A U.S.-Pakistan Reset Just Got a Lot Harder

[PakistaniAtBahrain]

As i said before, on Biden victory, I was amazed at the lack of strategic thinking and complete aloofness shown by Pakistanis, specially libturd crowd in Pakistan, , as if some Messiah just arrived after the long dark days! If Trump was a orange clown, bad for his country, he was still a useful idiot. Neither beneficial to Pakistan nor harmful. Who cares if he was screwing his country? Non of our business. Now you are dealing with the "selected" ones, the pets of American deep state. It will be long hard bumpy drive from now on.

I refuse to believe that releasing of a suspect was just unplanned event. Timing is very telling, right when Biden and co came into the power. Some subtle messaging is going about.

For yanks, fear the day when Pakistan itself start seeing you from the prism of Afghanistan only, setting aside the geo-economics agenda its trying to purse with American led west.

we had so much to gain from Trump. he was pulling US troops out of Afghanistan. the moment Biden took control he said he wont remove the troops.

 

[SQ8]

So your equating Calabria [region of Italy] with Pakistan [country] as region of India? Calabria is a tiny region with 3 million people. Pakistan is a COUNTRY of 220 million nearly as large as EU.

I am sorry most of these countries you listed have populations less than Lahore.

Uruguay - 3 million
Norway - 5 million

Im equating exposure to immigrants and their types - if you can see beyond food.

 

[PradoTLC]

The acquittal of Daniel Pearl’s abductors came at the worst possible time.
BY MICHAEL KUGELMAN

On Jan. 28, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ordered the acquittal of four men convicted of abducting and murdering the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. The ruling upheld a lower court decision in Sindh province last year—appealed by Pakistani government officials—that overturned the murder convictions, found them guilty of kidnapping charges only, and ordered their release because they had already served enough time on the less serious charge.

The Biden administration reacted strongly. White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said the United States was “outraged.” She described it as “an affront to terror victims everywhere.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in a lengthy written statement, said the United States was “deeply concerned.” Washington is particularly unhappy about the acquittal of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, widely believed to be the mastermind of Pearl’s abduction and a longtime, card-carrying member of the Islamist terrorist elite.

There’s never a good time for convicted terrorists to be acquitted, but the ruling has spoiled a rare bright spot in an often-troubled U.S.-Pakistan relationship. U.S. President Joe Biden has been keen to cooperate with Pakistan to advance a floundering Afghan peace process, and Islamabad has called for a reset of the relationship that expands cooperation into non-security spaces. Both goals, but especially Islamabad’s, will now be harder to achieve.

Pakistani militants snatched Pearl in Karachi in January 2002. They held him captive for more than a week before decapitating him, slicing his body into 10 pieces, and burying his remains in a shallow grave. The sickening crime set terrible precedents. Journalists became a favorite abduction target for Islamist terrorists, and militants began producing execution videos like the one filmed by Pearl’s killers.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruling amplifies long-standing tension points in U.S. relations with Islamabad. One is Pakistan’s failure to keep terrorists who target the United States or its interests behind bars. The trial of Sheikh and his three co-conspirators, which ran from April to July 2002 and wasn’t open to the public, was a mess. According to the Pearl Project, a Georgetown University investigation published in 2011, the prosecution used false testimony to build a strong case for murder convictions, even though there was only sound evidence of the defendants’ roles in Pearl’s abduction. The Pearl Project’s research, based on reviews of legal documents and interviews with those involved in the case, concluded that Islamabad was embarrassed about Pearl’s execution and wanted to show it was tough on terrorism—at a time when it had just established a new, post-9/11 counterterrorism partnership with Washington.


Sheikh and the others were convicted of murder, with Sheikh sentenced to death and the others to life in prison. However, their lawyers, because of the Pearl Project’s findings of a flawed trial, later appealed. The appeals led to the recent acquittal rulings. Serious problems afflicted the trial—not just false testimony but also unqualified expert witnesses and intimidation that included the defendants and even their lawyer cursing and taunting the prosecution. Yet no effort was made to pursue a new trial. Pakistan’s constitution has a double jeopardy clause that prevents someone from being prosecuted for the same crime more than once.

None of those believed to be directly involved in, and present for, Pearl’s murder have been prosecuted—and that’s unlikely to change. Pearl’s autopsy was never entered into the court record. The Sindh court ruling falsely said his body was never found. Sheikh’s lawyer, remarkably, suggested last month that Pearl was alive.

Washington, however, deserves some blame too. In 2007, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the al Qaeda leader and 9/11 mastermind, confessed to personally having executed Pearl. Some U.S. investigators believe he’s right based on a forensic tool that compared the veins on the hands of Pearl’s killer (seen in the execution video) to those of Mohammed. However, Washington never sought to prosecute Mohammed for the Pearl execution because of concerns this would complicate his prosecution for 9/11 and because he confessed to Pearl’s execution after being waterboarded.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruling underscores another longtime U.S. concern about the country—its complex relationship with terrorists. Before the Pearl execution, Sheikh worked with two Pakistani militant groups: Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen—both supported by the Pakistani security establishment. It’s also notable that Sheikh instructed Pearl’s kidnappers to compose a ransom note that demanded a consignment of U.S. F-16 fighter jets. These potent aircraft—an unusual request from Islamist militants—have long been a top acquisition priority for the Pakistani military.


Sheikh has connections to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s main intelligence agency. According to a Guardian report published soon after Sheikh’s conviction, Sheikh had links to two former senior ISI officials. One of them, Ijaz Shah, is the person to whom Sheikh first turned himself in—something later acknowledged by the ISI director at the time. (Shah is currently Pakistan’s minister for narcotics control.)

FBI investigators say he was in ISI custody for a week before being turned over to the police. While U.S. investigators cooperated closely with Pakistani counterparts on the Pearl case, Pakistan unsurprisingly balked at providing more information on the ISI’s role.

This past history prompts a question: Did someone influential within Pakistan’s security establishment pressure the courts to acquit its onetime asset? Given Pakistan’s genuine desire to strengthen relations with Washington in the Biden era and given the pressure it’s under from the Financial Action Task Force to crack down on terrorist networks (it holds its next plenary meeting later this month), it makes little sense for the country to try to facilitate Sheikh’s release, especially now. But some aggrieved U.S. officials may think differently. Additionally, Sheikh’s acquittal does give Islamabad a useful bargaining chip in future negotiations with the United States—over the restoration of suspended security assistance, perhaps, or its role in the Afghan peace process.


Despite the Supreme Court ruling, the Biden administration’s focus will remain the same: seek Pakistan’s assistance in the peace process in Afghanistan and press it to continue eliminating militant networks on its soil. However, there’s now a risk, at least in the near term, that Washington’s thinking about its relationship with Islamabad will be driven more by emotion than by rational policy considerations. It’s reminiscent of a particularly traumatic period in 2011 and 2012, when Osama Bin Laden was discovered in Pakistan and the Haqqani Network, a Taliban faction close to Islamabad, was staging attacks on U.S. targets in Afghanistan, including the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. These developments happened during the Obama presidency, and many, including Biden and other current senior officials who also served in the Obama administration, have vivid memories of them.


But the fallout of the decision will hit Islamabad even harder than Washington. In recent weeks, Pakistani officials have laid out a vision for a fresh start in bilateral ties that focuses less on Afghanistan, terrorism, and other security issues and more on economic and trade cooperation. They have also called on the Biden administration to balance its relations with Islamabad and New Delhi and to focus more on the Kashmir dispute and India’s oppressive policies there.

Even before the ruling, getting Washington to agree to the idea of a relationship redirect was going to be a hard sell. Officials aren’t opposed to greater commercial relations—bilateral trade volume set new records in recent years—but Afghanistan and counterterrorism remain the core issues for U.S. interests. Mainly because of shared concern about China, the U.S.-India partnership is set to deepen far more than a U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which is constrained by trust issues and the reality that China is Pakistan’s closest ally. This means the Biden administration, while likely to press India on human rights issues more than its predecessor, will go easy on New Delhi so as not to antagonize a government that Washington considers its best strategic bet in South Asia—and one highly sensitive to outside criticism.

Yet now, Islamabad’s ask has morphed from ambitious to practically impossible. The ruling injects fresh tensions into a relationship that has enjoyed relative stability over the last few years amid stepped-up cooperation on the Afghan peace process. And it ensures that the very security issues—especially terrorism—that Islamabad prefers to move away from will remain perched on the front burner of Washington’s policy priorities. A telling moment came on Jan. 29, the day after the ruling, when Blinken had an introductory call with his Pakistani counterpart, Shah Mahmood Qureshi. The official readouts couldn’t be more different. Islamabad’s was lengthy, conveyed a positive tone, and listed discussions on many issues, with the Pearl case mentioned only briefly toward the end. Washington’s was terser and largely revolved around Pearl, with Afghanistan and several other issues noted quickly at the end.

This isn’t to say there’s no hope. Washington appears to accept that the ruling was a court decision, not a government one. It has acknowledged Pakistani officials’ attempts, mainly through appeals, to keep Sheikh from being released. New paths for cooperation are still possible. The Biden administration’s emphasis on working bilaterally and multilaterally to tackle global challenges such as climate change and public health will find favor in Pakistan.

But the stain of the ruling won’t wash out anytime soon. Sheikh is reportedly now in a government safe house, forbidden from communicating with the outside or leaving the facility but permitted to receive family. Pakistani officials and Pearl’s family have requested a review of the Supreme Court judgment, and the apex court will weigh in later this month. But with the same justices on the review panel, chances of success are low. A failed appeal will likely prompt Pakistani officials, citing public safety risks, to keep him under indefinite house arrest. Washington has few legal options of its own; it has no extradition treaty with Pakistan.

No matter the final chapter of Sheikh’s legal saga, it has already charred a volatile U.S.-Pakistan relationship that always seems to be fighting fires—even when the smoke shows signs of clearing.

A U.S.-Pakistan Reset Just Got a Lot Harder

The acquittal of Daniel Pearl’s abductors came at the worst possible time.

foreignpolicy.com

missed Mi6 angle... shiekh earlier also worked for mi6 in bosina

When I say Pakistani, I mean with a distinct Pakistani identity with the flag, the menu written in Urdu. I could read Urdu since I was taking private lessons upon my parents insistence in Arabic at the time.
I know the difference since our Pakistani caretaker/driver/gardener at my fathers company provided accommodation in Dubai brought us food from a restaurant called Karachi Darbar.
He is now in his 80s but he still brings me food, my parents helped him and his family to move to US many years ago.

My father used to turn his nose at the food because everything floated in a river of oil
But my mother loved the food, unlike my mom I didn't have the stomach for the spicy stuff but I did enjoy the bread and the grilled meat.

..the older I get the more I reminisce

karachi darbar...lol. that is a eatery for taxi drivers ..

 

[Dalit]

Micheal Kugelman..

Who takes this guy seriously ? Read his twitter feeds , what a chutiya

He is a deep state twat.

 

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

First of all 1 Country is not center of world there are other countries of world , who are geographically closer to Pakistan and can offer more

Bilateral relations should be based on respecting Pakistan's Existence and what Pakistan stands for

 

[El Sidd]

A curtailed relationship between US and Pakistan is best for both the countries with diverging interests in the coming decade.

PTI government, termed the last pro US government in Pakistan, is urged to formulate a policy which can reflect the hard facts of realpolitik.

The onus lies upon US to do more to covet favourable Pakistani stance. They have the most to lose in the relationship.

 

[Xone]

Afghan dilemma
Fahd HumayunPublished February 12, 2021

The writer is a PhD candidate in political science at Yale.
THE Biden administration has made clear its desire to bring America’s 20-year involvement in Afghanistan to a dignified end. But after a decade of missed objectives in a country ravaged by conflict in a region vulnerable to mistrust, there is little dignity to be found. While President Joe Biden made no overt reference to Afghanistan in his first foreign policy address, senior officials have been locking horns on what it will take to bring home the last remaining 2,500 American troops four months before a May 2021 deadline.
The problem is that in their current discussions in Doha, the Afghan government and the Taliban seem to be at an impasse. Intra-Afghan violence is on the rise, and neither party seems ready to make major concessions. A recent congressionally mandated Afghanistan Study Group has suggested that the Biden administration consider revoking the May 2021 withdrawal deadline stipulated by its February 2020 agreement with the Taliban, and instead, condition US withdrawal from Afghanistan on a further reduction in violence.
The possibility that the US may seek to unilaterally alter the withdrawal timeline carries risks, with the Taliban warning of dangerous escalation if the terms of the deal are breached. While Pakistan has long viewed the prospect of a clumsy US exit sans credible security guarantees unfavourably, the prospect of any unilateral alteration of the terms of the US-Taliban agreement is worrying for another set of reasons.

Any unilateral change to the Taliban-US deal carries risks.

The first has to do with the signal such an alteration will send to the Taliban — primarily of America’s unreliability as an honest broker. If last February’s deal is revised, Pakistan may not be able to get the Taliban to agree to get back to the table, unless it does so on vastly diminished US terms. This is because the May withdrawal was an explicit component of the agreement, and a politically invigorated Taliban will likely view an eleventh-hour change uncharitably. Taliban hardliners could use this to make a case for another summer fighting season. Heightened violence will snuff out hopes for progress in Doha and undercut Pakistan’s own political and security interests which, Pakistani officials have made clear, are co-dependent on a stable, secure Afghan state.
Two, Pakistan has been looking to reset the tone of its own ties with the US by moving the conversation away from the war in Afghanistan to other avenues of potential cooperation, especially geoeconomics. It has also been wanting to get Washington to look beyond zero-sum configurations of the region, especially with respect to China (in particular, disabusing the US of the notion that it has to compete with China for Pakistani cooperation). But by jettisoning the terms of the February agreement, the US will only ensure its conversation with Pakistan remains predictably short term, framed by the broader structural context and compulsions of tactical outcomes next door.
Three, by toying with the May deadline, the US risks upsetting a delicate equilibrium that has taken years of public and private diplomacy by all stakeholders — Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US, Iran and China — to configure.
Whether or not the US decides to cut its losses remains an open question. But despite, or perhaps because of, the damage to America’s regional reputation as a deliverer of peace and stability, it won’t be long before Biden casts around for a scapegoat when the Taliban block future overtures. When that happens, the first casualty will likely be Pakistan’s bilateral equation with Washington, followed by heightened tensions with the Ghani administration in Kabul.
Diplomats in Kabul and Islamabad have worked hard in recent months to crisis-proof the relationship; from agreeing to set up border markets to expediting development projects. But creeping tensions have the capacity to flare up and turn into serious security concerns for Pakistan, including Kabul’s tendency to reach out to India to referee a testy regional dynamic.
As Biden looks to formulate policy around America’s last remaining forever war, levelled for now at seeking some kind of face-saving, he will likely opt for a strategy that makes the May withdrawal contingent on other factors. If this happens, the consequences will be high for Pakistan, whose support was crucial to facilitating the initial deal as well as ongoing intra-Afghan discussions in Doha. It would be good, then, for Islamabad and Washington to speak soon and holistically about the region and its constituent constraints.
It would also be helpful if the US could persuade the Ghani administration to show greater flexibility around political power-sharing, once guarantees for women and minorities are safely and constitutionally enshrined. Ultimately, the US should steer clear of choosing a policy that disproportionately raises the costs of its own objectives vis-à-vis both Afghanistan, and the neighbourhood.

Afghan dilemma

The first has to do with the signal it will send to the Taliban — primarily of America’s unreliability as an honest broker.

www.dawn.com

 

[nahtanbob]

we had so much to gain from Trump. he was pulling US troops out of Afghanistan. the moment Biden took control he said he wont remove the troops.

you were wrong. Biden stuck to Trump's plan. I am as surprised as anyone

I respectfully disagree. Specifically in Central Asian Region, A-Stan, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Russia, China, the US has being cornered.

Its Ally India has been surrounded from the North, West and from East due to recent changes in Burma. There is very good chance of India being attacked from 2 to 3 fronts.

In South China Sea, US is facing China from the West and South. The Russians have surrounded them from the North.

The ONLY WAY FOR US to be successful in the region which consists of 40% of humanity is to have one of these major countries turn sides and join US. And that is why there is HIGH CHANCE OF US giving the Pindi Boys WHAT THEY WANT.

What makes you think Russia, Iran and Turkey aren't forsale to the highest bidder ?

You can attack India from all fronts. If USAF and US Navy intervene you can kiss good bye.

USA owns the Pacific Ocean. China is fighting for control of South China Sea