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India in Asia
A bit-more player
Closer relations with America will make India more active in Asia
Jan 31st 2015 | DELHI |
FOR many a year, India’s strategy in Asia has been to avoid entanglements while building strength at home. Certainly, it reserves a divine right to meddle in its South Asian backyard. But many Indians still enjoy the warm glow of their country’s having once been a leader of the non-aligned movement. And further east in Asia, though ties with Japan have improved, India has been a bit-player. It fields few diplomats. It has no role in most regional bodies and little say in trade talks. Even if India did, one day, expand its role, most assumed it would do so quietly, to avoid upsetting China.
So how to explain a 430-word “joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region”, issued by America and India on January 25th? Admittedly, it mainly restates language used in September when India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, visited Washington. But it does so prominently. It calls for “a closer partnership” to promote stability from Africa to East Asia, celebrates human rights and highlights India’s desire to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum. Most striking, it calls for “safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navig-ation…especially in the South China Sea”. That is an unambiguous message to China, which has been assertive in staking maritime claims in the sea. It is bold stuff.
During Barack Obama’s three-day visit to Delhi, Mr Modi all but aligned India openly with America. Shyam Saran, a former top diplomat, calls the joint statement evidence of “a much stronger understanding” between the two countries, promoted with “more coherence and vigour” than before. Nick Bisley, an expert on the region at La Trobe University in Melbourne, discerns more co-ordination among Asia’s liberal democracies: increasingly, official missives from America, Japan, Australia and now India share wording that emphasises such things as democracy and the rule of law.
China swiftly hit back. Its foreign ministry said only “parties directly concerned” should comment on disputes in the South China Sea, and only with words “conducive to peace and stability”. China’s Global Times, which likes to pontificate, said India risks becoming America’s “yes-man”. Chinese academics divined a crude American effort to divide India and China. Pakistan, China’s closest ally in the region, added criticism over Indo-American nuclear co-operation.
Mr Modi will shrug it all off. India has long worried about the growing access of China’s navy to harbours in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the Maldives, seeing a strategic challenge in the Indian Ocean. Though not as shrill about the risks as some hyperventilating Indian strategists, Mr Modi speaks up about it. Visiting Japan in September he warned against countries with “expansionist mindsets”. He expressed annoyance last year when a Chinese submarine twice docked in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s port capital, and when Chinese troops camped in Himalayan territory claimed—and supposedly controlled—by India.
Mr Saran insists that being more outspoken does not imply a more hostile approach to China. In dealings with foreign leaders, China’s included, Mr Modi is both frank and charming. He plans to visit Beijing this year. Relations with China might even improve: historians note that China softens its stance towards India just when American interest in the country is greatest. That would suit Mr Modi. Assuming that his next step is to commit more money, diplomats and trade negotiators to support his strong talk of doing more, then India’s role across Asia will surely grow.
India in Asia: A bit-more player | The Economist
A bit-more player
Closer relations with America will make India more active in Asia
Jan 31st 2015 | DELHI |
FOR many a year, India’s strategy in Asia has been to avoid entanglements while building strength at home. Certainly, it reserves a divine right to meddle in its South Asian backyard. But many Indians still enjoy the warm glow of their country’s having once been a leader of the non-aligned movement. And further east in Asia, though ties with Japan have improved, India has been a bit-player. It fields few diplomats. It has no role in most regional bodies and little say in trade talks. Even if India did, one day, expand its role, most assumed it would do so quietly, to avoid upsetting China.
So how to explain a 430-word “joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region”, issued by America and India on January 25th? Admittedly, it mainly restates language used in September when India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, visited Washington. But it does so prominently. It calls for “a closer partnership” to promote stability from Africa to East Asia, celebrates human rights and highlights India’s desire to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum. Most striking, it calls for “safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navig-ation…especially in the South China Sea”. That is an unambiguous message to China, which has been assertive in staking maritime claims in the sea. It is bold stuff.
During Barack Obama’s three-day visit to Delhi, Mr Modi all but aligned India openly with America. Shyam Saran, a former top diplomat, calls the joint statement evidence of “a much stronger understanding” between the two countries, promoted with “more coherence and vigour” than before. Nick Bisley, an expert on the region at La Trobe University in Melbourne, discerns more co-ordination among Asia’s liberal democracies: increasingly, official missives from America, Japan, Australia and now India share wording that emphasises such things as democracy and the rule of law.
China swiftly hit back. Its foreign ministry said only “parties directly concerned” should comment on disputes in the South China Sea, and only with words “conducive to peace and stability”. China’s Global Times, which likes to pontificate, said India risks becoming America’s “yes-man”. Chinese academics divined a crude American effort to divide India and China. Pakistan, China’s closest ally in the region, added criticism over Indo-American nuclear co-operation.
Mr Modi will shrug it all off. India has long worried about the growing access of China’s navy to harbours in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the Maldives, seeing a strategic challenge in the Indian Ocean. Though not as shrill about the risks as some hyperventilating Indian strategists, Mr Modi speaks up about it. Visiting Japan in September he warned against countries with “expansionist mindsets”. He expressed annoyance last year when a Chinese submarine twice docked in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s port capital, and when Chinese troops camped in Himalayan territory claimed—and supposedly controlled—by India.
Mr Saran insists that being more outspoken does not imply a more hostile approach to China. In dealings with foreign leaders, China’s included, Mr Modi is both frank and charming. He plans to visit Beijing this year. Relations with China might even improve: historians note that China softens its stance towards India just when American interest in the country is greatest. That would suit Mr Modi. Assuming that his next step is to commit more money, diplomats and trade negotiators to support his strong talk of doing more, then India’s role across Asia will surely grow.
India in Asia: A bit-more player | The Economist
Atleast Indians and Pakistanis shares many facial features of European . But it's other way around they look like us ...
