ANALYSIS: The Afghan Factional Army

[fatman17]

ANALYSIS: The Afghan Factional Army —Musa Khan Jalalzai


Experts claim that the Indian military’s presence in Kabul will expand India’s power projection in Central Asia. This military presence will deny Pakistan strategic depth and it will shift the battleground away from Kashmir to Balochistan and FATA

The establishment of an Afghan Factional Army (AFA) — an army of unskilled, illiterate and non-professional former mujahideen and Taliban warlords — is a threat to peace, stability and the national concordance of Afghanistan. Members of this ethnic and sectarian rogue army are not only fighting alongside Taliban militants against the coalition forces in various provinces of the country and in the tribal belts of Pakistan, they support terrorist networks as well.

Neighbouring states, specifically Pakistan, fear that any weak Afghan government will easily become prey to the Indian political and military influence after NATO withdrawal in 2014. India is trying to counter Pakistan’s military and political influence by establishing an India-friendly government in Kabul.

The decades-old rivalry between Pakistan and India has resulted in Afghanistan being caught in the crossfire. India and Pakistan have been trading accusations about each other’s involvement in Afghanistan for years. The Indian Army has long wished to deploy its forces in Afghanistan and train the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers. Last year, during the Afghan president’s visit to Islamabad, Pakistan offered training facilities to the ANA and promised a more active role in the reconstruction process.

In 2009, Indian army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, claimed that the Indian military presence in Afghanistan could give it some strategic depth against Pakistan. Indian military presence in Afghanistan and its support to the ANA can leave a significant geo-strategic impact on Pakistan. To effectively counter the Indian hegemony in Afghanistan, the country supported the Afghan Taliban militarily. Islamabad considers the Afghan Taliban its strategic assets.

Experts claim that the Indian military’s presence in Kabul will expand India’s power projection in Central Asia. This military presence will deny Pakistan strategic depth and it will shift the battleground away from Kashmir to Balochistan and FATA. The Pakistan Army recently claimed that it had recovered US and Israeli manufactured weapons from terrorists in various parts of the country bordering Afghanistan. The army and intelligence circles complain that the secret services of some eight states are actively operating inside Pakistan.

After nine years in power, President Karzai became suddenly worried about the political and sectarian influence of former mujahideen groups in the ANA last year. President Karzai warned that during the mujahideen years, it was sectarianism, ethnic violence and political rifts that destroyed the army. During the so-called mujahideen rule in the 1990s, the country’s weapons, tanks, missiles and soldiers were all distributed among sectarian warlords.

This was the worst way to destroy the ANA. The mujahideen destroyed over 5,000 tanks, sold Ariana Afghan Airline planes and looted all the museums, libraries, warehouses and military headquarters. President Karzai has recently complained about the politicisation, ethnicisation and sectarianisation of the ANA. He named some former mujahideen and communist groups that raised their flags in the army headquarters. A military expert says that if the seeds of factionalism, sectarianism and regionalism take root in the army, another future civil war cannot be ruled out in Afghanistan.

These concerns, the president’s disillusion and his gestures about the expected future war within the Afghan Army need to be considered deeply. Keeping in view President Karzai’s concerns about the factionalisation of the ANA during his rule, military experts claim that all appointments to the defence and interior ministries are being made on political and sectarian bases. For example, the first non-professional and illiterate defence minister was Qasim Fahim who belonged to a sectarian and linguistic group of the Northern Alliance. The Chief of Army Staff Mullah Bismillah Khan was from the same group.

The present defence minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, belongs to the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Pir Gilani Group), the deputy defence minister, Gul Zarak Zadran, has a long association with Professor Sayyaf Group. The former interior minister, Yunus Qanooni, belongs to the Northern Alliance. The three slogans of the Afghan Army, ‘Khuda, Watan, Wazifa’ (God, country and responsibility) now just remain confined to paper, as the soldiers look upon one another as enemies. The present bunch of 140,000 soldiers of the AFA is decreased and curtailed. Every day, soldiers run away due to hardship.

For the past eight years, the lack of leadership in army units has resulted in abuses of power. Notwithstanding fixed ethnic quotas for army recruitment, Northern Alliance warlords still control the command of the armed forces. This domination of the high command created more problems in the south. Most officers of the Afghan Army have been deeply involved in illegal contracting practices, drug trade, embezzlement and killings. They fight alongside their Taliban partners against the US and NATO forces at night.

They have been playing the role of 10, 20 and 50 dollars-a-day Taliban for the last five years. The International Crisis Group (ICG), in its report for 2010, has revealed that ethnic and political rivalries among high-ranking officers of the Afghan military establishment and the general staff put the popularity and credibility of the forces at stake. From 2006-2009, a cold war between Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak and Chief Of Army Staff General Bismillah Khan caused deadlocks over control of staff, resources and operations.

Army vehicles and helicopters are being used by army officers for commercial purposes. Arms are being sold to the Taliban. The culture of this military corruption has complicated the task of NATO, ISAF and ministry of defence advisers. The issue of the recruitment of Pashtuns has become more complicated as the Northern Alliance does not like seeing a large number of Pashtuns in the army. According to sources from within the Afghan Army, at present, the Islamic Unity Party of Professor Sayyaf, National Islamic Front, Northern Alliance, Shia groups, Gulbuddin’s Hizb-i-Islami, and former Afghan communist groups have strong representation in the AFA. With weak training and education, inadequate logistics and equipment, the army has never been able to prove effective in the war against terrorism.

In southern Afghanistan, non-Pashtun soldiers feel like foreigners. In January 2011, a Tajik soldier said that as there are ethnic minorities in the country’s Pashtun-heavy army, bribery was the only way they could make sure their Pashtun commanders give them a break. Another soldier said, “As a non-Pashtun, I am cheap. I am not as valuable to them (the army) as a Pashtun soldier.” The US approach to demobilisation and reintegration has, specifically, eliminated the Afghan Army’s professionalism and skills of countering the Taliban insurgency. To prevent future civil war within the Afghan Army, the president must reshape the management by strengthening legal and administrative departments to depoliticise and de-ethnicise the military establishment.

The writer is author of Britain’s National Security Challenges and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com

 

[Ratus Ratus]

And this is some new discovery!!

Its been an issue since day 1.
But it is so easy to hide ones head in the sand and pretend it is not there.

It does not help when NATO et al use northern alliance warlords as their 'protection service'.

Another piece on the same lines:
From: The Institute for the Study of War
Analysis of Afghan Defense Appointments, July 20, 2010, Pamela Brown
Analysis of Afghan Defense Appointments | Institute for the Study of War

When NATO etc all pull out Afghanistan will become that new civil war playground. Yes it is going to be helped by this intended strategic depth both Pakistan and India believe that can have re Afghanistan.

Forget it it will be your strategic death not depth.

 

[fatman17]

ANALYSIS: Private mercenaries and the Afghan Army —Musa Khan Jalalzai

The involvement of Afghan generals in land grabbing and drug trafficking is a major threat for the NATO mission. In Kabul and many other districts, narcotics are transferred from one place to another in military vehicles

Ethnicity, misgovernment, corruption and political violence have put in danger the national unity of Afghanistan. All ethnic groups have their own thinking of national unity and concordance. The recent institutionalised ethnic and sectarian divisions, specifically in the police and army units raised some questions: whether Afghanistan will again become the battleground or will this persistent insecurity affect the security of neighbouring states? The decade-long civil war in the country has already left devastating effects on Pakistan’s economic performance and security infrastructure. This is a big challenge for Pakistan, which has close ethnic, sectarian, cultural, religious and tribal proximity with Afghanistan. Thus Pakistan understands the way Afghan forces are being trained and armed is not a proper method to create a standing military.

The US, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are training soldiers of the Afghan National Army but rely on private security agencies and rogue warlord armies. Coalition forces in Afghanistan feel more threatened by the Afghan National Army than the Taliban. Last year, several coalition soldiers were killed by their Afghan partners during a military patrol in the south. Afghan Army commanders have established close contacts with drug lords and the Taliban militia, provide them with arms and military information, including counter-insurgency strategies.

The police department is considered to be the most corrupt institution. Last year, Britain’s top representative warned that amid enduring suspicions over the reliability of local forces, Afghans are turning to the Taliban for justice. Drug trafficking, facilitation, corruption and the trends of alienation among the police force may delay the force’s ability to take over the responsibility of law and order enforcement in 2014. Smoking narcotics in police barracks is not new. Illiteracy is another issue that has badly affected the performance of the police. A police officer needs to have some notes, write down number plates of vehicles and take a necessary statement, but unfortunately, Afghan police are not able to read or write.

The involvement of Afghan generals in land grabbing and drug trafficking is a major threat for the NATO mission. In Kabul and many other districts, narcotics are transferred from one place to another in military vehicles. Generals and their cronies have grabbed thousands of acres of agricultural and government land across the country. Commanders of the Tajik-dominated army protect drug lords and the criminal mafia and supply arms to the dissidents across the border into Pakistan.

A recent report submitted to the British parliament has warned that: “Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan cannot succeed without two elements essential for success: a legitimate, functioning government and insurgents that are deprived of external sanctuary and support. Transition — efforts to build Afghan forces and transfer responsibilities to them — faces major obstacles and will take longer than anticipated.” If there is no functioning state in the country, what is the purpose of the presence of foreign forces there?

A black market economy and criminal trade has flourished while thousands of private security personnel have taken control of important places across the country. Keeping in view their secret links with insurgents and warlords, the Afghan president once cried that private security firms empowered warlords. Recent reports say some private security agencies have hired Iranian agents and Taliban soldiers. In Helmand and in Kandahar, US military officials discovered that Afghan security guards were passing sensitive security and troops information to the Taliban. At the same time a security firm — EOD — had hired two Iranian intelligence agents who were known to the US military intelligence.

An Afghan Security Council secret official and an aide to President Karzai, Muhammad Zai Salehi, was arrested in July 2010. The New York Times reported Salehi was accused of soliciting a bribe to help shut down an investigation into a company suspected of transferring millions of dollars out of the country for officials, insurgents and drug smugglers. This is not the only instance. There are innumerable cases of civil and military officials’ secret involvement with the Taliban. After the appearance of this news item, the NATO command issued new instructions for awarding billions of dollars worth of international contracts in Afghanistan.

Some reports of the Afghan Interior Ministry confirm that there are over 200 agents of Iranian Sepah-Ansar operating in Afghanistan. These agents are collecting sensitive information and facilitate the Taliban in arms and training. Reports revealed major warlords or their relatives or allies have been contracted for security services in four provinces. In Uruzgan province, Australian Special Forces and the US signed an agreement with a local warlord Matiullah Khan for protecting their convoys and military bases. His army is known for kidnapping and the drug trade. Matiullah Khan has built an army of 2,500 soldiers known as Kandak-e-Amniat-e-Uruzgan — Uruzgan Security Force. Warlord Matiullah Khan receives 340,000 dollars per month. This agreement is clearly evident of the US and NATO distrust of the Afghan National Army and the police. Military observer are of the opinion that now the US and NATO may not show more interest in building an Afghan Army as its soldiers are killing coalition forces. This distrust among the Afghan National Army, NATO and the Afghan police has strengthened the Taliban and Iran on the one hand and delayed the process of building a strong Afghan Army on the other. In southern Afghanistan, Canadian forces in 2007 hired a local warlord for the security of their forces. General Gulalai had helped the US in driving out the Taliban from Kandahar in 2001. Moreover, the Canadian military hired another warlord, Haji Toor Jan’s private army for the protection of its installations.

In Badakhshan, a local warlord who is in control of a significant portion of the drug trade provides security to the German Army’s Provincial Reconstruction Team. Warlord Nazari Muhammad receives thousands of dollars as a salary for his private army. The Afghan president, his brothers — Wali Karzai and Hashmat Karzai — the son of Afghan Defence Minister, Hamid Wardak — Pir Gailani — Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Rabbani, Gulbadin’s son, ex-army chief Fahim, General Dostum, Haji Din Muhammad and other warlords and parliamentarians have established their own private armies, which erode the strategic role of the Afghan National Army across the country.

According to two recent reports of the UN, ISAF forces have trained, armed and employed some 1,000 private security groups across Afghanistan. The UN has estimated that there are 120,000 armed individuals belonging to about 5,000 private militias in Afghanistan. As the US and NATO is ultimately dependent on private criminal armies, the existence of the Afghan National Army remains a question. If the US and NATO do not rely on the national army and Afghan police, the question is; what is the basic role and function of these two forces? The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) gives arms, money and communication equipment to the warlords and has hired them on their payroll. These warlords, with the help of the CIA, consolidate their political control over different regions. The Afghan National Army is divided into five combat corps. But it has neither performed as a counter-insurgency force or as a strategic force.

The writer is the author of Britain’s National Security Challenges and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com