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ANALYSIS: A new approach to counter-terrorism

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ANALYSIS: A new approach to counter-terrorism — Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

The government will have to articulate a new perspective on counter-terrorism as an alternative to the Islamist discourse. It needs to highlight Pakistan’s responsibility to cope with extremism and terrorism as a nation-state and a member of the international community

The visit of two senior American officials to Islamabad before the new government is fully installed in Pakistan shows the US government’s nervousness and concern about the future of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy. They do not expect Pakistan to drop out of the on-going global counter-terrorism efforts but are concerned about possible changes in the formulation and implementation of specific strategies to address the problem.

Of late, the US intelligence community got convinced that Al Qaeda and related elements are entrenched in Pakistan’s tribal areas and they want either Pakistan to adopt effective measures to extricate the militants from there or allow the US to directly deal with the matter.

In the past, US military authorities have periodically used unmanned aircraft (Predators) to target militant strongholds. On a couple of occasions, ground operations were also launched. However, their latest demand to use Predators more freely or resort to military/intelligence operations to target militant concentrations is not likely to be accommodated by the new Pakistani government.

The new government will take time to articulate new operational strategies for pursuing counter-terrorism. Its first priority is going to be to restore the judges and clip President Pervez Musharraf’s power, if not remove him altogether. Once the government has stabilised itself, the new contours of counter-terrorism policy will be clear.

The US needs to re-orient its approach towards Pakistan. In the past, power was concentrated in Musharraf and his close affiliates in the military, bureaucracy and intelligence agencies. The prime minister and the parliament played a peripheral role and the Foreign Office was assigned the task of policy implementation, or the FO made recommendations to the presidency, which took the final decision. Such centralised decision-making made the task of US policymakers somewhat easy and they devoted more attention and resources to the presidency and the army.

Now, Pakistan is going to have an amorphous decision-making structure. This involves three new players: a prime minister who will function as the first among equals rather than an overpowering leader; top leaders of the coalition parties, especially the PPP and the PMLN; and Parliament. Traditional players like the army, intelligence agencies and the Foreign Office will also make their inputs.

As these institutions and entities do not have much experience of pluralist decision-making and management, they can face problems. This process is expected to be noisy as Parliament seeks a greater role. US diplomats and policymakers will now have to focus on several points in Pakistan’s state system, which makes the task more complex.

American guests got an inkling of what they will be facing in their meeting with Nawaz Sharif, who is known for weak diplomatic skills and is surrounded with advisors with Islamist orientations. He took exception to American disregard of Pakistani sensitivities about counter-terrorism. Later, American officials met with PPP and ANP leaders and found that the US would need strong lobbying with the political class for its worldview on terrorism.

The prime minister, while reiterating his government’s support for counter-terrorism, declared that all important policy matters would be decided by Parliament. This must be a new message for the US. The major hazard of parliamentary debate on counter-terrorism and the problems in the tribal areas is that American policies are going to be subjected to sharp criticism.

In the past, the US identified with Musharraf very closely for understandable reasons. He was the pivot of power in Pakistan but this policy alienated the opposition and independent political forces. What appalled the opposition was that even after Musharraf loyalists lost the elections and the opposition demanded the president’s resignation, the US, especially the White House, continued to support Musharraf and lobbied for retaining him in the new political arrangement.

Musharraf is holding on to the presidency because he expects the political forces to divide in a couple of months and the US to continue supporting him as part of its counter-terrorism policy. The latest visit must have made it clear to them that Musharraf is increasingly becoming irrelevant to policy making and implementation in Pakistan. Short of a dismissal of the political government, Musharraf is not expected to retrieve the initiative which will not be possible without the support of the Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani.

Musharraf managed counter-terrorism as an administrative and military affair without bothering to cultivate popular support. Consequently, there was a major disconnect between what the government was doing pertaining to counter-terrorism, including its close interaction with the US, and how people perceived the whole affair. His government could not convince the people that the ongoing war on terrorism served Pakistan’s national interests.

Liberal and moderate political parties and societal groups that viewed terrorism as a threat to civic order and stability were kept at bay by the government because they questioned Musharraf’s legitimacy as the military ruler. They were discouraged from engaging in popular mobilisation.

Instead, Musharraf developed partnership, albeit reluctant and uneasy, with the Islamists who opposed Pakistan’s role in US sponsored war on terrorism. These Islamists got a free hand to build public opinion against the US and the war on terror. Their views became the most popular discourse on terrorism in Pakistan. This perspective was supported by many inside official circles who were not convinced of the genuineness of Pakistan’s counter-terrorist policy.

The Islamists and the Musharraf government developed an understanding on counter- terrorism: the Islamist projected their perspective on terrorism without actually challenging government measures on the ground. On the other hand, the government pursued its counter-terrorism policy in a manner that left some space to militants to survive. This also satisfied those in official circles who viewed some (not all) militants as a possible asset in the future.

Musharraf’s reluctant partnership with the Islamists broke down with the Red Mosque incident as Islamist hard liners viewed it as a shift in government policy. They decided to take on the government to deter it from applying the Red Mosque strategy elsewhere.

Another factor that built resentment against counter terrorism was the large-scale use of force in the tribal areas without taking into account its injurious implications for ordinary Pashtuns who were not directly involved in terrorism. Instead of protecting them from the terrorists, security forces often used force indiscriminately. Over 50,000 people migrated from the tribal areas to the rest of Pakistan to save themselves both from the militants and from the military.

These issues will be fully reflected in parliamentary debates that will then influence new government’s policy options. These developments have also built strong pressure on the government to open negotiations with some militant groups through newly elected representatives from the tribal areas and the new NWFP provincial government. Further, immediate steps need to be taken to increase economic opportunities for people in the tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan.

The government will have to articulate a new perspective on counter-terrorism as an alternative to the Islamist discourse. It needs to highlight Pakistan’s responsibility to cope with extremism and terrorism as a nation-state and a member of the international community.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
 
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’Reach out to the Taliban’: UK defence secretary

LONDON: Britain should reach out to elements of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan who can be won over to the side of democracy, Defence Secretary Des Browne said in a newspaper interview published Saturday.

Speaking to the Daily Telegraph, Browne said conflict resolution was about persuading people who believe that violence is the way to achieve their aims to try to fulfil their ambitions through politics instead. And that meant engaging with individuals or groups, even if their views were disagreeable. He applied the argument to Taliban insurgents -- whom British troops are fighting in southern Afghanistan -- as well as Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

Browne said there was currently "no basis of negotiation" with Al-Qaeda, but added: "The Taliban is a collective noun. There are some people who are driven by their own self interest rather than ideology." There’s no question that we should try to reach them. People have been switched. We have to get people who have previously been on the side of the Taliban to come onto the side of the (Afghan) government."

His comments come after Jonathan Powell, who was former prime minister Tony Blair’s top adviser, said in a March 15 interview with The Guardian that Western nations should talk to the likes of the Taliban, Hamas and Al-Qaeda.
Powell argued that opening up channels of communication had proved to be successful in ending three decades of bloody sectarian violence between Protestants and Catholics in the British province of Northern Ireland.

But efforts to engage elements of the Taliban saw Kabul expel two senior United Nations and European Union diplomats -- one from Britain and the other from Ireland -- for contacting insurgents in southern Helmand province.

According to a Financial Times report from the Afghan capital on February 4, President Hamid Karzai was furious at the proposal to set up a military training camp for 2,000 Taliban militants who wanted to switch sides.
 
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’Reach out to the Taliban’: UK defence secretary

LONDON: Britain should reach out to elements of the Taliban militia in Afghanistan who can be won over to the side of democracy, Defence Secretary Des Browne said in a newspaper interview published Saturday.

Speaking to the Daily Telegraph, Browne said conflict resolution was about persuading people who believe that violence is the way to achieve their aims to try to fulfil their ambitions through politics instead. And that meant engaging with individuals or groups, even if their views were disagreeable. He applied the argument to Taliban insurgents -- whom British troops are fighting in southern Afghanistan -- as well as Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

Browne said there was currently "no basis of negotiation" with Al-Qaeda, but added: "The Taliban is a collective noun. There are some people who are driven by their own self interest rather than ideology." There’s no question that we should try to reach them. People have been switched. We have to get people who have previously been on the side of the Taliban to come onto the side of the (Afghan) government."

His comments come after Jonathan Powell, who was former prime minister Tony Blair’s top adviser, said in a March 15 interview with The Guardian that Western nations should talk to the likes of the Taliban, Hamas and Al-Qaeda.
Powell argued that opening up channels of communication had proved to be successful in ending three decades of bloody sectarian violence between Protestants and Catholics in the British province of Northern Ireland.

But efforts to engage elements of the Taliban saw Kabul expel two senior United Nations and European Union diplomats -- one from Britain and the other from Ireland -- for contacting insurgents in southern Helmand province.

According to a Financial Times report from the Afghan capital on February 4, President Hamid Karzai was furious at the proposal to set up a military training camp for 2,000 Taliban militants who wanted to switch sides.

hmmm, very strange!
if the US or UK support this view its ok. if musharraf supports this view, pakistan is not co-operating in the WoT.
 
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It has been always like this.
They just don't want to give due credit to efforts made by Pak military and to the leadership skills of Musharraf.
Same western media blasted Musharraf for not pardoning BB and Sharif (medling in our internal affairs) and now they are publishing that new government will not co-operate with US.
If an American soldier die it is a great deal but when a paid terrorist travell from Afghanistan to Pakistan and kill Pakistani soldiers no praise is extended by US for the those dying in the line of duty.
All the new risks emerged in Pakistan are due non-coperation of US in war on terror.
Infect it appears that US govt. is more interested in Arming India with nuclear technology (violation of intelectual rights of US citizens) instead of giving attention to war on terror.
US is investing and consulting Indian army and their arms industry more than those who are helping America in his war.
 
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It has been always like this.
They just don't want to give due credit to efforts made by Pak military and to the leadership skills of Musharraf.
Same western media blasted Musharraf for not pardoning BB and Sharif (medling in our internal affairs) and now they are publishing that new government will not co-operate with US.
If an American soldier die it is a great deal but when a paid terrorist travell from Afghanistan to Pakistan and kill Pakistani soldiers no praise is extended by US for the those dying in the line of duty.
All the new risks emerged in Pakistan are due non-coperation of US in war on terror.
Infect it appears that US govt. is more interested in Arming India with nuclear technology (violation of intelectual rights of US citizens) instead of giving attention to war on terror.
US is investing and consulting Indian army and their arms industry more than those who are helping America in his war.

some things u have mentioned are correct but i dont agree with your india-baiting comments - you need to provide some solid proof backed with data
 
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Strenghtening India is also a Military Sales Issue, since India is a Huge Market for Arms and Civilian Nuclear Technology.

Furthermore, recons that US wants to Isolate Russia and China with all it can gather as Friends for the future to come.
 
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Haha, I think the very terrorism lie in World-Ploce's brain, and the most dangerous terrorist was their private!

Wherever they went, there're chaos;whatever they did, it rised destruction.

Ironic!
 
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Can Pakistan Afford To Withdraw From Coalition Against Terrorism?

by Muhammad Khurshid

The new leadership emerging after the election has been calling for withdrawal from the coalition against terrorism. But in truth, it can do nothing as now Pakistan is on the hit list of terrorists.

According to Nation comment: General Kayani's briefing to government and ruling coalition leaders is for two reasons an indicator that the centre of gravity is gradually shifting from the Presidency to the Prime Minister's House.

First is the venue of the meeting and the second the absence of President Musharraf. Under the system devised by the latter that remained in place till the handing over of power to the present government, it was inconceivable for any briefing of the sort to be held at the Prime Minister's House or be presided over by anyone except the President. The meeting has also underlined the redundancy of the NSC for taking up momentous issues connected with national security, raising hopes that it would be soon dispensed with.

The policy on the War On Terror formulated under President Musharraf has failed to produce the desired results. Militancy has continued to spread and no city in the country is safe from attacks by suicide bombings. The briefing indicates the recognition of a separation between the institution which takes policy decisions and those required to implement them. Only a political government, viewing the security situation in its entirety rather than from a myopic military angle, can formulate a feasible policy. One hopes the briefing would help the government and alliance leaders evolve a more comprehensive view on the issue.

There is a need now to take the matter to the National Assembly after it has been properly thrashed out in the relevant parliamentary committee to formulate a comprehensive policy. One hopes that the coalition government representing all major trends and enjoying more than a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly would be able to persuade the militants to take to peace.

This would help extricate the Army from the quagmire where it has been pushed through wrong policies. One also hopes the new government would fulfil its promise of withdrawing the Army from Balochistan, release political prisoners and persuade militants to return to peaceful parliamentary politics.

Under the present government the FO has finally gotten courage to tell Washington plainly that any 'irresponsible and dangerous' military action in the tribal areas would be considered aggression. This is a happy departure from the past. There is also a growing respect for the newly-elected government abroad.

Speaking ahead of a formal NATO summit in Bucharest, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has recognised that NATO was misled by the previous government in Islamabad that democracy would inflame the radicals in Pakistan. Recognising that military-to-military dialogue is not enough, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said he would soon visit Islamabad to hold talks with the new leadership. This constitutes a welcome recognition of the new ground realities in Pakistan and indicates respects for a democratic set-up.
 
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