PAKISTAN ARMY ORBAT
At the start of Operation in Bajaur (Ops Sherdil), 26 Infantry Brigade comprised
1. 25 Punjab
2. 34 Baloch
3. 7 Sind.
4. Frontier Corps Wings ( 5 Wings)
5. Bajaur Levies
The Brigade was immediately reinforced by T-59 Armored regiment (21 Horse) and Artillery regiment (7 Field Regt)
The sector was reinforced later by:
1. 10 AK Regt
2. 7 Commando Regt
3. 63 FF Regt
4. 12 NLI Regt
5. 132 medium Arty Regt
6. 3 SP Arty Regt
7. 87 Medium Regt
8. 48 Field Regt
9. Aviation/Signals/Engineers Units
Nature of Conflict
Since 9/11, conflict in FATA and Afghanistan has transformed from War on Terror (WOT) to War of Power (WOP), though for entirely different reasons. While WOP in Afghanistan stems from resistance against foreign occupation and unjust political dispensation, in FATA, it is a revolt by down trodden segment of society, led by religious bigots and criminals to address their grievances. Becoming a Taliban is only a convenient façade. Common denominator on both sides of the border is the writ of state. In Afghanistan it was always non-existent, in FATA it gradually caved in due to years of inept governance.
Nature and Composition of Militancy
For fighting Taliban militancy it is essential to have deeper understanding of their composition. As was the case in other agencies, in Bajaur also it was a mix of various factions, united under the banner of TTP. While Maulvi Faqir Muhammad as Naib Ameer ofT TP enjoyed leadership status, yet each faction maintained an independent standing. Also, each faction, maintaining strong hold in a particular area aspired for a dominant role. However, the unifying factor was holding onto power over their particular areas as de facto rulers. This internal composition can always be exploited through a design based upon cultivating dissentions among the leadership and piecemeal tackling of each faction thereafter. This was effectively implemented during Stage-2 of Operation Sherdil.
Broadly speaking, within each group, 70-80 percent fighters were youngsters, aligned with militancy for socio-economic reasons and thrill of wielding power. While remaining is part of militancy due to perverted ideological reasons. It is these 70-80 percent young foot soldiers which can be weaned away from militancy, provided the state is ready to provide better alternative to them. For this to happen, as first step, taking their surrender and granting them amnesty as per law of the land (FCR and Riwaj) is essential. Remaining 20-30 percent can then be isolated and dealt with through military means. This was adopted successfully during Stage-2 of the Operation.
The approach also helps in empowering tribes and their elders.
Force Composition
With the experience of hindsight, it can be concluded that Operation in Bajaur required more than a Brigade. Incremental addition and de-induction of battalions proves this point. However, intelligence picture prior to launching of Bajaur Operation (Ops Sherdil) was hazy and correct assessment of troops to task could not be made. As time elapsed and FC troops grew in confidence, military issues could be managed with one brigade.
@PanzerKiel
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Tactical Concept
Salient aspects of the concept evolved are as following:-
Maneuver versus Fire Power
1. Firepower assumes greater importance than maneuver in such operations. Undue efforts for maneuver are counterproductive as there is no well defined flank or rear, therefore must be avoided. Moreover such maneuvers will always favor militants, who obviously know the terrain much more intimately. Operations should be planned along well defined axes, cleared through reliance on fire power. However, application of fire power can only be effective once locals have been evacuated. It should only be
us and
they in the area. This was invariably done in Bajaur and was implemented during operations in Swat and South Waziristan subsequently.
@Inception-06
2. All components of fire power, ie air force, artillery, combat aviation and armor once synergized with infantry's integral fire power will yield better results.
3. Optimal exploitation of fire power assets is contingent upon understanding entire spectrum of their capabilities and limitations. Ideally for a given tactical objective, fire should be planned in concentric circles, with longest shooting indirect weapons disposed off towards outer ring(s). Infantry's indirect firing weapons including fire base weapons should form the inner rings. Aim should be to seal off and suppress the objective through fire.
Tanks and Recoilless Rifles are most effective against thick walled mud compounds. However, ammunition expenditure is heavy.
4. Instead of using combat aviation as a platform for engaging pre-planned targets, its most effective use is to keep it over head troops as a deterrent component and for impromptu engagements.
Aim of this technique is to exploit combat aviation's endurance than fire power.
5. Field caliber artillery will not be effective during compound to compound clearance due to safety factor.
6. Putting together max
60mm Mortars of the Battalion to support attacking company yielded best results. 60 mm Mortars emerged as the most effective weapon for close support, especially once combat aviation is not available.
6a.
Rocket Launchers (RLs) once fired in elevated positions also give good results as the rockets can land behind covered positions / inside compounds. Fired in elevated position, RL can range up to 1000 Meters. Also filling the hollow charge of RL with small quantity of petrol can start fire at the target end.
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7. Above could be summed up as
A(4)IConcept, reflecting integration of Air Force, Artillery, Armour, Aviation and Infantry.
8. Clearance, occupation and retention of spaces is far more important than the notion of time. To a military mind, trained primarily for conventional war, time and space are intertwined according to a definitive equation of D plus one, two, three and so on. In an unconventional conflict this may not be the case as clearance of spaces takes much more time. Progress at times is painfully slow. Impatience to achieve objectives in terms of time alone runs the risk of failure. Phase lines should therefore indicate a broad timeframe and not very strict timelines.
9. Tactics evolved and adopted during Operation Sherdil manifested the above concept of time-space relationship. Simply put it was a repetitive cycle of four key words;
Advance, Attack, Clear and Hold, within a stipulated timeframe.
Day versus Night Operations To exploit the advantage of firepower, day light operations may be preferred overnight. However, as battalions get accustomed to militants tactics/ technique of fighting, pre-dawn operations paid rich dividends. This is the time once militants' guard is at lowest and they are not expecting an attack. All offensive operations should seize by mid-day or latest by noon, thereby affording sufficient time to troops for consolidation to absorb reaction at night, which comes always and every time.
Securing Lead of Convoy Severing leading elements from the base is a standard tactics employed by militants. If successful, entire dimension of own operations change. Thus viable safe guards against such threats are a precondition.
Role of Supporting Arms
Armour
Armour emerged as one of the key components of success. As against conventional thinking, it played decisive role in clearance of built up areas. Performance of squadrons of 21 Horse and FC was commendable. 21 Horse needs special mention. Led by dynamic officers and JCOs, the Squadron was instrumental in battles for Loe Sam and Inayat Qilla. CO of the Regiment, Lt Col (now Brig) Salman was always present prior to a major operation to lead from the front. Others who deserve special mention for their bravery and commitment are Maj Asif Afridi, Lt Saqib and Ris Muhammad Khan (Shaheed).
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Artillery
Artillery also played its due role. Performance of some of the observers was outstanding. Capt Asad (7 Field) and Capt Naqib (48 Field) stood out as they volunteered to stay on even after their attachment period was over with the Bde. On difficult occasions both even volunteered to act as leading observers with FC troops.
In one of the encounters, Capt Asad was injured, however, refused evacuation to Peshawar. Lt Col (now Lt Gen) Asif Ghafoor, commanding 87 Medium Regiment was always a source of strength, especially during initial days. He not only managed affairs related to Artillery but also looked after functioning of Bde HQ during those critical 19 days, once Bde Comd was battling it out around Rashakai.
Some of the important artillery specific lessons are:-
1. Deployment to provide all round fire support. For this recording of guns on multiple Centres of Arc is essential.
2. Split battery deployment is more often than not an operational requirement; therefore batteries must be trained and suitably equipped.
3. Local defense of gun positions is integral responsibility of gunners. This was ensured during entire Operation with success.
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Aviation
Aviation was excellent. Combat pilots were exceptional. They were always ready to take risks to support ground troops. Without Aviation, success would not have been possible. During those 19 days of disruption of L of C, it was Aviation which played a pivotal role in logistic and combat support. Again during critical battle at Khazai Sar (Point 1839.7), Aviation support was outstanding.
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Engineers
Bde's Engineer Company also did an outstanding job. Capt Kiyani, first OC of the Company was instrumental in setting the tone in right direction. Company's performance can be gauged from the fact that, Bde's first casualty from IED occupied during operations in Chaharmang Valley. Prior to that the Company was able to detect and handle every IED planted along various routes of advance, totalling more than 50.
Maintenance and Logistic Support Units
Credit is also due to maintenance and logistic support units affiliated with the Bde. Workshop and Supply & Transport companies ensured uninterrupted support to the Bde and at times to FC as well. Led by young captains, the companies devised a system in which most of the required support to the battalions was delivered to them within their areas of responsibility.
Besides above, during entire operation, no infantry was provided to these companies for local protection, even when they were deployed at independent locations and came under regular attacks. As a policy they were tasked to defend and perform their duties. Capt Rahat, Officer-in-Charge of the Workshop Company was outstanding.
Intelligence
Intelligence was non-existent at the start of operation. The kind of tunnel system and preparations encountered during the operation could not have been prepared overnight, yet our intelligence tentacles were found to be initially unaware of their location and magnitude. In later days, Bde and FC, through own efforts and sources were able to formulate better intelligence picture.
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Role of Media
National and international media covered Operation Sherdil extensively. By and large both reported positively.
Reason for positive reporting was policy of openness, which was set forth by IGFC. In pursuance of this policy, officers were encouraged to talk candidly with media and own weaknesses were never glossed over. Experience of
selectively embedding media during active operations also resulted in positive reporting. Arshad Sharif, Syed Talat Hussian, Rageh Omaar (Al Jazeera) and Jason Burke (Guardian) stood out for their objective reporting.
@Bleek
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Use of Own FM Radio Station
Setting up and use of own FM Radio Station was a great success. It served as an effective tool for conducting psychological operations and neutralizing TIP's negative propaganda. With the facility of live call-in system, it also facilitated in understanding public sentiments and responding to their immediate needs.
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Capacity Building of Law Enforcement Agencies
Concurrent with military operations, capacity building of Levies and FC is critical to transfer authority to them. While a structured regime and plan is being followed for FC, Levies continue to suffer due to lack of focus of authorities. 26 Bde contributed towards this aspect by organising training of new recruits of Levies, however, till a national plan is implemented to address their issues, this will always remain a weak link in security apparatus.
@Khan_patriot
@blain2
Role of Lashkars
Operating within the ambit of FCR and Riwaj, concept of supporting tribal lashkars against militants must be followed. Salarzai Lashkar in Bajaur is a success story, which was replicated elsewhere but with not so much of success. Support to a lashkar, should be contingent upon following parameters:-
1. A lashkar should be formed by the tribes themselves. Encouragement for this can be articulated through Political Administration and FC. Army as a matter of policy should remain away from it. Intrusive management by Army/FC and intelligence agencies, especially in hierarchy of the lashkar should always be avoided.
2. Expecting quick results from lashkar will lead to disappointment. Therefore pushing it beyond a certain limit can be counter-productive.
3. Material support to lashkar should always be made contingent to ground performance. Nothing gels the lashkar better than collective burning of few houses and shedding of some blood. Open-ended material support to even a performing lashkar must be avoided.
4. While taking surrenders, lashkar elders must be taken on board.
5. Pilferage of material support will always happen. This is part of culture. Therefore even if it happens and the lashkar is performing; keep the support going.
Capacity of State Institutions
The "Writ of State" is proportional to the capacity of state institutions. Weaker the institutions, lesser the writ will be. Furthermore, writ is not abstract; it has to be seen and felt by the people, not only in the realm of law/order enforcement but in all socio economic state functions. Also, erosion of writ is not an overnight phenomenon. As was in other agencies, state's writ in Bajaur eroded gradually. It is assumed that the militants slowly gained strength and took over state functions. The notion is flawed; militants just filled in a vacuum which was created by years of indifference towards capacity development of state institutions. Post 9/11 environment only acted as a catalyst. In a nutshell it was a case of relinquishing the writ than losing it.
@SabzShaheen
Following will exemplify the issue.
1. PA's office in Bajaur was extremely under staffed. Out of five Tehsildars, there were only two. Additional PA, responsible for development projects in Agency had no support staff.
2. Since its inception, authorised strength of Levies in Bajaur was stagnant at around 2000 all ranks. There exists no institutional system of providing training and weapons / ammunition to the force. Anybody who can bring in his own weapon and ammunition is preferred for induction.
A Levies soldier is extremely under-paid as compared to a policeman in settled areas.
3. Agency Hospital at Khar had only a couple of specialists as against authorization of thirteen.
4. The greatest functional dichotomy is that while the Political Administration works under the Governor through FATA Secretariat, staff for Political Administration is provided by the provincial and federal government. An arrangement flawed at the root.
Cost of War and National Priorities
Once the writ of state is relinquished, claiming it back is at an enormous cost and effort. Application of force to re-establish the writ, at times is unavoidable, yet cost-benefit analysis points towards greater introspection. What we lose due to lack of investment in state institutions and people is reclaimed at great cost.
In Bajaur alone cost of reclaiming state's authority during first six months of Operation in Bajaur stood at approximately Rs Two Billion (Aviation and PAF expenditure not included).
History has time and again shown that effects created by application of force are time sensitive and unsustainable without commensurate socio economic follow up plan, which is the domain of political leadership. Unfortunately, political leadership and state apparatus remains mostly oblivious to this. At the end of Stage-1 of Operation Sherdil, we conceived a Rehabilitation Plan for Bajaur. The Plan envisaged financial outlay of around Rs 750 million over a period of five years. Till Jan 2010, what we got was Rs 20 million from Army resources. Nothing came in from state's politico-economic apparatus. A typical case of political leadership's obliviousness to ground realities.
@The Accountant
The issue of financial constraints is also questionable. It is a matter of setting our national priorities right. Instead of investing in FATA and its people, we continue to invest in mega cities and mega projects, not realising that investing in FATA and its people means sustainable security in Pakistan. We continue to treat people of FATA as children of lesser God. Following examples will help understand the problem of our national priorities:-
Size and population wise, Bajaur and Islamabad are comparable. Constitutionally, both are Federal Territories as well. However, how we treat them at federal level is reflected in following:-
CDA budget for the fiscal year 2010-11, stood at
Rs 22.71 billion, out of which
Rs 2.23 billion were for Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) and
Rs 1.58 billion for the maintenance of President and Prime Minister House, Pak Secretariat, Parliament House, Parliament Lodges and other buildings. Compare these figures to Annual Development Programme (ADP) for the year 2010-11 of Bajaur, which was
Rs 1.39 billion. FATA's entire ADP for the same period was
Rs 15 billion.
During 2008/2009, while the war was at its peak in Malakand and FATA, Rs 2 billion alone were earmarked for road construction and expansion in Islamabad. A stark reminder of our misplaced priorities.
Data and excerpts from:
BATTLE for BAJAUR
A MEMOIR BY MAJOR GENERAL ABID MUMTAZ
Below are troops from 10 AK regiment which formed the screenshot for the game.
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@Falgrine @farooqbhai007 @Maarkhoor @-blitzkrieg- @_NOBODY_ @undercover JIX @Raja Porus @Sifar zero @ThunderCat @PDF
