US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORCES: Covert warriors
Andrew Koch is JDW Bureau Chief - Washington, DC
The little-known activities of the CIA paramilitary forces involve fighting secret battles on behalf of the 'war on terrorism'. Moves are under way to increase this covert military punch, writes Andrew Koch
Qaed Senyan al-Harthi (also known as Abu Ali) never knew what hit him. One minute the suspected Al-Qaeda operative and five accomplices were driving along in the Yemeni desert, the next an AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missile fired from a Predator unmanned air vehicle turned their vehicle into a smouldering ruin.
The operation that caused Abu Ali's demise was part of a new US strategy to strike terrorists around the world. That strategy has sought to deny terrorists safehaven, and, as one senior US official described it, "get them moving" in the hopes that operational security mistakes would be made.
But whether Ali's downfall was due to lax operational security or good intelligence, the strike that killed him was carefully planned and implemented by the secret warriors who form the sword-wielding arm of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Called the Special Activities (SA) Division, these CIA paramilitary forces along with covert special operations force (SOF) units are fighting a clandestine 'war on terrorism', details of which are rarely seen or acknowledged.
The Yemen attack is the exception that demonstrates the rule. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the US has conducted covert SOF and paramilitary missions against suspected terrorists around the world from Afghanistan and Colombia to Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen.
They are also active in Iraq. According to US military sources, CIA and SOF forces have travelled in and out of the country's northern and western areas since at least late last year. Those forces are scouting for ballistic-missile launchers and suspected weapons of mass destruction sites, monitoring oil wells, looking for potential Iraqi defectors and organising Kurdish guerrilla forces for operations if there is an armed conflict.
Some Kurdish politicians are also being organised for their role in post-war reconstruction, mostly by the time-tested CIA tactic of buying loyalty.
But it is in Afghanistan where the SA, part of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, has played its most significant role. They were the first US forces sent to the country, smoothing the way for SOF and other military personnel that would follow. Working in small teams of not more than a dozen people, they organised anti-Taliban efforts, often by bribing local warlords; provided intelligence on targets the military would later strike during the air campaign; and prepared landing zones and safehouses for the follow-on SOF personnel. The CIA gave out "bags of cash" while organising Afghan resistance to the Taliban, one official said, estimating the value of the effort at over $50 million.
The CIA personnel built on the agency's year of experience in Afghanistan and contacts with local leaders. As James Pravitt, CIA Deputy Director of Operations, explained earlier this year: "The first American team on the ground out there was CIA - for a reason. We had people with the right local languages, we had people with the right local contacts, and the right universal skills - the ability both to report conditions and, if need be, to change them for the better." The agency has received much public acclaim for this performance in Afghanistan, but the very survival of its secret SA units was in doubt less than a decade ago. By the end of the Cold War the CIA had largely scrapped its covert-action capabilities, especially its paramilitary forces.
According to an agency document, by 1993 the Special Activities Division, then called the Special Activities Staff, had declined to a staff of 190 personnel overseeing a $70 million budget. That changed, starting in July 1997, when Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet took the agency's helm and the SA and other covert-action units began to grow again. The 'war on terrorism' has accelerated that trend, although the unit is still estimated to have no more than "several hundred" operators in the field - perhaps three times the 1993 total. As Pravitt notes: "You simply cannot create overnight the combination of assets - the talent, the sources, that went into the highest possible gear in defence of America after 11 September."
CIA versus military
The growth of the CIA-SA has left some senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials wondering why they are not military missions. Moreover, they asked, why did the military, with its extensive SOF capabilities, have to rely on the CIA to prepare the ground in Afghanistan for the introduction of US military forces? One senior intelligence official noted the agency's views on such a division of labour, explaining that CIA operators can deploy "in days" rather than the weeks it can take the military.
But, he added, the agency cannot sustain that presence for long periods of time due to their limited number of operational personnel. In many instances the CIA sees its role as going in first to prepare the way for SOF/military units to take over.
This, several DoD sources said, worries Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld because CIA operatives could start a conflict that the Pentagon would have to finish. Rather than have this happen, they said, Rumsfeld is seeking to increase the size and capabilities of SOFs capable of fighting a covert war to disrupt, interdict, capture or kill terrorists around the world (Jane's Defence Weekly 15 January).
The newly reinforced SOFs would report to Rumsfeld not Tenet. The plans are for specialised military units to play a greater role in intelligence-gathering, special reconnaissance, and what is called "direct action", a euphemism for clandestine paramilitary operations such as that which killed Abu Ali.
A number of proposals are being floated in the DoD to increase this covert military punch, although none has been approved yet. One, forwarded by the Defense Science Board (DSB), recommends creating "a new elite Counter-Terrorism Proactive Pre-emptive Operations Group" (JDW 6 November 2002).
Comprising personnel with highly specialised skills including covert action, special operations, information operations, intelligence- gathering and deception, the group would report to a specially designated co-ordinator on the National Security Council. At the same time, the study recommended the DoD and CIA "increase emphasis on counter-terrorism covert action to gain close target access".
Increasing DoD capabilities to conduct covert missions might be feasible in some situations, the CIA argues, but any increased SOF role in secret missions abroad would be complementary to, not competing with, the agency's activities. As the senior intelligence official noted, "there are some countries in the world where the DoD cannot easily go into".
This is due to the visibility military forces have that could carry serious political consequences for host countries with which the US is not at war.
Small-scale civilian CIA teams can better conduct missions in such circumstances, the official argued, because they have a better ability and network to blend in. They also offer political cover due to the absence of uniforms and of public US government recognition that provides a degree of plausible deniability. Still, the official said, "when the military enters in, the agency takes on a support role".
Specialisation
To conduct such missions, Rumsfeld is likely to turn to a small number of secret military units associated with the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which sources said is "considerably bigger in terms of operators" than the CIA-SA. These personnel already possess the requisite skills and specialisation in counter-terrorism (hostage rescue, close-combat operations, covert action) and counter-proliferation (including materiel interdiction missions).
JSOC units include the army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, commonly known as Delta Force. Specialising in counter-terrorism missions such as hostage rescues, as well as a growing counter-proliferation focus, the size of the Delta Force is difficult to estimate; most military sources put it at several hundred. The navy's Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) forces also have a covert specialised unit for similar missions called the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU). Formerly known as Seal Team 6 and based at Dam Neck, Virginia, the unit is believed to comprise no more than 400 personnel. JSOC may further include a special aviation unit, possibly part of the army's160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, but few details are available.
A final group, which together with Deltas and DEVGRU personnel could form the core of any increased DoD role in covert counter-terrorist operations over the short term, is a highly classified army intelligence unit once called the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA).
Now believed to be known as Grey Fox - the unit conducts covert operations, infiltration, direct action, signals intelligence, and other close-in intelligence collection that is separate from both the regular intelligence community and SOF, although the exact nature of its relations with the latter is unclear.
Said to be "several hundred" strong at most - members of the unit took part in SOF/CIA efforts to grab Bosnian-Serb war criminals in the Balkans during the late-1990s, several former US officials said.
Despite these groups' capabilities, at least one former senior counter-terrorism official questioned the wisdom of increasing the military's counter-terrorism role if it came at the expense of the CIA. Units from JSOC, the official said, are very well trained for 'taking down' aircraft hijackers and rescuing hostages, but asking them to conduct global interdiction missions of terrorists would be "a dramatically different role".
The official also said that despite great proficiency by JSOC forces because of their very rigorous training, before Afghanistan they had little operational experience because the US military leadership had become averse to using special operations for covert missions. For example, the Clinton administration wanted to use SOF more extensively in the Balkans to go after war criminals, but met resistance at the DoD, with many requests for using JSOC personnel in "direct action" roles having been declined.
All CIA-SA personnel have a broad array of military and special-purpose kit available; the most publicised are Hellfire-armed Predators. Both JSOC and the CIA-SA forces, for example, were seen using Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters and non-traditional aircraft in Afghanistan.
Either force could use US Air Force Special Operations Command's 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) aircraft, depending on the mission. The 6 SOS operates Mi-17 and Mi-8 helicopters and other foreign-built aircraft.
And while the unit primarily conducts foreign internal defence and training missions, "the squadron can also function in a direct-execution role", the command says.
Their capabilities in this regard include support for SOF missions such as exfiltration/ infiltration, resupply, and airdrops from both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The CIA-SA also has its own fleet of aircraft, often with civilian markings.
The CIA's fleet includes foreign-built aviation assets as well as specialised Gulfstream and Boeing 757 aircraft often leased through front companies.
Equipment is not the only area these forces share resources. Many of the CIA-SA personnel come from JSOC units - either through the recruitment of retired SOFs or active troops on detail from the DoD.
The CIA-SA had just over 100 personnel deployed to Afghanistan, slightly more than the number of SOFs that are understood to have been detailed to the CIA for the Afghan operations because the agency did not have enough paramilitary personnel available.
In all, US SOFs totalled fewer than 500 personnel during US-led Operation 'Enduring Freedom' (OEF), according to Marshall Billingslea, the DoD's head of the office for Special Operations and Low Intensive Conflict.
SOFs are still in Afghanistan working to track down Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants, while CIA-SA personnel are conducting a similar mission in Pakistan and Afghanistan, US officials say.
CIA-SA operatives worked in tandem with their SOF counterparts during 'Enduring Freedom'.
Many of the small specialised SOF teams that proved crucial during OEF included a CIA-SA operative, and more SA forces were detailed to both regional planning cells as well as US Central Command, to whom they reported for that conflict.
But despite these operational links, US military sources complained that the two groups experienced co-ordination and interoperability difficulties, particularly early in the conflict.
Some senior DoD officials, for example, have complained that they were not always informed about what the CIA forces were doing nor were regular non-SOF troops well informed about their counterparts' activities.
Such complaints concerning interoperability and communications may be true at the headquarters level in Washington, one intelligence official noted, but it is not the case among the operators.
During OEF "there [was] a total visibility between military planners at the [regional combatant commander]-level and agency planners for covert action on how to integrate their respective roles and missions", the official said. "The information goes to the most sensitive operations. There is nothing kept from [the combatant commanders]."
Still, the official said, the CIA has been looking to improve interoperability and information flow with US military forces to allow more people in the field to obtain agency data quickly. In attempting one technical effort, the CIA attempted to utilise the military's communications infrastructure by using the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.
New policies and procedures are also being implemented based on the lessons of OEF. Such co-operation "is unprecedented but that is going to be growing in the future as part of the global 'war on terrorism'...The relationship that [Special Operations Command] is developing with the CIA will only grow with time", the official noted.
Sources familiar with both the covert SOF and CIA units also note that overcoming inter- operability challenges requires additional effort despite plans already being in place.
These challenges, the sources said, are due more to policy, doctrine and tactics than equipment issues.
For example, military forces including specialised SOF units tend to be creatures of habit, and their doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures well-developed and exercised.
Others they may co-operate with, however, such as CIA and especially foreign government personnel, do not follow these procedures, forcing the SOF to improvise. "Sometimes it works out well, but other times not so great," one source said, "mostly because [of] this lack of practised co-ordination."
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