A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

[Cuirassier]

Disagree on keeping upgraded T72s at same level of T90/AK etc. They're mid-tier with T85s and AZs.

This thread is rather amusing due to the amateur assumptions of the OP.He has no understanding of the road-rail networks on both sides,without which you can't launch any mechanized offensive due to logistics.Total absence of understanding of logistics and terrain is shown by the talk of mechanized offensives accross marshy swamps of sindh-gujarat border.Nor does he seem to understand the significance of the canal and ditch cum bund defenses which can be flooded/act as barrier with layered defense as necessary on both sides.

His understanding of 'new' doctrine is also fantastical.Some basic mistakes are -
1.Calling for hundreds of piston engine CAS aircraft and assuming they will 'devastate' indian army by swamping them due to cheapness.It seems he has forgotten that a piston engine aircraft can be shot down by even the 12.7 mm Heavy machine gun on the tanks and 30 mm cannons on IFVs,forget the 200 odd upgraded zsu-23-4 and tunguska mobile gun-AA systems accompanying indian armour and static bofors L70 and zsu-57-2 systems.Cheap as piston engine aircraft are,you know what's cheaper ?-AA guns and MANPADS.A single soldier with even an obsolete MANPAD can 100% one shot a piston engine aircraft with a dirt cheap MANPAD.India has thousands of IGLAs deployed at platoon level.Piston engine aircraft are also defenceless against mistral/stinger armed helicopters like HAL Rudra/LCH(not yet deployed) and apaches.And all this without even getting into missile defences such as QRSAM/SPYDER, Akash, barak-8(not yet deployed).OP has also assumed that these CAS aircraft will operate will total impunity over indian airspace which means PAF has gained total air dominance over core indian territory,if you believe PAF can achieve that i commend you on your optimism.

2.OP also has developed unreal notions of breakthrough with cheap 'light' tank/car and obsolete 'upgraded' t-55 derivatives and also believes that putting ATGM on a platform makes it a breakthrough offensive weapon(in reality its a defensive weapon).Let me give you a reality check on 'light tanks'.A light tank-car can be easily defeated by even basic light infantry.Indian army platoon and some times squad level M3/M4 Carl gustav rocket launcher(which has far better accuracy at range over RPGs)/LAW are sufficient to destroy 'light' tanks and these are present in tens of thousands .Thats not even counting the 50,000 plus ATGM stock of the indian army's infantry battalions.The 4000 MILAN-2T,3000 kornet,300 NAG and 300 Spike-LR are generally kept for enemy's modern tanks but over 40,000 konkurs-m and milan 2 are available for general use which are more than enough for tin cans like the ones being proposed(infact enough for all PA armour with exception of maybe T-80UD with duplet ERA).Heavy tanks can survive MBRL barrages,soft skinned vehicles can't,as was found in ukraine where whole mechanized battalions were wiped out in seconds by MBRL attacks but heavy armour did rather well.

Hear this lecture if you want to understand modern warfare trends in maneuvre from an american veteran expert who was an on the ground observer in ukraine.

I pity the mind that thinks that these tank-car or t-55 upgrades can offensively punch through even a single regiment of dug in hull down modern tanks like a t-90.The frontal armour of the T-90 is on video in youtube shown to have survived direct hit from american TOW-2 in syria,survived 7 RPG hits in dagestan in chechen wars.The 1200 strong(400 more in production) T-90 fleet has a stock of 25,000 INVAR 4km range cannon launched ATGM also.

The real armour balance between IA and PA is ~770 modern tanks for PA-450 Al khalid + 320 T-80UD vs ~2300 modern tanks for IA- 1200 T-90 plus 1000 upgraded t-72 plus 124 arjuns.Add to this 1500 unupgraded T-72 for IA and thousands of t-55 derivatives and older chinese models for PA.
http://fofanov.armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/TRIALS/19991020.html
Russian source on T-80U vs T-90 protection levels.


3.Also the above ORBAT starting from post #124 on page 9 and plan of attack is messed up(even though commands and corps structure is due to be overhauled in next 3 years with IBG and theatre commands).He assumes that size of corps is uniform on both sides and uses the corps as a basic maneuvre unit creating fake material superiority where none exists.

Let me put into perspective -(infantry is lorry borne,mech either m-113 APC for PA or BMP-2 IFV for IA)

Southern command - Indian XII corps(1 rapid div+ 1 inf div+ 1 arm brigade+1 mech brigade) is seen being defeated and losing half of gujarat to an undisclosed airborne helicopter force and a random marine division ignoring the existence of indian air force and navy altogether or how they would be supplied over the marshes.Realistically speaking PN would be lucky to have its surface fleet survive the first 48 hours and not have karachi harbour in flames against the full might of indian navy,forget an amphibious assault with transports along the coast.The grand fantasy envisages these embarked 'marines' and light airborne forces will capture half of gujarat against a rapid division(which is 2-3 infantry/mech inf brigades plus an armoured brigade),another full infantry division quartered in ahmedabad,plus 2 more independent mechanized brigade and armoured brigade formations.Not sure if this is scenario meant to be serious or ganja humour.The air borne force penetration (if its gets through IAF) being proposed in gujarat can be crushed by just the sole infantry division,leaving all the mechanized formations to entreat the pak armour movements further north.The petty hovercraft penetrations proposed can be simply dealt with by the BSF and coast guard.The size of the BSF is 260,000 compared to 40,000 for pak rangers to put things in perspective.So the whole gujarat -bhuj front is a fantasy.

Now little to the north coming to southern rajasthan sector,what the fantasy in gujarat has allowed the OP is to artificially negate on paper 3 mechanized and 2 armoured brigades of indian southern command as if they didn't exist,and thus not allocate any pakistani forces in sindh to oppose them by imagining they are defeated by vague airborne troops and some imaginery marine division just so he can now focus 2 corps in this sector,creating a fake local superiority.Infact 12 RAPID division(2 mech brig+1 amd brig) of indian XII corps is not even in gujarat,and actually based at Jodhpur and will face action in rajasthan.

Here,Pakistan 12corps is brought in which in reality is in Quetta garrisoning balochistan against an uprising and manning the afghan border.Even allowing this its 2 infantry divisions,1 armd brigade and 1 inf brigade.Add 5th corps (freed up because of gujarat fantasy) with 2 infantry divisions and a mechanized inf div(25th,not sure composition) still total attacking force is 4 infantry divisions,1 inf brigade and,1 armd brigade and 1 mech div.Against this will be pitted XXI strike corps plus 12 RAPID at jodhpur (even if we magically ignore indp armd brigade and indp mech brigde of XII corps keeping in line with gujarat fantasy,when in reality they would crash into the open flank of pak 5th corps from the south in any attempted turning move).Even ignoring them you have 2 RAPID divisions,a full armoured division,an infantry division and an artillery division with its own smerch battalions and brahmos regiment(~100 missiles plus 100 reload) and field arty.Upto the observer to decide who has better chances in the open desert - total 13 inf brigades,2 amd brgde,1-2 mech brgde vs 4 amd brigades,3 inf brigades,4-6 inf/ mechanized brigades ,1 artillery division).I am not shifting any units from eastern command to counter 12 corps shift from quetta due to china threat.

In OP's scheme,moving further north around bikaner Indian I strike corps is attacked by Pak 2nd strike corps(1 amd div plus 1 mech inf div) and 31 corps(2 infantry divs +1 mech inf div) over the rajasthan canal.However here OP has made a mistake in his ORBAT.2 whole Rapid divisions under X corps have been placed much north ,whereas they are actually deployed in bikaner and kota in this axis.(24 RAPID at bikaner,18 RAPID reserve at kota).So in case of a attempted pincer attack on this front by pak 2nd and 31 corps it will face overwhelming forces.The balance of forces would be 2 pak infantry divs,2 mech inf divs and 1 armoured division against india's 3 full rapid divisions,1 armoured division,1 infantry division and 1 independent armoured brigade(iab),plus a full artillery division(with integral smerch and brahamos regiments).The result would be a decimation of the pakistani attack at worst,a huge battle of attrition at best.

By prematurely deploying the PA 2nd strike corps and its armoured division,OP also creates a crisis further up north.Pak XI corps(wrongly shown as IX corps probably typo) is seen as a defensive force(11 corps presumably redeployed from NWFP in peshawar) with 1 or 2 infantry divisions and one iab facing indian X corps with one infantry div and one iab in defense.(its two rapid divisions fighting in bikaner axis)
Now here the indian II strike corps -the kharga corps which is the elite tip of the spear formation(500 t-90 and 500 bmp-2 approx) of the indian army is free to make its move.The kharga corps has one armoured division,one rapid division,one iab( overstrength),one artillery division and one infantry division.The forward advance of the PA 2nd strike corps removes any obstacle from its path and essentially gives it a free run to do its traditional job.The kharga corps has an open field to race south-west towards rahim yar khan and then jacobabad blocking off N5 and n55 highway,cutting off punjab from sindh and splitting pakistan in two.This movement would also put it into the rear of pak attacking forces in bikaner axis(31st and 2nd) encircling them and annihilating them in a hammer anvil with II kharga corps as hammer and I strike corps plus elements of X corps as anvil.
So i consider the 2 prong attack plan on bikaner as suicidal,would certainly lead to destruction of the two attacking PA corps due to kharga corps attack and resulting sandwich between two strike corps of indian army.

Further north in the lahore-amritsar axis OP's scheme pits pakistan 4th corps(with 2 inf div,one inf brigde,one arty bgde,one iab) against IA XI corps with 3 infantry divisions,one arty bgde,one iab,one mech brigade).IA superiority is marginal and insufficient for major advance.XI corps if needed can however easily detatch a mechanized brigade north or south and still maintain slight numerical superiority.No hard progress on any side can be expected here.

Further north in sakargarh -pathankot -akhnoor area you have pakistan 1st strike corps and 30 corps vs IX corps and XVI corps of india.72 mountain strike corps(MSC) division based at pathankot(currently being reorganized into IBGs) is reserve which can go north towards china border or west towards pakistan.Combination of 30 corps (two infantry divs + iab +arty division+AT bgde) and 1st strike corps(two infantry divisions+iab +arty bgd+ one armoured division) for total of 4 infantry div,2iab,2artybgd,1 amd div,AT bgd is an impressive concentration. Combined indian formations would amount to 6 infantry divisions(incl MSC),4 iab,1artybgd.Battle here would be a ferocious .

Further north,due to difficult terrain no major advances in LOC except localized operations .India certain to make an attempt on haji pir which it foolishly gave back in 1965 after capture and the bulge is major source of infiltration.

5.Finally the role of raising hundreds of thousands of conscripts in this scheme is meaningless.Conscripts will have to be fed and supplied,have very limited military utility,and would get massacred if facing regular formations with armour and artillery(may hold back infantry for limited time).Also not explained why hundreds of thousands of conscripts are added to Pak ORBAT ,but 1 million strong active paramilitary forces of india not similarly accounted for ,or the territorial army or reserve manpower over 2 million .

 

[kongn]

Disagree on keeping upgraded T72s at same level of T90/AK etc. They're mid-tier with T85s and AZs.

Thats a reasonable argument,though slightly better than them still.

 

[Cuirassier]

Thats a reasonable argument,though slightly better than them still.

Unaware of the specifics of the T72 upgrades.

 

[Nilgiri]

There is much more to it than merely picking one or two sectors out of the hat. The India-Pakistan border is about 3,300 kms long; it has no homogeneity. What works for Siachen does not work for the Dras-Kargil sector; what works for the Dras-Kargil sector does not work in the proximity of the Neelum Valley north of the Vale of Kashmir, or in the valley of the Jhelum once it takes a right turn and goes south. My comments about the Pir Panjal were to tease our Pahadi friend; he reacted beautifully, but teasing apart, I cannot understand why we have no Kannadigas in the Indian Army. You see, in that state, there is a saying,"Don't dig a well when you are thirsty". To watch artillery batteries being set up in school playgrounds in Panzgam is bad for the blood pressure; what were the sappers doing all these years? There are perfectly good plateaus in locations nearby, and it is impossible to accept that a military highway between Panzgam and Sopore cannot be done in six months or so. The point is that this is not the time to rush around placing howitzers in people's children's playgrounds, with the guarantee that counter-battery fire will after the first couple of exchanges merely make the rubble bounce.

It gets worse further down, where the spectre of the return of Haji Pir Pass hangs over the military landscape. If you look closely, it is a U-shaped feature; that is why there is such a flood of infiltrators coming in through there. Even an amateur can stroll across - physically; he might land up with a couple of dozen machine-gun bullet perforations, but that's all right - and they do. What happens after the strolling is nasty, brutish and short, but the physical feature invites excess. Heaven knows that there is no shortage of tactical bravado and strategic myopia in certain South Asian quarters, and now that the northern approach has been used by K. S. Brar and his crew, THAT approach is tighter stitched up than Suhrawardy's jackets.

You have already mentioned my teasing our mutual friend, and I shall let that pass.

This much for the mountain warfare sections facing Pakistan and Pakistani military elements, and it does not take into account the necessary 'joint' thinking that is inescapable. We never, on the Indian side, talk about or think about linking air defence and air force elements with our terrestrial forces; the Pakistanis do. All this does not apply between Chushul and Bareilly, where we are wide open; some Chinese general in their inscrutable fashion suggested that Delhi was only a ten-day campaign away. If we look at the deployment of Indian troops in this sector, it is not very difficult to understand why he said what he did. He has probably been shot for it, but surely there are others with similar maps and plans in Chengdu.

Let us not even think about the mountain warfare situation between Darbhanga to Dibrugarh, with literally dozens of Bailley's Trails pointing straight down at the Brahmaputra Valley.

If there is no mention here of the topography beloved of @Armchair's apparently Bengali and very fertile mind, it is too good a matter to be dismissed in a paragraph or ten. Suffice it to say that tanks are not the best way to traverse the loose sand, wholly unlike the Western Desert that the 8th Army fought over, and that the only value of the southern marshlands would have been as key points of access to the soft commercial underbelly of Sind. It is good enough to look with pleasure at the Makran coast, and temple one's hands in anticipation. Somewhere else, it might have been fun to have had a go at the war games played out, perhaps with @PanzerKiel as a referee, but with the right to be able to re-organise the Indian side into formations radically different from what is on offer at the moment, a proposition that might not be permitted.

It's all your fault, @Nilgiri, not to have given us a suitable venue by now.

Well finding+organising suitable venue and gathering all worthies ran into timing issue (ppl like panzerkiel just were absent around then when iron was hot) and also inevitable prima donna + RL issue with ppl haha (incl myself).

I have found the harder you try sometimes for these kind of things, the more dissonant the activity becomes....it is especially true when you have active "in-stream" military opposition/activity/realpolitik running in real world (unlike say analysing WW2 from any side, much more cooly and more calmly downstream).

In real life I have also found it many times, two people get along with me just fine, and I would assume they would thus get along with each other (friend of yours is a friend of mine etc etc)....but it strangely doesn't happen for whatever reason more than you can imagine.

I will try use the gentle sun approach henceforth and not try to dictate/organise too much. This forum still has enough churn and "reappearance" that I think some sections of it can have a quiet redemption and renewal when members like Panzer appear....and help steer and set a good analysis over time (but not rush it too much). Let us see.

BTW, What is funny is that Armchair got called as "sanghi" a few times by other fertile minded BD members lol. He only declared flags recently now I think.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This thread is rather amusing due to the amateur assumptions of the OP.He has no understanding of the road-rail networks on both sides,without which you can't launch any mechanized offensive due to logistics.Total absence of understanding of logistics and terrain is shown by the talk of mechanized offensives accross marshy swamps of sindh-gujarat border.Nor does he seem to understand the significance of the canal and ditch cum bund defenses which can be flooded/act as barrier with layered defense as necessary on both sides.

His understanding of 'new' doctrine is also fantastical.Some basic mistakes are -
1.Calling for hundreds of piston engine CAS aircraft and assuming they will 'devastate' indian army by swamping them due to cheapness.It seems he has forgotten that a piston engine aircraft can be shot down by even the 12.7 mm Heavy machine gun on the tanks and 30 mm cannons on IFVs,forget the 200 odd upgraded zsu-23-4 and tunguska mobile gun-AA systems accompanying indian armour and static bofors L70 and zsu-57-2 systems.Cheap as piston engine aircraft are,you know what's cheaper ?-AA guns and MANPADS.A single soldier with even an obsolete MANPAD can 100% one shot a piston engine aircraft with a dirt cheap MANPAD.India has thousands of IGLAs deployed at platoon level.Piston engine aircraft are also defenceless against mistral/stinger armed helicopters like HAL Rudra/LCH(not yet deployed) and apaches.And all this without even getting into missile defences such as QRSAM/SPYDER, Akash, barak-8(not yet deployed).OP has also assumed that these CAS aircraft will operate will total impunity over indian airspace which means PAF has gained total air dominance over core indian territory,if you believe PAF can achieve that i commend you on your optimism.

2.OP also has developed unreal notions of breakthrough with cheap 'light' tank/car and obsolete 'upgraded' t-55 derivatives and also believes that putting ATGM on a platform makes it a breakthrough offensive weapon(in reality its a defensive weapon).Let me give you a reality check on 'light tanks'.A light tank-car can be easily defeated by even basic light infantry.Indian army platoon and some times squad level M3/M4 Carl gustav rocket launcher(which has far better accuracy at range over RPGs)/LAW are sufficient to destroy 'light' tanks and these are present in tens of thousands .Thats not even counting the 50,000 plus ATGM stock of the indian army's infantry battalions.The 4000 MILAN-2T,3000 kornet,300 NAG and 300 Spike-LR are generally kept for enemy's modern tanks but over 40,000 konkurs-m and milan 2 are available for general use which are more than enough for tin cans like the ones being proposed(infact enough for all PA armour with exception of maybe T-80UD with duplet ERA).Heavy tanks can survive MBRL barrages,soft skinned vehicles can't,as was found in ukraine where whole mechanized battalions were wiped out in seconds by MBRL attacks but heavy armour did rather well.

Hear this lecture if you want to understand modern warfare trends in maneuvre from an american veteran expert who was an on the ground observer in ukraine.

I pity the mind that thinks that these tank-car or t-55 upgrades can offensively punch through even a single regiment of dug in hull down modern tanks like a t-90.The frontal armour of the T-90 is on video in youtube shown to have survived direct hit from american TOW-2 in syria,survived 7 RPG hits in dagestan in chechen wars.The 1200 strong(400 more in production) T-90 fleet has a stock of 25,000 INVAR 4km range cannon launched ATGM also.

The real armour balance between IA and PA is ~770 modern tanks for PA-450 Al khalid + 320 T-80UD vs ~2300 modern tanks for IA- 1200 T-90 plus 1000 upgraded t-72 plus 124 arjuns.Add to this 1500 unupgraded T-72 for IA and thousands of t-55 derivatives and older chinese models for PA.
http://fofanov.armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/TRIALS/19991020.html
Russian source on T-80U vs T-90 protection levels.


3.Also the above ORBAT starting from post #124 on page 9 and plan of attack is messed up(even though commands and corps structure is due to be overhauled in next 3 years with IBG and theatre commands).He assumes that size of corps is uniform on both sides and uses the corps as a basic maneuvre unit creating fake material superiority where none exists.

Let me put into perspective -(infantry is lorry borne,mech either m-113 APC for PA or BMP-2 IFV for IA)

Southern command - Indian XII corps(1 rapid div+ 1 inf div+ 1 arm brigade+1 mech brigade) is seen being defeated and losing half of gujarat to an undisclosed airborne helicopter force and a random marine division ignoring the existence of indian air force and navy altogether or how they would be supplied over the marshes.Realistically speaking PN would be lucky to have its surface fleet survive the first 48 hours and not have karachi harbour in flames against the full might of indian navy,forget an amphibious assault with transports along the coast.The grand fantasy envisages these embarked 'marines' and light airborne forces will capture half of gujarat against a rapid division(which is 2-3 infantry/mech inf brigades plus an armoured brigade),another full infantry division quartered in ahmedabad,plus 2 more independent mechanized brigade and armoured brigade formations.Not sure if this is scenario meant to be serious or ganja humour.The air borne force penetration (if its gets through IAF) being proposed in gujarat can be crushed by just the sole infantry division,leaving all the mechanized formations to entreat the pak armour movements further north.The petty hovercraft penetrations proposed can be simply dealt with by the BSF and coast guard.The size of the BSF is 260,000 compared to 40,000 for pak rangers to put things in perspective.So the whole gujarat -bhuj front is a fantasy.

Now little to the north coming to southern rajasthan sector,what the fantasy in gujarat has allowed the OP is to artificially negate on paper 3 mechanized and 2 armoured brigades of indian southern command as if they didn't exist,and thus not allocate any pakistani forces in sindh to oppose them by imagining they are defeated by vague airborne troops and some imaginery marine division just so he can now focus 2 corps in this sector,creating a fake local superiority.Infact 12 RAPID division(2 mech brig+1 amd brig) of indian XII corps is not even in gujarat,and actually based at Jodhpur and will face action in rajasthan.

Here,Pakistan 12corps is brought in which in reality is in Quetta garrisoning balochistan against an uprising and manning the afghan border.Even allowing this its 2 infantry divisions,1 armd brigade and 1 inf brigade.Add 5th corps (freed up because of gujarat fantasy) with 2 infantry divisions and a mechanized inf div(25th,not sure composition) still total attacking force is 4 infantry divisions,1 inf brigade and,1 armd brigade and 1 mech div.Against this will be pitted XXI strike corps plus 12 RAPID at jodhpur (even if we magically ignore indp armd brigade and indp mech brigde of XII corps keeping in line with gujarat fantasy,when in reality they would crash into the open flank of pak 5th corps from the south in any attempted turning move).Even ignoring them you have 2 RAPID divisions,a full armoured division,an infantry division and an artillery division with its own smerch battalions and brahmos regiment(~100 missiles plus 100 reload) and field arty.Upto the observer to decide who has better chances in the open desert - total 13 inf brigades,2 amd brgde,1-2 mech brgde vs 4 amd brigades,3 inf brigades,4-6 inf/ mechanized brigades ,1 artillery division).I am not shifting any units from eastern command to counter 12 corps shift from quetta due to china threat.

In OP's scheme,moving further north around bikaner Indian I strike corps is attacked by Pak 2nd strike corps(1 amd div plus 1 mech inf div) and 31 corps(2 infantry divs +1 mech inf div) over the rajasthan canal.However here OP has made a mistake in his ORBAT.2 whole Rapid divisions under X corps have been placed much north ,whereas they are actually deployed in bikaner and kota in this axis.(24 RAPID at bikaner,18 RAPID reserve at kota).So in case of a attempted pincer attack on this front by pak 2nd and 31 corps it will face overwhelming forces.The balance of forces would be 2 pak infantry divs,2 mech inf divs and 1 armoured division against india's 3 full rapid divisions,1 armoured division,1 infantry division and 1 independent armoured brigade(iab),plus a full artillery division(with integral smerch and brahamos regiments).The result would be a decimation of the pakistani attack at worst,a huge battle of attrition at best.

By prematurely deploying the PA 2nd strike corps and its armoured division,OP also creates a crisis further up north.Pak XI corps(wrongly shown as IX corps probably typo) is seen as a defensive force(11 corps presumably redeployed from NWFP in peshawar) with 1 or 2 infantry divisions and one iab facing indian X corps with one infantry div and one iab in defense.(its two rapid divisions fighting in bikaner axis)
Now here the indian II strike corps -the kharga corps which is the elite tip of the spear formation(500 t-90 and 500 bmp-2 approx) of the indian army is free to make its move.The kharga corps has one armoured division,one rapid division,one iab( overstrength),one artillery division and one infantry division.The forward advance of the PA 2nd strike corps removes any obstacle from its path and essentially gives it a free run to do its traditional job.The kharga corps has an open field to race south-west towards rahim yar khan and then jacobabad blocking off N5 and n55 highway,cutting off punjab from sindh and splitting pakistan in two.This movement would also put it into the rear of pak attacking forces in bikaner axis(31st and 2nd) encircling them and annihilating them in a hammer anvil with II kharga corps as hammer and I strike corps plus elements of X corps as anvil.
So i consider the 2 prong attack plan on bikaner as suicidal,would certainly lead to destruction of the two attacking PA corps due to kharga corps attack and resulting sandwich between two strike corps of indian army.

Further north in the lahore-amritsar axis OP's scheme pits pakistan 4th corps(with 2 inf div,one inf brigde,one arty bgde,one iab) against IA XI corps with 3 infantry divisions,one arty bgde,one iab,one mech brigade).IA superiority is marginal and insufficient for major advance.XI corps if needed can however easily detatch a mechanized brigade north or south and still maintain slight numerical superiority.No hard progress on any side can be expected here.

Further north in sakargarh -pathankot -akhnoor area you have pakistan 1st strike corps and 30 corps vs IX corps and XVI corps of india.72 mountain strike corps(MSC) division based at pathankot(currently being reorganized into IBGs) is reserve which can go north towards china border or west towards pakistan.Combination of 30 corps (two infantry divs + iab +arty division+AT bgde) and 1st strike corps(two infantry divisions+iab +arty bgd+ one armoured division) for total of 4 infantry div,2iab,2artybgd,1 amd div,AT bgd is an impressive concentration. Combined indian formations would amount to 6 infantry divisions(incl MSC),4 iab,1artybgd.Battle here would be a ferocious .

Further north,due to difficult terrain no major advances in LOC except localized operations .India certain to make an attempt on haji pir which it foolishly gave back in 1965 after capture and the bulge is major source of infiltration.

5.Finally the role of raising hundreds of thousands of conscripts in this scheme is meaningless.Conscripts will have to be fed and supplied,have very limited military utility,and would get massacred if facing regular formations with armour and artillery(may hold back infantry for limited time).Also not explained why hundreds of thousands of conscripts are added to Pak ORBAT ,but 1 million strong active paramilitary forces of india not similarly accounted for ,or the territorial army or reserve manpower over 2 million .

I am left half-admiring and half-resentful of your excellent synopsis. @PanzerKiel succeeded in his heroic attempt not to give in to his baser self and fall all over himself laughing, and as a result, with the temperature at 33/34 in the shade, in an iron-fisted lock-down, this thread was a whiff of oxygen.

Thank you for wrecking the most fun available in these difficult days.

Well finding+organising suitable venue and gathering all worthies ran into timing issue (ppl like panzerkiel just were absent around then when iron was hot) and also inevitable prima donna + RL issue with ppl haha (incl myself).

I have found the harder you try sometimes for these kind of things, the more dissonant the activity becomes....it is especially true when you have active "in-stream" military opposition/activity/realpolitik running in real world (unlike say analysing WW2 from any side, much more cooly and more calmly downstream).

In real life I have also found it many times, two people get along with me just fine, and I would assume they would thus get along with each other (friend of yours is a friend of mine etc etc)....but it strangely doesn't happen for whatever reason more than you can imagine.

I will try use the gentle sun approach henceforth and not try to dictate/organise too much. This forum still has enough churn and "reappearance" that I think some sections of it can have a quiet redemption and renewal when members like Panzer appear....and help steer and set a good analysis over time (but not rush it too much). Let us see.

BTW, What is funny is that Armchair got called as "sanghi" a few times by other fertile minded BD members lol. He only declared flags recently now I think.

You missed @kongn.

Where are these people emerging from? Between him and @PanzerKiel, they have the situation stitched up tight. It was fun sticking banderillas into @Armchair, but with these two gentlemen in the line-up - from his taciturn disposition, and his clear insight into terrain, PanzerKiel is a field-level officer - there is no percentage in sticking around. I'm not going on.

The critique by kongn at #150 summarises things very clearly, and takes the wind out of the sails of anyone who tries to produce alternative scenarios without having done his homework. It is almost as if he is standing behind us and looking over our shoulders. Without @Hellfire and @jbgt90, in fact, even with them, there is no amusement potential in this thread any more.

PS: The more I read it, the more #150 is chilling; he is saying all the things that PanzerKiel refuses to say out loud. Perhaps his greater willingness to share insights is due to his being an Indian, assessing a Pakistani hypothetical situation.

Look at his appreciation south to north; he is clinical in his insight into Armchair's mythical Marine Division, and into the outcome of open warfare on coastal defence - forget about broader war aims - by the PN against the Indian Navy.

He sees the fallacy of diverting the Quetta formation eastward, leaving a wide, gaping hole in the defences of Makran and the Afghan border. He has pointed out in dry, precise phrases the dilemma facing PA forces looking east, where they have to cover a lot of territory with very limited resources, and has bluntly outlined the probable outcome (leaving Khambatta and Bewoor and imbeciles like that, and Iftekhar Janjua on the other end of the spectrum out of the equation) in the desert.

He sees clearly that both sides have too much to lose in the Punjab heartland, and that both will probably play cautious, risk-avoidance games, and he also sees - and says, in guarded tones - that India's long-lived weakness in the Chhamb-Akhnoor sector (shades of 1971) presents an opportunity. He points out that the IA will give an arm and a leg to get back Haji Pir Pass, and most likely will not succeed, and that the mountain terrain further north and east is too difficult to overcome the defender's advantage. Harsh, but realistic.

Read it carefully and the orbat you helped to put up will come to life.

 

[ali_raza]

I am left half-admiring and half-resentful of your excellent synopsis. @PanzerKiel succeeded in his heroic attempt not to give in to his baser self and fall all over himself laughing, and as a result, with the temperature at 33/34 in the shade, in an iron-fisted lock-down, this thread was a whiff of oxygen.

Thank you for wrecking the most fun available in these difficult days.



You missed @kongn.

Where are these people emerging from? Between him and @PanzerKiel, they have the situation stitched up tight. It was fun sticking banderillas into @Armchair, but with these two gentlemen in the line-up - from his taciturn disposition, and his clear insight into terrain, PanzerKiel is a field-level officer - there is no percentage in sticking around. I'm not going on.

The critique by kongn at #150 summarises things very clearly, and takes the wind out of the sails of anyone who tries to produce alternative scenarios without having done his homework. It is almost as if he is standing behind us and looking over our shoulders. Without @Hellfire and @jbgt90, in fact, even with them, there is no amusement potential in this thread any more.

PS: The more I read it, the more #150 is chilling; he is saying all the things that PanzerKiel refuses to say out loud. Perhaps his greater willingness to share insights is due to his being an Indian, assessing a Pakistani hypothetical situation.

Look at his appreciation south to north; he is clinical in his insight into Armchair's mythical Marine Division, and into the outcome of open warfare on coastal defence - forget about broader war aims - by the PN against the Indian Navy.

He sees the fallacy of diverting the Quetta formation eastward, leaving a wide, gaping hole in the defences of Makran and the Afghan border. He has pointed out in dry, precise phrases the dilemma facing PA forces looking east, where they have to cover a lot of territory with very limited resources, and has bluntly outlined the probable outcome (leaving Khambatta and Bewoor and imbeciles like that, and Iftekhar Janjua on the other end of the spectrum out of the equation) in the desert.

He sees clearly that both sides have too much to lose in the Punjab heartland, and that both will probably play cautious, risk-avoidance games, and he also sees - and says, in guarded tones - that India's long-lived weakness in the Chhamb-Akhnoor sector (shades of 1971) presents an opportunity. He points out that the IA will give an arm and a leg to get back Haji Pir Pass, and most likely will not succeed, and that the mountain terrain further north and east is too difficult to overcome the defender's advantage. Harsh, but realistic.

Read it carefully and the orbat you helped to put up will come to life.

crux of the matter is there is a potential of inflicting heavy damage to the enemy from both sides.
wht @Armchair is refersing to is getting above ur weight and punch the enemy
a chain is as strong as its weakest link.
now don’t tell me IA doesn’t have weaknesses
neither can we say it about pakistan
but as history dictates us
anybody coming from west will have more chance to grab a win.
as gen montgomri famously said.
biggest lesson of military history is never face an enemy from your west u will never be in advantage

 

[Joe Shearer]

crux of the matter is there is a potential of inflicting heavy damage to the enemy from both sides.
wht @Armchair is refersing to is getting above ur weight and punch the enemy
a chain is as strong as its weakest link.
now don’t tell me IA doesn’t have weaknesses
neither can we say it about pakistan
but as history dictates us
anybody coming from west will have more chance to grab a win.
as gen montgomri famously said.
biggest lesson of military history is never face an enemy from your west u will never be in advantage

May I suggest that you lead a delegation to Teheran proposing the merger of your state with Iran without going through the meaningless bloodshed of a war? There is historical precedent for this, and many members will cheer loudly. If you feel this is too extreme a step, you might merge with the Taliban instead.

If Montgomery made that famous remark, it gives us a clue to his lifelong teetotaller status; something, some incident must have pushed him into it, and perhaps the remark too dates to that episode.

 

[Nilgiri]

I am left half-admiring and half-resentful of your excellent synopsis. @PanzerKiel succeeded in his heroic attempt not to give in to his baser self and fall all over himself laughing, and as a result, with the temperature at 33/34 in the shade, in an iron-fisted lock-down, this thread was a whiff of oxygen.

Thank you for wrecking the most fun available in these difficult days.



You missed @kongn.

Where are these people emerging from? Between him and @PanzerKiel, they have the situation stitched up tight. It was fun sticking banderillas into @Armchair, but with these two gentlemen in the line-up - from his taciturn disposition, and his clear insight into terrain, PanzerKiel is a field-level officer - there is no percentage in sticking around. I'm not going on.

The critique by kongn at #150 summarises things very clearly, and takes the wind out of the sails of anyone who tries to produce alternative scenarios without having done his homework. It is almost as if he is standing behind us and looking over our shoulders. Without @Hellfire and @jbgt90, in fact, even with them, there is no amusement potential in this thread any more.

PS: The more I read it, the more #150 is chilling; he is saying all the things that PanzerKiel refuses to say out loud. Perhaps his greater willingness to share insights is due to his being an Indian, assessing a Pakistani hypothetical situation.

Look at his appreciation south to north; he is clinical in his insight into Armchair's mythical Marine Division, and into the outcome of open warfare on coastal defence - forget about broader war aims - by the PN against the Indian Navy.

He sees the fallacy of diverting the Quetta formation eastward, leaving a wide, gaping hole in the defences of Makran and the Afghan border. He has pointed out in dry, precise phrases the dilemma facing PA forces looking east, where they have to cover a lot of territory with very limited resources, and has bluntly outlined the probable outcome (leaving Khambatta and Bewoor and imbeciles like that, and Iftekhar Janjua on the other end of the spectrum out of the equation) in the desert.

He sees clearly that both sides have too much to lose in the Punjab heartland, and that both will probably play cautious, risk-avoidance games, and he also sees - and says, in guarded tones - that India's long-lived weakness in the Chhamb-Akhnoor sector (shades of 1971) presents an opportunity. He points out that the IA will give an arm and a leg to get back Haji Pir Pass, and most likely will not succeed, and that the mountain terrain further north and east is too difficult to overcome the defender's advantage. Harsh, but realistic.

Read it carefully and the orbat you helped to put up will come to life.

I seemed to have missed that post completely when I was replying...thanks for bringing it to my attention. A very excellent read, I shall be following this thread closely.

But we need people of all calibers on a subject (both hot and cold) to get good responses/discussion on it as you can see. Some fanciful assertions and projections need to be made to get stoic counters!

crux of the matter is there is a potential of inflicting heavy damage to the enemy from both sides.
wht @Armchair is refersing to is getting above ur weight and punch the enemy
a chain is as strong as its weakest link.
now don’t tell me IA doesn’t have weaknesses
neither can we say it about pakistan
but as history dictates us
anybody coming from west will have more chance to grab a win.
as gen montgomri famously said.
biggest lesson of military history is never face an enemy from your west u will never be in advantage

Is it due to the earths rotational direction?

Why then did both the Grand armee and Wehrmacht ultimately get foiled in the eastern adventure?

That place itself got totally thumped from it's east when the mongols were on the scene.

 

[Armchair]

Hi @kogn welcome to the forum and glad to see your participation. Please do continue to post and if you wish give us your take on the "real" situation.

He has no understanding of the road-rail networks on both sides,without which you can't launch any mechanized offensive due to logistics.

I'm aware of the long canals on both sides and road and rail network (which I learned from @PanzerKiel 8 years ago) but choose to ignore them as they don't make for an interesting category of warfare. Reminds me more about WWI rather than even WWII. Canals can be bridged, trucks can replace rail logistics.

His understanding of 'new' doctrine is also fantastical.Some basic mistakes are -
1.Calling for hundreds of piston engine CAS aircraft and assuming they will 'devastate' indian army by swamping them due to cheapness.It seems he has forgotten that a piston engine aircraft can be shot down by even the 12.7 mm Heavy machine gun on the tanks and 30 mm cannons on IFVs,forget the 200 odd upgraded zsu-23-4 and tunguska mobile gun-AA systems accompanying indian armour and static bofors L70 and zsu-57-2 systems.Cheap as piston engine aircraft are,you know what's cheaper ?-AA guns and MANPADS.A single soldier with even an obsolete MANPAD can 100% one shot a piston engine aircraft with a dirt cheap MANPAD.India has thousands of IGLAs deployed at platoon level.Piston engine aircraft are also defenceless against mistral/stinger armed helicopters like HAL Rudra/LCH(not yet deployed) and apaches.And all this without even getting into missile defences such as QRSAM/SPYDER, Akash, barak-8(not yet deployed).OP has also assumed that these CAS aircraft will operate will total impunity over indian airspace which means PAF has gained total air dominance over core indian territory,if you believe PAF can achieve that i commend you on your optimism.

Yet surprisingly Turkish drones with puny engines have / are ripping apart unseemly numbers of tanks, apcs, artillery, etc. How do we make sense of that? Perhaps it is not the type of engine that matters, what matters are:

1. flight profile
2. standoff range attack ability
3. Being able to fly nap of the earth.

An aircraft with a piston engine is not magically inferior. Particularly not when armed with modern standoff weapons delivery capabilities. In fact, technically speaking, there is little performance difference between a piston and a turboprop below 8000 feet. The real benefits of a turboprop start at about 100 FL.

Do not the Turkish drone operators know what you are saying? They must be pretty dumb to throw their drones at Igla armed, Buk armed, and a whole host of other Russian system armed forces right? Yes, including the 0.5 cal and 23mm. Good luck to them shooting down aircraft armed with modern ranged munition.

2.OP also has developed unreal notions of breakthrough with cheap 'light' tank/car and obsolete 'upgraded' t-55 derivatives and also believes that putting ATGM on a platform makes it a breakthrough offensive weapon(in reality its a defensive weapon).Let me give you a reality check on 'light tanks'.A light tank-car can be easily defeated by even basic light infantry.Indian army platoon and some times squad level M3/M4 Carl gustav rocket launcher(which has far better accuracy at range over RPGs)/LAW are sufficient to destroy 'light' tanks and these are present in tens of thousands

Yet your own forces have a very large number of BMP2s. Pak has no equivalent. I think you should preach to the Indian Army why they are using BMP2s since they are just going to get blown away by light infantry. What we see in the battlefield in Syria is that T-55s and BMP2s play an effective and meaningful role, despite them being "light". In real war scenarios, their role appears to be marginally inferior to T-90s. Perhaps a more indepth discussion can explain why.

PA's own experience with T-59s / T-69s in KPK has shown that they are of amazing utility. How can we negate that with the fantasy that an IA Karl Gustav is going to take them out at range?

How do we negate the South African experience with the Rooikat which faced Karl Gustavs and an endless litany of Soviet weaponry and still proved incredibly valuable to the South Africans?

Regarding the rest of your posts, I'm just a civilian, I don't pretend to know the actual placement of IA forces. I've just painted a hypothetical scenario. I've also assumed you won't have all your forces pressed against Pakistan as China would be moving forces on your borders which will tie up a good number of your forces.

I've left aside IABGs on both sides to paint a clearer picture and ignored paramilitary units (from both sides) for the same purpose. In the greater scheme of things they will fill in the gaps and play more minor roles.

You've ignored my conscript units completely from your equation. Yes they will need logistics like all military units do. How does that stop them from being effective? They are fielding artillery, tanks, apcs, etc just like other units are. Why do they "not work" just because they are conscripted? It makes no sense either given military history or the experience of past and present conscript forces. Here is a litany of such:
1. Switzerland
2. Israel
3. Singapore
4. Taiwan
5. Warsaw Pact during the Cold War
6. Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria
....

Its hard to answer your war gaming as you haven't clarified what you expect on both sides and magically placed your own units on my hypothetical map. Why don't you instead place your own war game in your own map and then we can all understand more clearly what you are playing.

PS: There doesn't seem to be any division of the IA in Bhuj. Could you tell what which unit that would happen to be?

@Joe Shearer you have ignored completely my conscript forces placed with a red x. Mekran Coast and Karachi are both covered. As is Quetta and Peshawar. Conscript forces are shown on the map placed all along the "canal and rail" line going north to south.

 

[ali_raza]

I seemed to have missed that post completely when I was replying...thanks for bringing it to my attention. A very excellent read, I shall be following this thread closely.

But we need people of all calibers on a subject (both hot and cold) to get good responses/discussion on it as you can see. Some fanciful assertions and projections need to be made to get stoic counters!



Is it due to the earths rotational direction?

Why then did both the Grand armee and Wehrmacht ultimately get foiled in the eastern adventure?

That place itself got totally thumped from it's east when the mongols were on the scene.

russia is another story its more to do with stupidity of both hitler and nepoleon for choosing bad weather and punching way above there weight
russian wilderness is soo vast it can hide germany and france in uts belly and wont even show a bump.
regarding montgomry quote
it was truly based on history of subcontinent and he sai it in staff college quetta
wht ever happens in subcontinent even birds migrate feom west to east
winds come feom west to east.
as well as all major invaders came west to east minus brits
but britain was never a invader per say but a businessman
when they came india was already rotten to core by drunk minion kings they just had to push a little and whole house collapsed

 

[Armchair]

BTW, What is funny is that Armchair got called as "sanghi" a few times by other fertile minded BD members lol. He only declared flags recently now I think.

I've been called a "sanghi" yes

 

[ali_raza]

May I suggest that you lead a delegation to Teheran proposing the merger of your state with Iran without going through the meaningless bloodshed of a war? There is historical precedent for this, and many members will cheer loudly. If you feel this is too extreme a step, you might merge with the Taliban instead.

If Montgomery made that famous remark, it gives us a clue to his lifelong teetotaller status; something, some incident must have pushed him into it, and perhaps the remark too dates to that episode.

why would we want a merger with iran
with afghanistan maybe but iran never
we might have to invade parts of iran at some point in future because iranian balochistan is ours in the first place but it will happen without bloodshed
when irani regime would collapse we might bring our lost brothers back.thats about it
and afghanistan is ours god willing
now people r realizing it the hard way
politics aside but india chose the wrong horse always when it comes to afghanistan

I've been called a "sanghi" yes

a sanghi planning to invade bharat mata

 

[Tipu7]

I am left half-admiring and half-resentful of your excellent synopsis. @PanzerKiel succeeded in his heroic attempt not to give in to his baser self and fall all over himself laughing, and as a result, with the temperature at 33/34 in the shade, in an iron-fisted lock-down, this thread was a whiff of oxygen.

Thank you for wrecking the most fun available in these difficult days.



You missed @kongn.

Where are these people emerging from? Between him and @PanzerKiel, they have the situation stitched up tight. It was fun sticking banderillas into @Armchair, but with these two gentlemen in the line-up - from his taciturn disposition, and his clear insight into terrain, PanzerKiel is a field-level officer - there is no percentage in sticking around. I'm not going on.

The critique by kongn at #150 summarises things very clearly, and takes the wind out of the sails of anyone who tries to produce alternative scenarios without having done his homework. It is almost as if he is standing behind us and looking over our shoulders. Without @Hellfire and @jbgt90, in fact, even with them, there is no amusement potential in this thread any more.

PS: The more I read it, the more #150 is chilling; he is saying all the things that PanzerKiel refuses to say out loud. Perhaps his greater willingness to share insights is due to his being an Indian, assessing a Pakistani hypothetical situation.

Look at his appreciation south to north; he is clinical in his insight into Armchair's mythical Marine Division, and into the outcome of open warfare on coastal defence - forget about broader war aims - by the PN against the Indian Navy.

He sees the fallacy of diverting the Quetta formation eastward, leaving a wide, gaping hole in the defences of Makran and the Afghan border. He has pointed out in dry, precise phrases the dilemma facing PA forces looking east, where they have to cover a lot of territory with very limited resources, and has bluntly outlined the probable outcome (leaving Khambatta and Bewoor and imbeciles like that, and Iftekhar Janjua on the other end of the spectrum out of the equation) in the desert.

He sees clearly that both sides have too much to lose in the Punjab heartland, and that both will probably play cautious, risk-avoidance games, and he also sees - and says, in guarded tones - that India's long-lived weakness in the Chhamb-Akhnoor sector (shades of 1971) presents an opportunity. He points out that the IA will give an arm and a leg to get back Haji Pir Pass, and most likely will not succeed, and that the mountain terrain further north and east is too difficult to overcome the defender's advantage. Harsh, but realistic.

Read it carefully and the orbat you helped to put up will come to life.

One of the few things I hate about PDF is that in certain occasions random threads with some cool-complex title, are created by random members which carry zero knowledge about the subject. These members write up what ever fantasy they got without putting ground realities into perspective. So what happens? The expert or professional members jump in, and in an 'attempt' to steer that thread in right direction for sake of 'rectification', they end up discussing stuff which is not meant to be discussed in an open forum.

Take this thread for example, a single read up is sufficient to get the clear picture how the very fundamental understanding is missing from the proposed idea by the OP. Yes it's good to come up with nascent concepts which are likely to work in future, but the ground realities and fundamentals must be followed beforehand otherwise it's just wastage of time.

 

[Armchair]

why would we want a merger with iran
with afghanistan maybe but iran never
we might have to invade parts of iran at some point in future because iranian balochistan is ours in the first place but it will happen without bloodshed
when irani regime would collapse we might bring our lost brothers back.thats about it
and afghanistan is ours god willing
now people r realizing it the hard way
politics aside but india chose the wrong horse always when it comes to afghanistan


a sanghi planning to invade bharat mata

Couldn't agree more about Sistan-Baluchestan and Afghanistan. Between why hasn't any government yet fixed the Wakhan Corridor problem? Its Pak's route to Central Asia, a relic of the original "cold war" or "Great Game" between the British Empire and Russia. This corridor needs to be handed over to Pakistan.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Hi @kogn welcome to the forum and glad to see your participation. Please do continue to post and if you wish give us your take on the "real" situation.


I'm aware of the long canals on both sides and road and rail network (which I learned from @PanzerKiel 8 years ago) but choose to ignore them as they don't make for an interesting category of warfare. Reminds me more about WWI rather than even WWII. Canals can be bridged, trucks can replace rail logistics.


Yet surprisingly Turkish drones with puny engines have / are ripping apart unseemly numbers of tanks, apcs, artillery, etc. How do we make sense of that? Perhaps it is not the type of engine that matters, what matters are:

1. flight profile
2. standoff range attack ability
3. Being able to fly nap of the earth.

An aircraft with a piston engine is not magically inferior. Particularly not when armed with modern standoff weapons delivery capabilities. In fact, technically speaking, there is little performance difference between a piston and a turboprop below 8000 feet. The real benefits of a turboprop start at about 100 FL.

Do not the Turkish drone operators know what you are saying? They must be pretty dumb to throw their drones at Igla armed, Buk armed, and a whole host of other Russian system armed forces right? Yes, including the 0.5 cal and 23mm. Good luck to them shooting down aircraft armed with modern ranged munition.


Yet your own forces have a very large number of BMP2s. Pak has no equivalent. I think you should preach to the Indian Army why they are using BMP2s since they are just going to get blown away by light infantry. What we see in the battlefield in Syria is that T-55s and BMP2s play an effective and meaningful role, despite them being "light". In real war scenarios, their role appears to be marginally inferior to T-90s. Perhaps a more indepth discussion can explain why.

PA's own experience with T-59s / T-69s in KPK has shown that they are of amazing utility. How can we negate that with the fantasy that an IA Karl Gustav is going to take them out at range?

How do we negate the South African experience with the Rooikat which faced Karl Gustavs and an endless litany of Soviet weaponry and still proved incredibly valuable to the South Africans?

Regarding the rest of your posts, I'm just a civilian, I don't pretend to know the actual placement of IA forces. I've just painted a hypothetical scenario. I've also assumed you won't have all your forces pressed against Pakistan as China would be moving forces on your borders which will tie up a good number of your forces.

I've left aside IABGs on both sides to paint a clearer picture and ignored paramilitary units (from both sides) for the same purpose. In the greater scheme of things they will fill in the gaps and play more minor roles.

You've ignored my conscript units completely from your equation. Yes they will need logistics like all military units do. How does that stop them from being effective? They are fielding artillery, tanks, apcs, etc just like other units are. Why do they "not work" just because they are conscripted? It makes no sense either given military history or the experience of past and present conscript forces. Here is a litany of such:
1. Switzerland
2. Israel
3. Singapore
4. Taiwan
5. Warsaw Pact during the Cold War
6. Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria
....

Its hard to answer your war gaming as you haven't clarified what you expect on both sides and magically placed your own units on my hypothetical map. Why don't you instead place your own war game in your own map and then we can all understand more clearly what you are playing.

PS: There doesn't seem to be any division of the IA in Bhuj. Could you tell what which unit that would happen to be?

@Joe Shearer you have ignored completely my conscript forces placed with a red x. Mekran Coast and Karachi are both covered. As is Quetta and Peshawar. Conscript forces are shown on the map placed all along the "canal and rail" line going north to south.

Two points: you have misunderstood @kongn about 'light tanks' and 'IFVs'; they are good for carrying troops into battle in close coordination with armoured troops, they are not very good by themselves. That presupposes that the armour in question is not a Dinky toy.

Second, your recourse to conscripts has already been answered, and more than adequately. Take a look at the sizeable manpower available already trained as a uniformed force in the CAPFs, and available as far advanced on the training cycle as compared to conscipts. They will, by themselves, make the sponsor of a move to bring in conscripts regret their rashness.

Third, think of the consequences to Pakistan of the Indians taking to conscription, as a direct response.to any Pakistani move. Be warned that you lose credibility in Pakistani eyes, proposing any temporary band-aid solution that can be taken up by their arch-enemies with no difficulty, and with the daunting prospect of doing better than the original Pakistani initiative.

why would we want a merger with iran
with afghanistan maybe but iran never
we might have to invade parts of iran at some point in future because iranian balochistan is ours in the first place but it will happen without bloodshed
when irani regime would collapse we might bring our lost brothers back.thats about it
and afghanistan is ours god willing
now people r realizing it the hard way
politics aside but india chose the wrong horse always when it comes to afghanistan


a sanghi planning to invade bharat mata

Sarcasm will be buried this afternoon at 4:30 at the Hindu cemetery, Kowkoor. A condolence meeting will be held next to the graveyard, as it may not be possible to hold a virtual meeting on PDF, as would have been the best option.

One of the few things I hate about PDF is that in certain occasions random threads with some cool-complex title, are created by random members which carry zero knowledge about the subject. These members write up what ever fantasy they got without putting ground realities into perspective. So what happens? The expert or professional members jump in, and in an 'attempt' to steer that thread in right direction for sake of 'rectification', they end up discussing stuff which is not meant to be discussed in an open forum.

Take this thread for example, a single read up is sufficient to get the clear picture how the very fundamental understanding is missing from the proposed idea by the OP. Yes it's good to come up with nascent concepts which are likely to work in future, but the ground realities and fundamentals must be followed beforehand otherwise it's just wastage of time.

Well said. We have never been on cordial terms, but your criticism is most relevant, and I acknowledge it as being most appropriate. Please note that the member of the military in the discussion has remained discreet and selective in his responses, and that is as it should be. The indiscretions, if any, are due to civilians who have been involved in defence matters, and we may be forgiven, as we give away only the limited knowledge of dispositions and availability of resources, human resources and weaponry, on the ground.

Thank you for giving us all a reality check.