Well the answer to a few of your questions.
I believe the tank main gun is a Chinese upgrade of a 2A46
The engine has been upgraded to a 730 HP (not sure if this would rectify the power issue.)
The suspension has been improved which would hopefully improve crew comfort.
Hey if the AZ can reach parity then I would be glad as it probably costs a fraction of a new build....
The Chinese deny cloning the 2A46, although I do not believe that and think they did clone and modify the gun.
AZ 40/730 18.25hp ton Ajeya MK2 44/840 19hp ton
Theres only so much you can do to a 60 year old suspension, thew road wheel are still in the same place, same number, and the hull width/length hasn't changed.
The AZ does indeed appear to deliver a rough parity although I would not count on too much in savings. The AZ is cheaper than a new build but requires 25% more crew (recruitment, training, pay, health care, wages, housing, food etc) which over the life of the tank will add up.
skill vs technology
A tank is designed to deliver three things to the battlefield
Mobility+ firepower= shock when properly combined and delivered.
The delivery also comes in three parts
technology, training, and doctrine
The last big tank battle saw the clash of 2 different doctrines as well as two different technological levels. Iraq employed thier tanks in two distinct ways both perfect on paper. 1- Regular Army formations dug in and were supported by infantry, ATGM, artillery, mines, and obstacles to create kill zones and channels. These formations had older less capable equipment but on paper had the perfect blend of combined arms in a defensive mission. Backing them up were the Republican Guard units with better equipment, far better training, and most importantly aggressiveness. This system developed during the Iran-Iraq war was an almost carbon copy of the theory and doctrine of the German Army in the latter part of WW2. Namely hold and channel the front in order to let your reserves counter attack.
Pitted against them was a new style of warfare that reflected both Americas Cold war doctrine and its Wild West history. The US planned and executed an attack whose primary goal was not to destroy the Iraqi army by fire but by the tempo of the operation. The US blitzed or flanked the Iraqi formations and went pell mell for the rear. American crews had been training to do this since Reagen took office and thus had the skill and experience to do it even though 99% had never been shot at.
The front line Iraqi formations never had a chance, the US literally moved too fast for thier command cycle to follow. Even if thier communications had been at 100% no Army in history has been able to stop another army whose command cycle was faster and more nimble. It's called getting inside thier decision cycle or initive, once you've lost it your all but doomed.
The Republican Guard was a different story, as shown by the battle of 73 Easting they did everything right. They kept thier mass together to deliver a schwerepunkt into were they thought VII Corps flank was and they were aggressive and pressed forward. This is where skill and technology really combined to show just how lethal the combination can be. VII Corps was without a doubt the finest unblooded heavy armored force in history.
Leaving aside the technology differences the Guards never stood a chance. The US style of warfare meant that the US was always one or more steps ahead. The Abrams only made a bad situation hellish. The real secret weapon was information. The US had perfected what they called the reconnaissance battle and what they called at the time the Air Land Battle Doctrine.
Most people assume that a division will fight what it finds in front of it to a fairly shallow depth. Its a logical conclusion, thats where the obvious threat is, but thats not how the US fought. The US Division fought to a dept of about 40km while the USAF took the fight even deeper thus pressure was not just brought to bear on the enemy front line but his entire area of operations.This over loaded the Iraqi commanders who already suffering from a lack of solid intell , and a fear of marauding fighter bombers were being bombarded by reports of units under attack everywhere by numerous American assets in front of them, around them, behind them, and they themselves when they came up on the net. Their reserves were being attacked by fixed wing jets and attack helicopters, radio transmitters were being blasted within seconds of broadcasting, artillery was coming under counter battery fire before thier own shells had landed, and thier front lines were being ripped apart by superior firepower and maneuvering- No commander in history could kept track of everything going on without a system like the US had with out a information .
The effect was to shatter the Iraqi structure and this made each unit fight on its own without significant support. They were swarmed under so that even if the T-72 had been the equal of the Abrams the result would have been the same: Desert Storm was about doctrine not technology as shown by USMC M60A1ERA tanks that were every bit as effective with thier older tanks and 105mm guns. Although having the Abrams didn't hurt and reduced casualties, the result would have been the same 100 hour war if both sides had the same tanks.
Even America was surprised by the success of the attack, we epxted much higher losses.After all Iraq was battle hardened, had the worlds best tube artillery, unjammable fiber optic communications, was on the defensive etc plus they had poison gas. How the result was tremdous and it lead to the defining of a whole new style of warfare: RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). This doctrine called for high tech weapons and highly skilled crews but most importantly folded the lessons of Desert Storm and of the ALB Doctrine in a system that stressed information above anything else. Once the big end of the Cold War drawn down was over and the new army was being formed, the US spent billions to develop a multi layered information warfare system was not just the old C3I(Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence), but C4SRI (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Surveillance, Intelligence, Reconnaissance) that fought battles in depth (up to 200km deep) How effective this would be in a conventional fight would be shown in 2003. Yes Iraq was weaker in 2003, and yes the US was stronger, but the US was astride the Karbala Gap in a week and into Baghdad before the Iraqi Government had a chance to evacuate.
So in the end it is not just training nor is it just technology, it is technology in many forms, training the right way, and the proper doctrine for the mission and terrain.
