This is just a continuation of your argument, that it is being suggested that all the countries in the neighbourhood will get together and jump on China, which is frankly downright ludicrous. It was relevant, and continues to be so, that China has an increasingly difficult relationship with several neighbours, and that she has to deal with all of them, whether individually or collectively.
You asked what's a bad relationship, well that's it. All these countries are doing is saying stuff, until artillery fire starts to rain. It's pretty good. Oh and who's diverting the topic now. If a few countries have arguments here and there is bad, then even Canada, US and UK have bad relationships.
In other words, as little children say, sticks and stones may break my bones, but words won't hurt me. That is simplifying things to the level of an arithmetic equation: 2+2=4, but 2+anything else higher <>4, so why worry.
An interesting outlook on international relations and bilateral relations. What are you telling us about the future, through this rather self-satisfied smug attitude?
You are effectively telling the rest of the world that it is now the dawn of the Chinese century, or of another Chinese century, and let the world look to its relations with China with care and concern for the world's ability to cope. I wonder if this can be sustained indefinitely. The prospect ahead for the rest of us, vis-a-vis China, is this: if China has really broken away from its historical pattern of good and prosperous periods marked by domination of its neighbourhood and substantial increases in its sphere of influence, alternatiing with periods of relative subsidence of energy and the will to dominate, marked by a shrinking of its influence, then of course, you have a point and we had better all adjust ourselves to working with China, and accepting Chinese demands right at the outset, and offering tribute sooner or later. This means that everybody in the neighbourhood, including those currently in China's good books, has to prepare for inevitable rape; if the idea is to increase China's influence irrespective of international law, irrespective of co-existence, and irrespective of history read from more than a Chinese perspective, then nobody is safe.
All that happens short of open warfare is meaningless; all that happens in terms of open warfare is also meaningless. In either case, China will prevail, and, with at most a couple of thousand dead on either side, the war will end with victory for China.
Whether alone or collectively, China's neighbours, and China's interlocutors who are not next door, all have to figure out what to do in the near future. Friction with China is then posited as inevitable, and Chinese will to dominate might extend up to the shores of the Americas and of Africa. This is hypothetical, but if the South China Sea is only the first post in a longer journey, it seems to be a natural progression.
Historically there have been such situations before. We are going through one just now, in fact, where the US is dominant, with qualifications, throughout the globe, even with regard to China. That domination is clearly on the decline, but it is the downslope of a period that started arguably with the Monroe Doctrine, the rough equivalent of the next step of China's policy towards east and south-east, and perhaps south Asia as well. Once given an option to treat the South China Sea as China's own North Sea equivalent, or as the equivalent of Ottoman rule over the Mediterrranean at the height of the Ottoman Empire, the inevitable next step, unless China's power goes into rapid decline in half-a-century more, is to rule that powers from outside the region are forbidden to interfere with the internal and external relations of countries in the region.
We are likely, for several reasons, to be under indirect threat, unless we manage our own affairs internally so badly that we represent no opposition at all to Chinese hegemonism, either direct or through clients, in south Asia; not hegemonism directly exercised, but exercised through more than one puppet state, empowered by China acting in the wings and supporting these puppets. We can afford, therefore, to concentrate on putting our own house in order - something we are doing in fits and starts and lurches from side to side, not with the impressive, automaton-like rhythm of more successful Asian models - while keeping our defences intact, relevant to the threat we face, and sufficient to support a defensive diplomatic posture where reconciliation and co-existence is precluded by the national exuberance of the other party, and continuous, low-level friction punctuated by sharp exchanges is the order of the day.
For others, as we had considered in other posts and as the general trend of the discussion goes, life is likelier to be far more bleak and forbidding in the next century, perhaps a little more. They have the choice of hanging together or hanging separately, to put one's tongue in one's cheek. The major difference with the US, the current hegemon, is that the US absorbed very large numbers of people throughout its period of domination; China has been exporting people. This may be affected, and more may flow out if your neighbours remain secular and ethnically unbiased, less if they take fright and put on the brakes, in the fear that immigrants may prove to weaken their ability to withstand future Chinese pressure.
If that was not the point of your post, then your post have no point. If they are not going to jointly fight, what's the difference between 1 and a million.
That was not the point of my post. There was, however, a point, irrespective of your cavalier dismissal of anything that does not strike your immediate attention as useful to consider. That point was that under increased Chinese threat, each neighbour will build its own military capability to a point higher than exists today. Some of them will succumb to Chinese pressure - one cannot see them resisting very hard, and they have an history of domination by foreign powers; some of them have an history of intermittent war with China. Who falls within which group is an exercise in speculation; this is a signal to defence contractors to appoint Asian agents if they have not done so already, and to expect a gradual transfer of technology at various levels to various locations in Asia, that is, east and south east Asia.
That is also the theme of the thread. I think.
I mean all he did was lose a minor war and he got almost destroyed. He created India, none of the others can say that about themselves.
You are right at one level, and superficially right, not truly reflective of a complex situation, at another level. Presumably you do not want to know the details and are happy with this summary. Suffice it to say that he was hardly the superhuman being that an history of the world in 100 pages might seem to indicate, and that Indian nation-building, the building of the present nation-state based on the geographical and cultural sub-stratum, started in the nineteenth century, and Nehru is increasingly looking to be a very important figure in the midst of other very important figures who contributed to what we are today. He did not create India, not even in the sense that Mao 'created' China.
Returning to your point. The 1962 war was certainly very damaging to his personal reputation and acceptance within the country. It did not destroy him; not only did he continue in office, but his influence was marked in years to come, gradually declining to the point where alternatives showed up: but only after a decade of his passing away, after roughly a decade and a half of his failure to understand and handle China.He was also only the third victim of Chinese expansionism.
Having said that, it is probably all right to accept your remark at face value, and to agree that even a dominating figure might suffer irreversible damage if unsuccessful in a military or diplomatic confrontation with China. The question is whether contemporary leaders will see it in quite such dismal terms, or will choose to try their own luck.
It is if you are going to name countries like your Christmas gift list. They have to stand together, or else naming them just shows you name what a globe looks like.
Not really. The idea was to point out that China was alienating almost everybody in the neighbourhood, but not to imply that everyone was, as a result, bonding together. There is a difference between China undergoing friction with one, or two, nations and undergoing friction with almost everybody else. Until even a year ago, even on this forum, both Pakistani and Chinese comments tended to tease Indians with this: that China had remarkably good neighbourly relations, and India had failed. It does look rather different now, doesn't it?
Just for the record, and to allay any apprehensions that you might have, I also know what a globe looks like. It looks round.
You seem to believe them acting against a far greater power is not so stupid, I can't see how this is more stupid. At least with this, they have a chance.
Your comment seems self-contradictory, so something is evidently missing 'in translation'.
Besides, if you think these countries won't, you obviously don't know the history of the sea and the history of ASEAN.
There is nothing in the history of the sea or the history of ASEAN that seems to have a bearing. Do point it out if you have the time.
Manny should lose, yes, but he was close. He can win. Berto on the other hand has no chance, and thus losing to Floyd had no real impact on him.
The point of this is to ASEAN and China we are Mayweather and they are Berto, but to ASEAN themselves, they are Mayweather and Manny, they can't afford to lose to each other, because they are peer competitors, and it would hurt them.
I have frankly no idea what all this is. It seems to be vitally important and a sporting image of deep meaning, but I don't have that degree of knowledge of boxing and of these characters, so it is necessary to read these with the next, and try to make some sense of it in that context.
Losing to China is a forgone conclusion and thus not a big deal when and if it happens. Vietnam losing Spratlys to China may be considered a lose, but lose it to the Philippines and you should know what the reaction will be.
Ah, here it comes.
A reasonable dynamic, from the Chinese point of view. Do not fight us, fight each other, and we are always there, to pick up the pieces, dry the tears and heal wounds.
In other words, benevolent centralised arbitration of conflicts: a mini-United Nations with a single member of the Security Council.
I wonder if the authors of the Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere are spinning madly in their graves or simply lying there with broad grins on their bony lips.
Don't care about India in the least, the point is that if India in your eyes is not a bully, and what not, it is still not receiving any benefits. It still lacks prestige or any recognition.
China needs to do this for prestige, it didn't come out of no where. It is not the right move, it is the only move. If India wants prestige, it must also go through something like this. So your entire argument on China is irrelevant, because we must go through this if we want prestige.
This last is both amusing and disquieting. What sort of huge inferiority complex dictates this craving for prestige? This is the behaviour and mindset of a badly-adjusted teen-ager.