09/12/1971 | Submarine PNS Hangor Sinks INS Khukri.
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MilSpec
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some of the other events of 1971 naval duals related to the INS khukri sinking
The IAF aircraft damaged the Rajshahi, while Comilla sunk on 4 December.
On December 5, the IAF sank two patrol boats in Khulna.
The PNS Sylhet was destroyed on December 6 and the Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. On 11 December, the PNS Jessore was destroyed, while Rajshahi was repaired.
Rajashahi under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Shikder Hayat managed to evade the Indian blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16
The Indian Navy's Eastern Naval Command had effectively applied a naval blockade which also completely isolated East-Pakistan's Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports.
The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, along with her escort LST ships INS Guldar, INS Gharial, INS Magar, and the submarine INS Khanderi, executed their operations independently.
On December 4 of 1971, the INS Vikrant, the aircraft carrier, was also deployed in which its Hawker Sea Hawk attack aircraft contributed in Air Operations in East Pakistan. The aircraft successfully attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. The continuous attacks later destroyed the PAF's capability to retaliate.
The INS Rajput's sonar radar reported the disturbance underwater and two depth charges were released. The deadly game ended when the submarine sank mysteriously while laying a mine with all 92 hands on board around midnight on 3 December 1971 off the Vishakapatnam coast.
On 5/6 December 1971, naval air operations were carried out Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations were destroyed at Chittagong, and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage.
On December 12, additional amphibious battalion was aboard on INS Vishwa Vijaya was sailed from Calcutta port. On the night of December 15/16, the amphibious landing was carried out, immediately after IAF bombardment of the beach a day earlier.
On 4 December, the Indian Navy, equipped with P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles, launched Operation Trident against the port of Karachi.
The Indian missile ships successfully sunk the minesweeper PNS Muhafiz,
the destroyer PNS Khaibarand the MV Venus Challenger which,according to indian sources,was carrying ammunition for pakistan from the United States forces in Saigon.
The destroyer PNS Shah Jahan was damaged beyond repair.
The missile ships also bombed the Kemari oil storage tanks of the port which were burnt and destroyed causing massive loss to the Karachi Harbour.
Operation Trident was an enormous success with no physical damage to any of the ships in the Indian task group, which returned safely to their garrison.
Pakistan Airforce retaliated to these attacks by bombing Okha harbour scoring direct hits on fuelling facilities for missile boats, ammunition dump and the missile boats jetty. Indians were ready for this and had already moved the missile boats to other locations to prevent any losses.But the destruction of the special fuel tank prevented any further incursions until Operation Python. On the way back from the bombing the PAF aircraft encountered an Alize 203 Indian aircraft and shot it down.
On December 6, a false alarm by a Pakistani Fokker aircraft carrying naval observers caused a friendly fire confrontation between Pakistan's Navy and Air Force. A PAF jet mistakenly strafed the frigate PNS Zulfikar, breaking off shortly after the ship got itself recognized by frantic efforts.
The Indian Navy launched a second large-scale operation on the midnight of December 8 and December 9 of 1971. The INS Vinash, a missile boat, and two multipurpose frigates, INS Talwar and INS Trishul participated in the operation. The attack squadron approached Karachi and fired four missiles. During the raid, the Panamanian vessel Gulf Star and the British ship SS Harmattan were sunk and Pakistan Navy's Fleet Tanker PNS Dacca received heavy damage.More than 50% of Karachi's total fuel reserves were destroyed in the attack. More than $3 billion worth of economic and social sector damage was inflicted by the Indian Navy. Most of Karachi's oil reserves were lost and warehouses and naval workshops destroyed. The operation damaged the Pakistani economy and hindered the Pakistan Navy's operations along the western coast.
The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi and ten smaller vessels were captured.Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka. According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, the Pakistan Navy lost a third of its force in the war.
The IAF aircraft damaged the Rajshahi, while Comilla sunk on 4 December.
On December 5, the IAF sank two patrol boats in Khulna.
The PNS Sylhet was destroyed on December 6 and the Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. On 11 December, the PNS Jessore was destroyed, while Rajshahi was repaired.
Rajashahi under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Shikder Hayat managed to evade the Indian blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16
The Indian Navy's Eastern Naval Command had effectively applied a naval blockade which also completely isolated East-Pakistan's Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports.
The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, along with her escort LST ships INS Guldar, INS Gharial, INS Magar, and the submarine INS Khanderi, executed their operations independently.
On December 4 of 1971, the INS Vikrant, the aircraft carrier, was also deployed in which its Hawker Sea Hawk attack aircraft contributed in Air Operations in East Pakistan. The aircraft successfully attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. The continuous attacks later destroyed the PAF's capability to retaliate.
The INS Rajput's sonar radar reported the disturbance underwater and two depth charges were released. The deadly game ended when the submarine sank mysteriously while laying a mine with all 92 hands on board around midnight on 3 December 1971 off the Vishakapatnam coast.
On 5/6 December 1971, naval air operations were carried out Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations were destroyed at Chittagong, and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage.
On December 12, additional amphibious battalion was aboard on INS Vishwa Vijaya was sailed from Calcutta port. On the night of December 15/16, the amphibious landing was carried out, immediately after IAF bombardment of the beach a day earlier.
On 4 December, the Indian Navy, equipped with P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles, launched Operation Trident against the port of Karachi.
The Indian missile ships successfully sunk the minesweeper PNS Muhafiz,
the destroyer PNS Khaibarand the MV Venus Challenger which,according to indian sources,was carrying ammunition for pakistan from the United States forces in Saigon.
The destroyer PNS Shah Jahan was damaged beyond repair.
The missile ships also bombed the Kemari oil storage tanks of the port which were burnt and destroyed causing massive loss to the Karachi Harbour.
Operation Trident was an enormous success with no physical damage to any of the ships in the Indian task group, which returned safely to their garrison.
Pakistan Airforce retaliated to these attacks by bombing Okha harbour scoring direct hits on fuelling facilities for missile boats, ammunition dump and the missile boats jetty. Indians were ready for this and had already moved the missile boats to other locations to prevent any losses.But the destruction of the special fuel tank prevented any further incursions until Operation Python. On the way back from the bombing the PAF aircraft encountered an Alize 203 Indian aircraft and shot it down.
On December 6, a false alarm by a Pakistani Fokker aircraft carrying naval observers caused a friendly fire confrontation between Pakistan's Navy and Air Force. A PAF jet mistakenly strafed the frigate PNS Zulfikar, breaking off shortly after the ship got itself recognized by frantic efforts.
The Indian Navy launched a second large-scale operation on the midnight of December 8 and December 9 of 1971. The INS Vinash, a missile boat, and two multipurpose frigates, INS Talwar and INS Trishul participated in the operation. The attack squadron approached Karachi and fired four missiles. During the raid, the Panamanian vessel Gulf Star and the British ship SS Harmattan were sunk and Pakistan Navy's Fleet Tanker PNS Dacca received heavy damage.More than 50% of Karachi's total fuel reserves were destroyed in the attack. More than $3 billion worth of economic and social sector damage was inflicted by the Indian Navy. Most of Karachi's oil reserves were lost and warehouses and naval workshops destroyed. The operation damaged the Pakistani economy and hindered the Pakistan Navy's operations along the western coast.
The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi and ten smaller vessels were captured.Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka. According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, the Pakistan Navy lost a third of its force in the war.
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These guys open a thread on the only thing they could sink of the IN. If we opened a thread each for all the casualties their Navy got, we would have to open 200 new threads
ajtr
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During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla was commanding a task force of two ships which was assigned to destroy enemy submarines. On 9th December 1971, INS Khukri of the task force, was hit by torpedoes fired from a Pakistan Navy submarine. The ship could not be saved and Captain Mulla decided to abandon the ship. Unmindful of his personal safety he arranged for the rescue of the ship's crew. Displaying great courage and presence of mind, he continued with the rescue operations even when the ship was about to sink. Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla was last seen on the bridge going down with the ship....
ajtr
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The warship's sunken secret
Indian Navy locates INS Khukri sunk during 1971 Indo-Pak war
December 9, 1971. The Indian Navy had just fired the first two devastating salvos of the Indo-Pak war, launching missile attacks on Karachi, sinking and crippling Pakistani warships and merchantmen and setting the port ablaze. Hundreds of miles south of this naval battle, off Diu, two anti-submarine frigates had been sent on a mission to search and destroy a Pakistani submarine lurking in the vicinity.
Shortly after 8 p.m., Shiv Bhagwan, a sailor on watch duty on the frigate INS Kirpan, looked out to his left and saw the Kirpan's sister ship INS Khukri cruising in the pitch black night with her lights switched off. But he wasn't the only one looking.
Five kilometres away, some 60 m under water, commander Ahmad Tasneem of the Pakistan Navy submarine Hangor had picked up the two Indian ships on his sonar and was closing in for the kill. The hunter was about to become the hunted.
The Hangor fired its first torpedo which sped on a straight course towards the Kirpan, passing under the ship without exploding. The Hangor then fired a second torpedo which hit the side of the Khukri and exploded.
Within minutes her bow pulled out of the water as sea water gushed into the gaping hole left by the torpedo, and then the ship began to slide into the water. There was panic. Even as the crew of the Khukri leapt overboard, the Hangor fired a third torpedo at the Kirpan. Deftly avoiding it, the Kirpan dashed away into the night.
One hundred and ninety-four crewmen, including the Khukri's captain Mahendra Nath Mulla, died that night. Only 67 could be pulled out of the sea when the Kirpan returned the following morning. For 33 years since that fateful night, the Khukri has continued to be the nation's sorrow.
India's single largest wartime casualty lies at the sandy bottom of the Arabian Sea, covered by a thick layer of silt deposited on it over three decades. This was perhaps one reason why at least three expeditions in the past five years could not locate her.
This included the most exhaustive attempt at locating the wreck when the survey ship INS Investigator accompanied the diving ship INS Nireekshak in 1999. Divers were sent to the bottom but they found nothing on the vast featureless desert of the seabed.
Then, between February 4 and 6 this year, the navy's hydrographic survey ship INS Jamuna was dispatched to search for the Khukri. The survey ship deployed its side scan sonar-a 4-ft-long cylindrical metal "fish" that is towed behind the ship and emits ultrasonic waves to give a picture of the sea bottom.
One of the images thus obtained was of a huge silt covered hump on the seabed 80 m below the sea surface. It was close to the Khukri's last reported position, more than 40 km south of Diu. It was no ordinary lump of silt as the magnetometer which ran over it confirmed the presence of steel inside. The object was nearly 300ft long, had a north-east south-west orientation and seemed to be sitting on its keel with its mast sticking out of the silt.
"The orientation, length and breadth of the sonar image lead us to believe that we have the Khukri," says a senior naval officer. The exact location of the wreck is being kept a secret to protect it from private divers as the navy debates what exactly it wants to do with the wreck: dive and explore, or leave it undisturbed.
How significant was the sinking of the Khukri? For one, it prevented the western fleet from launching a third debilitating missile attack on Karachi. All fleet assets were instead thrown into Operation Falcon, the unsuccessful hunt for the Hangor which lasted till the war ended.
The Khukri's sinking, one of only two warships to be sunk by a submarine since World War II, has heavily influenced naval strategies on both sides. While Pakistan's navy has continued to invest heavily in submarines, the Indian Navy has accorded priority to the anti-submarine warfare capability of its surface ships.
To be able to even see the wreck of the 1,500 tonne frigate, divers would first have to clear the silt using water jets. This is where concerns have been raised by a section of the naval brass. The wreck is a war grave holding the remains of crewmen.
Diving and clearing the silt would mean disturbing the grave. Admiral S.M. Nanda, who was navy chief when the ship sank, firmly says, "Leave the Khukri as she is."
Vice-Admiral Vinod Pasricha, however, advocates raising the wreck. "After all, the Russian submarine Kursk too was raised. Such an operation can give us insights into salvaging a sunken warship."
There are questions that require answers. "We know she was torpedoed but you must remember that warships are built for watertight integrity. Even with one hit she should have been able to limp back to port," says former chief of navy staff Admiral Ram Tahiliani.
But the Khukri did not. She went down quickly leaving mysteries relating to its sinking: where exactly did the torpedo strike the fatal blow? And how did a ship at action stations-which meant all watertight compartments were shut to prevent flooding-flood and sink so quickly after a single hit?
"One must never disturb the dead," says Admiral O.S. Dawson, former chief of naval staff. "However, it is worth sending a recce dive to see where and how much damage was caused by the torpedo."
The knowledge gained from such an expedition could potentially outweigh sentimental sacrilege by influencing future ship building, particularly regarding the watertight integrity of surface ships. The Khukri, in its death, could well be the source of some life saving lessons.
Indian Navy locates INS Khukri sunk during 1971 Indo-Pak war
December 9, 1971. The Indian Navy had just fired the first two devastating salvos of the Indo-Pak war, launching missile attacks on Karachi, sinking and crippling Pakistani warships and merchantmen and setting the port ablaze. Hundreds of miles south of this naval battle, off Diu, two anti-submarine frigates had been sent on a mission to search and destroy a Pakistani submarine lurking in the vicinity.
Shortly after 8 p.m., Shiv Bhagwan, a sailor on watch duty on the frigate INS Kirpan, looked out to his left and saw the Kirpan's sister ship INS Khukri cruising in the pitch black night with her lights switched off. But he wasn't the only one looking.
Five kilometres away, some 60 m under water, commander Ahmad Tasneem of the Pakistan Navy submarine Hangor had picked up the two Indian ships on his sonar and was closing in for the kill. The hunter was about to become the hunted.
The Hangor fired its first torpedo which sped on a straight course towards the Kirpan, passing under the ship without exploding. The Hangor then fired a second torpedo which hit the side of the Khukri and exploded.
Within minutes her bow pulled out of the water as sea water gushed into the gaping hole left by the torpedo, and then the ship began to slide into the water. There was panic. Even as the crew of the Khukri leapt overboard, the Hangor fired a third torpedo at the Kirpan. Deftly avoiding it, the Kirpan dashed away into the night.
One hundred and ninety-four crewmen, including the Khukri's captain Mahendra Nath Mulla, died that night. Only 67 could be pulled out of the sea when the Kirpan returned the following morning. For 33 years since that fateful night, the Khukri has continued to be the nation's sorrow.
India's single largest wartime casualty lies at the sandy bottom of the Arabian Sea, covered by a thick layer of silt deposited on it over three decades. This was perhaps one reason why at least three expeditions in the past five years could not locate her.
This included the most exhaustive attempt at locating the wreck when the survey ship INS Investigator accompanied the diving ship INS Nireekshak in 1999. Divers were sent to the bottom but they found nothing on the vast featureless desert of the seabed.
Then, between February 4 and 6 this year, the navy's hydrographic survey ship INS Jamuna was dispatched to search for the Khukri. The survey ship deployed its side scan sonar-a 4-ft-long cylindrical metal "fish" that is towed behind the ship and emits ultrasonic waves to give a picture of the sea bottom.
One of the images thus obtained was of a huge silt covered hump on the seabed 80 m below the sea surface. It was close to the Khukri's last reported position, more than 40 km south of Diu. It was no ordinary lump of silt as the magnetometer which ran over it confirmed the presence of steel inside. The object was nearly 300ft long, had a north-east south-west orientation and seemed to be sitting on its keel with its mast sticking out of the silt.
"The orientation, length and breadth of the sonar image lead us to believe that we have the Khukri," says a senior naval officer. The exact location of the wreck is being kept a secret to protect it from private divers as the navy debates what exactly it wants to do with the wreck: dive and explore, or leave it undisturbed.
How significant was the sinking of the Khukri? For one, it prevented the western fleet from launching a third debilitating missile attack on Karachi. All fleet assets were instead thrown into Operation Falcon, the unsuccessful hunt for the Hangor which lasted till the war ended.
The Khukri's sinking, one of only two warships to be sunk by a submarine since World War II, has heavily influenced naval strategies on both sides. While Pakistan's navy has continued to invest heavily in submarines, the Indian Navy has accorded priority to the anti-submarine warfare capability of its surface ships.
To be able to even see the wreck of the 1,500 tonne frigate, divers would first have to clear the silt using water jets. This is where concerns have been raised by a section of the naval brass. The wreck is a war grave holding the remains of crewmen.
Diving and clearing the silt would mean disturbing the grave. Admiral S.M. Nanda, who was navy chief when the ship sank, firmly says, "Leave the Khukri as she is."
Vice-Admiral Vinod Pasricha, however, advocates raising the wreck. "After all, the Russian submarine Kursk too was raised. Such an operation can give us insights into salvaging a sunken warship."
There are questions that require answers. "We know she was torpedoed but you must remember that warships are built for watertight integrity. Even with one hit she should have been able to limp back to port," says former chief of navy staff Admiral Ram Tahiliani.
But the Khukri did not. She went down quickly leaving mysteries relating to its sinking: where exactly did the torpedo strike the fatal blow? And how did a ship at action stations-which meant all watertight compartments were shut to prevent flooding-flood and sink so quickly after a single hit?
"One must never disturb the dead," says Admiral O.S. Dawson, former chief of naval staff. "However, it is worth sending a recce dive to see where and how much damage was caused by the torpedo."
The knowledge gained from such an expedition could potentially outweigh sentimental sacrilege by influencing future ship building, particularly regarding the watertight integrity of surface ships. The Khukri, in its death, could well be the source of some life saving lessons.
Bilsher007
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Proud of PAkistan Navy, Pakistan Armed forces Paindabaad...Pakistan Zindbaad !
ajtr
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We sank the Khukri
Sinking of India’s Antisubmarine Frigate INS Khukri
By Rear admiral R Qadri, SJ (Retd)
November 20, 1971 was a holiday and so was 21 November – two whole days “free” during the difficult days of turmoil in East Pakistan. It was Eid-al-Azha, time for sacrificial offering of animals, of family get-togethers and of feasting and sharing of joys. However, 1971 was not to be a year for such celebrations for us. The Indians had decided that 1971 was their year of the “opportunity of the century” and they were not about to miss the opportunity.
INS Khukri, the first anti-submarine frigate sunk by a submarine after WWII
It was already apparent to any thinking person keeping track of the unfolding events that with each passing day, he day of decision was drawing nearer. The Indians had to intervene in East Pakistan during that winter or miss the “opportunity of the century” forever.
PN Submarine Ghazi had been dispatched only a few days earlier to the Bay of Bengal for operations in that distant area, should the need arise. The mission assigned was difficult and dangerous but the submarine had sailed out in a blaze of glory with the battle cries of Allah-Ho-Akbar little knowing that this was to be its last mission.
I was at that time the Electrical Officer of PN submarine Hangor and therefore before going home for two days Eid holidays had made sure, as is the practice, that everything was ready in case the submarine was required to proceed to sea at short notice. Except for attending the congregational Eid prayers, I had decided to stay at home. There was no visiting relatives or friends, only a quiet day at home, knowing that the Indians always preferred days or events of National or religious importance to launch their attacks.
Eid day passed off quietly, but on the evening of second day of Eid my front gate bell rang. Thinking it might be a visitor, I went to open the front gate, but on seeing a naval police patrolman standing there, realization at once dawned that the time of waiting and uncertainty was over and that time had finally come for the submarine Hangor to put to sea.
This was confirmed by the patrolman. I therefore quickly changed into uniform, picked up the small handbag which was already packed for such an eventuality and with a quick goodbye to wife and children sped away at breakneck speed towards the Submarine Base – praying all the way to be granted enough time to enable our submarine to put to sea before hostilities commenced in the Western theatre of war also.
On reaching the Submarine Base, I found that those submariners who lived nearer or had been contacted earlier had already reported for duty, while others like me were just arriving. The fact that not a single officer or sailor wasted a single second in reporting for duty, and every single one of them reported promptly, showed that without being told, every submariner had the same thought in mind and had kept himself ready for this eventuality.
As each member of Hangor’s crew arrived on board, he knew exactly what had to be done in terms of final preparations, and set about doing it. Family, friends and festival were all forgotten – only the mission and the task at hand mattered. It was a good team, disciplined and well trained and needed no guidance.
The daredevil crew of PNS Hangor that hunted INS Khukri
After the sailing-orders had been received, all the submarines, with their identification numbers painted out slipped silently from their berths one by one, as their departure times came, to proceed separately to their respective patrol areas. From now on hey would be on their own, without contact with the outside world except to periodically receive, and that too only when possible, radioed instructions from Naval Headquarters. They themselves could not contact the outside world and, in order not to compromise their location, would have to maintain complete radio silence, except to pass an extremely important message.
Once the submarines were in their patrol areas, all contacts if classified as warships or submarines, were to be considered hostile. From now on life would be a constant effort to stay one jump ahead of the enemy. Every emission and every noise, be it electro-magnetic, sonic or ultra-sonic would have to be checked, measured, plotted, analysed and evaluated. On this would depend whether you were the attacker or the attacked in this deadly game.
PNS Hangor, meaning Shark, proved itself to be true to its name in 1971 war with India
Once Hangor had cleared the Manora breakwater, on the way to its patrol area, ships company automatically fell into its usual three watch system, with one watch on duty and two watches “off”. This would now be the constant routine except when “action stations” were closed up or during other emergencies when everybody would be closed up at his allocated station, depending on the type of emergency.
I found myself in the “off” watch at this stage and therefore, after checking once again that everything was shipshape in my department, I turned in to take some rest before my own watch which would be in the middle of the night.
While lying in my bunk, I could not help reflecting back on that cold, grey and gloomy early morning of November 1969 at Brest, France, when I happened to be standing on the gates of a submarine pen in which Hangor had been docked. I still remember the deadly appearance its sleek, black hull presented with the sharp lines of its vertical rudders, the horizontal planes and stabilizers sticking out like the fins of shark, and saying to myself: “God help those who fall prey to this deadly submarine”. Well! Hangor, the shark, was now loose at last, fully armed and hunting for real prey. No more exercises. All e training was behind. It was now the real thing – kill or be killed. In submarine warfare there isn’t much room for any other choice once the battle is joined, especially when an anti-submarine force itself is one of the targets.
Hangor reached it’s patrol area without encountering any enemy units, though a lot of air activity was seen and frantic communication traffic intercepted. Until 2 December Hangor operated in various areas, as ordered by Naval Headquarters, sometimes encountering small vessels such as ferries and dhows and some merchant ships. Indian warships generally remained out of the area, except for some close inshore patrolling by their small frigates and patrol craft in shallow waters out of reach of the submarine.
Late in the afternoon of 2 December Hangor’s sensors picked up a number of radar emissions from the direction of Bombay harbour. These emissions were analysed and were correctly identified as transmissions of radars fitted on certain Indian warships. It was also correctly appreciated, taking various factors into account, that this presaged imminent sailing out of the Indian Western Fleet. A little latter a sudden jump in the strength of the radar emissions was again correctly appreciated to indicate that the Indian fleet had indeed sailed out of harbour. Hangor, thereafter, kept close watch on it, tracking it be radar emissions as well as the propeller H.E. (Hydrophone Effect) of ships.
At about 2340, when the strength of the radar emissions indicated that the Indian fleet was within our radar range, the radar mast was raised and a radar sweep was taken from periscope depth. This radar sweep clearly painted ten enemy contacts. On the radar screen a clear picture could be seen of four ships of the main body in the centre of the formation being screened by six units around it.
Hangor having estimated the enemy’s course and speed found itself ahead of the approaching enemy, and set course to intercept. Finally, with “action stations” closed up and with all torpedoes ready for launch, Hangor managed to penetrate the anti-submarine screen and ended up between the main-body and its protective screen, in an ideal position to attack both and could have played havoc with the Indian Fleet.
All the crew’s preparations and training had been for this moment. Had the rules of engagement permitted, we could have fired torpedoes at the enemy units as fast as we could line up the sight on each target. But the enemy was just about to be granted a reprieve, for all submarines had sailed out with strict orders not to engage the enemy unless fired upon first or till these orders were cancelled by Naval Headquarters. There had been no change in these orders, and therefore all that Hangor could do was to pass under the enemy ships and then break radio silence to make an enemy contact report to Naval Headquarters. It was one of the most frustrating experience that a submariner can go through. It was even more frustrating to learn later on that hostilities had commenced in the Western theatre on 3 December, within a few hours of the submarine’s encounter with the Indian fleet.
The Indian Fleet had a close call and Hangor missed a golden opportunity but, after restrictions on engaging enemy units were lifted, its crew became even more determined to ensure that no enemy units in its patrol area escaped unscathed. However, the submarine’s tribulations were not yet over and one of the cooling pumps on board broke down. Without repairs to this pump it would not be possible to continue its war patrol. But repairs to this pump involved shutting down the main air conditioning plant of the submarine and lifting and removing its compressor motor to gain access to the defective pump.
Repairs to the pump itself were not much of a problem but removal of the air conditioning plant compressor motor was a different matter entirely, posing many serious problems.
In a submarine, owing to lack of space, machinery is closely packed so that access to machines fitted close to the hull is only possible after removal of the intervening machinery in a specific sequence. Also, due to lack of space, certain heavier machines can only be lifted and moved after cutting the “soft” deck plates above the machine and then re-welding the plates back after the repairs are completed. The AC compressor motor was one such machine.
Even during peacetime in harbour with all dockyard facilities available, the task would have taken approximately a week to complete. We now had to choose either to return to harbour for repairs – which everyone on board realized would effectively put the submarine out of the war or attempts to effect repairs at sea in enemy waters with none of the dockyard facilities at hand. In case it was decided to effect repairs at sea, there was a further question of whether to carry out repairs with the submarine completely submerged or partly surfaced. Detection by enemy aircraft in the middle of repairs would necessitate crash dive by the submarine, with the possibility of the detached heavy compressor motor causing further damage to material and men. Also, the repairs had to be completed in hours rather than days or weeks.
Hangor’s crew were a determined lot. They did not want to sit out the war in the safety of Karachi harbour and had a tradition of accepting challenges. It was therefore decided to carry out the repairs at sea. Carrying out repairs at sea with the submarine completely submerged and the air conditioning plant shut down was not possible as not only the heat inside the submarine would be unbearable for the crew, but also the rise in humidity would lead to problems in the very important electronic equipment due to condensation of water vapour on sensitive circuits. It was, therefore, decided to take a risk and work with the submarine partially surfaced. A sharp lookout was to be maintained for enemy aircraft and surface units and at the first sign of the enemy, the submarine was to dive.
Once the decision was taken, work was commenced in right earnest and continued without break. The spirit of the crew had to be seen to be believed. Everybody from the commanding officer to the junior most sailor was involved in the work in one way or the other. If the requirement was to keep a look out for the enemy, the sharpest eyes and ears were constantly at it. If any thing was required by the repair team, it was promptly provided if available, if not, it was improvised. Those who could not contribute by their technical knowledge contributed with their muscle power, and those who could not even contribute in this way, maintained a constant flow of nourishment in the form of tea and water to those working cramped in tight corners, soaked in the oily bilge water. There was no distinction by branch or seniority, everyone contributed in whatever way he could.
The impossible had finally became possible and, even under the most hazardous conditions faced by Hangor, the repairs were completed in under 48 hours. Everybody heaved a sigh of relief when the submarine was able to submerge completely once again, with the repaired pump working satisfactorily and the air conditioning plant back in operation. Like a true shark, Hangor was back on the hunt once again, having effected repairs in the enemy’s own backyard.
Hangor’s crew had worked hard and made many sacrifices. While at sea none of them had any idea of what their near and dear ones faced back on shore. Everyone of them had responded to the call to duty without hesitation. Even he Eid holidays had been spent in the waiting. The cool pleasant days of November and December, when officers and men would normally be thinking of annual leave to go north, were spent in this deadly game of hide and seek. Surely it was an act of God that our sacrifices did not go unrewarded.
The reward came in the form of two distant contacts early on the morning of 9 December 1971. Analysis of the contacts had already established that they were two warships equipped with radars and sonars. But their speed and course were such that the much slower submarine could not catch up with them. They were, however, tracked and by the afternoon the analysis of their behaviour indicated that they were doing a rectangular anti-submarine search. The two contacts were thus appreciated to be two anti-submarine frigates engaged in SAU (Search and Attack Unit) operations.
It was therefore decided to wait for the ships at a selected point on their search pattern, rather than chasing them all over the place. This strategy paid off as the two contacts started closing, late in the evening. Course and speed of the submarine was adjusted to ensure being in a position to attack at a time of our own choosing.
By 1900 Hangor was waiting on the estimated rack of the targets. Everyone on board already knew what was happening and there was an air of expectancy everywhere. The targets were still behaving as anticipated and range was steadily closing with both frigates still operating their sonars. “Action Stations” was therefore sounded at 1915. The “shark” had bared it’s teeth, and it’s moment of truth had come. Next few minutes would permanently seal the fate of one of the two frigates.
Though the enemy was operating sonar, Hangor had not been detected and therefore still enjoyed the advantage of surprise. She knew too well that failure to hit the enemy at first attempt would shift the balance of advantage completely in favour of the two anti-submarine frigates. Hangor had to hit the enemy first, and hit hard at the first attempt.
Already the factor of shallow depth (60-65 meters) in the area was working in favour of the enemy as the submarine did not have much room to maneuver in the vertical plane to avoid enemy’s depth charges, should that be necessary.
Outside, it was dark, the sunset already having taken place. It was, therefore, decided to go deep and to carry out a blind (Sonar only) approach and attack. The attack team now concentrated on tracking the two targets as they gradually came within firing range. (After the war, these two targets were identified as INS Kirpan and INS Khukri. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight we can henceforth refer to all three participants in the unfolding drama by their proper names.)
After having obtained a perfect solution Hangor commenced the attack at 1957 by firing one homing torpedo, “down the throat” at the more northerly target, which was INS Kirpan. The torpedo ran true and it was tracked on sonar all the way as it acquired “lock on” to the target and passed under it (as it was supposed to do). However, the newly acquired torpedoes, whose test facilities had not yet been set up, failed to explode and kept going. Until the time that the torpedo was fired neither of the two frigates had any inkling of being under attack. However, the moment the torpedo passed under INS Kirpan, she suddenly woke up, realized she was under attack and turned away at maximum speed. Hangor had struck first, but had failed to hit hard. The new torpedo had let it down.
The advantage had now shifted completely in favour of the enemy. If the enemy had kept their cool, it is difficult to say what would have been the final outcome. Perhaps, this article would not have been written in such detail. But one thing is sure – the fate of INS Khukri would still have been what it was.
As Kirpan turned away and ran, Khukri, which was to its south, now knowing the direction from which the torpedo had come, increased speed and came straight for an attack on Hangor.
It was now Hangor’s turn to keep it’s cool – and this, the submarine did well. As Khukri came in for attack, Hangor’s attack team calmly shifted target to Khukri, obtained a quick solution and fired the second torpedo at it. This quick shot was mostly meant to spoil he attack by Khukri, however loss of nerve by Khukri’s Commanding Officer on hearing the oncoming torpedo, made him try to turn away from it. This greatly helped to “pull” the torpedo towards the frigate. As soon as the torpedo acquired “lock on” it went straight for the target, passed under it and when it was directly under the keel it exploded, breaking the keel of INS Khukri which sank in a matter of two minutes, with all hands on board. There were no survivors. There was simply no time for the myth of the “CO nonchalantly lighting a cigarette as the ship sank under him” to be enacted.
The poor captain of INS Khukri (now a mythical figure in India) who was not even (surprisingly) wearing a life jacket on an action station state of alert.
The sinking of Khukri had now made the balance of advantage even between Hangor and Kirpan and the action had not yet finished.
Seeing its sister ship sink in such a short time must have been a nerve shattering experience for the Kirpan’s Commanding Officer, for he came charging in for an emergency attack, fired off a pattern of depth charges, hoping to scare Hangor away into breaking off its attack. But when he found that the Hangor was not intimidated and instead had fired the third torpedo at Kirpan, he broke off the attack just as quickly and ran “hell for leather” in panic trying to outrun the torpedo locked on to the frigates tail. That was the last seen (actually heard) of her.
INS Kirpan, the lucky survivor of PNS Hangor’s misfired torpedo
Hangor, the shark, had struck first. It had struck hard in the second attempt, and in the third attempt the surviving enemy frigate had been left worrying about the “torpedo locked on to its tail”.
What followed this action was a massive anti-submarine effort by the Indian Navy, in the form of Operation Falcon to hunt down and kill just one submarine, PNS/M Hangor. The operation was launched shortly after the sinking of the Khukri, on the night of 9 December and continued for four days till the night of 13 December.
During these four days, the Indian Navy utilized all available anti-submarine ships, Alize (Specialized anti-submarine naval aircraft), shore-based surveillance aircraft and Sea King anti-submarine helicopters in HUK Groups (Hunter-Killer Groups) and combed an area extending from the point southwest of Diu Head, where Khukri was sunk, right upto a point just short of PAF’s air-strike range from Karachi.
Details of Operation Falcon are given in the book ‘War in The Indian Ocean’ written by Vice Admiral (Retd) Roy, IN.
In fact, indirectly Hangor was responsible for another loss to the Indian Navy, for according to Admiral Roy, during Operation Falcon, the Indian Navy also lost an Alize anti-submarine aircraft at sea with all three of its crew.
What Vice Admiral (Retd) Roy has not mentioned is the number of anti-submarine charges fired, on hat the HUK groups thought was Hangor. In the submarine itself 24 salvoes (each of three charges) on 10 December and 12 salvoes on 12 December were registered. The latter depth charging took place after Indian Navy’s shore stations had taken cross bearings on Hangor’s radio message to Naval Headquarters regarding the action.
Throughout these four days Hangor remained completely aware of the huge effort underway (though the details of Operation Falcon as such were known only after the war) and it is a measure of Hangor’s efficiency that in spite of leaving the action area with a highly depleted battery, and with such a massive hunt for her in progress, she managed not only to recharge her batteries but was able to successfully lay a false trail for the HUK groups to follow. How successful the false trail was, can be judged from the fact that of the more than 36 salvoes fired, only two slightly shook the submarine. Most being far away and could just be heard on sonar. In spite of this, the Indians claimed to have sunk the Hangor a number of times between 9 and 13 December.
By now, the submarine had been at sea for over 21 days and, though the body odours of the crew were getting stronger and the unshaven hair on their chins longer, their morale was sky high. They had just been through the ultimate test as submariners, both collectively as well as individually. They all knew in their own hearts how they had stood the test, and they were satisfied.
The hunter-killer Submarine PNS Hangor now placed in Naval Museum, Karachi
Sinking of India’s Antisubmarine Frigate INS Khukri
By Rear admiral R Qadri, SJ (Retd)
November 20, 1971 was a holiday and so was 21 November – two whole days “free” during the difficult days of turmoil in East Pakistan. It was Eid-al-Azha, time for sacrificial offering of animals, of family get-togethers and of feasting and sharing of joys. However, 1971 was not to be a year for such celebrations for us. The Indians had decided that 1971 was their year of the “opportunity of the century” and they were not about to miss the opportunity.
INS Khukri, the first anti-submarine frigate sunk by a submarine after WWII
It was already apparent to any thinking person keeping track of the unfolding events that with each passing day, he day of decision was drawing nearer. The Indians had to intervene in East Pakistan during that winter or miss the “opportunity of the century” forever.
PN Submarine Ghazi had been dispatched only a few days earlier to the Bay of Bengal for operations in that distant area, should the need arise. The mission assigned was difficult and dangerous but the submarine had sailed out in a blaze of glory with the battle cries of Allah-Ho-Akbar little knowing that this was to be its last mission.
I was at that time the Electrical Officer of PN submarine Hangor and therefore before going home for two days Eid holidays had made sure, as is the practice, that everything was ready in case the submarine was required to proceed to sea at short notice. Except for attending the congregational Eid prayers, I had decided to stay at home. There was no visiting relatives or friends, only a quiet day at home, knowing that the Indians always preferred days or events of National or religious importance to launch their attacks.
Eid day passed off quietly, but on the evening of second day of Eid my front gate bell rang. Thinking it might be a visitor, I went to open the front gate, but on seeing a naval police patrolman standing there, realization at once dawned that the time of waiting and uncertainty was over and that time had finally come for the submarine Hangor to put to sea.
This was confirmed by the patrolman. I therefore quickly changed into uniform, picked up the small handbag which was already packed for such an eventuality and with a quick goodbye to wife and children sped away at breakneck speed towards the Submarine Base – praying all the way to be granted enough time to enable our submarine to put to sea before hostilities commenced in the Western theatre of war also.
On reaching the Submarine Base, I found that those submariners who lived nearer or had been contacted earlier had already reported for duty, while others like me were just arriving. The fact that not a single officer or sailor wasted a single second in reporting for duty, and every single one of them reported promptly, showed that without being told, every submariner had the same thought in mind and had kept himself ready for this eventuality.
As each member of Hangor’s crew arrived on board, he knew exactly what had to be done in terms of final preparations, and set about doing it. Family, friends and festival were all forgotten – only the mission and the task at hand mattered. It was a good team, disciplined and well trained and needed no guidance.
The daredevil crew of PNS Hangor that hunted INS Khukri
After the sailing-orders had been received, all the submarines, with their identification numbers painted out slipped silently from their berths one by one, as their departure times came, to proceed separately to their respective patrol areas. From now on hey would be on their own, without contact with the outside world except to periodically receive, and that too only when possible, radioed instructions from Naval Headquarters. They themselves could not contact the outside world and, in order not to compromise their location, would have to maintain complete radio silence, except to pass an extremely important message.
Once the submarines were in their patrol areas, all contacts if classified as warships or submarines, were to be considered hostile. From now on life would be a constant effort to stay one jump ahead of the enemy. Every emission and every noise, be it electro-magnetic, sonic or ultra-sonic would have to be checked, measured, plotted, analysed and evaluated. On this would depend whether you were the attacker or the attacked in this deadly game.
PNS Hangor, meaning Shark, proved itself to be true to its name in 1971 war with India
Once Hangor had cleared the Manora breakwater, on the way to its patrol area, ships company automatically fell into its usual three watch system, with one watch on duty and two watches “off”. This would now be the constant routine except when “action stations” were closed up or during other emergencies when everybody would be closed up at his allocated station, depending on the type of emergency.
I found myself in the “off” watch at this stage and therefore, after checking once again that everything was shipshape in my department, I turned in to take some rest before my own watch which would be in the middle of the night.
While lying in my bunk, I could not help reflecting back on that cold, grey and gloomy early morning of November 1969 at Brest, France, when I happened to be standing on the gates of a submarine pen in which Hangor had been docked. I still remember the deadly appearance its sleek, black hull presented with the sharp lines of its vertical rudders, the horizontal planes and stabilizers sticking out like the fins of shark, and saying to myself: “God help those who fall prey to this deadly submarine”. Well! Hangor, the shark, was now loose at last, fully armed and hunting for real prey. No more exercises. All e training was behind. It was now the real thing – kill or be killed. In submarine warfare there isn’t much room for any other choice once the battle is joined, especially when an anti-submarine force itself is one of the targets.
Hangor reached it’s patrol area without encountering any enemy units, though a lot of air activity was seen and frantic communication traffic intercepted. Until 2 December Hangor operated in various areas, as ordered by Naval Headquarters, sometimes encountering small vessels such as ferries and dhows and some merchant ships. Indian warships generally remained out of the area, except for some close inshore patrolling by their small frigates and patrol craft in shallow waters out of reach of the submarine.
Late in the afternoon of 2 December Hangor’s sensors picked up a number of radar emissions from the direction of Bombay harbour. These emissions were analysed and were correctly identified as transmissions of radars fitted on certain Indian warships. It was also correctly appreciated, taking various factors into account, that this presaged imminent sailing out of the Indian Western Fleet. A little latter a sudden jump in the strength of the radar emissions was again correctly appreciated to indicate that the Indian fleet had indeed sailed out of harbour. Hangor, thereafter, kept close watch on it, tracking it be radar emissions as well as the propeller H.E. (Hydrophone Effect) of ships.
At about 2340, when the strength of the radar emissions indicated that the Indian fleet was within our radar range, the radar mast was raised and a radar sweep was taken from periscope depth. This radar sweep clearly painted ten enemy contacts. On the radar screen a clear picture could be seen of four ships of the main body in the centre of the formation being screened by six units around it.
Hangor having estimated the enemy’s course and speed found itself ahead of the approaching enemy, and set course to intercept. Finally, with “action stations” closed up and with all torpedoes ready for launch, Hangor managed to penetrate the anti-submarine screen and ended up between the main-body and its protective screen, in an ideal position to attack both and could have played havoc with the Indian Fleet.
All the crew’s preparations and training had been for this moment. Had the rules of engagement permitted, we could have fired torpedoes at the enemy units as fast as we could line up the sight on each target. But the enemy was just about to be granted a reprieve, for all submarines had sailed out with strict orders not to engage the enemy unless fired upon first or till these orders were cancelled by Naval Headquarters. There had been no change in these orders, and therefore all that Hangor could do was to pass under the enemy ships and then break radio silence to make an enemy contact report to Naval Headquarters. It was one of the most frustrating experience that a submariner can go through. It was even more frustrating to learn later on that hostilities had commenced in the Western theatre on 3 December, within a few hours of the submarine’s encounter with the Indian fleet.
The Indian Fleet had a close call and Hangor missed a golden opportunity but, after restrictions on engaging enemy units were lifted, its crew became even more determined to ensure that no enemy units in its patrol area escaped unscathed. However, the submarine’s tribulations were not yet over and one of the cooling pumps on board broke down. Without repairs to this pump it would not be possible to continue its war patrol. But repairs to this pump involved shutting down the main air conditioning plant of the submarine and lifting and removing its compressor motor to gain access to the defective pump.
Repairs to the pump itself were not much of a problem but removal of the air conditioning plant compressor motor was a different matter entirely, posing many serious problems.
In a submarine, owing to lack of space, machinery is closely packed so that access to machines fitted close to the hull is only possible after removal of the intervening machinery in a specific sequence. Also, due to lack of space, certain heavier machines can only be lifted and moved after cutting the “soft” deck plates above the machine and then re-welding the plates back after the repairs are completed. The AC compressor motor was one such machine.
Even during peacetime in harbour with all dockyard facilities available, the task would have taken approximately a week to complete. We now had to choose either to return to harbour for repairs – which everyone on board realized would effectively put the submarine out of the war or attempts to effect repairs at sea in enemy waters with none of the dockyard facilities at hand. In case it was decided to effect repairs at sea, there was a further question of whether to carry out repairs with the submarine completely submerged or partly surfaced. Detection by enemy aircraft in the middle of repairs would necessitate crash dive by the submarine, with the possibility of the detached heavy compressor motor causing further damage to material and men. Also, the repairs had to be completed in hours rather than days or weeks.
Hangor’s crew were a determined lot. They did not want to sit out the war in the safety of Karachi harbour and had a tradition of accepting challenges. It was therefore decided to carry out the repairs at sea. Carrying out repairs at sea with the submarine completely submerged and the air conditioning plant shut down was not possible as not only the heat inside the submarine would be unbearable for the crew, but also the rise in humidity would lead to problems in the very important electronic equipment due to condensation of water vapour on sensitive circuits. It was, therefore, decided to take a risk and work with the submarine partially surfaced. A sharp lookout was to be maintained for enemy aircraft and surface units and at the first sign of the enemy, the submarine was to dive.
Once the decision was taken, work was commenced in right earnest and continued without break. The spirit of the crew had to be seen to be believed. Everybody from the commanding officer to the junior most sailor was involved in the work in one way or the other. If the requirement was to keep a look out for the enemy, the sharpest eyes and ears were constantly at it. If any thing was required by the repair team, it was promptly provided if available, if not, it was improvised. Those who could not contribute by their technical knowledge contributed with their muscle power, and those who could not even contribute in this way, maintained a constant flow of nourishment in the form of tea and water to those working cramped in tight corners, soaked in the oily bilge water. There was no distinction by branch or seniority, everyone contributed in whatever way he could.
The impossible had finally became possible and, even under the most hazardous conditions faced by Hangor, the repairs were completed in under 48 hours. Everybody heaved a sigh of relief when the submarine was able to submerge completely once again, with the repaired pump working satisfactorily and the air conditioning plant back in operation. Like a true shark, Hangor was back on the hunt once again, having effected repairs in the enemy’s own backyard.
Hangor’s crew had worked hard and made many sacrifices. While at sea none of them had any idea of what their near and dear ones faced back on shore. Everyone of them had responded to the call to duty without hesitation. Even he Eid holidays had been spent in the waiting. The cool pleasant days of November and December, when officers and men would normally be thinking of annual leave to go north, were spent in this deadly game of hide and seek. Surely it was an act of God that our sacrifices did not go unrewarded.
The reward came in the form of two distant contacts early on the morning of 9 December 1971. Analysis of the contacts had already established that they were two warships equipped with radars and sonars. But their speed and course were such that the much slower submarine could not catch up with them. They were, however, tracked and by the afternoon the analysis of their behaviour indicated that they were doing a rectangular anti-submarine search. The two contacts were thus appreciated to be two anti-submarine frigates engaged in SAU (Search and Attack Unit) operations.
It was therefore decided to wait for the ships at a selected point on their search pattern, rather than chasing them all over the place. This strategy paid off as the two contacts started closing, late in the evening. Course and speed of the submarine was adjusted to ensure being in a position to attack at a time of our own choosing.
By 1900 Hangor was waiting on the estimated rack of the targets. Everyone on board already knew what was happening and there was an air of expectancy everywhere. The targets were still behaving as anticipated and range was steadily closing with both frigates still operating their sonars. “Action Stations” was therefore sounded at 1915. The “shark” had bared it’s teeth, and it’s moment of truth had come. Next few minutes would permanently seal the fate of one of the two frigates.
Though the enemy was operating sonar, Hangor had not been detected and therefore still enjoyed the advantage of surprise. She knew too well that failure to hit the enemy at first attempt would shift the balance of advantage completely in favour of the two anti-submarine frigates. Hangor had to hit the enemy first, and hit hard at the first attempt.
Already the factor of shallow depth (60-65 meters) in the area was working in favour of the enemy as the submarine did not have much room to maneuver in the vertical plane to avoid enemy’s depth charges, should that be necessary.
Outside, it was dark, the sunset already having taken place. It was, therefore, decided to go deep and to carry out a blind (Sonar only) approach and attack. The attack team now concentrated on tracking the two targets as they gradually came within firing range. (After the war, these two targets were identified as INS Kirpan and INS Khukri. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight we can henceforth refer to all three participants in the unfolding drama by their proper names.)
After having obtained a perfect solution Hangor commenced the attack at 1957 by firing one homing torpedo, “down the throat” at the more northerly target, which was INS Kirpan. The torpedo ran true and it was tracked on sonar all the way as it acquired “lock on” to the target and passed under it (as it was supposed to do). However, the newly acquired torpedoes, whose test facilities had not yet been set up, failed to explode and kept going. Until the time that the torpedo was fired neither of the two frigates had any inkling of being under attack. However, the moment the torpedo passed under INS Kirpan, she suddenly woke up, realized she was under attack and turned away at maximum speed. Hangor had struck first, but had failed to hit hard. The new torpedo had let it down.
The advantage had now shifted completely in favour of the enemy. If the enemy had kept their cool, it is difficult to say what would have been the final outcome. Perhaps, this article would not have been written in such detail. But one thing is sure – the fate of INS Khukri would still have been what it was.
As Kirpan turned away and ran, Khukri, which was to its south, now knowing the direction from which the torpedo had come, increased speed and came straight for an attack on Hangor.
It was now Hangor’s turn to keep it’s cool – and this, the submarine did well. As Khukri came in for attack, Hangor’s attack team calmly shifted target to Khukri, obtained a quick solution and fired the second torpedo at it. This quick shot was mostly meant to spoil he attack by Khukri, however loss of nerve by Khukri’s Commanding Officer on hearing the oncoming torpedo, made him try to turn away from it. This greatly helped to “pull” the torpedo towards the frigate. As soon as the torpedo acquired “lock on” it went straight for the target, passed under it and when it was directly under the keel it exploded, breaking the keel of INS Khukri which sank in a matter of two minutes, with all hands on board. There were no survivors. There was simply no time for the myth of the “CO nonchalantly lighting a cigarette as the ship sank under him” to be enacted.
The poor captain of INS Khukri (now a mythical figure in India) who was not even (surprisingly) wearing a life jacket on an action station state of alert.
The sinking of Khukri had now made the balance of advantage even between Hangor and Kirpan and the action had not yet finished.
Seeing its sister ship sink in such a short time must have been a nerve shattering experience for the Kirpan’s Commanding Officer, for he came charging in for an emergency attack, fired off a pattern of depth charges, hoping to scare Hangor away into breaking off its attack. But when he found that the Hangor was not intimidated and instead had fired the third torpedo at Kirpan, he broke off the attack just as quickly and ran “hell for leather” in panic trying to outrun the torpedo locked on to the frigates tail. That was the last seen (actually heard) of her.
INS Kirpan, the lucky survivor of PNS Hangor’s misfired torpedo
Hangor, the shark, had struck first. It had struck hard in the second attempt, and in the third attempt the surviving enemy frigate had been left worrying about the “torpedo locked on to its tail”.
What followed this action was a massive anti-submarine effort by the Indian Navy, in the form of Operation Falcon to hunt down and kill just one submarine, PNS/M Hangor. The operation was launched shortly after the sinking of the Khukri, on the night of 9 December and continued for four days till the night of 13 December.
During these four days, the Indian Navy utilized all available anti-submarine ships, Alize (Specialized anti-submarine naval aircraft), shore-based surveillance aircraft and Sea King anti-submarine helicopters in HUK Groups (Hunter-Killer Groups) and combed an area extending from the point southwest of Diu Head, where Khukri was sunk, right upto a point just short of PAF’s air-strike range from Karachi.
Details of Operation Falcon are given in the book ‘War in The Indian Ocean’ written by Vice Admiral (Retd) Roy, IN.
In fact, indirectly Hangor was responsible for another loss to the Indian Navy, for according to Admiral Roy, during Operation Falcon, the Indian Navy also lost an Alize anti-submarine aircraft at sea with all three of its crew.
What Vice Admiral (Retd) Roy has not mentioned is the number of anti-submarine charges fired, on hat the HUK groups thought was Hangor. In the submarine itself 24 salvoes (each of three charges) on 10 December and 12 salvoes on 12 December were registered. The latter depth charging took place after Indian Navy’s shore stations had taken cross bearings on Hangor’s radio message to Naval Headquarters regarding the action.
Throughout these four days Hangor remained completely aware of the huge effort underway (though the details of Operation Falcon as such were known only after the war) and it is a measure of Hangor’s efficiency that in spite of leaving the action area with a highly depleted battery, and with such a massive hunt for her in progress, she managed not only to recharge her batteries but was able to successfully lay a false trail for the HUK groups to follow. How successful the false trail was, can be judged from the fact that of the more than 36 salvoes fired, only two slightly shook the submarine. Most being far away and could just be heard on sonar. In spite of this, the Indians claimed to have sunk the Hangor a number of times between 9 and 13 December.
By now, the submarine had been at sea for over 21 days and, though the body odours of the crew were getting stronger and the unshaven hair on their chins longer, their morale was sky high. They had just been through the ultimate test as submariners, both collectively as well as individually. They all knew in their own hearts how they had stood the test, and they were satisfied.
The hunter-killer Submarine PNS Hangor now placed in Naval Museum, Karachi
jaiind
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it was only great achievement by our PN to sink only one ship.It is very essential to remember what was happened to our remaining
PN fleet in that war. Even our sub was destroyed by our IN in BOB.In the event of war If PN has one reason to celebrate,IN has multiple reasons to celebrate it.
PN fleet in that war. Even our sub was destroyed by our IN in BOB.In the event of war If PN has one reason to celebrate,IN has multiple reasons to celebrate it.
acetophenol
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RIP to the dead,brave sailors Of Indian Navy. Congrats to PNS Hangor and its Crew.
Black Widow
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Every war has many stories.. INS Khukhari was one of those story.. Battle of Longewala was another story. Each side of war has some story to feed there ego.. In a battle you can not assume that loosing side will loose all wars..
There are some conflicts which Pakistan had upper hand , some conflict where India had. Bottom line is Yes INS khukhari was sunk and there is nothing wrong in accepting that.
I suggest some Indian members to stop being pakistani, and accept the truth. Unlike Pakistani (who deny the truth, Make conspiracy theories, Never accept there defeat) we must accept the truth.
There are some conflicts which Pakistan had upper hand , some conflict where India had. Bottom line is Yes INS khukhari was sunk and there is nothing wrong in accepting that.
I suggest some Indian members to stop being pakistani, and accept the truth. Unlike Pakistani (who deny the truth, Make conspiracy theories, Never accept there defeat) we must accept the truth.
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