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Algerian War of Independence (1954–62)
Armed struggle against French rule launched by Algerian nationalists in 1954. By far the bloodiest and most traumatic episode in French decolonization, the war ended with the independence of Algeria in 1962. Within France, the political strains provoked by the war brought the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return to power of Charles de Gaulle. The scale and brutality of the fighting, which included the widespread use of torture by French forces, resulted in heavy Algerian casualties and caused deep divisions of opinion among French intellectuals and the public at large.
The ferocity of the conflict arose from a combination of factors: the presence in Algeria of an unusually large and uncompromising settler population, a growing sense of exasperation among the indigenous, mainly Muslim, majority over the lack of reforms, a determination on the part of the French army to avoid another defeat of the kind which it had recently suffered in Indo-China, and the conviction among leading French politicians that Algeria was an integral part of France. The myth of Algérie française had been nurtured not only by the large number of settlers, popularly known as pieds-noirs, but also by the geographical proximity of Algeria (compared with other colonies), its relatively early conquest from 1830 onwards, which marked the beginning of France's second colonial empire [see Colonization], and a series of legal and administrative fictions woven by successive governments in Paris. Unlike other overseas territories, which were administered either by the Ministry of Colonies or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria came under the Ministry of the Interior. Its northern part, where most of the population was concentrated, was divided into départements, supposedly modelled on those in metropolitan France. In reality, the Muslims who made up the majority of the population were given an entirely different legal status, with none of the political rights enjoyed by the settlers.
Only a small number of Muslims passed through the French educational system. At first, most supported the colonial concept of assimilation, which promised the general diffusion of French culture and the extension of equal rights to the whole of the population. Disillusioned by French reluctance to honour these promises which, if implemented, would have undermined the privileged position of the settlers, Muslim leaders looked increasingly towards independence as a solution to their grievances. Nationalist sentiments hardened when, in 1945, pro-independence demonstrations in Sétif and other parts of north-eastern Algeria were brutally repressed. French promises of political reform in the shape of a new statute granted to Algeria in 1947 were effectively nullified by systematic ballotrigging. Convinced that independence could be achieved only through military action, the nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) launched a guerrilla war on 1 November 1954.
In France there was all-party support for a policy of military repression. In 1956 parliament gave the government special powers to pursue the war by any means it saw fit, and the number of French troops in Algeria rose to over 400, 000, many of them conscripts. The systematic use of torture to extract information from prisoners enabled French paratroopers, commanded by General Jacques Massu, to dismantle the FLN bombing network in the capital, Algiers, but fighting continued across much of the country. With the resolve of some politicians weakening and public opinion in France increasingly ill at ease over the war, on 13 May 1958 a coalition of settlers and army officers set up a Comité de Salut Public in Algiers in open defiance of the government in Paris. The committee called on de Gaulle, then in retirement, to take up the reins of power. Fearing political collapse, the French parliament voted to invest extensive powers in de Gaulle, who became the first president of the Fifth Republic. He maintained the confidence of most of the army by pursuing a vigorous military campaign in Algeria, while at the same time exploring the options for a peaceful settlement. When it became clear that he was prepared to grant independence to Algeria, dissident army officers staged an unsuccessful putsch in April 1961 and joined with hard-line settlers in the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), a terrorist organization dedicated to the cause of Algérie française. Under a peace agreement reached between France and the FLN at Évian in March 1962, Algeria became independent in July of that year. A scorched-earth policy by the OAS created panic among the settlers, almost all of whom fled to France, where they became known as rapatriés.
Its fundamental role in the constitution of an independent Algerian state gave the war a privileged position among Algerian authors . French writers and intellectuals found the war a more difficult issue to handle. Inhibited by his roots in the settler community, the normally outspoken Camus retreated into silence on the Algerian conflict. Sartre, whose play Les Séquestrés d'Altona (1959) used German atrocities in World War II as an indirect way of exploring the use of torture in contemporary Algeria, became the target of OAS attacks because of his support for the FLN. Sartre's outright commitment to an organization seeking to defeat France militarily was comparatively rare. In the early stages of the war some of the main opposition inside France came from Catholic intellectuals grouped around the review Esprit. Their denunciation of French military tactics, as in Pierre-Henri Simon's essay Contre la torture (1957), did not necessarily imply support for the independence movement in Algeria. The most active support for the FLN came from a clandestine network of Catholics, Communists, and others organized by Francis Jeanson, a friend of Sartre. When members of the network were prosecuted in 1960, their right to oppose the war was supported by the Manifeste des 121, whose 121 signatories—among them Blanchot, Sartre, Breton, Sarraute, and Vercors—reflected a broad spectrum of French cultural life. A counter-manifesto was signed by 300 supporters of the war, including Dorgelès, Nimier, and Romains.
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Armed struggle against French rule launched by Algerian nationalists in 1954. By far the bloodiest and most traumatic episode in French decolonization, the war ended with the independence of Algeria in 1962. Within France, the political strains provoked by the war brought the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return to power of Charles de Gaulle. The scale and brutality of the fighting, which included the widespread use of torture by French forces, resulted in heavy Algerian casualties and caused deep divisions of opinion among French intellectuals and the public at large.
The ferocity of the conflict arose from a combination of factors: the presence in Algeria of an unusually large and uncompromising settler population, a growing sense of exasperation among the indigenous, mainly Muslim, majority over the lack of reforms, a determination on the part of the French army to avoid another defeat of the kind which it had recently suffered in Indo-China, and the conviction among leading French politicians that Algeria was an integral part of France. The myth of Algérie française had been nurtured not only by the large number of settlers, popularly known as pieds-noirs, but also by the geographical proximity of Algeria (compared with other colonies), its relatively early conquest from 1830 onwards, which marked the beginning of France's second colonial empire [see Colonization], and a series of legal and administrative fictions woven by successive governments in Paris. Unlike other overseas territories, which were administered either by the Ministry of Colonies or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria came under the Ministry of the Interior. Its northern part, where most of the population was concentrated, was divided into départements, supposedly modelled on those in metropolitan France. In reality, the Muslims who made up the majority of the population were given an entirely different legal status, with none of the political rights enjoyed by the settlers.
Only a small number of Muslims passed through the French educational system. At first, most supported the colonial concept of assimilation, which promised the general diffusion of French culture and the extension of equal rights to the whole of the population. Disillusioned by French reluctance to honour these promises which, if implemented, would have undermined the privileged position of the settlers, Muslim leaders looked increasingly towards independence as a solution to their grievances. Nationalist sentiments hardened when, in 1945, pro-independence demonstrations in Sétif and other parts of north-eastern Algeria were brutally repressed. French promises of political reform in the shape of a new statute granted to Algeria in 1947 were effectively nullified by systematic ballotrigging. Convinced that independence could be achieved only through military action, the nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) launched a guerrilla war on 1 November 1954.
In France there was all-party support for a policy of military repression. In 1956 parliament gave the government special powers to pursue the war by any means it saw fit, and the number of French troops in Algeria rose to over 400, 000, many of them conscripts. The systematic use of torture to extract information from prisoners enabled French paratroopers, commanded by General Jacques Massu, to dismantle the FLN bombing network in the capital, Algiers, but fighting continued across much of the country. With the resolve of some politicians weakening and public opinion in France increasingly ill at ease over the war, on 13 May 1958 a coalition of settlers and army officers set up a Comité de Salut Public in Algiers in open defiance of the government in Paris. The committee called on de Gaulle, then in retirement, to take up the reins of power. Fearing political collapse, the French parliament voted to invest extensive powers in de Gaulle, who became the first president of the Fifth Republic. He maintained the confidence of most of the army by pursuing a vigorous military campaign in Algeria, while at the same time exploring the options for a peaceful settlement. When it became clear that he was prepared to grant independence to Algeria, dissident army officers staged an unsuccessful putsch in April 1961 and joined with hard-line settlers in the Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), a terrorist organization dedicated to the cause of Algérie française. Under a peace agreement reached between France and the FLN at Évian in March 1962, Algeria became independent in July of that year. A scorched-earth policy by the OAS created panic among the settlers, almost all of whom fled to France, where they became known as rapatriés.
Its fundamental role in the constitution of an independent Algerian state gave the war a privileged position among Algerian authors . French writers and intellectuals found the war a more difficult issue to handle. Inhibited by his roots in the settler community, the normally outspoken Camus retreated into silence on the Algerian conflict. Sartre, whose play Les Séquestrés d'Altona (1959) used German atrocities in World War II as an indirect way of exploring the use of torture in contemporary Algeria, became the target of OAS attacks because of his support for the FLN. Sartre's outright commitment to an organization seeking to defeat France militarily was comparatively rare. In the early stages of the war some of the main opposition inside France came from Catholic intellectuals grouped around the review Esprit. Their denunciation of French military tactics, as in Pierre-Henri Simon's essay Contre la torture (1957), did not necessarily imply support for the independence movement in Algeria. The most active support for the FLN came from a clandestine network of Catholics, Communists, and others organized by Francis Jeanson, a friend of Sartre. When members of the network were prosecuted in 1960, their right to oppose the war was supported by the Manifeste des 121, whose 121 signatories—among them Blanchot, Sartre, Breton, Sarraute, and Vercors—reflected a broad spectrum of French cultural life. A counter-manifesto was signed by 300 supporters of the war, including Dorgelès, Nimier, and Romains.
LINK
The movie "Battle of Algiers" shows that French failure is more from political and strategic side than from military side. It is a text book movie probably still followed by some people even today. For instance, some people believe that East Turkestan independence movement group is adopting the exact same strategy in China's Xinjiang to alienate different ethic groups.
