hembo
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 6, 2009
- Messages
- 3,395
- Reaction score
- -3
- Country
- Location
20 passenger jets in Iran fall victim to GPS spoofing
This scenario arises from the manipulation of ground-based GPS signals overpowering the aircraft's onboard navigation systems. It is termed "GPS signal spoofing," a covert technique that entails replacing authentic satellite signals with manipulated counterparts.Written By: Adan Khan
Updated On: 01 Oct 2023 11:01:AM
Image used for representational purpose only (Photo credit: Pixabay)
Mumbai: In recent weeks, a concerning trend has emerged in the skies over Iran, where at least 20 passenger jets, including Boeing 777, 737, and 747 aircraft, have veered significantly off course. This alarming situation has been attributed to the manipulation of GPS signals originating from the ground, overpowering the aircraft’s own navigation systems.
What is it?
The term for this interference is “GPS signal spoofing,” which involves the secret replacement of genuine satellite signals with manipulated ones. These fake signals can cause a GPS receiver to output erroneous position and time information. While this phenomenon has been known for over a decade, it is the first time that civilian passenger flights have been targeted on such a scale.
Most of the recent incidents of GPS spoofing occurred along airway UM688 in Iran’s airspace, raising concerns about the safety of civil aviation. The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) took notice and issued a memo to airlines, warning of the dangers posed by GPS jamming and spoofing in the regions of Baghdad and Baku flight information.
How is it different?
What sets GPS spoofing apart from jamming is its stealthy nature. Unlike jamming, which causes noticeable disruptions in GPS readings, spoofing is subtle. The aircraft’s GPS receiver unknowingly accepts false signals, causing the flight management system to redirect the aircraft off its intended course.
To counteract spoofing, pilots are advised to disable GPS inputs when they notice a discrepancy between the aircraft’s inertial reference system (IRS) position and the GPS position. However, this manipulation has taken even experienced pilots by surprise as fake GPS signals managed to manipulate the IRS.
Modern airliner jets typically rely on both IRS and GPS inputs to calculate a ‘GPIRS position.’ When fake GPS signals enter the equation, a wrong GPIRS position is computed. This disagreement between IRS and GPS signals can lead the aircraft off its intended flight path if the crew fails to disable GPS inputs promptly.
Implications are significant
The implications of such incidents are significant, especially along busy air routes like UM688, which connects West Asia to Europe and the United States. These routes often pass through conflict zones, making deviations from the flight plan particularly hazardous.
In response to these events, airlines and aviation authorities are evaluating their protocols to better detect and mitigate GPS spoofing, ensuring the safety and accuracy of passenger flights that traverse this region.
Forbes: Someone In the Middle East is Leading Aircraft Astray by Spoofing GPS Signals
Eric Tegler
Sep 28, 2023,04:01pm EDT
Business jets like this Bombardier Challenger 650 and airliners are experiencing GPS signal spoofing ... [+]
BOMBARDIER
GPS spoofing from an unknown source in the Iraq-Iran area is causing complete aircraft navigational system failures in some overflying airliners and business jets. As a result, one bizjet almost strayed into Iranian airspace without clearance.
A flight data intelligence crowdsourcing website called OPSGROUP began reporting incidents of GPS navigation signals spoofing on Monday. The site claims to have a membership of 8,000 pilots, flight dispatchers, schedulers, and controllers.
According to OPSGROUP, commercial and business aircraft using Airway UMB688 in northern Iraq (a major airway utilized by traffic routing between Europe and the Middle East) have experienced complete navigation system failures after receiving spoofed GPS broadcasts. They appear to have broader cyber components than just the replacement of position data beamed by the GPS signals with false coordinates.
Earlier this week, OPSGROUP reported that, “[Twelve] separate reports have been now received by OPSGROUP, and in most cases the [Inertial Reference System] becomes unusable, VOR/DME sensor inputs fail, the aircraft UTC clock fails, and the crew have been forced to request vectors from ATC to navigate.”
Since then, reports of GPS spoofing have risen to 20 incidents. In one report, the site says that an Embraer 650 business jet crew enroute from Europe to Dubai related that they lost both GPS navigation units aboard the airplane and GPS signals to both pilot/co-pilot iPads.
“Further, the IRS didn’t work anymore,” the crew reported. “We only realized there was an issue because the autopilot started turning to the left and right, so it was obvious that something was wrong. After couple of minutes we got error messages on our FMS [aircraft flight management system] regarding GPS, etc. So we had to request radar vectors. We were showing about 80 nm off track. During the event, we nearly entered Iran airspace (OIIX/Tehran FIR) with no clearance.”
In another reported incident a Bombardier Challenger 604 bizjet required ATC radar vectors all the way to its destination at Doha, Qatar after losing GPS.
“Nearing north of Baghdad something happened where we must have been spoofed. We lost anything related to Nav and the IRS [inertial reference system] suggested we had drifted by 70-90 miles. We had a ground speed of zero and the aircraft calculated 250kts of wind. The FMS’s [flight management systems] reverted to DR (Dead Reckoning) and had no idea where they were.”
“We initially took vectors to get around the corner at SISIN [northern Iraq airspace]. Nav capability was never restored, so we required vectors all the way from Iraq to Doha for an ILS. We never got our GPS sensors back until we fired up the plane and went back to home base two days later.”
For background, OPSGROUP notes that airway routes over Baghdad near the eastern Iraq-Iran border are considered sensitive areas by Iran.
“There are two large missile bases just across the boundary: one at Kermansah (a huge facility with dedicated anti-aircraft weapons), and another at Khorramabad. For context, Iran shot down a passenger aircraft in 2020 in Tehran (accidentally), and has been heard in September 2023 issuing warnings on [the] 121.5 [MHz frequency] with threats to shoot down aircraft entering the FIR without a clearance.”
A map of Iraqi airspace showing the border countries of Iran (to the east), Saudi Arabia, Jordan, ... [+]
OPSGROUP
The FAA is aware of the spoofing incidents and issued a Notice to Air Men (NOTAM) on Wednesday evening centered on Baghdad overflights;
“ALL AIRLINES FLYING THROUGH BAGHDAD FIR-ORBB SHOULD EXPECT GPS JA MMING/GNSS INTERFERENCE IN THE NORTHERN PART OF IRAQ ALONG THE ATS RO UTE UM688 FROM RATVO TO VAXEN. 2-ALL AIRLINES WITH DESTINATION ORER SHOULD EXPECT GPS JAMMING/GNSS I NTERFERENCE DURING FINAL APPROACH PHASES. 3-PILOTS ARE EXPECTED TO INFORM THE RELEVANT ATS UNIT IN THE EVENT OF GPS SIGNAL OUTAGE IN ORDER TO REPORT IT TO THE CONCERNED AUTHORITIES AND TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT ALL FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED IN SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER...”
I queried U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) - which oversees U.S. and coalition military operations in the Middle East - regarding what knowledge of GPS spoofing it has, whether U.S./coalition military aircraft have experience similar episodes and whether the source of the spoofed GPS signals has been identified.
A CENTCOM spokesperson said the Command was aware of the issue but had no further comment. Updates from CENTCOM may be coming however, and I’ll include them here when issued.
Based on information from its members, OPSGROUP characterized the spoofing as something beyond the ordinary GPS jamming common to the area. It reports that a specific GPS receiver on a single aircraft is sent a signal that shifts the displayed position by 60 nautical miles.
The aircraft’s navigation systems cannot process or make sense of the sudden new data and in almost all reported cases navigation systems and GPS displays are rendered useless. The pilots then have to call air traffic control for vectors to stay on course.
Any delay in recognizing the loss of navigation and resultant positional drift near Iranian border areas could result in an intercept by Iranian Air Force aircraft, the consequences of which can be unpredictable.
Last edited:
