The case for speeding up India's domestic fifth generation fighter projects
Thursday , March 13, 2014
The Indian Air Force's (IAF) quest for its first fifth generation fighter
has been running into the usual back and forth with the Russians as well as domestic discord with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) . It seems on top of the reported delays,
the Russians are also hiking the costs associated with the Fifth generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) project.
Meanwhile, the IAF is at odds with an apparent HAL move to surrender almost two-thirds of its purported work share for the FGFA development programme. The Americans are also testing waters by making offers to India to join the F-35 programme although that is not really on the cards. In the midst of all this it is clear that India needs to pursue the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme with maximum zeal. If India truly has to fashion an airpower doctrine for the new millennia it has to concurrently develop the in house hardware needed to execute that doctrine optimally.
Although HAL signed a preliminary design contract (PDC) valued at 295 million dollars with Russia's UAC way back in 2010 that was completed in April 2013 there is as yet no firm date for the signing of the final research and development (R&D) contract. While it was earlier expected to be signed in 2012 itself it seems that the final agreement is likely only in fiscal 2014-15. The IAF's plan to start inducting the FGFA from 2022 onwards hangs in the balance and it remains to be seen if the earlier hope of getting a prototype each in 2014, 2017 and 2019 for trials at the HAL manufacturing facility at Ozhar actually materializes on schedule.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) knows that the timeframes mentioned above are becoming dicey and it has now established a committee to assess the rise in costs indicated by the Russian side. The final R&D contract is estimated to be worth 11 billion dollars with India and Russia each bearing half of the said amount. The development contract includes the cost of designing the airframe, setting up infrastructure at Ozhar, prototype manufacturing and flight testing related development costs.
Painfully aware of the issues
associated with the development of the FGFA, the IAF in 2012 pared down its requirement to just 144 single seat fighters from the earlier requirement of 166 twin-seaters and 48 single seat versions. Previously the IAF had wanted twin-seaters in keeping with its air superiority doctrine of having two pilots on-board with one serving as a dedicated weapons systems operator - a doctrine that it has evolved through its experience with the Su-30MKI.
But in the case of the FGFA it seems that there is an appreciable loss in terms of stealthiness arising from a larger radar cross section (RCS) for the two-seater configuration. There are also accompanying payload and combat radius penalties. These factors when taken together with the rising costs of development mean that the two-seater version does not make that much sense anymore.
But the
decision to opt for only single seat fighters also means that some of the development work that was earlier envisaged for modifying the basic frame itself is no longer on the anvil. HAL after all was tasked with providing designs for the tandem seating configuration and attendant cockpit displays for the two-seater. To be sure, a twin seat modification is something that UAC itself must have done on the drawing board at some point since the Russians usually build type trainers for their combat jets. Indeed the fact that the twin seat configuration has been discarded rather quickly suggests that the Russians must have already done some preliminary SWOT analysis on that modification.
Nevertheless in 2013 there was talk of HAL 'surrendering' almost two-thirds of the 50 per cent work share that it is supposed to contribute to the FGFA. To begin with, this notion of a 50:50 work share between HAL and UAC even for a two seat version would have been bit of a stretch. The PAK-FA which serves as a baseline design for the FGFA is far too down the development path for any 'equal' division of the work share.
The IAF on its part has of course been very keen to make the FGFA unique to itself in terms of sensors, avionics, weapons nomenclature and perhaps also with regard to the choice of future propulsion units. Some 43 improvements to the prototype PAK-FA designs have also been recommended by the IAF after observing flight trials at Zhukovsky aerodrome. All this, the IAF believes, should have kept HAL well engaged in the development phase. On the other hand, the fact that the IAF itself has reduced overall orders for the aircraft suggests that now HAL now might just be keen to contain development costs since they will be amortized over a smaller number of airframes.
T
he FGFA was also envisioned by the IAF as being lighter than the PAK-FA through the extensive use of composites, something that India has developed competence in through the LCA project. There are Russian sources who suggest that composites cover 70 per cent of the PAK-FA's surface which has led to large weight reductions over a comparable all metallic airframe.
But the Indian side seems to have a different view and believes that Sukhoi (UAC) designers have still stuck to the Russian practise of heavy use of metallics in the airframe. In fact the PAK-FA is very much designed in keeping with Russian industrial strengths and to suit Russian airpower doctrine. It carries forward the legacy of the Sukhoi Flanker series in some important respects and is naturally based around the requirements of the Russian Air force. It was already quite 'developed' by the time the IAF chose to join in and that is probably why Russian Air force commander General Victor Bondarev has been saying his service would receive production aircraft in 2015. This 2015 timeline is of course also considered too optimistic by some observers but it is becoming apparent that the PAK-FA was much further down the road than people expected when it was publicly unveiled in 2010.
Truth be told an uncharitable view would suggest that the
FGFA is now beginning to resemble the Su-30 MKI project that involved customization rather than any co-development much less co-design. UAC President Mikhail Pogosyan for instance has reportedly said that both the Russian and Indian versions "will be based not only on the same platform, but also have identical on board systems and avionics". This would seem to be a little at odds with statements attributed to former IAF chief Browne's comments that clearly talk about the FGFA having different sensors and weapons from the Russian Airforce's PAK-FA. Of course given that HAL seems to be voluntarily abandoning a part of its work share, Pogosyan could end up being more accurate than not.
Meanwhile always looking for openings to enter different segments of the Indian defence market, the Americans have been reiterating their offer of India joining the F-35 program. The Indians, however, have made it clear that they are already heavily committed to the FGFA program and the budget currently does not allow room for two foreign fifth generation fighter projects.
And given the sticker shock associated with batch 5 low rate of initial production (LRIP) F-35A units rolled out last year, the Indian budget would probably not be able to accommodate the F-35 anytime this decade on top of the FGFA. With future LRIP batches these costs are being projected as lower by some 20 per cent but that remains to be seen. Also several kinks in the test phase need to be sorted out before the F-35 approaches initial operational capability by even the timelines being bandies about at the moment.
In any case joining the F-35 at this late stage would not be the most prudent course of action given that even a Su-30 MKI type customization is far from given, not to mention co-development. The F-35 is even more 'developed' than the PAK-FA and is less likely to be accompanied by any significant technology transfers compared to the latter. One has to note that America in the past has declined to supply source code for the F-35's radar even to the British. Beset by budgetary issues the British have cut orders to a third of what had been initially envisaged.
Either way it is clear that the A
MCA project now needs to move out of the design study phase and be pursued in right earnest. The LCA project warts and all has brought India to a stage where both Russia and America are willing to offer India a role in their key combat jet programs, howsoever convoluted that role might be. When the combat jet developers of the world realize that India is wholeheartedly pursuing a home grown stealth fighter, they are likely to be even more amenable to giving the IAF what it wants.
The AMCA project if pursue wholeheartedly would yield India a home grown contemporary fighter by 2027-28 since a much larger aerospace base has already been built in India through the LCA project. Besides, if large orders for the AMCA are guaranteed private players would find setting up new facilities much more lucrative. Indeed, the AMCA should actually be executed on a newer kind of public private model that could obviate many of the concerns the IAF has about indigenous production today. Moreover some of the envisaged capabilities for the AMCA including fly by light, cloud shooting and new generation man-machine interfaces actually put it in a realm closer to that of a sixth generation fighter.
The present day anxieties of the IAF are also understandable. India has long depended on superior airpower capability to keep its adversaries at bay and would like to keep it that way in the face of China's pursuit of the J-20 and J-31 programs. Given the budgetary resources available to the IAF and its emerging force mix, the time is ripe for it to commit heavily to the AMCA. One must remember that the IAF has to play to its own airpower doctrine and for that it also needs to 'build' its own aircraft at some level. As an aside, the IAF's move to set up its own R&D practice on the lines of the USAF's Air force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is therefore a welcome step. Of course this new R&D setup must fully synergize itself with the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) which is developing the AMCA.
Both the F-35 and the PAK-FA cater to the airpower doctrines of their respective home air forces. The F-35 for instance will be part of a team comprising very serious electronic attack capability. The PAK-FA on its part is designed to 'close in' with other stealth aircraft and prevail over them through superior manoeuvrability and infrared sensors. India's own LCA represents a specific kind of design philosophy growing out of the IAF's experience with the Mig 21. Interestingly, even Turkey which is a participant in the F-35 program is now pursuing a home grown stealth fighter along with the South Koreans. It is now time that the IAF played from a position of strength and sent the right signals to aircraft manufacturers around the world.
Saurav Jha's Blog : The case for speeding up India's domestic fifth generation fighter projects
