to attack militants close to the al-Qaida, but spare armed syndicates that protect Pakistan’s flanks.

The turbulence in the ****** border zone has led Washington to put out strategic leaks about possible military intervention inside Pakistan. The heart of the problem is what could alter the dynamics of declining US-Nato successes in the Afghan theatre. North Waziristan agency (NWA), and what the Pakistan army is able to do there, seems to have become the litmus test for US-Pakistan relations. After Faisal Shahzad’s attempted bomb attack in Times Square, the pressure on Islamabad to act against anti-US Taliban in NWA has increased. Islamabad pleads capacity constraints; the US cites commitment gaps.

The stakes are high. After failing to build institutional structures in Afghanistan, the test for Washington is linking US-Nato ground offensives in the south and Loya Paktiya to Pakistan’s push on the militant Haqqani-led groups from NWA. The Obama presidency needs a game-changer in a theatre where success is elusive despite a COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy that focuses on population safety. The expected Taliban reversals have not happened despite a massive offensive in Marjah. In Washington’s view, Pakistan is pulling its punches as it may need the Taliban when the US exits Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, this is a battle for its stability and survival. Action is overdue against terrorist and sectarian groups in Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. There is a compelling need to act against extremist groups after the massacre of nearly a hundred Ahmadiyas in Lahore recently. The Punjab government needs to do a counter-terror sweep of its cities. The federal government must back up this action with pro-minority legislation. None of this requires the military to act, but such actions will see heightened terrorist attacks on civilians and military alike. This is something that the government will have to brace itself for.

The challenge in NWA is that Islamabad does not have the military or civilian capacity to open all fronts at the same time. Enmeshed in a blighted strategic endgame, with a growing terrorist threat, tanking economy and India posturing to the east, the military option in NWA cannot be a hair-trigger decision. The terrain has sobered the ambitions of several imperial powers, including the British, Russians and now perhaps the Americans. Despite impressive successes in other agencies, the army now faces 50,000 massed armed guerrillas in NWA. Hardened groups such as the Tehrik-I-Taliban, the Haqqani-group and jihadist outfits such as LeT and Lashkar-I-Jhangvi, Lashkar Zil, al-Qaida veterans and Salafists have sought sanctuary there after resisting army operations in surrounding areas. Islamabad’s fear is that if it shoves a fist into this hornet’s nest, maintaining the fragile consensus against terrorists at home would be difficult, as well as protecting its cities from further attacks.

This can be no “shock and awe” exercise that can be switched off by remote control. Pakistan has already lost over 3,000 people in two years as a result of the terrorist backlash; the economy has taken a $35 billion hit. The question is, will the US be around to help hold down Pakistan’s fist when its army swoops on al-Qaida strongholds such as Mir Ali? The military’s tactic in any counterinsurgency initiative in mountainous terrain is ‘pincer and choke’ the enemies’ escape routes. The 8,000-feet high mountainous trails in NWA are legendary for providing escape routes to Afghanistan. So, if these routes are not blocked, the whole exercise will lead to the enemy escaping to hospitable terrain. Given the unequal number of border checkposts on either side of the Durand Line, it is unlikely that any permanent flush-out of Waziristan is possible. If the NWA is grand central for terrorists, then the Afghan border provinces provide strategic depth. While the US-Nato forces in Afghanistan need to do their bit, Pakistan will have to step up border checks and review unwritten peace deals with tribal leaders who change sides too often.

The other question is: how long can the Pakistani army stay in the agencies it has secured? Is there a civilian ‘build, hold and transition’ component to the project? Once again, before putting pressure Pakistan with an escalating war, huge governance commitments such as ROZ (reconstruction opportunity zones) assistance will have to roll off the US machine. Why should Pakistan be expected to do more than reverse the Taliban tide in some areas, when US has not been able even to broker a new post-insurgency model for Afghanistan? Pakhtun alienation is not a concern for exiting nations, but it has huge blowback potential for Pakistan — Karachi is host to five million Pakhtuns.

What will help is a phase-by-phase plan for securing the area, holding it until the tribes that have been terrorized by the Taliban are able to return and do business. Second, though the elites in Waziristan’s tribal areas have been marginalized by the Taliban, they will resist governance models that diminish their pre-Taliban political powers. The military will have to stay in Waziristan until the police and frontier corps in that area is strengthened, and the tribal leadership prepares for critical reforms and political activity by mainstream parties. FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) reform will only work if introduced incrementally, and the government’s recent announcements, if implemented, will be a brave start. At the federal level, security sector reform is critical because peace deals with militants who promised not to attack government installations have almost always failed. As a temporary tactical move, there is some use in neutralizing militants to focus on the main enemy, but not in the long-run. The state must start assuming charge of security.

The politics of a military operation are never easy. No military relishes fighting inside its own borders, and no civilian, elected government embraces the use of force as a first, or even second option. The government has thrown its full weight behind the operations, despite the costs that accrue from such initiatives. As a result, Pakistan now has its own generation of lost people, human tragedies, economic crises, internal strife and political instability.

While the military presses on with an offensive in Orakzai agency, there will be little room to divert forces for anything more than strategic strikes on NWA areas where the terrorists cluster. Pakistan must dismantle al-Qaida as well as India-centric jihadist outfits as a priority. It also must allow Kabul to form its own stable government and hope for a friendly partner. But it will need Pakhtuns to maintain stability in Afghan border provinces after the expected US troop withdrawal in 2011. Seeking more than surgical raids in NWA is asking for too much. Pakistan must act decisively against terrorists, but using its own gameplan.

Sherry Rehman is a member of the National Security Committee in Pakistan’s Parliament

Its already posted by sir fatman17.

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan buying time in North Waziristan

* Official says army is over-stretched after carrying out other offensives

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan is buying time in North Waziristan — gathering intelligence, building alliances and insisting any assault into the Taliban and al Qaeda fortress take place at its own time and choosing..

Part of the tribal belt on the Afghan border, North Waziristan is home to 350,000 people but considered a stronghold for the most dangerous terrorists in the world and largely impenetrable. It is also a rumoured hiding place of al Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden. Commanders are walking a tightrope, balancing US pressure for action against fears that a major push into the hornet’s nest would make enemies they cannot beat and drag Pakistan into a new wave of violence. “The army is already over-stretched after carrying out offensives in other tribal regions,” one Pakistani security official told AFP. “Security forces got in touch with local tribesmen in a policy of dialogue and asked them not to harbour any insurgents, and this policy has worked,” he said.

“There are problems in North Waziristan where the TTP has established a presence,” another senior security official told AFP. “The issue is how to handle these problems. Security forces don’t want to lose the gains made in South Waziristan and north-western regions, including Swat,” he said, warning that any hasty relocation of troops could lead to a deterioration in those areas. “Fears of a fierce reaction by Punjab-based terrorists, because of their links with the TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud and the Haqqani and Bahadur networks might be one reason holding the army back,” analyst Imtiaz Gul said. Instead of a major assault, Gul said a North Waziristan operation would be “selective” — at a time and on a scale of the military’s choosing. For example, troops may try and “shrink the space” for local facilitators of al Qaeda, such as the TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. afp