Afghanistan may get attack helicopters from India soon.

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

No one is born with such capabilities. They are developed over time, with proper training. I don't see why the Afghans won't be able to operate advance equipment if they are given the right opportunities. They are at a very nascent state at the moment but if they remain on track they would be able to build up a good force.

There is pessimism because continued improvement in the Afghan security forces, both qualitative and capacity related, is almost entirely dependent upon foreign funding running into billions of dollars annually.

In addition, given the lack of institutional history in the Afghan security forces, political interference can play havoc with attaining those goals even if the finances are there, as happened in Iraq under the Maliki government.

 

[!eon]

No one is born with such capabilities. They are developed over time, with proper training. I don't see why the Afghans won't be able to operate advance equipment if they are given the right opportunities. They are at a very nascent state at the moment but if they remain on track they would be able to build up a potent force.

Your tax payers money, and you have every right to waste it.

 

[jaunty]

There is pessimism because continued improvement in the Afghan security forces, both qualitative and capacity related, is almost entirely dependent upon foreign funding running into billions of dollars annually.

In addition, given the lack of institutional history in the Afghan security forces, political interference can play havoc with attaining those goals even if the finances are there, as happened in Iraq under the Maliki government.

Rome was not built in a day. Like I said before, if they stay in the right course there is no reason why they can't raise a good army. Many countries have done it, they don't need to reinvent the wheel and there is enough help on offer.

Your tax payers money, and you have every right to waste it.

We don't consider it as a wastage. Thanks for your concern though!

 

[acetophenol]

All our birds have been reportedly upgraded in Israel with :

• A day-night sight with TV and FLIR.
  
  
• A mission computer.
  
  
• NVG-compatible cockpit with MFDs and moving-map display.
  
  
• Support for helmet-mounted sights.
  
  
• A countermeasures suite.
  
  
• Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite navigation network receiver.
  
  
• Support for the AT-6 Spiral and Rafael Spike antitank missiles.

But I'm quite surprised by this news, never thought we were in a position to give up our Hinds.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Rome was not built in a day. Like I said before, if they stay in the right course there is no reason why they can't raise a good army. Many countries have done it, they don't need to reinvent the wheel and there is enough help on offer.

But I'm quite surprised by this news, never thought we were in a position to give up our Hinds.

Anything is theoretically possible - the pessimism with the Afghan experiment is, as I mentioned, because a lot of different factors require alignment over time with a small to non-existent foundation to build upon. The Iraqis had significantly fewer issues to deal with and plenty of resources to throw at their military, but were undone by corruption and sectarian divisions.

Long term planning and investments in institutional capacity building (regular equipment purchases, maintenance, personnel facilities and training etc) require some level of confidence in revenue projections. Afghan revenues, especially for security, are overwhelmingly dependent on foreign aid. The overwhelming majority of that foreign aid running into billions of dollars annually (to sustain the Afghan security forces) is entirely dependent upon the US at the moment, and there is no concrete long term commitment from the US to sustain that level of support. The EU and Asian countries should/could commit to financial support for Afghanistan and reduce the US burden, but there is no long term commitment there either, nor any strong interest or domestic public support to do so.

The alternate would be domestic revenue growth in Afghanistan (taxes, duties etc) that offsets the loss of foreign financial support, but that itself is dependent upon economic growth which is tied to improved governance and security. There are so many variables involved here that forecasting domestic Afghan revenue grow is largely pointless. The pessimism is therefore entirely warranted.

It's not a simple matter of just handing over X number of platforms. The US went through this whole process when they investigated handing over (for free) surplus military equipment to the Afghans. The fact that they chose to scrap a lot of equipment because the Afghan security forces simply did not have the technical capacity and/or discipline to maintain said equipment illustrates the challenges involved.

The Hinds will require extensive training for Afghan pilots, technicians and maintenance crews along with broader doctrinal and tactical integration of such platforms into the Afghan military (which will involve additional investment in training and equipment) with the associated technology to get the most effective battlefield application out of these platforms. Are the discussions between Afghanistan and India, regarding the provision of new equipment, also focusing on the other associated critical requirements, whether in concert with the US/Russia or independently?

 

[A-Team]

Anything is theoretically possible - the pessimism with the Afghan experiment is, as I mentioned, because a lot of different factors require alignment over time with a small to non-existent foundation to build upon. The Iraqis had significantly fewer issues to deal with and plenty of resources to throw at their military, but were undone by corruption and sectarian divisions.

Long term planning and investments in institutional capacity building (regular equipment purchases, maintenance, personnel facilities and training etc) require some level of confidence in revenue projections. Afghan revenues, especially for security, are overwhelmingly dependent on foreign aid. The overwhelming majority of that foreign aid running into billions of dollars annually (to sustain the Afghan security forces) is entirely dependent upon the US at the moment, and there is no concrete long term commitment from the US to sustain that level of support. The EU and Asian countries should/could commit to financial support for Afghanistan and reduce the US burden, but there is no long term commitment there either, nor any strong interest or domestic public support to do so.

The alternate would be domestic revenue growth in Afghanistan (taxes, duties etc) that offsets the loss of foreign financial support, but that itself is dependent upon economic growth which is tied to improved governance and security. There are so many variables involved here that forecasting domestic Afghan revenue grow is largely pointless. The pessimism is therefore entirely warranted.

It's not a simple matter of just handing over X number of platforms. The US went through this whole process when they investigated handing over (for free) surplus military equipment to the Afghans. The fact that they chose to scrap a lot of equipment because the Afghan security forces simply did not have the technical capacity and/or discipline to maintain said equipment illustrates the challenges involved.

The Hinds will require extensive training for Afghan pilots, technicians and maintenance crews along with broader doctrinal and tactical integration of such platforms into the Afghan military (which will involve additional investment in training and equipment) with the associated technology to get the most effective battlefield application out of these platforms. Are the discussions between Afghanistan and India, regarding the provision of new equipment, also focusing on the other associated critical requirements, whether in concert with the US/Russia or independently?

Afghans were flowing hundreds of these hinds in 80s, they know these machines and that is the main reason that Afghanistan is interested in these Helis.

The pilots, the technicians are still there albeit a bit aged.

There is pessimism because continued improvement in the Afghan security forces, both qualitative and capacity related, is almost entirely dependent upon foreign funding running into billions of dollars annually.

In addition, given the lack of institutional history in the Afghan security forces, political interference can play havoc with attaining those goals even if the finances are there, as happened in Iraq under the Maliki government.

Lack of institutional history ? Yes the dark decade of Talis and so called Mujahedan but prior to that Afghanistan had capable, strong security institutions, remeber the 80s when Afghan airforce was considered the strongest in the region. ( How do I know this, because I come from a military family with a tradition going back 40 years.)

 

[pakistani342]

Afghans were flowing hundreds of these hinds in 80s, they know these machines and that is the main reason that Afghanistan is interested in these Helis.

The pilots, the technicians are still there albeit a bit aged.



Lack of institutional history ? Yes the dark decade of Talis and so called Mujahedan but prior to that Afghanistan had capable, strong security institutions, remeber the 80s when Afghan airforce was considered the strongest in the region. ( How do I know this, because I come from a military family with a tradition going back 40 years.)

you seriously think the Afghan air force was the strongest in the region? -- and not one that would be significantly worse at best than say the Syrian Airforce of the 2000s -- patriotic fervor is one thing but this borders on schizophrenia.

It is these rag tag uneducated Mujahideen/Taliban that eventually led to the destruction of the Afghan Institutions -- how good could such institutions be if uneducated, poorly equipped guerrillas could fracture a main Army on it's home territory.

As my mom often said: Dushman-e dana behtar az dust-e na-dana

Psst .. shhhh... why stop our Eastern neighbor from flushing good money and equipment down the gaping toilet in our Western neighbor

The type and numbers being looked at are not, in isolation, going to make any significant difference to either the Afghan COIN campaign or any irredentist Afghan ambitions related to Pakistan.

Because 4 helicopters won't change the face of the battlefield -- the Taliban will consider India an enemy and may attack Indian assets with ferocity -- the death of Indian's sons and daughters will be blamed by Indian mothers on Pakistan and the cycle will go on.

No one will benefit from this -- certainly not Pakistan -- except perhaps the Taliban

You have to remember US/Nato airpower could not snuff out the Taliban -- there are deeper roots to this problem.

 

[A-Team]

you seriously think the Afghan air force was the strongest in the region? -- and not one that would be significantly worse at best than say the Syrian Airforce of the 2000s -- patriotic fervor is one thing but this borders on schizophrenia.

It is these rag tag uneducated Mujahideen/Taliban that eventually led to the destruction of the Afghan Institutions -- how good could such institutions be if uneducated, poorly equipped guerrillas could fracture a main Army on it's home territory.

As my mom often said: Dushman-e dana behtar az dust-e na-dana



Because 4 helicopters won't change the face of the battlefield -- the Taliban will consider India an enemy and may attack Indian assets with ferocity -- the death of Indian's sons and daughters will be blamed by Indian mothers on Pakistan and the cycle will go on.

No one will benefit from this -- certainly not Pakistan -- except perhaps the Taliban

You have to remember US/Nato airpower could not snuff out the Taliban -- there are deeper roots to this problem.

I meant one of the strongest

With over 7000 personal, hundreds of aircrafts and access to chemical weapons,it shows that there was an institution which was responsible for operating all this, as opposed to what @AgNoStiC MuSliM was suggesting.

 

[pakistani342]

I meant one of the strongest

With over 7000 personal, hundreds of aircrafts and access to chemical weapons,it shows that there was an institution which was responsible for operating all this, as opposed to what @AgNoStiC MuSliM was suggesting.

fair point

 

[GR!FF!N]

ANA is not capable of handling advance equipment.

Well,they're flying M-25 for quite some time now.I wonder why you think they can't,because they've more experience on Mi-25 than Pakistan as a matter of fact.

But I'm quite surprised by this news, never thought we were in a position to give up our Hinds.

There is contradictory reports in media..some are saying we're giving Mi-35,others are saying we're giving Mi-25.

by the way,India started buying Mi-25 in 1983 and Mi-35s in 1990.so,possibly we're donating the older ones.most of these are well past their half life or more.Plus,India is slowly inducting Rudra which might somewhat made IAF capable to donate 4 work horses.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Afghans were flowing hundreds of these hinds in 80s, they know these machines and that is the main reason that Afghanistan is interested in these Helis.

The pilots, the technicians are still there albeit a bit aged.

Lack of institutional history ? Yes the dark decade of Talis and so called Mujahedan but prior to that Afghanistan had capable, strong security institutions, remeber the 80s when Afghan airforce was considered the strongest in the region. ( How do I know this, because I come from a military family with a tradition going back 40 years.)

Yes, the current Afghan security forces suffer from a lack of institutional history and a lack of trained personnel - having a certain capability 30+ years ago does not automatically mean continuity in that capability, especially if the institutions with said capability were dismantled for a large part of that time (as has been the case in Afghanistan). New equipment (as some Indians are suggesting), while similar in terms of the air frame, might also contain significantly new/upgraded avionics and other critical systems that the older support staff and pilots would also have to be trained on. Additional investment in tactical training and overall COIN doctrine would be required because modern COIN tactics and doctrine are drastically different from the tactics and doctrine the Afghan Air Force from the 1980's followed.

The US military itself has multiple assessments that do not support your contention of 'ready availability of trained technicians and pilots':

"The air force is not expected to be fully operational until the end of 2016, when officials hope to have more than 120 aircraft and enough crews to man them.

The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction highlighted that problem last month when it found that the Special Mission Wing, a unit separate from the Afghan Air Force, does not have the capability to man or maintain 30 new helicopters that have been ordered.

Shepro said filling maintenance and other support crews remains difficult, but the training programs for aviators are finally at full capacity. The air force is a small group at about 6,000 servicemembers — including maintenance crews, trainers, security and logistics specialties. But it has the best retention rate of all the Afghan National Security Forces at less than 1.5 percent attrition, he said."

Nascent Afghan Air Force struggles to add air assault capability - News - Stripes​

Last year, most of the 20 Italian-made G222 transport planes the U.S. bought for $486 million were sold for scrap metal after being grounded because Afghans could not maintain them, said the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction....

Even when Air Force capabilities are expanded, the NATO training mission must teach pilots not only how to fly new aircraft, but also use them tactically.

Largely untested younger pilots will have to learn quickly how to coordinate with ground troops, fly in formation, discern enemy fighters from Afghan forces and avoid killing civilians.

"It takes a long time for them to learn the Western style of fighting and being organized," said Glenn Sands, editor of Air Forces Monthly...

Read more at Reutershttp://Afghan air force ascent slow, imperiling battle with Taliban| Reuters
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