Attila the Hun
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2016
- Messages
- 3,912
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
I really do not know much about this conflict. Why would the Bengalis not want to save their own kin? I hear the argument that these Rohingyas are being pushed to Bangladesh so the Burmaese can call them illegals if they ever try get back, but even that is good enough reason to not save their own kin, by refusing them entry into Bangladesh.What do you know about 71 war?
Have you seen the map?
View attachment 354611
There was no bangladeshi soldiers fighting for Pak Army rather there was a mutiny and bengali troops were turning on their own West Pak officers and soldiers... Pak troops/officers and their families were butchered by them!
The sole Ordinance Factory in Ghazipur,East Pak was occupied by mutineering workers and the west Pak officers,workers and their families butchered..
It was a civil war that lasted almost an year... with indians being directly involved in the conflict since march 1970...
And the Pak : indian manpower ratio was 1:15
And only 1 sqd of Sabres in East wing that too thanks to US sanctions was struggling .. and yet they performed excellently against the indian airforce... apart from that indians still couldnt take the region with force... several sectors remained defiant and undefeated... only when the surrender was announced did they lay down the arms...
One such example was the Battle of Hilli:
Hilli-Bogra Sector: 205 Brigade: East Pakistan 1971 War
This is a Pakpotpourri Exclusive
By: Naveed Tajammal
View attachment 354612
This short article is dedicated to the everlasting memory of the men of 205 Brigade[ Hilli-Bogra Sector] Pakistan Army, who fought & fell fighting the Indians in East Pakistan, in the 1971 war.
Of late much has been written on the subject of the fall of Dacca,a grave misconception exists that Pakistan Army buckled under the Indian Invasion without putting up a fight,Hence it is to clear this, that this article has been written.
My father after remaining in Command of 54 Brigade in Sialkot for two years was in October 1971 posted to GHQ as the Director Staff Duties, a much coveted post in those days,In early November 1971 the War was imminent,new units were being raised and hectic preparations had started for an all out War with India,my father was never a chair-borne soldier and hated the uniformed babu’s,so he requested the CGS [Chief of General Staff] that he be given a command of a Brigade,in view of the looming war,CGS showed his helplessness,and said, that it was beyond his powers to do so,however the Chief of Staff could, should he so wished too,my father put in a request to seek a personal interview,which was arranged.General Hamid told my father that there was No vacancy on the Western Front however should he volunteer to go to East Pakistan,it was possible,as most of the officers being posted to East Pakistan were reporting sick or using their contacts to get their postings cancelled,and there was a queue of officers in East Pakistan awaiting to be sent back to West Pakistan,my father without any hesitation said he would like to volunteer to go to East Pakistan,shortly after the interview my father received a call from the staff officer to the Military Secretary [MS] that he was being posted to East Pakistan on his request,and his formal posting orders were being typed.
On 17th November 1971,my father reached Dacca,on 18th Nov,General Nazar hussain his new GOC [General Officer Commanding] 16 Division who was visiting the Corps HQ at Dacca took him to Bogra in his helicopter,soon after the same day General Niazi too arrived in Bogra as he was visiting all the new units which had been flown in from West Pakistan,and given their new locations,and met my father,who was to take over the 205 brigade,on 19th November my father started his first official visit of the units under his new command,but by mid-day orders from Corps HQ had been received that a helicopter was on its way to collect my father back to Dacca,he reached late in evening and met the COS eastern command Brig.Baqar Siddique and inquired the reason of his recall,who informed him that Commander Eastern Command,Would like to see him urgently,as he had some other task in mind which he wanted to entrust my father with.So my father went over to the Flag Staff House and met General Niazi,and asked him,why he had been called back,General Niazi told my father that they had intelligence reports that India was launching its offensive Tomorrow i.e 20th November,and so i have called you back to remain in reserve for some other operational task,my father told him,’Sir after having an interview with the Chief of Staff I have come as a volunteer to Command a fighting brigade and if Not required I be sent back forthwith to West Pakistan or be allowed to take command of the Brigade allotted to myself.General Niazi in his usual style remarked ‘Shera,I know you well, I wanted you for some other important Task,but If india does not attack tonight you can go back to Bogra and take over your command tomorrow morning,next day my father met General Niazi and reminded him of his words,so immediately a helicopter was put at my fathers disposal to take him to Bogra,it was around Mid-Day 20th November 1971 that my father took command of his 205 Brigade officially.The purpose of these dates and conversations given above was inform the reader that,what a short time my father had to prepare his units and plan his defences,on the same day he visited 4 FF forward defences ,at Hilli ,and subsequently other units of his command i.e 8 Balluch and 13 FF.
On the night 23/24 November 1971,20 Mountain Indian Division launched its first attack on my fathers Brigade positions.
It would be pertinent to note that under the command of Major-General.Lachhman Singh,who was the opposing Commander,fighting my fathers 205 Brigade,had Four indian Infantry Brigades 202,165,66 &340,one armoured brigade [3rd armour brigade] one engineer Brigade[471] and the 20 Mountain Division artillery augmented by 33 Corps reserves beside the 6 BSF[Indian border security forces] and Mukhti-Bahini battalions.
The ratio of manpower needs no further elaboration,General.Lachhman Singh writes in his book ‘Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan’-page 34,”On the other hand most of the senior officers took no risk and surrendered as soon as a threat developed to their Head Quarters or to their lives.Brigadier Tajammul was the sole exception,He showed fanatical will to fight,even at the cost of his life…..on page 143 of his book,General Lachhman states,..”by about 0830 hrs 16 December 1971,Commanding Officer 80 Field Regiment ,Brigade-Major 205 Brigade,GSO-3,and 50 jawans of the Brigade Head Quarter surrendered to our troops.TheBrigade Major gave information that their Brigade Commander with his Orderly and a couple of Officers had decided to break out of encircled Bogra fortress,and join one of their Brigade units at Naogoan’.However He was caught by mukhti-Bahini a few kilo-meters outside Bogra….He was in uniform with his badges of ranks and mukhti-bahini realized that he was a important man-He was badly beaten with his wrists broken along with fingers and his head was bandaged,when on 17 December 1971 he was brought before me.”
General Sukhwant Singh commenting on the performance of 205 Brigade wrote in his book,”The Liberation of Bangladesh” new dehli 1979.”It was the only battle Indian Army fought to reduce the Pakistani fortress in the entire Bangladesh operation,This operation demonstrated to the indians the futility of attacking Pakistani Fortresses…”
General Niazi commenting on the performance of 205 Brigade,has this to say in his book,’The Betrayal Of East Pakistan’ oxford press.1998-page 140;”…One Pakistani Brigade crippled 20 Mountain Division which was backed by tremendous Artillery and Air fire power,20 Division consisted of 5 brigades and one tank brigade,six BSF and the mukhti-bahini forces,they were supported by divisional and corps artillery,and they had complete Air Supremacy,with No Pakistani aircraft to counter them,our positions were attacked by indian aircraft several times a day,Indian General Sukhwant singh admits that five of Lieut-General Thapan’s brigades were laying Siege to the Hilli Fortress”.
And lastly General Niazi adds in his book,page-145,with reference to the war performance of my father,that,”Brigadier.Tajammal Hussain Malik,had volunteered to fight in East Pakistan,I wanted to keep him for the Defence of Dacca,but he insisted on going to a front-line brigade.He was sent to 205 brigade under General Nazar.I had full faith in him as a good commander and a brave leader.He had proved his mettle in the 1965 War.He displayed the qualities of a true soldier of Islam and gave the toughest battle to the Indians.I Recommended him for the award of ,”Nishan e Haider”,but GHQ ignored him and his Heroic deeds as many chair-bound soldiers and sycophants had to be catered for.I insisted on his promotion to Major-General as some people were afraid of him,because of his unflinching faith in Islam.He was promoted and became the only Brigadier from East Pakistan to attain this rank’.
Maj Gen (Retd) Tajammal Hussain Malik
Brigade Commander of 205 Pakistani Brigade deployed at Hilli and Bogra
INTERVIEW BY Major Agha H Amin (Retd)-SEPTEMBER 2001 Regarding the 1971 War and specially Battle of Hilli
In the first week of Jan 1948, we landed at Chittagong by the sea route. I stayed in East Pakistan up till June 1950. It was a wonderful experience. The East Pakistanis treated us with love and affection. I had developed great liking for those people. I wish those feeling had continued but it was our own fault. We treated them as Negroes were treated in the United States of America. We considered East Pakistan as our colony. We had to pay dearly for our follies twenty-five years later.
From 1947 up till 1958, Pakistan Army was a small Army but highly competent and dedicated to the profession. We had very simple living but took pride in the profession and being men in uniform. Therefore, all its efforts were concentrated on professional training and loyalty to the Constitutional Government. However, after the proclamation of Martial Law in 1958, its priorities changed. Martial law changes the very outlook of a soldier towards his profession or his duty to the state. Loyalty to Ayub Khan and the ruling junta was given the top priority whereas training in the Army and its obligation to the State were relegated to the second position. Our senior officers started indulging in accumulation of wealth and building palatial houses. The higher leadership was mostly incompetent. Thus the seed for the disintegration of Pakistan was sown. And after about ten years or so it resulted in the break-up of Pakistan in the 1971 war. Had we not lived under martial law from 1958 onwards and remained a professional army, as in the past, I have no doubt that we would have decisively defeated the Indian Army both in 1965 and 71 wars.
In 1948, my unit 3rd Baluch was in East Pakistan. Then Major General Ayub Khan was the local Log Area Commander. Another unit of that formation was a battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment, perhaps the 8th FF Regiment. That was the total force under the Command of General Ayub. He very frequently used to visit the combined Unit Officers Mess and informally spend the evenings with the officers like our Commanding Officer. One day during informal conversation he said, Before partition anyone who had a bit of brain preferred to join the services. They either got commission in the Army or joined Class One Civil Services. Only junk was left behind.
In fact, one of the main reason why democracy could not take roots in Pakistan was that the Army had started indulging in Politics in the very early stages of its creation. The first Martial Law was proclaimed at Lahore in 1953. And the first constitutional government of Khawaja Nazim ud Din was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in 1954 with the connivance of General Ayub Khan, then C-in-C Pakistan Army.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
You volunteered for service in the East Pakistan when many people already thought that it had been lost. What were your reasons for doing so?
In Oct / Nov 1971, I was holding the appointment of Director Staff Duties at GS Branch, General Headquarters. I used to see reports of at least 30 to 40 own troops being killed everyday. One got the impression that if that state of affairs continued, East Pakistan would slip into Indian hands. I am a devoted Muslim and I became very emotional. I sent a personal letter to Brigadier Baqar Saddiqi, Chief of Staff Eastern Command, who was an old friend, saying we would not let East Pakistan become Spain in the History of Islam. In those days, officers posted to East Pakistan often used to remain on Sick Report or got themselves admitted in Hospitals. The MS had to issue a letter throughout the Army saying that in future posting to East Pakistan would not be cancelled on the grounds of admission in hospitals. The officer would have to move to East Pakistan even on stretcher and if it was a genuine case he would be admitted in hospital in Dacca.
Regardless of the prevailing situation I asked for interview with General Hameed, then Chief of the Army Staff and requested him for posting to East Pakistan for command of a Brigade. He highly appreciated my volunteering for service in East Pakistan and in a few hours my posting order was issued by the Military Secretary to take over the command of 205 Brigade at Bogra.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
Please tell us something about your experiences as a Brigade Commander in the East Pakistan in 1971?
The battle of Hilli Bogra sector in 1971 war can rightfully be regarded as a classic example of defence in the history of warfare. Against my one brigade, Indians had deployed four infantry brigades i.e 202 Brigade, 66 Brigade, 165 Brigade and 340 Brigade, one armoured bridge i.e 3 Armoured Brigade, 471 Engineer Brigade and two artillery brigades augmented by 33 Corps Artillery, yet when the war ended on 16th September, the battle was still going on in the streets of Bogra. The Indians could not succeed in breaking through that sector till the very end. The Indian General, Major General Lachman Singh in his book, The Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan described this battle in detail. He has devoted at least two chapters on it. After the war the Indians had sent a team of experts to study the battle on the ground and determine reasons why such a heavy force as described above could not break through that sector till the end.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd),
You have stated in your book that atrocities were committed by many units / individuals in East Pakistan. You have also stated that you tried to curb these. What was the extent / magnitude of the alleged atrocities vis-a-vis alleged atrocities committed by the Mukti Bahini ?
I took over the command of 205 Brigade on 17th of November 1971 and about 4 days later the Indians had started the attack on our positions. During the period of my command, on one occasion, it was reported to me that one of my units 8 Baluch had captured about 8 civilians. The brigade headquarter was informed for their disposal. I was told that as a routine all such persons who were captured were to be shot without any investigation. I passed orders that in future no such shooting would take place unless I had seen them myself. When I visited the unit, they produced them before me. As I was meeting them, one of them fainted. The CO of that unit said, he is malingering. On further inquiry I found out that they were not in fact muktis but were the local people working in the fields, grazing cattle. I ordered that they be released.
I learnt through many other officers that during the earlier operations against the Mukti Bahinis thousands of innocent people were killed.
In one of my defensive position at Santahar, large number of people were massacred. General Tikka Khan & Lieutenant General Jahanzeb Arbab had earned their reputation of being Butchers of East Pakistan. So were many other Brigadiers and Generals. Mukti Bahinis too, may also have done so in retaliation but it was very negligible as compared to the atrocities committed by the West Pakistani troops against the East Pakistanis. Despite the fact what we had done to them, I personally found the local people very sympathetic towards us. In fact after the war, when I was moving from Bogra to Naogaon to link up with 13 FF of my brigade, I and a team of another officer with 17 other ranks were captured by Mukti Bahinis and the locals who not only saved our life but put bandages on the wounds I had sustained during the process of my capture.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd),
How would you sum up the root cause of the failure in East Pakistan from the pure military point of view?
We had enough resources in way of equipment and manpower to continue the war at least for six months. There was absolutely no justification for surrender. It was, perhaps, the guilt conscious weighing heavy on the minds of the Commanders, who had committed atrocities during the cleaning up operations. Had General Niazi and his team of Generals and Brigadiers decided to stand and fight, the Indian Army would never have succeeded in reaching even the fringes of Dacca. Even in the Hamood ur Rahman Commission it has been brought out that there was no justification for surrender. I do not consider it necessary to go into further details. For, it will become very lengthy.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
We understand that you refused to surrender in East Pakistan. Please tell in detail what you felt about the whole issue.
Hilli Bogra sector was the only sector where Indians used an Armoured Brigade. For, in December the terrain represented the plains of Punjab. As I said before in this sector the Indians used 4 Infantry Brigade, one Armoured Brigade, one Engineer Brigade, one Mukti Brigade and yet could not break through this sector to the end and when the war ended the fighting was still going on in the streets of Bogra. The Battle of Hilli Bogra received the maximum publicity through the world media. I was mentally attuned to resist the Indians in the same manner as I had done on Wagha Sector in 1965 War. I could not conceive of surrender. On 15th and 16th December, when Bogra was surrounded from all sides, I was moving about in the battle area in my jeep, with the flag and stars uncovered, and announcing on the loud speaker, We shall fight from the rooftops, the windows and in the streets but we shall not surrender.
I was inspiring them with the Quranic Ayat that a Muslim soldier does not surrender on the battlefield. Anyone who turns his back will go to hell. I could see that almost everyone whom I addressed was prepared to die. They responded to my speech with slogans of Allah Ho Akbar. It was most thrilling scene. These words, which I have uttered, were later confirmed in the Indian Books published after the war. Some of the excerpts I would like to quote here. General Palit, in his book, The Lightening Campaign had said, In Hilli Bogra sector the Pakistani troops fought for every inch of ground.
Dr Monkakar in his book Pakistan cut to size had said, the Battle of Hilli was the toughest battle of Indo-Pak War, General Aurora, GOC-in-C Indian Eastern Command, in his interview with the Illustrated Weekly of India, published in 1973 had said, The battle of Bhaduria (which was fought within Hilli Bogra sector) was the bloodiest battle fought in East Pakistan.
General Lachman Singh in his Book, The Indian sword strikes in East Pakistan described the battle in this sector in great detail. He was a brave general, who had the courage to praise his opponents. He admired my fighting capabilities and went to the extent of saying, Most of the senior officers preferred to surrender as soon as a threat developed to their Headquarters or their lives. Brigadier Tajammal was the only exception in my sector. He showed fanatical will to fight even at the cost of his life. I was happy to take him prisoner. I was glad to learn that he was the first senior officer to be promoted by the Pakistanis out of those who had surrendered in Bangladesh.
He almost wrote my ACR, wherein he said, when in all other sectors, Pakistani troops were laying down arms, a group of officers and JCOs came to him and advised him to surrender. He refused to do so. He was no doubt a very brave and capable commander. He was in fact, prepared to die rather than surrender on the battlefield. His troops followed his example and resisted till the end.
In fact he said much more than what I have said. I have only given a brief gist of it. Imbued with such a spirit how could I possibly think of surrender. The examples of Muslim commanders in the history of Islam who had fought against overwhelming Christian armies were ringing in my ears. At that critical moment those examples became a source of strength for me to continue to fight till the end.
Major Agha H Amin (Retd):
Was the failure in East Pakistan related to Niazis incompetence or also to the Pakistani GHQs poor initial planning and assessments which dated to the period before the 1971 war broke out?
General Niazi had a brave record of service. In the past, whether during the Second World War as a company commander or in the 1965 War as a Brigade Commander, he had fought for mundane gains as a mercenary soldier.He is not the type who was guided by spiritual or moral convictions. In East Pakistan had he decided to stand and fight, he would have created example of bravery and dedication to the cause of Islam surpassing many Muslim commanders of the past.
He would have been compared favourably with Musa Bin Ghasam who had refused to surrender in the last Battle of Granada (Spain), wherein at the time King Abdullah and his cabinet were laying down arms against the enemy forces of King Fernandez and Queen Isabella, he mounted his horse, drew his sword and broke through the enemy lines who had surrounded the palace. In this process he was so heavily wounded that his dead body was found on the riverbank about 20 miles away. I do not entirely blame him. Most of the senior Brigadiers and General Officers at that time were brought up in mercenary traditions and they were fighting for mundane gains. At the time when final surrender took place on 16th December, there were about 4 other Generals, one Admiral and about 30 Brigadiers. They could have forced him not to surrender, had anyone of them had the courage to do so.
In all armies of the world, it is the inherent right of a soldier to refuse to lay down arms on the battlefield. Field Marshal Manstein in his book, The Lost Victories had said No General can vindicate his loss of a battle by claiming that he was compelled against his better judgement to execute an order that led to defeat. In this case the only course open to him is that of disobedience for which he is answerable with his head. Success will usually decide whether he was right or not.
Source: https://defence.pk/threads/the-batt...pakistani-bde-commander.143866/#ixzz4QmsqbbJQ
TAJAMMUL HUSSAIN MALIKS EPIC STAND AT HILLI 1971 DESCRIBED BY HIS INDIAN OPPONENTS
The Battle of Hilli or the Battle of Bogra was a major battle fought in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and Bangladesh Liberation War. It is generally regarded as the most pitched battle that took place in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. The battle of Hilli took place between 23 November 1971 and 11 December 1971,though the final surrender took place on 18 December, 1971.
The main objective of the Indian Army was to control Bogra, thereby cutting off Pakistan forces in the north from the rest of East Pakistan. The best way of getting to Bogra was through Hilli. The frontal assault on the Pakistan fortifications took a huge toll on both sides - the Indian Army suffering the greater number of casualties - before Indian forces finally broke through by establishing a block in the read of Pakistani forces in Hilli, upon which the 4FF Battalion in Hilli was withdrew for the defence of Bogra.The Indian side consisted of the 20 Indian Mountain Division led by Maj-Gen. Lachhman Singh. The constituent units of this division were 66 Brigade, 165 Brigade, 202 Brigade and 340 Brigade (all infantry units), 3 Armoured Brigade, 471 Engineer Brigade and two artillery brigades augmented by 33 Corps Artillery. The ground troops were aided by aerial support provided by the Indian Air Force which had acquired air superiority in the east and were armed with rockets, guns and 100 lb bombs.
On the Pakistan side, the Area of Responsibility (AOR) was on 205 Brigade of Pakistan Army led by Brigadier(later retired as Major General) Tajammul Hussain Malik. He had joined the brigade 4 days ago, when he volunteered to leave GHQ, Rawalpindi and command troops in the East Pakistan. He put up a stiff resistance that earned praise from many quarters.He had placed screens along the railway line nearby and at the Railway Station complex in the area. The defensive positions were sited in depth to cover all routes leading into East Pakistan.
They fought the entire Indian division and the Mukti Bahini soldiers till the Indians decided to bypass Hilli and establish a block in its rear. Brig. Malik then withdrew the forces in Hilli to avoid being cut off and to defend for the Bogra itself. Bogra was surrounded from all sides by the greater numbers of the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini.
Brig. Malik's resistance continued even after the Pakistani Eastern Command surrendered in Dacca on 16 December. He, in his staff car with flags and stars uncovered went around the streets of Bogra motivating his soldiers to keep fighting. The Indian army had by then, surrounded the city of Bogra. The Brigade Major along with some 50 ORs surrendered but the Brigadier still full of vigour refused to give up. Brig. Malik ordered the rest of his brigade to break out in small groups to Naogong, where one of his units was still fighting on. However en-route, his jeep was ambused, severely injuring him and his orderly. Muktis captured both of them and subjected them to torture. They broke his arms and split his head after which he was taken semi-conscious to an Indian army hospital. Major General Nazar Hussain Shah, was especially flown in from Natore for the surrender of this brigade on 18 December 1971, due to the refusal of Brigadier Malik. Upon return from captivity, he was the only brigadier out of 32 or so who fought the 1971 War in East Pakistan to have been promoted to Major General rank.The battle was a significant one as it involved great personal valour on both sides. This is highlighted by the fact that soldiers on either side won their nation's highest military honours. This battle was also unique in that it had started before the official start of the India Pakistan war but continued right until the formal surrender of Pakistan. Unlike other battles in the East where the Indian army dominated, Pakistan forces gave a very good account of themselves before the combined might of the Indian military managed to occupy the area. The Indians were so impressed by General Tajammul Hussain Malik’s fighting tactics that after the war the Indians had sent a team of experts to study the battle on the ground and determine reasons why such a heavy force as described above could not break through that sector till the end.
Source: https://defence.pk/threads/the-batt...pakistani-bde-commander.143866/#ixzz4QmsyQXuK
A heroic 1971 battle remembered
FROM THE NEWSPAPER — PUBLISHED Nov 27, 2015 06:59am
6 COMMENTS
EVEN though we lost East Pakistan, the people of Pakistan must be told that the Battle of Hilli fought between Pakistani and Indian forces over 25 days in 1971 is a golden chapter of our history. Outnumbered in men and material, Pakistani troops fought a heroic battle. Many foreign institutions have adopted this battle for teaching.
The battle began when the Indians attacked our position on the night between Nov 22/23 at 0130 hours.
The Indian attack was led by 20th Mountain Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lachman Singh. It consisted of four brigades, plus direct support from their 30 Corp besides Mukti Bahini militia and elements of East Pakistan Rifles who had switched sides and others. Within half an hour of the Indian attack, spearheaded by 8 Guards, they had suffered 97 dead.
The Pakistani side consisted of 4 Frontier Force, having just six field guns, part of the 80 Field Regiment artillery, commanded by Major Anwar Khan, three old tanks, commanded by Lt. Sher Jan Tajik (SJ), two jeep-mounted anti-tank recoiless rifles, besides 51 policemen from West Pakistan and local volunteers.
The enemy continued to attack with the aim of breaking through to the Bogra-Rangpur road to break 16th Division in two parts, but 4 FF didn’t allow them and kept them engaged till the end of the war.
Maj Mohammad Akram fell in battle and was awarded Nishan-i-Haider. Many others were also awarded for gallantry. 4 FF lost 150 and about the same number wounded. I was among those who went into Indian territory to look for Major Akram’s body. He had gone inside the territory to hunt for tanks and acted beyond the call of duty.
Brig. M. Mumtaz Malik, SJ, SI, took over command when informed that Lt Col (later Brigadier) M. A. Abbasi was wounded, Major Anwar was killed and many others wounded in a daylight attack by two of our companies. This attack was ordered by Brig Tajammul Hussain Malik under adverse circumstances because there was no air support and we were facing a much larger enemy force.
This battle is known as the Battle of Hilli, and Brig Mumtaz, now retired, must be considered an authority. Any one writing a book on this battle must consult him.
Major (r) Mian Muzaffar Gul
Peshawar
Rohingyas are ethnically bengalis... so yes they dont really care about their own kin.
Pak has 200% more rohingya refugees than bangladesh..
Again, I am no expert.
