Analysis : Iran can already make an ICBM anytime it wants

[Mrc]

ICBMs are not for conventional warheads so any of the CBRN options can be used. CW is the most plausible one and lethal if used properly. Modern day stability fine tuned CW agents can put up one hell of a fight against with fission warfare in terms of mass annhilation. 80s war has taught Iran good lessons so I wont discount it.

I am personally against it though.

good answer. I was just curious

 

[drmeson]

Good... in this and previous posts I was getting the impression you were pro-CW.

I am not pro CW. I am far from that.

I just believe it can save lives by proving to be a deterrent against CBRN armed hostile parties.

 

[925boy]

Solid fuel with 16x16 TEL.

yup. those 16x16 TELs were sold by china to NK illegally agqinst sqnctioms already in place.prolly cuz china doesnt want NK to get too weak she becomes an ineffective deterrent agains US+SK.

 

[925boy]

Good... in this and previous posts I was getting the impression you were pro-CW.

lol.from the way he talks u can tell hes a cold logical type so he wasnt likely to be pro CW

 

[haman10]

To all my Iranians friends here. I just read a article which shows Iran as leading Stem graduating country at over 300k per year. With such scientific talent available how is Iran using this? Is it being wasted or lost as "brain drain"? Just curious ?

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/futu...to-1-and-by-2030-15-to-1.510388/#post-9732421

No brother. There simply is little jobs created for these graduates. So most of this potential is gone to waste

 

[Galactic Penguin SST]

Like these.

View attachment 415569

View attachment 415570

View attachment 415571

View attachment 415572

I must concur with @ChineseTiger1986, here are my photogrammetric analysis on a 40 meters length, 4 stages solid propellant ICBM with ~4 meters diameter first stage.
The thrust might exceed the 1,000 tons force and the payload capability ~ 20 tons in LEO. This in correlation with hints from North Korea.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...5/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 9/9/2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility (35°37'27.43"N 50°52'28.24"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Photogrammetric measurements of a booster's first stage or second stage black solid propellant section indicate a ~3 meters maximum diameter, and a ~1 meter inner diameter.
This larger stage might be assembled from ~6 of these sections (~6 visible on the image).
Two ~3 meters cylinders of obviously even greater length (as indicated by the shadow) are also visible just 80 meters south at the entrance of another bulding.
Smaller stage of ~2 meters are also visible.
This smaller stage might be assembled from ~5 of these sections.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...6/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 27/JUN/2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility (35°37'23.63"N 50°52'14.54"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Photogrammetric measurements of a ~4 meter maximum diameter white cylinder and ~ 1.25 inner diameter, possibly a solid motor casing mold for a first stage booster.
Several brown, green and white cylinders of ~10 meters long and ~2 and ~3 meters diameters.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...9/?temp_hash=287c88e83c8e7d241a355dbeee1658ea

▲ 2012 satellite image of the ~10 meters circular exhaust's pit at the Tonghae Space Center's Launch Complex 3, suitable to support the 4.5 meters diameter solid propellant Unha-27 launcher.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...7/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 9 Sept 2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility, solid motor static test firing site with no less than 8 horizontal static test stands in a row among others in the area that clearly show the burn mark obstructions from their gas jet firings (35°36'26.26"N 50°52'18.94"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Photogrammetric measurements of ~60 to 90 meters ground burn mark from gas jet firings.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...8/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 9 Sept 2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility, solid motor static test firing site with no less than 8 horizontal static test stands in a row among others in the area that clearly show the burn mark obstructions from their gas jet firings (35°36'26.26"N 50°52'18.94"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Simulated ~40 meters Ghaem SLV scaled to the ~90 meters ground burn mark from gas jet firings, according to the rocket to flame length 1:2 ratio.

 

[SOHEIL]

I must concur with @ChineseTiger1986, here are my photogrammetric analysis on a 40 meters length, 4 stages solid propellant ICBM with ~4 meters diameter first stage.
The thrust might exceed the 1,000 tons force and the payload capability ~ 20 tons in LEO. This in correlation with hints from North Korea.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...5/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 9/9/2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility (35°37'27.43"N 50°52'28.24"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Photogrammetric measurements of a booster's first stage or second stage black solid propellant section indicate a ~3 meters maximum diameter, and a ~1 meter inner diameter.
This larger stage might be assembled from ~6 of these sections (~6 visible on the image).
Two ~3 meters cylinders of obviously even greater length (as indicated by the shadow) are also visible just 80 meters south at the entrance of another bulding.
Smaller stage of ~2 meters are also visible.
This smaller stage might be assembled from ~5 of these sections.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...6/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 27/JUN/2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility (35°37'23.63"N 50°52'14.54"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Photogrammetric measurements of a ~4 meter maximum diameter white cylinder and ~ 1.25 inner diameter, possibly a solid motor casing mold for a first stage booster.
Several brown, green and white cylinders of ~10 meters long and ~2 and ~3 meters diameters.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...9/?temp_hash=287c88e83c8e7d241a355dbeee1658ea

▲ 2012 satellite image of the ~10 meters circular exhaust's pit at the Tonghae Space Center's Launch Complex 3, suitable to support the 4.5 meters diameter solid propellant Unha-27 launcher.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...7/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 9 Sept 2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility, solid motor static test firing site with no less than 8 horizontal static test stands in a row among others in the area that clearly show the burn mark obstructions from their gas jet firings (35°36'26.26"N 50°52'18.94"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Photogrammetric measurements of ~60 to 90 meters ground burn mark from gas jet firings.

Spoiler

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...8/?temp_hash=4fa773c54f3a4de7afc07baa78874e52

▲ 9 Sept 2011 satellite imagery of the Shahid Modarres Garrison facility, solid motor static test firing site with no less than 8 horizontal static test stands in a row among others in the area that clearly show the burn mark obstructions from their gas jet firings (35°36'26.26"N 50°52'18.94"E), just before the November 12, 2011 explosion.
Simulated ~40 meters Ghaem SLV scaled to the ~90 meters ground burn mark from gas jet firings, according to the rocket to flame length 1:2 ratio.

Are you the same guy who created fake accounts with my name in other forums !?

 

[Galactic Penguin SST]

Are you the same guy who created fake accounts with my name in other forums !?

Solved!

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/iranian-space-program.291303/page-76#post-9777784

 

[Galactic Penguin SST]

The Simorgh itself is not an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, but the technologies are broadly similar.

IRCG ICBM

Very interesting official video, published on December 12, 2017, showing a model of what could be a militarized version of the Kwangmyongsong rocket (an improved and more powerful Unha-3#2 derived rocket, producing a takeoff thrust of 150 tons-force) used in February 2016 to place the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite in orbit.
This North Korean second generation intercontinental ballistic missile, replacing the first generation 8,000 km range Moksong-1 ICBM, is known in North Korea as Moksong-2 (목성, 木星, Jupiter-2).

Spoiler: Links

https://i.imgur.com/ptYvJzg.jpg
Открытие 8-го съезда работников военной промышленности.
Published on Dec 12, 2017
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VctC15LKzjk
8th Conference of Munitions Industry Opens in Presence of Kim Jong Un
Pyongyang, December 12 (KCNA) -- The 8th Conference of Munitions Industry opened here with splendor on Monday. The conference is set to review the achievements and experience gained in the work to implement the Party's policy on the munitions industry and discuss the measures for ushering in a heyday of development of the Juche-based defense industry under the banner of simultaneously developing the two fronts and giving full play to the invincible might of socialist Korea. Attending it were Thae Jong Su, No Kwang Chol, Jang Chang Ha, Jon Il Ho, Hong Sung Mu and Hong Yong Chil and chairpersons of provincial party committees, contributors to the successful test-fire of ICBM Hwasong-15 and other scientists, technicians, labor innovators and officials in the field of defense science and the munitions industry who have made significant contributions to increasing the country's defense capability, and officials and workers of relevant units. When respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un appeared in the platform of the conference, all its participants enthusiastically welcomed him. Thae Jong Su, Politburo member and vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, stressed in a report at the conference that the DPRK's history of defense industry is a revolutionary history of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il and the WPK. The reporter said: Kim Il Sung created the precious tradition of building the Juche-based national defense industry in the flames of the anti-Japanese revolution in his early years. After the liberation of the country he advanced a policy of founding the independent defense industry without delay and had wisely led the struggle for its realization, making field guidance to the arsenal in Phyongchon before visiting the Kangson Steel Plant under the complicated situation of building a new country. Kim Jong Il kept up the project for bolstering up the arms as the most important matter of the Party and the revolution and lifeline of building a socialist power and brought about a radical turn in developing the Juche-based national defense industry with his distinguished idea and energetic leadership. The Juche-based national defense industry has now entered the fresh heyday of its development thanks to respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, the reporter said, and went on: Kim Jong Un set forth the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and provided a legal foundation for bolstering up the nuclear force. This became a historic turning point in putting the DPRK on the position of a matchless nuclear weapons state and hastening the final victory in the showdown with the U.S. and the cause of building a powerful socialist nation. Under his strategic decision, the DPRK carried out two successful H-bomb tests, "March 18 revolution" and "July 4 revolution" and won the miraculous July 28 victory and the great November 29 victory. These are extra-large auspicious events in the history of the nation as they opened up the era of radical changes and fully realized the long-cherished desire of our people for powerful national defense capability. The period from the 7th Conference of Munitions Industry up to now was years of victory and glory during which world-startling rapid progress has been made to clearly prove validity and vitality of our Party's policy on strengthening the self-reliant national defense capability in every way with the nuclear force as a pivot. Noting that the DPRK's defense industry has advanced along the road only indicated by the Party, regarding the leadership of its Central Committee as lifeline, the reporter said: In particular, the great success in the test-fire of Hwasong-15, a new type ICBM capable of hitting the whole mainland of the U.S and carrying super-heavy warhead, conducted under the political decision and strategic resolution of the Workers' Party of Korea, is the great victory of the nation, a great event to be specially recorded in the history of the country, won by our people in the efforts to carry out the historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power. The reporter mentioned the prospect of the defense industry and the tasks for carrying forward the heyday of development of the Juche-based defense industry and increasing the self-reliant defense capability in every way. The conference goes on. -0- (2017.12.12)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELzKYsLqz4s

▲ From left to right: North Korean (intercontinental) ballistic missiles Hwasong-14, Hwasong-12, Hwasong-15 and Moksong-2.

Spoiler: Links

http://
Открытие 8-го съезда работников военной промышленности.
Published on Dec 12, 2017
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VctC15LKzjk

▲ At T=2:51, from left to right: North Korean (intercontinental) ballistic missiles Hwasong-14, Hwasong-12, Hwasong-15 and Moksong-2.

Four advanced ICBM (4대에 걸쳐 진보한 북의 대륙간탄도미사일)

2013/10/01 [12:35]

The length of the Moksong-2 (Jupiter-2) intercontinental ballistic missile is 32 meters. First stage is 2.4 meters in diameter.

The Dongfeng-4, 28.05m in length and 2.24m in diameter, made in China in the 1970s weighs 82t and has a range of 7,000km.

if [the Moksong-2 (Jupiter-2) ICBM] was made of a three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile, it could carry a warhead of 250 kg at some 15,000 km. Obviously, the Moksong-2 ICBM is a three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 15,000 km.

http://www.jajusibo.com/sub_read.html?uid=20161
​

 

[Jlaw]

I want to start my analysis with an article from Jeffrey Lewis

"Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey."

• By Jeffrey Lewis
• July 31, 2017

If you like North Korea’s nuclear-armed ICBM, you are going to love America walking away from the nuclear deal with Iran.

View attachment 415547
HS-14 ICBM​

On this week’s episode of the Federal Apprentice, the staff forced Donald Trump to certify that Iran is complying with the terms of the nuclear deal brokered by his predecessor. None too happy with that outcome, Trump is reportedly exploring ways to collapse it. That’s a terrible idea. Two rocket tests launched last week in a single 24-hour span by Iran and North Korea help explain why. They offer a useful opportunity to compare two very different possibilities: what Iran looks like today, with the nuclear deal in place, and how things have turned out with North Korea following the collapse of efforts to negotiate limits on Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.

Last week, Iran launched a rocket called the “Simorgh” as part of a program to place satellites in orbit. The Simorgh itself is not an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, but the technologies are broadly similar.​

View attachment 415548
Simorgh IRILV​

Space launches do not, however, violate the terms of the nuclear deal, contrary to the claims of some of the deal’s opponents. The text of the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is silent on the subject missile launches. Accordingly, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which implemented the deal, toned down the tough language in previous resolutions. Iran is merely “called upon” — the diplomatic equivalent of a suggestion — to refrain from activities related to “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” (And the term “designed to be capable” is so ambiguous as to be almost meaningless.) Indeed, the fact that the deal contained no limits on Iran’s missile program was something opponents highlighted and supporters, like me, lamented.

These details, though, don’t matter. The Trump administration is already signaling that it intends to sabotage the nuclear deal by insisting on inspections in a transparent and cynical effort to push Iran out of the agreement. The JCPOA already provides for inspections, but Team Trump seems to be envisioning the equivalent of a safeguards colonoscopy, not to catch Iran cheating but to make life under the agreement a constant source of friction. Whether or not a space launch is legally permitted or prohibited, Team Trump is likely to decide that it is one more calumny to launch against what Trump modestly called the “worst deal ever.”

But a casual glance at North Korea helps illustrate why that is shortsighted.

According to Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the Trump administration won’t be talking about North Korea’s missile launch. After all, what’s to talk about? North Korea’s recent tests of an ICBM clearly violate various U.N. Security Council resolutions, and the United States isn’t going to do anything about it.​

North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM flew more than 3,700 kilometers in altitude, before landing in the Sea of Japan. Had North Korea fired the Hwasong-14 on a normal trajectory, it would have traveled far enough to hit most major U.S. cities including New York and Los Angeles.

The people who are promising you a better deal with Iran have exactly no plan to deal with North Korea. It’s the equivalent of repeal and replace, except that stripping 20 million people of health care looks like a walk in the park compared with blundering into nuclear war.​

During the 1990s, a lot of U.S. officials objected to any diplomatic agreement with North Korea that would allow it to use its own rockets to launch satellites into space, arguing that the country would learn too much about ICBMs in the process. The Barack Obama administration walked away from a deal with North Korea in April 2012 because Pyongyang insisted it be able to conduct a space launch to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s birthday.

The shortsightedness of those decisions should now be obvious. North Korea has tested an ICBM that can deliver a nuclear weapon throughout the United States. Did it convert its Unha space launcher, which the United States calls the Taepodong-2, into an ICBM? No, it did not. It built something far more frightening!!!​

View attachment 415549​

North Korea’s ICBM, known as the Hwasong-14, looks nothing like the Taepodong-2 or Iran’s Simorgh.

The latter missiles are very large because their first stage uses the inefficient propellant types found in Scud missiles.

(Edit : Author made a mistake here! Simorgh uses UDMH/N2O4 as propellant)

It takes North Korea and Iran a long time to assemble these missiles using cranes and then to fuel them. The Simorgh was reportedly visible on the launch pad for an entire day. While this technology might be useful for an ICBM in a pinch, in a war the United States isn’t going to give either Iran or North Korea a day to assemble a nuclear-armed missile.

View attachment 415550
Unha-3
​

That is precisely why North Korea developed the Hwasong-14, which has a better first-stage engine, more advanced propellants, and a lightweight airframe. These innovations mean that the missile is small enough to be transported by a big truck that can drive to a remote location and then ready the missile to launch, probably in under an hour. That makes the Hwasong-14 extraordinarily difficult for the United States to track. For the most recent test, North Korea seems to have fired the missile from a surprise location deep inside the country to drive that point home.

If you had to choose between North Korea armed with jerry-built space launchers as ICBMs and North Korea armed with the Hwasong-14, you would always take your chances with the space launchers.

There are, of course, links between space launch programs and ballistic missiles.

At CNS, my research institute, we suspect that the second stage of North Korea’s Hwasong-14 missile is similar to the upper stages designed for the Iranian space launch vehicles.​

And while that does mean that Iran’s space programs could help advance an ICBM program, it also suggests something else — that the flow of technology has reversed. We are now seeing innovations in Iran that later appear in North Korea. Iran could build an ICBM just as well as North Korea, if not better, whenever it wants.

So what’s stopping Tehran? It’s not that Iran can’t build an ICBM; it’s that Iran is choosing not to. ​

And that is probably because, unlike short- or medium-range ballistic missiles, it is hard to imagine an ICBM with any purpose other than delivering a nuclear weapon. That would throw the Iran nuclear deal into chaos and trigger a confrontation that, for the moment, Tehran seems to want to avoid. In other words, the deal is working.

If we want it to keep working, we have to learn to live with Iran’s aspirations for spaceflight, just as we have learned to live with its nuclear energy program in exchange for limits that help prevent Iran from building a bomb. In both cases, the sticks of sanctions and military attack have to come with carrots — incentives like accepting the peaceful use of dangerous technologies. That includes a fair amount of research that might well be used for nefarious purposes. In life, there are some risks that you simply cannot eliminate.

And there is this: Idle hands are the devil’s playthings. If we really want to discourage Tehran from building an ICBM, we need to keep Iran’s missileers busy doing something else. If Iran’s missile scientists are content with sending satellites into space, that’s fine by me. We can sanction them when they sell their services to North Korea, but if they stop, we need to be prepared to welcome them into the community of space-faring states.​

Perhaps that’s not the best outcome, but it could be worse. Look at North Korea.

Not the same. NK has direct backing from China and indirectly by Russia. That's why NK has such leeway knowing 100% US will not start a war in Korea.
Who would fight with Iran if US to invade?

 

[TheImmortal]

Iran could have built an ICBM probably 10 years ago if it truly wanted and invested.

The problem is an ICBM is a wasted expensive technology. Especially for a country like Iran that likely won’t go nuclear before 2030 barring major war.

The future is hypersonic glide vehicles. Iran should focus in that area if it wants to achieve deterrence. There is a reason Russia, China, and US the big 3 remaining military powers are moving full steam to get HGVs operational.

Iran shouldn’t focus so much on Cold War era doomsday weapons.

Who would fight with Iran if US to invade?

Russia, China (indirectly through intelligence, satellite imagery, arms shipments, UN pressure for ceasefire).

Hezbollah, Shiite miltias (75,000+), and Syria.

That enough is a major deterrence for war. Won’t go into any more details why, as I have explained many times before.

And a US land invasion is a fairy tale as US would have to stomach 50,000+ casualties.

Furthermore, logistically is impossible for US right now to generate 750,000 soldiers for such a battle. That doesn’t even include the number of soldiers needed to keep iraq and Syria secure from Attacks on US military bases. This doesn’t even cover Lebanon where the IDF would have to mobilize a 250,000 strong army to clear the Hezbollah threat.

War is just too expensive and not a viable option for the West. Hence relying on sanctions to try to contain Iran and rollback its external military clout.

 

[Galactic Penguin SST]

The problem is an ICBM is a wasted expensive technology.
Iran shouldn’t focus so much on Cold War era doomsday weapons.

Who would fight with Iran if US to invade?
And a US land invasion is a fairy tale as US would have to stomach 50,000+ casualties.

Gone are the days when the U.S. could threaten the Islamic Republic of Iran with a blunt military invasion.

And as of 2018, Iran has already secured a credible deterrence against any direct act of aggression.

This is why the U.S. is now mostly using indirect strategies of proxy war against such military powerhouses, as demonstrated with the 2011 Jasmin Revolution targeting Syria, Libya and all the Middle East, the 21 February 2014 coup against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, and of course the botched 15 July 2016 coup d'état, thwarted by Turkish President Erdogan.

For this, no need to reach the American continent. Iran's IRCG has the ability to strike at the Empire's Achilles' heel, that is at the U.S. 20,000 orbital military satellites, and all the related ECHELON ground facilities.

Any salvo of Moksong-2 ICBMs (militarized Safir-2) could easily take down most of the U.S. space satellites with a single EMP blow.
In addition, Moksong-2 ICBMs are able to reach key facilities of the GEODSS, an important piece of U.S. Strategic Command in the Indian Ocean at some 3,800 km south-eastwards.

Spoiler: Link

https://defence.pk/pdf/attachments/...4/?temp_hash=9b7ba34e15fa647ae04b438d48dada79
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DV9_rMmXUAAH9hk.jpg:large
https://twitter.com/18SPCS/status/963629809921351680

▲ The U.S. Space Surveillance Network, GEODSS at Diego Garcia.

Spoiler: Links

https://i.imgur.com/b9nRk9b.jpg
http://
http://

▲ Diego Garcia at 3,867 km from South East Iran, within striking range of Iran's IRCG Moksong-2 ICBMs.

Spoiler: Links

https://i.imgur.com/NBoMVMU.jpg
http://
http://

▲ Iran's IRCG Moksong-2 TEL-launched ICBMs.

Indeed the U.S. is only a paper tiger, a colossus with feet of clay.

Iran has the capability to simply put an end to the century-long Pax Americana, within an hour of conflict.