A year on from Zarb i Azb : How much has changed ?

[pak-marine]

Military operation
EDITORIAL — UPDATED about 15 hours ago

What are the measures being taken to secure the Pak-Afghan border to prevent militants from re-entering?—ISPR/File

What are the measures being taken to secure the Pak-Afghan border to prevent militants from re-entering?—ISPR/File

What are the measures being taken to secure the Pak-Afghan border to prevent militants from re-entering?—ISPR/File

What are the measures being taken to secure the Pak-Afghan border to prevent militants from re-entering?—ISPR/File


AS the one-year anniversary of the launch of Operation Zarb-i-Azb approaches, it is helpful to recall just how much has changed inside Pakistan over the last year on the security front — and how much has not.

Consider first consecutive ISPR press releases. First, speaking on Sunday in Colombo to a group of Sri Lankan soldiers trained in Pakistan, army chief Gen Raheel Sharif had this to say: “Referring to the ongoing operation Zarb-i-Azb, COAS said … we have successfully dismantled their infrastructure and created significant effects. We as a nation are determined to take this surge to its logical end, whatever it may take.”

Then, yesterday, an ISPR press release had this to say: “19 terrorists were killed including five of their commanders in an intense exchange of fire with security forces last night in uncleared pocket along NWA-Afghan border.”

While the two claims are far from contradictory, together they underscore that the challenge in North Waziristan is far from over (as Sunday’s killing of seven soldiers in the area shows) — and that for all the gains there, militancy and terrorism are far from being in terminal decline.

Perhaps one of the biggest ongoing concerns about North Waziristan is how little has changed in terms of the media and the public’s access to information from the region.

Before Zarb-i-Azb, when large swathes of territory were effectively ruled by militants, it was apparent why there was, by and large, a news blackout and only rare access to independent information.

Then, as the military leadership pushed the political government to abandon its campaign to try and secure a peace deal with the banned TTP, there was, for a brief while, a window provided in the military mindset and the strategic approach to North Waziristan. Quickly enough, however, that evaporated.

Today, for example, how many can be sure about the operational endgame in the tribal agency? Has the military or political leadership provided any timelines, however loose, for when the much-expected-but-yet-to-materialise push in the Shawal region will begin? Also, what are the measures being taken to secure the Pak-Afghan border to prevent militants from re-entering?

Finally, and perhaps most critically, what efforts are being made to track down and capture or eliminate militant leaders from North Waziristan whichever side of the border they may be?

In asking these questions, military officials tend to be aggressive in response or dismissive all together.

Clearly, the present army chief did well by launching Zarb-i-Azb. It had been delayed too long under the previous military leadership and the political government’s strategy of first trying to secure a peace deal with elements of the TTP had only given the militants yet more space and time to consolidate and regroup.

But if an operation was needed, that surely cannot mean no further questions should be asked. A militarised strategy in North Waziristan or Fata does not appear to have within it the seeds of long-term peace in the region.

Published in Dawn, June 9th, 2015

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[Paksanity]

The author doesn't seem to know much about insurgency warfare. Asking about a timeline in counter terrorism operation gives away his naive mind.

 

[Indus Falcon]

The author doesn't seem to know much about insurgency warfare. Asking about a timeline in counter terrorism operation gives away his naive mind.

Well it's a Dawn editorial, so you can't really expect it to be accurate.

Secondly, forget armchair generals, even some of our highly respected defense analysts, are like a fish out of water, when it comes to asymmetric warfare!

 

[VCheng]

A militarised strategy in North Waziristan or FATA does not appear to have within it the seeds of long-term peace in the region.

Okay, what does the newspaper suggest to ensure long term peace if the military strategy won't?

 

[IceCold]

The wave of suecide attacks have decreased and this is a testimony of operation Zarb-i-azb success. However isolated incidents do take place because we still have a neighbour in our east run by a fascist terrorist who wants to somehow destroy Pakistan. The attacks on minorities are one of those attacks. Even today a high level police officer has been killed in Karachi who was also involved in investigation of Baldia Factory fire. This case directly implicates MQM and so MQM should be investigated. Not expected from Nawaz but military should force him to ask UK to hand over that fat toad sitting in UK to Pakistan. Let us find what he has to say.

 

[Salik]

Sabeen was not killed because of Balochistan issue, same the DSP was not murdered for Baldia Factory investigation. Things are working differently. They are killing to make news headlines. Understand what they're trying to say!!!!!!!

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

A comprehensive military operation across the last remaining areas in FATA, still under insurgent control, was always going to reduce the overall incidents of terrorism. However, as many argued at the start of the operation, and still do, the TTP and associated groups will eventually make a comeback, though at a smaller scale than before. That is essentially what we are seeing now - smaller scale hit and run attacks in the cities and in some areas of FATA.

For the short to medium term the situation is going to settle into this 'new normal', likely with the average number of terrorist attacks fluctuating around the lows we have seen of late, with the odd spike here and there. There is both opportunity and risk here - opportunity in that the dispersal of militants and the denial of 'sanctuary' they enjoyed in FATA has tangibly weakened them and their vulnerabilities can be exploited to further isolate and neutralize.

The risk here is that the absence of a concerted and comprehensive effort (and yes, the non-military law enforcement component is key here) to target terrorists outside of FATA will allow terrorists to adapt and strengthen in this new environment. Unfortunately, I don't really see any interest, let alone effort, on the part of the political parties running the 4 main provinces to undertake the necessary institutional reforms.

 

[Kompromat]

This article is just a show of frustration over not getting the access to NW. Considering how DAWN has teamed up with GEO group to bash the Army in recent times, it's hardly surprising. Army has occasionally given access to media, the claim of a blackout is plain wrong.

Zarb-e-azb has clearly lead to the ~40% dip in terrorism related casualties. What these idiots fail to understand is that this operation is also going on in the urban and rural areas of Sindh and Punjab where the strategy is to use Intel Borne Raids. Over 30,000 raids have been carried out since December.

Overall, the outcome of the operation hinges on the outcome of Shawal Valley op. It's going to be a tough and bloody battle. Army wants to make sure that it can take the valley without too many casualties.

 

[C130]

what do the locals think of zarb-i-azb?? if you don't got their support the rats will just back come back in a few years.

if you get the locals on board you can catch them quickly before they can get settled.

 

[VCheng]

Without media access to the war zone, nobody can say anything with certainty as to how things are going. All we have to go by are the military's claims that it is going well.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Without media access to the war zone, nobody can anything with certainty as to how things are going. All we have to go by are the military's claims that it is going well.

A statistical comparison of terrorist attacks in Pakistan outside of the conflict zone pre and post Zarb-e-Azb strongly supports the 'military's claims'.

Inside the conflict zone, with most of the locals evacuated, the TTP doesn't stand much of a chance against a numerically superior, better armed and better trained force that does not have to worry about collateral damage.

 

[VCheng]

A comparison of the statistics of major terrorist attacks in Pakistan outside of the conflict zon pre and post Zarb-e-Azb strongly supports the 'military's claims'.

Inside the conflict zone, with most of the locals evacuated, the TTP don't stand much of a chance against a numerically superior, better armed and better trained force that does not have to worry about collateral damage.

The reduction in attacks is indeed one indicator of progress, but the real situation will be ascertained only with open media access. The clampdown cannot last forever.

 

[Paksanity]

what do the locals think of zarb-i-azb?? if you don't got their support the rats will just back come back in a few years.

if you get the locals on board you can catch them quickly before they can get settled.

It's a bit complicated. Locals will side with
1. Side which is winning
2. Side which offers better economic prospects

At the moment Pak Army is winning side so they are with us however threat of Taliban return looms if Army has to withdraw say because of Eastern border heats up. For a permanent support Army has to stay and keep area secure long enough for development work to complete and honest economy to take root. Political and civil establishment has to move in swiftly to take advantage of security window and provide alternate economy and fill the poltical void. They are lacking terribly. Then there is the problem of porous Afghan border which gives opportunities like weapons trade, drug smuggling, kidnappings, ransoms, stolen goods, money earned from sheltering terrorists, women's trade etc. Locals can make lot more money and it is uphill task to convince them on honest livings (There aren't many options for that anyway). So I would say, on military front we are winning. On poltical and other aspects, well it is yet to unfold.

 

[Orakzai]

what do the locals think of zarb-i-azb?? if you don't got their support the rats will just back come back in a few years.

if you get the locals on board you can catch them quickly before they can get settled.

most of the locals were skeptical and had mixed feelings (most of them not favouring it, coz of worries of damages to their businesses, lives and houses) before the start of this operation but even locals were suffering from these idiots (same as people living under ISIS ruled areas in Iraq) but now they have more confidence in the army. To be honest until and unless government brings some development to these areas and give tribals jobs and stuff there is always a possibility of them coming back as people are poor and they need money and they can be mislead into something crazier.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The reduction in attacks is indeed one indicator of progress, but the real situation will be ascertained only with open media access. The clampdown cannot last forever.

The problem is not so much the lack of media access in the conflict zone (again, see my previous comment about the odds being stacked heavily against the TTP in a controlled conflict zone such as NW) as it is about whether the civilian administration will be able to step in when the IDP's return and earn the support of the majority. That support will be critical for both military and non-military counter-terrorism efforts in a zone that will no longer be governed by the RoE's that are currently in place.

The military has demonstrated the success of a similar strategy in Swat, but Swat was/is more progressive than most parts of FATA from a socio-cultural perspective and more integrated, ideologically and tangibly, with Pakistan/Pakistani Nationhood. FATA, post IDP return, will be significantly more challenging, not because of a failure of the military strategy, but because there appears to be no strategy in place to establish local civilian-led institutions that can govern and provide services in conjunction with the military providing macro-level security.