10 Most Extra Ordinary Weapons of The World

[abbasniazi]

 

[abbasniazi]

 

[abbasniazi]

 

[abbasniazi]

 

[naseebkhanniazi]

what a super post by you i had never seen befor these type of wepons i realy like all of these

 

[abbasniazi]

 

[abbasniazi]

 

[abbasniazi]

 

[Super Falcon]

i think germans are still one of the best in the world for producing weapons but are standing in their way
first they produced
Submarines
Fighter jets with jet engines
Bomber planes
Bombs,Missiles
Tanks
Cruise Missiels
Bullistic Missiles
ets

 

[Adios Amigo]

@ Abass>

a very nice thread,but after seeing tones of wonderful wepons, its now time to change the name of the thread from10 Most Extra Ordinary Weapons of The World to just
Most Extra Ordinary Weapons of The World.
a humble suggestion
adios.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Heckler & Koch PSG-1 sniper rifle​

Caliber: 7.62 x 51mm NATO (.308 Win)
Action: Semi-automatic, roller-delayed blowback
Barrel: 650 mm
Overall length: 1208 mm
Weight: 8.10 kg with scope and no magazine
Magazine: 5 or 20 round detachable box
Scope: Hendsoldt 6x42, 6 settings from 100 to 600 meters
Expected accuracy: Sub-1MOA with match grade ammunition

The PSG-1 sniper system (PrazisionsSchutzenGewehr, or "high-precision marksman's rifle" in English) had been developed by the German company Heckler - Koch by the mid-1980s as an ultimate police and counter-terror weapon. Some German elite law-enforcement groups, like GSG or KSK-9, participate in this development, and since its introduction the PSG-1 had been adopted by various police forces in Europe and Americas. It is way too heavy and somewhat too gentle for military use, so it never seen any military use. Instead, HK developed two more sniper weapons. The first, that actually preceded the PSG-1, was the G3-SG1, an accurized and scope-fitted version of the basic G3 automatic rifle for German Army. And in the mid-1980s HK also developed a derivative of the PSG-1, called MSG-90, for export military sales. The PSG-1 is still offered by the HK, and is one of the most expensive factory-made sniper rifles on the market, hitting the $10.000 price tag in the basic package.

Technically, the PSG-1 is no more than a heavily modified G3 rifle. It features the same roller-delayed blowback action, derived from earlier CETME rifles, and the same stamped steel receiver with separate detachable trigger unit. The heavy barrel is precisely made by the cold hammer forging process with polygonal rifling for improved accuracy and longer life. Special trigger unit features a semi-automatic only hammer group and the adjustable trigger with trigger pull of about 1.5 kg (3 lbs). The ergonomically shaped pistol grip features an adjustable palm stop. Plastic buttstock is also adjustable for height and for length of pull. Another non-typical feature of the PSG-1 is the "silent bolt closing device", actually similar to the forward assist, found on M16 rifles. This is apparently to be used in situations where a complete silence must be maintained until the shot is fired. The devise is no more that a pushbutton, located just behind the ejection port, and linked to the bolt carrier by the ratchet-like device. The rifle is fed using standard 20-rounds G3 magazines or special 5-rounds magazines. There's no open (iron) sights on the PSG-1. Instead, it is fitted with the Hendsoldt 6X42 fixed power telescope sight with illuminated reticle. The scope has built-in range adjuster that works in ranges from 100 to 60 meters, so 600 meters is considered the maximum effective range. Most strangely, the PSG-1 had no integral bipod. Instead, it is often used with the separate rest, mounted on the compact tripod.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Heckler and Koch MP-5​

The Heckler und Koch submachine gun, MP-5, is one of the most famous and wide-spread firearms of its class, developed since the Second World War. Its development began circa 1964 under the company designation HK MP-54, or simply HK 54. In the 1966, German police and Border Guard adopted the HK 54 as the MP-5, and it was originally available in two forms - MP-5 with fixed buttstock and MP-5A1 with retractable buttstock. Some years later HK slightly upgraded the design of MP-5, replacing the sights (from flip-up open notch rear and blade front to drum-type diopter rear and hooded post front) and the muzzle (replacing the two-slot muzzle compensator to the tree-lugs QD silencer mount without compensator). Other improvements made over the time concerned the magazines (early type magazines were of straight box type, latter - of curved box type for improved reliability). The trigger units also were upgraded - from original stamped steel with plastic grip to the all-plastic units, integral with grip, and with various fire modes and marking. Over the years MP-5 were adopted by the huge numbers of police, security and military forces around the world, including the German police and border guard, British police and elite Army SAS units, American police, FBI, Navy and Marine Corps, and many, many others. MP-5 is still manufactured in Germany by the HK itself, and also licensed to Greece, Iran, Pakistan and Mexico. The only real rival to the MP-5 in the terms of proliferation across the world is the famous Israeli UZI submachine gun. Most interestingly, the German Army (Bundeswehr) did not adopted the MP-5, most probably due to the economical reasons, and turned instead to the... UZI submachine guns, made under license in Belgium.
The success of the MP-5 is outstanding. It is based on the high quality and reliability of the gun, great single-shot accuracy (thanks to its closed bolt action), great flexibility and, of cause, good marketing. It seems that no other modern SMG at this time can rival the MP-5 in popularity (UZI is not manufactured anymore).

The MP-5, basically, is no more than the scaled-down version of the Heckler-Koch G3 battle rifle. It shares the same basic design with stamped steel receiver and the same roller-delayed blowback action, derived from the post-war CETME rifles. The trigger units are hinged to the receiver and are now available with various fire mode options, including 2 (Safe, Semi-auto), 3 (Safe, Semi, Full Auto) or 4 (Safe, Semi, Limited burst of 2 or 3 rounds, Full auto) position levers, ambidextrous or not, and marked with letters, digits or icons. The MP-5 is always fired from closed bolt for improved accuracy, but this limits the amount of sustained fire due to the barrel overheating and resulting cook-off problems. To avoid this, MP-5 cocking handle could be locked in the rear position in the special slot, leaving the bolt in the open position, with no cartridge in the chamber. To commence the fire one must simply release the cocking handle from its notch and then pull the trigger. Modern MP-5 submachine guns are equipped with three-lug quick detachable silencer mounts on the barrel. Sights are similar to other HK models, and consists of the front hooded post sight and the adjustable for windage and elevation drum-type diopter rear sight. Special quick-detachable clamp mounts allows for installation of night, optical and red-dot sights if required. Standard magazine capacity is 30 rounds, but shorter 15 rounds magazines are available. Special versions were developed and manufactured in limited numbers during 1980s-90s for the US Law Enforcement market, chambered for more powerful 10mm Auto (10x25mm) and .40S&W (10x22mm) ammunition. These guns can be easily distinguished from more common 9mm models by straight box 30 rounds magazines, made from plastic.

While all of MP-5 can be fitted with silencers, there also a dedicated silenced version of MP-5, called MP5SD2 or SD3 (depending on the stock type). This version is equipped with non detachable integral silencer, and the vented barrel, to reduce the bullet muzzle velocity down below the speed of sound. The MP-5SD is intended to fire standard 9mm ammunition, not the special subsonic one.

Semi-automatic only versions of the MP-5 were once made for civilian market under the designation of HK-94, some with longer, 16 inch (406 mm) barrels, to conform with US laws. There also is an US company, called Special Weapons LLC, that is manufacturing semi-automatic, civilian MP-5 clones in various pistol calibers, including the .45ACP.

 

[Seadog1]

Scalpel a 100 lb smart bomb that can glide 3 to 4 miles is prob going to be one of the most devastating weapons in the future,,,,one fighter bomber can carry a 80 of them and larger bombers can carry a 1000....a fliight of 100 bombers will be able to take out 100,000 targets in one strike. One of the reasons the USA is going to a smaller air force is that one plane with smart bombs can do what it would have taken a dozen bombers to do in the past.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Cruise Missiles​

Pictures Tomahawk Cruise Missile

The term cruise missile covers several vehicles and their capabilities, from the Chinese Silkworm (HY-2), which has a range of less than 105 km, to the U.S. Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), which can fly to ranges of up to 3,000 km. These vehicles vary greatly in their speed and ability to penetrate defenses. All, however, meet the definition of a cruise missile: “an unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload on a target.” This definition can include unmanned air ve-hicles (UAVs) and unmanned control-guided helicopters or aircraft.

Cruise missiles pose perhaps the gravest delivery system proliferation threat. They are inexpensive to build and can, therefore, overwhelm current defenses by sheer numbers. They can be designed to be small with low-thrust engines and can penetrate radar and infrared-detection networks. The technology to build them is simple and available to any country that builds even rudimentary aircraft. Finally, since cruise missiles are unmanned, they require no flight crew training, expensive upkeep programs, special hangars for housing, or large air bases for basing. These factors make it especially difficult to collect intelligence on the development of indigenous cruise missiles and to anticipate the developing threat.

Countries can achieve a cruise missile capability by simply buying existing cruise missiles from supplier states and modifying them to meet a particular need, or they can make a complete system from readily available parts. European aerospace firms, the FSU, and the Chinese have all sold many cruise missiles of one description or another to customers in proliferant and industrialized countries. In most cases, the performance of missiles is range limited and, in some cases, even payload limited, and their use as a carrier of WMD is probably confined to tactical applications. With the introduction of new guidance technologies, particularly the GPS, future cruise missiles will be more accurate and attractive to proliferants.

The United States introduced cruise missiles into its inventory when a combination of technologies reached a critical point in their development. Taken together, these same technologies can easily form the underpinnings for a capable unmanned aerial system. Except for Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM), the 1990’s have seen these technologies, or the knowledge of how to reproduce them, become wide-spread among industrialized and newly industrializing nations. The introduction of GPS and GLONASS eliminates the need for a country to rely on TERCOM navigation.

Of the four major subsystems that compose a cruise missile -— airframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integration —- none is expensive in and of itself, and a steady supply of each is available. In the late 1960’s, the United States first introduced turbine propulsion systems that weighed less than 100 lb and produced many hundreds of pounds of thrust. These turbine engines, or their lineal descendants, powered most of the early U.S. cruise missile designs and were one of the least costly items. Depending upon the range desired for its cruise missile, the powerplant may even be as prosaic as a reciprocating engine with a propeller. The latter, of course, has little hope of disguising its signature from defenses, but the mission profile may allow it to disguise itself as another platform. Even if no signature modification is considered, this type of missile has applications in regional wars where the technology of the defense is not as important as it is to an attacking proliferant.

Currently, GPS receivers provide more capability and accuracy than any targeting strategy requires of the guidance, control, and navigation subsystem. Cruise missiles, being aerodynamic vehicles, do not need the rapid response cycle time that ballistic missiles must have to keep the vehicle under control and on an appropriate track. Avionics systems available for first-generation commercial aircraft are both light enough and accurate enough to keep a cruise missile under control for long periods of time. For navigation, civilian code GPS is priced for the civilian hobbyist market, so pu-chasing an off-the-shelf navigation unit capable of obtaining 20 m of CEP is within the range of the common pocketbook. This level of accuracy is better than that of the early TERCOM systems installed on U.S. cruise missiles, which made them practical for the first time in the late 1970’s.

For long cruise missile flight paths, a country without access to GPS systems must develop a mapping guidance logic for its cruise missile or accept highly degraded performance from an inertial measurement unit (IMU). using one or two cruise missiles in an isolated attack from a standoff platform can achieve all of its targeting aims with an IMU, but long flight paths allow errors in the IMU to become so great that the missile may stray far from its target. Also, without an updated mapping system, the cruise missile must fly at an altitude high enough to avoid all manmade obstacles, thereby exposing itself to detection.

Even with GPS, the autonomous cruise missile carrying an on-board map must be supplied with the latest terrain and physical feature changes that have occurred along its course if it flies near the ground. Updated autonomous map guidance systems require large computer storage memories aboard the aircraft with units that can withstand the flight vibrations and possible thermal extremes of the missile over a long-duration flight. These units must be supplied with the latest maps that the delivering nation can obtain. Few nations have the space flight vehicles or high-altitude aircraft to build radar maps from overflights alone. The United States and Russia understand the key position that radar maps play in cruise missile guidance and are unlikely to allow the information stored in these maps to be released on the world market. Even if these maps are sold through some clandestine channel, they will quickly become outdated since cultural features change rather rapidly. As an alternative, a country may try to develop another guidance scheme, but the costs for developing a new infrastructure to support a map-based guidance system probably rivals that of the original TERCOM or a GPS constellation itself.

In the absence of GPS, the reliability of the cruise missile targeting philosophy becomes increasingly more problematic. As an alternative, a country may attempt to fly its cruise missile with radio guidance or other commands. Usually radio guidance uses frequencies high enough to operate only on line-of-sight reception. If the country expects to operate in hostile territory or attack at very long ranges, it must control the intervening repeater station to contact these missiles by real-time transmission of flight controls signals and position information.

Since cruise missiles fly relatively slowly and with only gentle accelerations, at the entry level, the airframes of these delivery systems can be built out of inexpensive aluminum of a grade as simple as 2024 - T1. Most proliferants with a basic metal production facility and an access to textbooks on metallurgy have a ready supply of this grade of aluminum. As proliferants design and build more sophisticated cruise missiles, they will undoubtedly substitute composite materials and other more elabo-rate structural elements in the airframe, but, for the most part, these materials are not needed.

A cruise missile airframe does not undergo particularly severe stress on its flight to a target, it does not pull any high “g” maneuvers, and it does not experience propulsion accelerations associated with gun or ballistic missile launches. Virtually any airframe that is structurally sound enough to be used in an ordinary airplane is adequate for a cruise missile. A designer can use factors of safety of 1.5 or 2 in the design to ensure structural integrity under all dynamic conditions without recourse to structural finite element computer codes, which generally only assist a designer to shave four or five percent from the weight of a design. Still, these technologies are included in the tables because their use does allow a proliferant to build a more capable cruise missile. Technologies that advance the large serial production of inexpensive cruise missiles threaten current defenses built against missile attacks. These technologies include sheet metal processing machines that could form complex shapes, such as those found on the airframe or leading edge of cruise missiles; hydraulic presses or stamping mills that shape the nose cones or turbine inlets; and numerically controlled machines for parts production.

If a country wants to increase the penetrability of its cruise missiles, it must identify technologies that aid in signature reduction, signature masking, or other means to confuse detection systems. Some of these technologies include radar jamming and spoofing technologies; infrared suppression of engine exhaust; paints and coatings that disguise the thermal signature of leading edges; computer routines that predict the flow field around aerodynamic surfaces and the methods to change those surfaces to reduce heat transfer and turbulent flow fields; wind tunnel technology that supports the computer prediction; and computer routines that predict the RCS from a given geometry and predict redesign methods to achieve certain design specifications. The cruise missile is suited for the delivery of chemical or biological agents if it does not fly at supersonic or transonic speeds. Most cruise missiles designed to fly at high speeds are not similarly able to fly at slow speeds without dramatic changes in the wing planform in flight. These changes in wing planform are generally not consistent with cruise missile geometries or packing volumes in the same way they might be in manned aircraft, such as the FB-111. Supersonic missiles generally cannot dispense chemical and biological agents from sprayers since the airstream itself will destroy the agent by heating or shock, but they do deliver nuclear weapons with great efficiency.

None of these considerations are exclusive impediments to a proliferant’s cruise missile development program. It is only a general guideline that high-speed cruise missiles make sense as a means to deliver nuclear weapons and low-speed cruise missiles are better suited for chemical and biological weapons.

Bomblets can also be included on transonic or supersonic missiles. These bomblets can be released over a target to ameliorate the airstream problem. After release, the bomblets decelerate, float to the target, and spray their agent into the air. Bomblets reduce the packing fraction of agent within the cruise missile airframe and, therefore, reduce the overall payload of a cruise missile. A subsonic cruise missile equipped with a sprayer dispensing agent from a single tank onboard the missile may simply release the agent into the airstream. In most cases, a large fraction of this agent will be destroyed before it reaches its target. To be more effective, the sprayer must dispense the agent so that it avoids the vortex from the tips of the wings and the disturbed airflow from the fuselage. Technologies that are required to develop bomblets, predict their flight path, or enhance the capabilities of sprayers as a means for a proliferant to deliver WMD from a cruise missile are highlighted.

Three key concerns of the cruise missile threat are (1) range extension to ranges greater than 500 km, (2) the ability to penetrate defenses, and (3) any technologies that reduce the cost of manufacture and therefore increase the size of a cruise missile in-ventory. In order of priority, the tables first list technologies that assist a country in building long-range cruise missiles. The tables then cover technologies that reduce the signature of a cruise missile and list those technologies that decrease the per unit cost or increase the total serial production of cruise missiles for a fixed price. Finally, the tables include support technologies that may make cruise missiles easier to use, package, or launch. As with each of the other delivery systems subsections, the tables are organized by specific subsystem of the aircraft: airframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integration.

Cruise missiles differ from ballistic missiles as a potential threat because they share so many common technologies with existing vehicles that have been designed for other purposes. As a consequence, a proliferant can obtain much of the hardware to construct a cruise missile by cannibalizing existing commercial aircraft or by purchas-ing parts and components for the missile from legitimate suppliers. The technology tables serve only as a guideline to alert and inform export control regulators of general categories of technologies as opposed to specific performance specifications.
Systems

At least 12 exporting countries—Great Britain, the United States, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Russia, Sweden,Pakistan, India and Taiwan—have developed cruise missiles with some capability Generally, these cruise missiles are small and have a limited range. While it is possible that they can be converted to deliver WMD, their short range limits their possible targets of interest. They may deliver biological or chemical agents against ports and airfields in regions of concern such as the Persian Gulf, but are not able to attack longer range targets. In addition, cruise missiles, such as the Chinese Silk-worm, have many other limitations besides short range that restrict their utility as a WMD delivery system. The missiles leave a turbulent airflow in their wake, which makes it difficult to deliver a sprayed pathogen or chemical agent cloud. They fly along a predictable path towards the target rather than one that can realign itself to match the geometry of the target.

The following cruise missiles are a sample of missiles that are available l on the world market and pose less threat as possible candidates for conversion to WMD delivery: the British Sea Eagle, the Chinese Seersucker and Silkworm, the French Exocet, the German Kormoran, the Israeli Gabriel, the Italian Otomat, the Japanese SSM-1, the Norwegian Penguin, the Soviet SSN-2C and its derivatives, the Swedish RBS-15, the Taiwanese Hsiung Feng 2, and the U.S. Harpoon. Older missiles, such as the Silkworm, have cumbersome and slow-moving control surfaces that do not readily adapt to the improvement in position calculation that GPS provides. Moreover, their guidance systems are intended mostly for the missiles in which they are placed and have little transference to a new airframe if they should be cannibal-ized. In most cases, the ease with which a cruise missile can be built leads a proliferant to build a new missile from scratch rather than attempting to adapt these older missiles for WMD delivery.

Even if the missiles do not pose a significant threat, some aspects of their manufacturing base may migrate to more capable missiles and require close scrutiny. Missiles that contain small turbojet engines can be canni-balized, and the engines can be used in more threatening applications. A proliferant can also glean the knowledge to build these turbojets by reverse engineering the engines or setting up indigenous co-production facilities. Examples of exported missiles with small turbojet engines include the British Sea Eagle and the Chinese HY-4. Israel is offering an upgraded Gabriel, which features the latest in propulsion technology, to overseas customers. Other missiles in this class include the U.S. Harpoon, the Swedish RBS-15, the Soviet SS-N-3, the Soviet SS-N-21, and the Otomat Mark-II. Cruise missiles that have immediate application to nuclear, chemical, and biological delivery include the U.S. Tomahawk and ACM, the Russian SSN-21, the AS-15, and the French Apache.

Harpoons have been exported to 19 countries, including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. India has received Sea Eagles, while Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea have Silkworms and Seersuckers, a version of which North Korea now manufactures. Italy has Kormorans, and Taiwan, South Africa, Chile, Ec-uador, Kenya, Singapore, and Thailand have Gabriel Mark-IIs. Italy has exported turbojet powered Otomats to Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, while the Swedes exported the RBS-15 to Yugoslavia and Finland. In addition, the Soviets sold the long-range (500 km, 850 kg) turbojet powered “Shad-dock” to Syria and Yugoslavia. At the next notch down in technological capability, the Soviets have flooded the world market with 1960’s-generation liquid-fueled “Styx” (SS-N-2C) missiles. Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia have the Styx missile in their inventories.

As the list of customers for the Styx demonstrates, the cost of a cruise missile is within the financial resources of even the most basic defense budgets. Even highly capable cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk only cost around $1.5 million per copy. This cost reflects the most advanced avionics systems and TERCOM guidance. At least one congressional study has shown that with the substitution of GPS, a proliferant could build a cruise missile with a range and payload capability roughly equivalent to the Tomahawk, for about $250,000. Unlike production of the heavy bomber, many countries have the economic resources and technical base to produce this kind of delivery system indigenously.

Subsystems

Though the sale of complete systems on the world market is a concern, that threat is much smaller than the possibility that a country could indigenously design and build a capable cruise missile by cannibalizing other systems for parts it cannot build on its own. Of particular concern are components and parts that reduce the cost of the mis-sile in serial production, reduce the cost of position mapping navigation systems, and increase the range of these missiles.

Navigation and guidance continues to be the pacing item in threatening cruise missile development. The Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) is a derivative of the Harpoon and contains in its nose a video camera that acts as a terminal guidance sys-tem. If a proliferant adopts this technology and can position a transmitter and receiver within line-of-sight to the missile from anywhere in the theater, it can dispense with the need for any other kind of guidance system. Israel has developed a capable guid-ance system that can be used in this application.

The next major subsystem component that enhances the capability of a cruise missile is the powerplant. The United States pursued the cruise missile long before the development of the first lightweight engine technology, so this is not a critical path item towards developing a cruise missile. Still, more capable engines increase the threat of a cruise missile. First, they reduce the RCS of the missile. Next, they in-crease the range by reducing the drag and power required for control surface actuation. Finally, they reduce other flight signatures, such as infrared cross-section and acoustic emission, that might be exploited in a defense network.
Cruise Missiles

Cruise Missiles of the World
Link: http://www.missilethreat.com/cruise/pageID.140/default.asp

 

[DaRk WaVe]

good choices, Emo Girl

You aren't planning to go militant or genocidal on us, are you

Come to Kurram Agency when things in FATA are peaceful again. Nothing better in life than taza-naan roti, roasted lamb, and some good hunting!

Inshallah

But First i will go to Swat