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Ahmed Rashid: "A real meltdown".

Classic Indian propoganda and nothing else.

These were personal recollections. Which part do you consider propaganda? Is there any portion that you think was untrue? Please have the courage to say so, out loud, so that I can address your doubts directly.

On one hand, Indian army was openly supporting Mukti Behini and on the other were crying in front of the world about "massive" HR violations by Pakistan army the units of which defected.

This was well before any Mukti Bahini existed, for the Indian Army to support.

If the operation "Search Light" caused this all then there is a more bigger question. What forced Pakistan army to launch that operation in the first place?

The decision of Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to overturn the results of the election, which would have made Mujib Prime Minister of Pakistan.

You mean you didn't know? Quite an innocent, aren't you?

Yesterday, It was reported that thousands of TTP militants are getting amass across Durind Line to attack Chitral. Now question is if it is not for CIA and RAW, then who else is supporting to these thousands of militants of TTP. TTP... Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan ... who have strong bastions in Afghanistan. Sounds little odd! Isn't it?

Not particularly odd.

Pakistan chose to keep those portions outside the purview of normal administration, and it is now paying the price. If you irritate a section of the population, which has close links with people across a national border, and you fail to gain their acceptance, and have not brought them under your military control, is it difficult to predict that they will go for you?

Apart from an administratively stupid decision, the Army has made a botched job of its counter-insurgency. Not surprising, considering that it was asked to fight its own strategic assets.
 
Answer to the first underlined part: Operation Searchlight happened, its a reality. It was not a reaction but a continuation (or escalation) of the effort to "keep the Bingoes in their place".

Why was that necessary?
Because the Bingoes had clearly demonstrated that they were not going to be cowed down after they had demonstrated their strength at the ballot-box, whose verdict was being sought to be subverted by a greedy politician and some stupid Gernails in West Pakistan.

Now for the second underlined part:
In that part of Pakistan, both the Govt. of Paksitan and governance (sic) are only conspicuous by their absence. About the PA's will to take control there, nobody knows.
There is no need for a third party to stir up anything in the already present anarchy there.


Sounds little odd! Isn't it? No it does'nt. Its only obvious.

Had that been the case, Why would Mujib got out jail when caught in Agartala Conspiracy case. That was the most suitable time to get rid of him and we are talking about 1968-9 here. So, Certainly, something else was going on there as well.


Listen hotshot, No law and order problem in Chitral and Kunar is in Afghanistan. Update your geography before replying that will help. Just give it a try.

Of course it is obvious that there is a far stronger command and control and logistical support base for TTP in Afghanistan than in Pakistan.

Not particularly odd.

Pakistan chose to keep those portions outside the purview of normal administration, and it is now paying the price. If you irritate a section of the population, which has close links with people across a national border, and you fail to gain their acceptance, and have not brought them under your military control, is it difficult to predict that they will go for you?

Apart from an administratively stupid decision, the Army has made a botched job of its counter-insurgency. Not surprising, considering that it was asked to fight its own strategic assets.

Care to explain why and when TTP became strategic assets of Pakistan army? TTP became in existence only in 2005 when Abdullah Mehsud was released from the Guantanamo and first thing he did after his return to Pakistan was to kidnap two Chinese engineers from Baluchistan.... Should i say any more about the genesis of TTP and Indo/US propaganda that they are Pakistan Army "Strategic Assets"? I don't think so.

And how you thing Pakistan must extended its administrative control into Kunar province of Afghanistan?

Not particularly odd.

Pakistan chose to keep those portions outside the purview of normal administration, and it is now paying the price. If you irritate a section of the population, which has close links with people across a national border, and you fail to gain their acceptance, and have not brought them under your military control, is it difficult to predict that they will go for you?

Apart from an administratively stupid decision, the Army has made a botched job of its counter-insurgency. Not surprising, considering that it was asked to fight its own strategic assets.

Care to explain why and when TTP became strategic assets of Pakistan army? TTP became in existence only in 2005 when Abdullah Mehsud was released from the Guantanamo and first thing he did after his return to Pakistan was to kidnap two Chinese engineers from Baluchistan.... Should i say any more about the genesis of TTP and Indo/US propaganda that they are Pakistan Army "Strategic Assets"? I don't think so.

And how you thing Pakistan must extended its administrative control into Kunar province of Afghanistan?
 
Care to explain why and when TTP became strategic assets of Pakistan army? TTP became in existence only in 2005 when Abdullah Mehsud was released from the Guantanamo and first thing he did after his return to Pakistan was to kidnap two Chinese engineers from Baluchistan.... Should i say any more about the genesis of TTP and Indo/US propaganda that they are Pakistan Army "Strategic Assets"? I don't think so.

I wouldnt discount the theory that Mehsun was released from Guntanamo with an agenda and indoctrination on his next mission.
 
Had that been the case, Why would Mujib got out jail when caught in Agartala Conspiracy case. That was the most suitable time to get rid of him and we are talking about 1968-9 here. So, Certainly, something else was going on there as well.

Because the people of East Pakistan rose in revolt. The Pakistan Government had it all worked out. The trial was held in a protected environment, with hand-picked judges. The final date of February 1969 was calculated to be ahead of the elections of 1970, to get rid of the thorn in their flesh that the majority in East Pakistan was rapidly becoming.

Since you appear to know nothing beyond what you have been fed by PakistanKaKhudaHafeez, perhaps it is necessary to inform you that East Pakistan rose up against this show trial, and forced the government to release the prisoners. The release was marked by a huge gathering in Ramna, where Mujib was called Bangabandhu for the first time.

So nobody in the Pakistan Government stopped trying to nail East Pakistani leaders who didn't toe the line. And the release of Mujib was precisely in line with what Captain Popeye has described.

Care to explain why and when TTP became strategic assets of Pakistan army? TTP became in existence only in 2005 when Abdullah Mehsud was released from the Guantanamo and first thing he did after his return to Pakistan was to kidnap two Chinese engineers from Baluchistan.... Should i say any more about the genesis of TTP and Indo/US propaganda that they are Pakistan Army "Strategic Assets"? I don't think so.

Are you not being too clever by half here? Who were the detainees at Guantanamo Bay? Suspects thought to have been associated with the Taliban or with Al Qaeda? Do I have to link either the Taliban or Al Qaeda with the Pakistan Army? And do I have to link either with the PA's strategic assets? I don't think so, with rather more justification than you.

Really? check my previous post please.

Yes, really.

Do you know the difference between declining percentage of population, and declining growth of percentage of population? Please take instruction in these statistical aspects before venturing into a public forum.
 
Pakistan on the Brink by Ahmed Rashid – review

Fatima Bhutto questions a study in which power has replaced the people and western narratives elbow out the real story

Fatima Bhutto
guardian.co.uk, Friday 27 April 2012 17.55 EDT

At the start of Pakistan on the Brink, Ahmed Rashid confesses that he didn't really want to write the book and that it was "forced" out of "a very reluctant author" by editors and publishers. To which one might uncharitably reply: we didn't want to read it either. The third book in a trilogy, following Taliban and Descent into Chaos, is a compendium of statistics, bomb counts and Wiki knowledge. If you've paid attention to the news during the past 12 years, you already know most of this.

It's also a little out of date. The killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the deadly attacks on Pakistan's naval and military bases over the past year, the rise of the Punjabi Taliban, and the murder of Afghan president Hamid Karzai's brother are only fleetingly described; the coming US elections are ignored and Osama bin Laden's death in Pakistan last spring is given only a cursory glance.

But the book's central fault is that Rashid's teleology is dedicatedly western. And it is precisely this sort of thinking that got us into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first place. There is no context that is not westernised for clarity (Bin Laden's retirement home of Abbottabad is like a "British country seat", a Pakistani military academy is a "West Point"). Rashid, whom his fellow Pakistani author Tariq Ali once called a "prize **** of the US defence establishment and videosphere", may have soured slightly in his views of the American government and its war in Afghanistan, but he still uses its language.

For Rashid the problem seems to be not that US and European troops are mired in a bloody, imperially designed and unwinnable war, but that there aren't enough of them to get the job done in good time. Only once is the conflict noticeably described in less than necessary terms, when Mullah Baradar of the Taliban is quoted as calling it a "game of colonisation". Rashid berates Obama for not "personalising" the war in Afghanistan and for not telling in any detail stories of Afghans and their plight. Yet he doesn't either. There's not one account of how people have suffered under Operation Enduring Freedom, merely statistics of doom.

Rashid made his name by bringing to light forgotten stories, but he has now become the story. The book's acknowledgments offer thanks to "all manner" of "bureaucrats, politicians and heads of state". Countless anecdotes begin with him advising the world's most powerful men on how to run their war (only for them to do the opposite). In his histories, power has replaced the people.

The chapter on the 2009 war in the Swat valley between the Pakistani army and Islamist militants is titled "A sliver of hope", but Rashid devotes hardly any space to the awful conditions 1.4 million internal refugees were held in after they had fled from the fighting. The UN called it "one of the world's worst displacement crises" and journalists, both international and local, were deliberately denied access. For Rashid, however, Pakistan gets an A grade for the war.

Pakistan and India are depicted one-dimensionally as paranoid powers unable to consider each other outside destructive paradigms – which indeed they might be, but their populations have long wanted peace, and are currently engaged in many hopeful people-to-people initiatives.

Sotto vocce, he tells us that anti-American sentiment in Pakistan is whipped up by the military and the nefarious Inter-Services Intelligence. According to Rashid, intelligence agencies manipulated the violent protests against Nato last November, following the airstrike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers (and for which the Pentagon grudgingly expressed "deepest regret"). But the author fails to understand that after a 12-year war, diplomatic dealings that are a perpetual exercise in humiliation, and hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent civilian deaths at the hands of drones, the one thing the Pakistani army need not manipulate is anti-American sentiment. The US military, with its trigger-happy contractors and recent renegade shooters, Raymond Davis and Sgt Robert Bales, does a fine job of whipping that up all by itself.

At least, if belatedly, Rashid has cooled off in his affection for President Karzai. Gone are the days when he wrote articles entitled "How my friend outwitted the mullahs", as he did for the Daily Telegraph in 2001. Karzai, who has presided over gross corruption, factionalism and dashed hopes for Afghanistan for the past eight years, is finally described as he is: "increasingly paranoid" and "controversial". Rashid deserves credit, too, for going after Pakistan's villainous elite, often celebrated as the country's last hope.

Readers of his previous work will know that Rashid possesses a sophisticated understanding of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US, but here he offers disappointingly bite-sized analyses of places one would expect him to delve deeper into. On the decades-long secessionist insurgency in Balochistan, he references only a Human Rights Watch director called Brad: he doesn't speak to any Baloch groups or survivors of the army's campaign of violence. Karachi, Rashid surmises in a hurry, could easily be taken over by the Taliban "when they feel the time is right". Such foggy analysis is a betrayal of centuries of the city's syncretic, tolerant history, during which it has offered space to Christians, Hindus, Jews, Parsis and Sufis. We need to know more, but no nuance is available when an author is being pressed to complete a trilogy.

Pakistan on the Brink by Ahmed Rashid
 
After Fatima Bhutto's reference to Tariq Ali's earlier commentary on Ahmed Rashid, I just had to dig it out:


Tariq Ali on Ahmed Rashid (From Next Door to War)

Some light is thrown on the Afghan situation by Ahmed Rashid in his new book, Descent into Chaos. As a foreign correspondent on the Far Eastern Economic Review and subsequently the Independent and Daily Telegraph, Rashid has been reporting diligently from the region for more than two decades; when the publication of his book on the Taliban coincided with 9/11, he was projected to media stardom in the United States, repeating a pattern that introduced the Iraqi-American writer Kanan Makiya and the Republic of Fear to the liberal public during the First Gulf War. Both men became prize-cocks of the US defence establishment and the videosphere. Graciously received by Bush in the Oval Office, Makiya strongly backed the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and predicted that the US would be greeted as liberators, looking forward to the day his friend Ahmad Chalabi would be running a ‘liberated Iraq’. It didn’t quite happen like that, but fortune favoured Rashid. The first chapter of Descent into Chaos lavishes praise on his friend Hamid Karzai and the book is full of sentences like ‘On 7 December, with Vice President Cheney in attendance, Karzai took oath as Afghanistan’s first legitimate leader for nearly three decades. Many grizzled old Afghan leaders broke down in tears.’

Rashid’s real argument can be summarised as follows: the war after 9/11 should have been fought in Afghanistan and not Iraq, which was a diversion. A heavy armed presence was needed. Bush and his neocon advisers have let the side down badly by trusting Musharraf and the ISI. Karzai, a legitimate leader, was prepared to embark on reforms, sidelining the Northern Alliance, but the Taliban were allowed to regroup and create chaos, helped by the conspiratorial and ‘Bolshevik-like’ al-Qaida. The real problem is Pakistan, not a Western occupation gone badly wrong, and there is no point being squeamish about what needs to be done. Rashid’s views coincide with those of the Pentagon hawks who have, for the last year, been pressuring Bush and Rice to unleash Special Operations units inside Pakistan on the pretext that al-Qaida has grown substantially and is preparing new attacks on the West.

Rashid was a firm supporter of the Soviet intervention, although he is coy about this in his book. He shouldn’t be. It reveals a certain consistency. Afghanistan, he thinks, can be transformed only through war and occupation by civilised empires. This line of argument avoids the need to concentrate on an exit strategy. Civilian casualties in Afghanistan are high and in the last two months more US and British soldiers have died here than in Iraq.

baithak: Tariq Ali on Ahmed Rashid (From Next Door to War)
 
Threads merged after a cleanup of the duplicate thread.

PM me if anyone has concerns over post deletion and provide reasons as to why post should be restored.

And enough of the EP discussion - there are plenty of existing threads for that - and enough of the 'X is more obsessed with Y than Y is obsessed with X' - stick to the Ahmed Rashid book series.
 
The more you talk about Pakistan melting down the more likely it is to happen because it becomes a self fulfilling prophecy!

This is what people like Rashid are working towards - America is covertly doing things hoping that Pakistan melts down then will swoop in with the solution.

When guys like Rashid say this stuff they are merely doing a psy ops in preparation for the self fulfilling prophecy.
 
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