A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

[muse]

Sir, I was thinking of 5 up to 10 percent

Pew's 2010 numbers favorable view of AQ is 18 - and favorable view of Talib is 15, so I think I've been conservative

 

[muse]

Readers are invited to review our comments on the thread below and compare it with the NYT editorial below

http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/105046-does-pakistan-really-want-stable-afghanistan-time.html



April 22, 2011
Bring in the Taliban
By ANATOL LIEVEN and MALEEHA LODHI

Washington’s military strategy in Afghanistan now aims to avoid the appearance of defeat for America, but for Afghanistan it is a recipe for unending civil war.

In essence, it is a version of the strategy pursued by the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s: to build up the Afghan army to the point where it can contain the insurgents without the help of outside ground forces, while seeking to win over individual insurgent commanders and their supporters.

This strategy may create forces that can defend key cities against the Taliban. But it is unlikely that Afghan security forces will be able to do this on their own. And it offers little real prospect of either eliminating or winning over enough of the Taliban to control the Pashtun countryside and end the insurgency. Nor can such a large security force be sustained by an impoverished country through its own resources.

Faced with awesome U.S. military power, most Taliban fighters neither fight to the death nor surrender. They just go home to their villages, and wait to see what happens next. This is exactly what happened after the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001.

To contain continuing Taliban influence across a large swathe of the country would require effective, honest, representative and locally rooted Afghan civilian authorities. Is this possible, given the experience of the past 10 years?

The overwhelming probability therefore is that existing U.S. strategy will lead to a situation in which, once American troops withdraw from an active ground role, the Taliban will re-establish their control of the countryside and besiege the southern and eastern cities, which will be defended by a mixture of the Afghan National Army on the ground and U.S. firepower in the air. Because they will need their help in this war, the Taliban will be compelled to preserve their links to Al Qaeda, and continue to draw revenue from the heroin trade.

There will be an enduring risk that the weakness of the Afghan government and the deep ethnic divisions in the Afghan Army will intensify internal strife and face Washington with the choice of either reoccupying the country with ground troops or pulling out and leaving Afghanistan to its fate.

Faced with this reality, there is a growing consensus in the international community and among many U.S. experts on the idea of peace talks with the Taliban — not just to break away individual commanders, but to draw the movement as a whole into a peace settlement. And as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in a key speech at the Asia Society in February, Pakistan will have to play an essential role in any settlement. In this way, Pakistan can be turned from Washington’s “problem” into an asset.

Declaring U.S. readiness to “reconcile with an adversary,” Ms. Clinton spelled out three “red lines for reconciliation” with the Taliban: “They must renounce violence ... abandon their alliance with Al Qaeda, and abide by the Constitution.”

Then came a crucially significant shift in the U.S. position. The three redlines were no longer described as pre-conditions but as objectives — as “necessary outcomes of any negotiation.”

There is also a growing recognition in the American establishment that the Afghan Constitution is not set in stone and can be renegotiated by Afghans themselves — including the Taliban.

Ms. Clinton’s speech narrows the difference in approach between the United States and Pakistan, which has long insisted that the war can only be brought to an end by political, not military means, and that talks must begin without preconditions. It also closed the gap with America’s NATO allies in Europe, virtually all of whom have privately been calling for talks with the Taliban to secure a political solution.

In talks with the United States, Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has suggested interim peace-building measures, intended both to lay the basis for later talks on a final settlement and to allow the U.S. to explore which leaders and elements in the Taliban are in fact ready for compromise. He has said that Pakistan stands ready to help in such a process.

His call for a sequenced approach to a peace settlement involves in the first instance a mutual deescalation of violence to open the way for negotiations and offer an incentive to the Taliban to disavow Al Qaeda. Peace-building measures can include local cease-fires to instill trust for serious talks, which must be led by the Afghans themselves.

Other steps can also be taken to prepare the ground for political negotiations. An important step would be the creation of a Taliban office possibly in a Gulf country to encourage their transformation into a political actor from a fighting force. Such measures need be initiated without delay, for without them the prospect of an unending conflict looms, an outcome that is in nobody’s interest.

However, Gen. David Petraeus and the Pentagon have yet to accept the notion of talks with Taliban leaders. So far they have only embraced a policy of “reintegration,” which aims at splitting and weakening the Taliban, and not “reconciliation” which means negotiating with them.

A European diplomat depicted this stance rather graphically: “the U.S. military only wants to talk with their boots on the Taliban’s neck.” This approach no longer enjoys the confidence either of the international community or of a majority of Americans. Above all the Afghans want an end to the fighting and a chance at peace.

Anatol Lieven is a professor in the War Studies Department of King’s College London and author of “Pakistan: A Hard Country.” Maleeha Lodhi is the former Pakistani ambassador to Washington and London and editor of “Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State.”

 

[red_baron]

our problems started when we bought the notion that america's enemies are enemies of Pakistan....what sort of gay statement is this that either you are with us or you are with our enemies???will america call enemies of Pakistan its own enemies?will it brand india a country that attacked Pakistan 3 times its enemy?will it sacrifice 33,000 of its citizens in an event of Pakistan india war?60,70 billion worth of loss to economy ?no it wont....did turkey got blackmailedafter 9/11?has america ever voilated irani airspace or north korean airspace?no what was the point of waging wars when no weapons of mass destruction were recovered from iraq and not even a single 9/11 suspect was an afghani....how can someone possibly fly the most sophisticated airplanes with laser percision into building by just learning to fly cessna in simulators???calculating the rate of descend....identifying the buildings from the cockpit and no second approach...thats just impossible and was air defence sleeping?where were the hornets and the raptors and those planes that travel 5 times faster than sound?
america has planes on its radars when they are on ground on airports in europe so thats was just a part of bigger game to destablise Pakistan

 

[dawud123]

Is this a global war against alqaeda or Pakistan...still confusing

 

[RabzonKhan]

Readers are invited to review our comments on the thread below and compare it with the NYT editorial below

http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/105046-does-pakistan-really-want-stable-afghanistan-time.html



April 22, 2011
Bring in the Taliban
By ANATOL LIEVEN and MALEEHA LODHI

Washington’s military strategy in Afghanistan now aims to avoid the appearance of defeat for America, but for Afghanistan it is a recipe for unending civil war.

In essence, it is a version of the strategy pursued by the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s: to build up the Afghan army to the point where it can contain the insurgents without the help of outside ground forces, while seeking to win over individual insurgent commanders and their supporters.

This strategy may create forces that can defend key cities against the Taliban. But it is unlikely that Afghan security forces will be able to do this on their own. And it offers little real prospect of either eliminating or winning over enough of the Taliban to control the Pashtun countryside and end the insurgency. Nor can such a large security force be sustained by an impoverished country through its own resources.

Faced with awesome U.S. military power, most Taliban fighters neither fight to the death nor surrender. They just go home to their villages, and wait to see what happens next. This is exactly what happened after the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001.

To contain continuing Taliban influence across a large swathe of the country would require effective, honest, representative and locally rooted Afghan civilian authorities. Is this possible, given the experience of the past 10 years?

The overwhelming probability therefore is that existing U.S. strategy will lead to a situation in which, once American troops withdraw from an active ground role, the Taliban will re-establish their control of the countryside and besiege the southern and eastern cities, which will be defended by a mixture of the Afghan National Army on the ground and U.S. firepower in the air. Because they will need their help in this war, the Taliban will be compelled to preserve their links to Al Qaeda, and continue to draw revenue from the heroin trade.

There will be an enduring risk that the weakness of the Afghan government and the deep ethnic divisions in the Afghan Army will intensify internal strife and face Washington with the choice of either reoccupying the country with ground troops or pulling out and leaving Afghanistan to its fate.

Faced with this reality, there is a growing consensus in the international community and among many U.S. experts on the idea of peace talks with the Taliban — not just to break away individual commanders, but to draw the movement as a whole into a peace settlement. And as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in a key speech at the Asia Society in February, Pakistan will have to play an essential role in any settlement. In this way, Pakistan can be turned from Washington’s “problem” into an asset.

Declaring U.S. readiness to “reconcile with an adversary,” Ms. Clinton spelled out three “red lines for reconciliation” with the Taliban: “They must renounce violence ... abandon their alliance with Al Qaeda, and abide by the Constitution.”

Then came a crucially significant shift in the U.S. position. The three redlines were no longer described as pre-conditions but as objectives — as “necessary outcomes of any negotiation.”

There is also a growing recognition in the American establishment that the Afghan Constitution is not set in stone and can be renegotiated by Afghans themselves — including the Taliban.

Ms. Clinton’s speech narrows the difference in approach between the United States and Pakistan, which has long insisted that the war can only be brought to an end by political, not military means, and that talks must begin without preconditions. It also closed the gap with America’s NATO allies in Europe, virtually all of whom have privately been calling for talks with the Taliban to secure a political solution.

In talks with the United States, Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has suggested interim peace-building measures, intended both to lay the basis for later talks on a final settlement and to allow the U.S. to explore which leaders and elements in the Taliban are in fact ready for compromise. He has said that Pakistan stands ready to help in such a process.

His call for a sequenced approach to a peace settlement involves in the first instance a mutual deescalation of violence to open the way for negotiations and offer an incentive to the Taliban to disavow Al Qaeda. Peace-building measures can include local cease-fires to instill trust for serious talks, which must be led by the Afghans themselves.

Other steps can also be taken to prepare the ground for political negotiations. An important step would be the creation of a Taliban office possibly in a Gulf country to encourage their transformation into a political actor from a fighting force. Such measures need be initiated without delay, for without them the prospect of an unending conflict looms, an outcome that is in nobody’s interest.

However, Gen. David Petraeus and the Pentagon have yet to accept the notion of talks with Taliban leaders. So far they have only embraced a policy of “reintegration,” which aims at splitting and weakening the Taliban, and not “reconciliation” which means negotiating with them.

A European diplomat depicted this stance rather graphically: “the U.S. military only wants to talk with their boots on the Taliban’s neck.” This approach no longer enjoys the confidence either of the international community or of a majority of Americans. Above all the Afghans want an end to the fighting and a chance at peace.

Anatol Lieven is a professor in the War Studies Department of King’s College London and author of “Pakistan: A Hard Country.” Maleeha Lodhi is the former Pakistani ambassador to Washington and London and editor of “Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State.”

My vote goes to Gen Petraeus, Hillary Clinton and Gen Kayani sound like Chamberlain! Taliban’s are evil people, we must destroy them, if they want peace (which is highly unlikely) they are most welcome but it has to be on our terms.

 

[muse]

Hmmm - I don't know if you are reading Petraeus (AKA betray us) right -- it's too late for him to deliver a victory, he's not going to get CIA directorship and the Republicans and their tea party mess, well, less said the better -- and of course Petraeus isn't in this alone, Do Afghans also think in the same way about the Talib? Well some do whereas others help 400 escape from under the noses of the US.


But look, the editorial is asking the US to be responsible, it's going to evacuate, it must not set the stage for the civil war and bifurcation of Afghanistan - it will regret it - lets set the stage for the Afghans to slowly be rid of their Talib -- but lets make laws to the effect that any Pakistani individual or institution risk death if convicted in any sort of religiously inspired ideology.

To my mind, the Afghan Talib are not anywhere as dangerous as the Pakistani varieties of the Saudi disease.

 

[RabzonKhan]

al qaeda is all us/cia backed and they fund it just to show the world that americans are doing everything right. . but originally it is all inside job and they are trying to destabilise pakistan .. . pakistan seemed a global threat for everyone specially when it was rated as the best economy growth in 2001-2002 (u can google it ) . .since then some or the other things have happend to destablise our country . . but we are still standing strong and insHALLAH will always. . .. yes indian part is also invovled. . they have their own indian consulates in afghanistan . .for what reason? god knows the best. . . . .

Our GDP growth rate (2001-2002) was around 3.6 %, so what’s the big deal, where are you getting your information from?

http://www.pap.org.pk/statistics/Economy.htm

Talk about conspiracy theories and unsubstantive claims.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Hmmm - I don't know if you are reading Petraeus (AKA betray us) right -- it's too late for him to deliver a victory, he's not going to get CIA directorship and the Republicans and their tea party mess, well, less said the better -- and of course Petraeus isn't in this alone, Do Afghans also think in the same way about the Talib? Well some do whereas others help 400 escape from under the noses of the US.


But look, the editorial is asking the US to be responsible, it's going to evacuate, it must not set the stage for the civil war and bifurcation of Afghanistan - it will regret it - lets set the stage for the Afghans to slowly be rid of their Talib -- but lets make laws to the effect that any Pakistani individual or institution risk death if convicted in any sort of religiously inspired ideology.

To my mind, the Afghan Talib are not anywhere as dangerous as the Pakistani varieties of the Saudi disease.

Muse, that’s really news to me, so what makes you think Afghan-Talibans are less evil than ours, please elaborate?

 

[muse]

I don't see them as ideologically "pure" -- The Afghan variety, in it's Qandahar home is more about tribal and clan rivalries = the Afghan need outside or external needling to get to the more extreme behavior -- The Pakistanis don't need any of this, they are more radical than their arbi masters and takfir is pretty much mothers milk to them whereas for the Afghan "Musa bar deen e khud, Issa bar deen e khud" - Yes the Hazara were victimized, but if I suggest, the "foreign" inspiration for this should not be over looked, recall the context, the line about the tajik not being Afghan and the Iranian involvement

 

[All-Green]

Segregating between Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda is critical.
Motivation of Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda were not the same.

Taliban were brutal but the combatants they bested were brutal as well.
Even the Northern Alliance played its part in the bloody civil wars.
It was the brutality and unpopularity of the warring factions which gave legitimacy to Omar and his Taliban's agenda of unification.
This was a political agenda and enabled Taliban to get an upper hand through local support, otherwise all the warring factions were similarly equipped and well trained in war.
Now the only place they could not subjugate was where there was next to no local support for them, Panjsher and beyond.

Whether we draw ethnic/sectarian lines here or not, there were many factors which contributed to Afghan Taliban's popularity/unpopularity.
Despite all their vices/virtues, since they had a national agenda of unification and governing unlike terrorists agenda, they can be talked to.
They were the government or at least one of the governing factions prior to US invasion, no reason they cannot be talked to.

If they are willing to be a stakeholder in the development of Afghanistan, bring them to the table.

 

[muse]

AG

Many claim that the Talib went ethnic early on - but this is not entirely true - the very nature of the context within which the talib appeared had a strong ethnic component to it - It wan't as if the Shura e nazar was less ethnic or the hazara less ethnic or less sectarian -- Don't get me wrong, I'm not suggesting the Afghan Talib are good guys, quite the oppositie, but lets be clear headed about ALL the other players as well.

Again, keeping in mind Rabzon's concern and the issue of "ethnic" that you highlight - One of the most important developments coming out of years of the anti-Soviet Jihad and the years of civil war is a development that not many speak of, unfortunately, and that development is the awakening of various minorities, ethnic and religious, of the effort and sacrifices they made towards a new more egalitarian Afghanistan in which they could be more than just the despised minority --- the Afghan Talib must make progress on this but what really is a concern now that Pakistan is once again getting close to Saudi Arabia, is that this will become difficult, the Saudi regime and it's elite really do see the world through sectarian lens, and that too.. well, you know. And this goes to the issue of disentangling the reputation of the Afghan Talib from association with Al-Qaida --- If I understand correctly, Pakistan seem to have offered assurances to the US that they will exert every influence to ensure that once the Talib are accepted as in "reconciliation" part, that such pressure will be exerted.

 

[Ahmad]

AG

Many claim that the Talib went ethnic early on - but this is not entirely true - the very nature of the context within which the talib appeared had a strong ethnic component to it - It wan't as if the Shura e nazar was less ethnic or the hazara less ethnic or less sectarian -- Don't get me wrong, I'm not suggesting the Afghan Talib are good guys, quite the oppositie, but lets be clear headed about ALL the other players as well.

Dear Muse,
You are right, the talibs were not the only ethno nationalist group, but lets be clear that before the emergence of the taliban, the hekmatyar and other groups were also ethnic based parties which they dont get that much of an attention here desspite all the atrocities and wrong doing he and his party committed, and yes, in this bloody conflict, nobody's hand is clean, taliban are not the only rogue people, but at least the others have at least abandoned their past behaviour.

Again, keeping in mind Rabzon's concern and the issue of "ethnic" that you highlight - One of the most important developments coming out of years of the anti-Soviet Jihad and the years of civil war is a development that not many speak of, unfortunately, and that development is the awakening of various minorities, ethnic and religious, of the effort and sacrifices they made towards a new more egalitarian Afghanistan in which they could be more than just the despised minority

well, it might be unfortunate for pakistani friends, as pakistani state, policy makers, media and evern ordinary people want the dominance of pashtons, that is good for pakistan(their perception anyway), but bad for us and our unity, how long more the other ethnics would have born the burden of injustice? it was only a matter of time and the soviet era only acted as a catalyst. i want to add another thing on that, some people wrongly accuse paksitan of CREATING ethnic divisions among us, but no, paksitan didnt create it, paksitan negatively took advantage of it, instead they have all the opportunities to bridge the gap, but they decidided to widen the gap instead.

--- the Afghan Talib must make progress on this but what really is a concern now that Pakistan is once again getting close to Saudi Arabia, is that this will become difficult, the Saudi regime and it's elite really do see the world through sectarian lens, and that too.. well, you know. And this goes to the issue of disentangling the reputation of the Afghan Talib from association with Al-Qaida ---

i personally dont know how the talibs make a progress in this field....... as per saudis, they are nothing but harm to all of us, including pakistan.

If I understand correctly, Pakistan seem to have offered assurances to the US that they will exert every influence to ensure that once the Talib are accepted as in "reconciliation" part, that such pressure will be exerted.

how? i personally dont know.... if the Talibs who were much more close, obedient and had brotherly relations with pakistan, didnt listen to pakistan(2001), i dont know how pakistgan can guarantee taht the talibs dont do the repeat of their past, right now, they are the closest ally of aqaeda, i cant say precisely about the number, but as far as i have seen documentries and reports about taliban/al qaeda, a significant number of aqaeada operators and suicide bombers have been among them, that is visible in areas such as kunar/nuristan and NW/khost. I personally believe, that if the taliban ever win this war, they will be different from yesterday's taliban, the fever of victory will put them in odds with paksitan, on the other hand they wont forget the fact that paksitan sided with america for a decade to pound them and imprison their leaders, but all these remain to be seen.

 

[JayAtl]

Get Imran Khan as your next president- he talks about his 'magical' political solution - note: tried by mushraff before and we all saw how successful it was yeah? but anyways - give him a chance at it- he never puts forth any specifics of his so called political solution, carefully throwing buzz words to get the Pakistani people to believe in him. Hopefully once he has the " power" - he would let the world know .

at this point as an American tax payer I think we should get the hell out of there, take any remaining aid and leave period. if an attack on US soil or interests is pr oven to come from Pakistan then deal with it American way at such point.

 

[muse]

well, it might be unfortunate for pakistani friends, as pakistani state, policy makers, media and evern ordinary people want the dominance of pashtons, that is good for pakistan(their perception anyway), but bad for us and our unity,

Well, that's absolutely true, obviously - but also I think education can go a long way towards helping people see this "truth" -- It would help all Afghans if they carefully project these realities without being hostile towards Pakistan -- The way to lose in Afghanistan, is to be hostile to Pakistan, it may be harsh but it's also true.

i personally dont know.... if the Talibs who were much more close, obedient and had brotherly relations with pakistan, didnt listen to pakistan(2001), i dont know how pakistgan can guarantee taht the talibs dont do the repeat of their past, right now, they are the closest ally of aqaeda, i cant say precisely about the number, but as far as i have seen documentries and reports about taliban/al qaeda, a significant number of aqaeada operators and suicide bombers have been among them, that is visible in areas such as kunar/nuristan and NW/khost.

Ok, a couple of issues, Pakistan cannot guarantee that the Talib will do X or Y or Z, all they can say is that they will exercise whatever influence they may have - But of course your post highlights exactly the problem of judging future performance by looking at past performance.

Talib and AQ in Kunar/Nuristan ---- That's a whole lot more complicated - according to Us officials quoted in NYT, AQ do not number 300 in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region - the kinds of governors, even district governors there had been a problem and there is no denying that "Arabs" were before and after the US invasion, a force in Kunar. And lets not discount NDS and it's ability to create much mischief.

I personally believe, that if the taliban ever win this war, they will be different from yesterday's taliban, the fever of victory will put them in odds with paksitan

And I don't think Pakistan will allow the Talib to "win" anytime soon, unless of course Karzai makes a unexpected turn

 

[Ahmad]

Well, that's absolutely true, obviously - but also I think education can go a long way towards helping people see this "truth" -- It would help all Afghans if they carefully project these realities without being hostile towards Pakistan -- The way to lose in Afghanistan, is to be hostile to Pakistan, it may be harsh but it's also true.

Thanks Muse,
May i ask ,what do you think about negatives and positves of this policy for pakistan? short and long term.