1965 war> from the view of PAF chief Nur Khan(retd.)

[jha]

The myth of the 1965 victory

 

[lem34]

I think the title on this thread is somewhat misleading. Its an article by an Incredible Indian posted here by another one stating thats their viewpoint of someone elses viewpoint, lol Why not just call it indian interpretation

 

[Veeru]

Nothing new we all know it only pakistani people should learn the truth that India never tried to invade pakistan ever.

But i think insted of accepting what their former PAF chief says they will put forward new conspiracy theories.

 

[Bl[i]tZ]

I think the title on this thread is somewhat misleading. Its an article by an Incredible Indian posted here by another one stating thats their viewpoint of someone elses viewpoint, lol Why not just call it indian interpretation

Its the interview of a PAF chief to a PAF newspaper (DAWN). Get over your conspiracy theories.

 

[T-Faz]

The worst decision by PA (Ayub) was when they changed Gen. Akhtar Hussain Malik with Gen. Yahya before the final Akhnoor push was supposed to happen.

The changeover disrupted the entire plan and Indian army was able to recover and went on to cut GT Road.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-history/59694-maj-general-akhtar-malik-1965-debacle.html

It has always been the decision by our leaders which have put Pakistan in jeopardy.

Another fact that most people might not know about is that the Indian embassy in some countries like Indonesia were stoned by demonstrators because they were at war with Pakistan.

 

[RoYaL~GuJJaR]

I think the title on this thread is somewhat misleading. Its an article by an Incredible Indian posted here by another one stating thats their viewpoint of someone elses viewpoint, lol Why not just call it indian interpretation

Are you blind or what ??

 

[T-Faz]

Read this excellent article from Time Magazine which covered the war.

Asia: Ending the Suspense - TIME

 

[Bl[i]tZ]

The worst decision by PA (Ayub) was when they changed Gen. Akhtar Hussain Malik with Gen. Yahya before the final Akhnoor push was supposed to happen.

The changeover disrupted the entire plan and Indian army was able to recover and went on to cut GT Road.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-history/59694-maj-general-akhtar-malik-1965-debacle.html

It has always been the decision by our leaders which have put Pakistan in jeopardy.

Another fact that most people might not know about is that the Indian embassy in some countries like Indonesia were stoned by demonstrators because they were at war with Pakistan.

Even if I believe whatever you said is right, when will you guys own up?

Blame for 1965 - Ayub Khan
Blame for 1971 - Yahya Khan
Blame for Kargil - Nawaj Sharif

These could very well be tactical mistakes but what about the strategic miscalculation that led to these wars and eventual defeat. You are still missing the bigger picture.

 

[Kyusuibu Honbu]

Some American de classified docs about the war

 

[Executioner]

There own people speak the truth, but unfortuntanley they never going accept the truth until there history books revise.

 

[Night_Raven]

I think the title on this thread is somewhat misleading. Its an article by an Incredible Indian posted here by another one stating thats their viewpoint of someone elses viewpoint, lol Why not just call it indian interpretation

Is it ? Don't you read the article before posting your BS.

 

[IND151]

[/COLOR]

Just for the record, according to neutral sources - Pakistan has lost all of it's wars because:

(i) It couldn't afford prolonged conflict, in all cases, it's inventory and resources were depleted and could not sustain prolonged conflict. It's enough evidence that stopping the war was in it's favour more than the Indians.

Time is quoted at wiki:

"Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N."

(ii) Their goals for starting most conflicts were not attained, Kashmir wasn't integrated. If their goals weren't achieved, it's a loss as demand was lowered, they couldn't dictate terms. They initially claimed they could stab the Indian territory and bulldoze their way into Delhi, splitting India into fragments, which was hardly the case.

It is due to Hari Singh signing accession instrument late that Pakistan managed to attain some territory because India's late intervention in the late 40s/50s, if they had dug in deep, I doubt Pakistanis could have made a difference. Though, at that time, they did probably have superior Armour in the 60s.

(iii) It has basically lost more land and territories in these conflicts. Based on territories lost and gained, Pakistanis have a smaller number to show, more is claimed than what was attained.

(iv) It has failed to drag India to the negotiation table, neither has it been able to exercise diplomatic victory it achieved due to Mr. Nehru agreeing a UN resolution to it.

(v) Basically Bangladeshi split in the 70s is more than enough evidence, if you ask me, of a weakened Pakistan due to the losses incurred in 60s. For India, things are intact. No mass surrenders in the history of conflicts between the countries - but the West Pakistanis in East Pakistan surrendered, forever blemishing Pakistani pride.

The 1970s was a consequence of a costly war the Pakistanis incurred in the 1960s, if you ask me.

(vi) Lowered goals and changing stance by the Pakistani military, I remember listening to Mr. Musharraf speak and he claimed how 'successful' they had been by getting India to the negotiation table. Remember, this is the same military which claimed 1 Pakistani could out maneuver 3-4 Indians and, in all conflicts, adopted preemptive strategies to a war. Their goal was the entire Kashmiri territory, not partial (about 1/3).

Their leaders were giving speeches how they'd begin the second moghul era in captured India.

The demands are lowered, today they remain non-existent. And Kashmiris prefer independence over union with Pakistan. Basically, this reflects a great deal of political, financial and diplomatic capital lost. I have tried my hardest to remain neutral, but as an analyst, Pakistan has suffered the most losses in almost all departments. And, it has been the aggressor at every point of conflict.

I am wondering if it can afford prolonged conflict, let's things be real here. Comparing India to Pakistan would be like comparing CHina with India or America with China, David vs. Goliath only works in fantasy. They aren't equals.

Pakistanis cannot win a conflict, let's be realistic. They were battling about 700,000+ troops with 200,000+ troops there was no way they'd expect to win, neither can they logically claim to. Be realistic.

i found this post on IDF.

its very good

 

[John Doe]

the Indian embassy in some countries like Indonesia were stoned by demonstrators because they were at war with Pakistan.

Indonesia supported Pakistan a lot during the war, prodded by China. I am not surprised if these stonings took place over there.

 

[Kyusuibu Honbu]

Indonesia supported Pakistan a lot during the war, prodded by China. I am not surprised if these stonings took place over there.

In 1971 Americans expected Indonesian Navy to harass Indian navy , but nothing like that happened.

 

[IND151]

-
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The myth of the 1965 victory
by Harris bin Munawar | | |
India’s attack on Lahore on September 6 was therefore not a sudden act of aggression on an unaware neighbor, as Pakistani textbooks claim, but an unexpected retaliation. Pakistan, with its superior military equipment donated by the US and a tactical victory in the Rann of Kachh, was confident India will not react to an incursion into Kashmir with a full-scale war

Nationhood is a cultural artifact. It mixes political thought with literary expression, to carve out ideological boundaries of a place where a people are supposed to belong. With time, the factual historical content becomes irrelevant. What remains is a myth.

Textbooks are an important method of disseminating that myth. “India is our traditional enemy and we should always keep ourselves ready to defend our beloved country from Indian aggression,” 11-year-olds are taught.

The creation of Pakistan is justified with the two-nation theory - the idea that Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent were two separate nations. India is the Other, without which there is no We. This national narrative defines a goal (security) and an enemy (India) and in doing so makes possible a meaningful co-existence of a diverse people who refer to themselves as a nation.

It is not possible to mobilize people around confusion, and that is especially true in the context of the 1965 war, when Ayub Khan’s approach of planned economy and social engineering had been producing outstanding results for several years.

But a little confusion is a good if it can act as a safety valve against the recklessness that led to that war.

“As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and the right place,” said a directive by president Ayub Khan to General Muhammad Musa, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, on August 29 (Annexure G to GHQ Letter 4050/5/MO-1). To the utter surprise of then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had drafted the text of the order, that turned out to be false.

By that time Pakistan had already began Operation Gibraltar. On August 5 and 6, hundreds of poorly trained ‘mujahids’ were into the Indian-held Kashmir with no clear goals with the expectation that Muslims of Kashmir will join them and revolt against the Indian government. That would legitimize a Pakistani troop movement into IHK (like a similar situation legitimized the movement of Indian troops in 1971 into what was then East Pakistan). Unfortunately for them, that did not happen. Muslims of IHK did not share the same narrative as Muslims of Pakistan. It took them another 35 years of oppression to realize they needed to rebel.

Pakistan, with its superior military equipment donated by the US and a tactical victory in the Rann of Kachh, was confident India will not react to an incursion into Kashmir with a full-scale war. And that is why it launched Operation Grand Slam on September 1, with the intention to capture Akhnur and cut off the only road link between India and Kashmir. Half way through the excellent operation, the incursion that took India by surprise and met very little resistance, was stopped at Chhamb-Jurian and the 12 Div GOC Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik was relieved of the command of the operation. Gen Yahya Khan, who commanded 7 Div at that time, was flown in to take charge. According to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the intention behind the move was to make Yahya a hero. The delay caused by the decision gave the Indians enough time to consolidate their defence, and the operation failed.

India’s attack on Lahore on September 6 was therefore not a sudden act of aggression on an unaware neighbor, as Pakistani textbooks claim, but an unexpected retaliation. A plan approved by the Indian Cabinet in 1949 for such a situation, said “Indian troops in Kashmir would seek to contain the opposing forces while the main Indian field army made a determined and rapid advance towards Lahore and Sialkot.” That is exactly what they did. “The primary aim of this strategy,” according to A Wright, “was to inflict a decisive defeat on Pakistan’s field army and, along with the possible occupation of Lahore, to compell the Pakistan government to seek peace.”

With its morale hurt by the humiliating loss to China in 1962 and the defeat in Rann of Kachh, the Indian military was keen on using its newly acquired weapons (meant to be used against China) to restore its reputation. Like Pakistam, India too wanted to catch the enemy unaware and capture as much land as possible. Like Pakistan, India too failed to do that.

In the ensuing see-saw battles in and around Lahore and Sialkot, Pakistan Army did a very good job at defending its territory, but they did nothing that could even be remotely regarded as a victory. The only time Pakistan came near a victory was a 1FF/6 Lancers flawless counter-advance towards Khem Kharan. According to military historian Brian Cloughley, “In spite of the elan and determination shown by the armoured regiments and infantry battalions, there was no comparable display of drive and energy on the part of some of their senior commanders.” After making advances several miles inwards of Khem Kharan surprised India (which had erred by not accounting for the new 6 Armoured Div), the troops were told to withdraw to Khem Kharan not once but twice. That gave India enough time to prepare a trap for the next advance, in which Pakistan fell, losing a total of 40 tanks.

“It was obvious,” wrote Cloughley, “that outstanding leadership at the junior level, as well as gallantry and good equipment, excellent artillery support and high morale do not compensate for inappropriate reconaissance, lack of press-on spirit in commanders, poor communications, shockingly bad command at the highest levels, and indifferent logistical planning.”

While it is obvious there was no clear winner or loser in the 1965 war, there are important lessons to be learned. One of them is, the military should not be politicised and its top leaders should not be chosen for loyalty rather than merit. These lessons need to be included in the national narrative.

The myth of the 1965 victory | ColumnNews