Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Another constraint on the Pakistan government is growing American pressure to do more to control the tribal areas. Drone strikes and public criticism of the ISI belittles the Pakistani government in the domestic context and adds to its difficulties in mobilising support for counterterrorism
Religious extremism and terrorism are now threatening civic order and security in varying degrees in the NWFP, Punjab and Sindh. In Balochistan, Taliban-type groups have a strong presence in and around Quetta, which has transformed the religio-cultural profile of the area.
Hard-line militant groups, the Taliban and others based in mainland Pakistan, appear to have gained confidence after the peace agreement in Swat and the spate of high-profile terrorist attacks in Lahore, Islamabad and Chakwal. The Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan threatened to launch two such attacks a week.
A Taliban commander, Maulvi Nazeer Ahmed, declared on April 8 that the day [was] not far when Islamabad [would] be in the hands of the mujahideen. Two co-ed educational institutions in Lahore received threats of punitive action in the first week of April which led all educational institutions to upgrade their security arrangements. Most private educational institutions and offices of international organisations in Islamabad were closed on April 10 as a security precaution.
It seems that hardliners have wrested the initiative and the federal and provincial governments are simply reacting to their violent activities. Either the government lacks the capacity to assert its primacy against the militants or it is internally divided on how to deal with the militancy. The government may also be restrained by the varying degree of sympathy and support for the Taliban pervading Pakistani society and official civil and military circles.
The overall disposition of the official and non-official circles towards terrorism is generally ambiguous, and they lack the much-needed unity of mind on the threat of terrorism. Most condemn terrorism and view it as a threat to Pakistan; however, many of them would not name a militant group for an incident or would not favour the application of tough measures against the perpetrators of terror.
The typical Pakistani mindset is oriented to religious conservatism and militancy and shows varying degrees of sympathy for militants. Naturally, such a mindset cannot be easily convinced that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are a genuine threat to Pakistan.
Suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks are typically described as nothing more than reactions to American military presence in Afghanistan or revenge for American drone attacks in the tribal areas. The argument is that Pakistans security forces are killing the tribal people at the behest of the US, which causes anger among the Taliban, who in turn target Pakistani state institutions and public places for retribution. The typical line of thought that runs quite deep in official civilian and military circles is what else can one expect from the Taliban when Pakistan and the US bomb their homes.
This mindset describes terrorist attacks as a US, Indian and Israeli conspiracy to destabilise Pakistan. The US wants to destabilise Pakistan in order to justify taking over Pakistans nuclear weapons and making it subservient to India.
This skewed mental and emotional disposition has been created not only by madrassa education but also by the regular state education system, starting in the mid-1980s under the Zia regime. Zia-ul Haqs government also used state patronage to promote Islamist groups and militancy, and the media was also used to propagate Islamic orthodoxy and militancy.
The socialisation of young people along these lines continued even after the death of Zia-ul Haq. The military, the ISI and their Islamist allies continued with the Zia legacy. A halfhearted attempt was made by General Pervez Musharraf after September 2001 to change this Islam-oriented socialisation but his desire to win over the MMA for political survival diluted this effort.
Thus, a generation and a half has been socialised into religious orthodoxy and militancy, and has internalised hard-line Islamist discourse on national and international affairs to the exclusion of other perspectives. This socialisation downplays the notion of Pakistan as a territorial nation-state, Pakistani citizenship and Pakistan as a political community. Their main reference points are transnational Muslim identity; Western injustices against Muslims; non-resolution of the Palestinian and Kashmir issues; the West as an adversary of Muslims; and the role of the Islamic movement rather than Muslim states as the liberators of Muslims from Western domination.
The present federal government faces the uphill task of pursuing counter-terrorism against the backdrop of this pervasive mindset that does not generally see the threat of militancy to Pakistan as a state, but sympathises with the Talibans discourse and anti-US disposition. It is not difficult to find varying degree of sympathy for the Taliban cause even in the government circles. They invariably argue that the US is the main threat to Pakistan because its policies have landed Pakistan into internal troubles. Even junior and mid-level army officers express such views, albeit in a cautious manner, although they also appear perturbed by increased internal insecurity and violence. Retired officers are generally more open in expressing their views, often laced with anti-India and anti-US sentiments.
The government faces several other obstacles as well. Opposition parties and other groups do not openly support the government on this issue because they want to cash in on the pro-militancy and anti-US sentiments at the popular level. Further, every party views the problem of terrorism from a partisan perspective rather than viewing it as a threat to Pakistans survival. From their perspective, increased violence discredits the government and thus serves their immediate political agenda. They invariably criticise the government for failing to ensuring internal security.
Increased tension between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks has also made it difficult for the government to mobilise support for effective military action against the Taliban. Indias tough rhetoric enables a large number of leaders and groups to argue that India is Pakistans real adversary, and if Pakistan stops supporting the US in Afghanistan, the Taliban would again become friendly to Pakistan. Some even argue the Taliban will join Pakistan to fight against India!
Another constraint on the Pakistan government is growing American pressure to do more to control the tribal areas. Drone strikes and public criticism of the ISI belittles the Pakistani government in the domestic context and adds to its difficulties in mobilising support for counterterrorism.
The government could have neutralised opposition to its counter terrorism policy had it addressed socio-economic issues and eased economic pressures on the people. Its governance and economic management have been so poor that its support has shrunk by the end of the first year of rule.
Given the serious internal security challenges and external pressures, Pakistan needs a government that enjoys widespread support on the basis of its performance. Only then it can stem the challenge of terrorism and neutralise the Islamist and pro-militancy disposition of large sections of the populace.
There are tangible signs that society is now slowly breaking free of the Islamist spell of the Zia era. This trend is likely to take a decade to crystallise. Meanwhile, the government will have to contend with divided societal orientations, polarisation on counter-terrorism and the American role in the region.
Pakistans inability to control these factors limits its capacity to engage in a sustained struggle to control extremism and terrorism and reviving the pluralist and tolerant spirit of Pakistan.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
