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Why They Get Pakistan Wrong
SEPTEMBER 29, 2011
Mohsin Hamid
Nearly ten years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the commencement of the US-led war in Afghanistan, the alliance between the US and Pakistan is on shaky ground. The killing of Osama bin Laden by US special forces this May in Abbottabad, Pakistan, has incensed officials on both sides: on the American side because bin Ladens hiding place appears to suggest Pakistani perfidy; and on the Pakistani side because the US raid humiliatingly violated Pakistans sovereignty.
As Ted Poe, a Republican congressman on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, puts it: Unless the State Department can certify to Congress that Pakistan was not harboring Americas number one enemy, Pakistan should not receive one more cent of American funding. Dramatic words,1 for Pakistan has been allocated quite a few cents of American funding. Yet this money has bought little love. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, only 12 percent of Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of the United States, and only 8 percent would like to see US troops stay in Afghanistan until the situation has stabilized. Why might this be the case?
The past decade has been devastating for Pakistan. The countrys annual death toll from terrorist attacks rose from 164 in 2003 to 3,318 in 2009, a level exceeding the number of Americans killed on September 11. Some 35,000 Pakistanis, including 3,500 members of security forces, have died in terror and counterterror violence. Millions more have been displaced by fighting. It is difficult to convey how profoundly the country has been wounded. In 1989, my Lahore American School classmates and I (including children from Pakistan, America, Canada, Sweden, Germany, and Korea) were able to go to the beautiful valley of Swat by bus for a weeklong field trip with no security arrangements whatsoever. In 2009, the battle to retake Swat from Taliban militants involved two full divisions of the Pakistani army and hundreds of casualties among Pakistani soldiers. (Similarly, until a few years ago, there had never been a suicide bombing in Lahore. Now one occurs every three or four months.) The Pakistani government puts direct and indirect economic losses from terrorism over the last ten years at $68 billion.
Of the $20.7 billion in US funding allocated to Pakistan from 2002 to 2010, $14.2 billion was for the Pakistani military. On paper, economic assistance came to $6.5 billion, less than a third of the total. In reality the civilian share was even smaller, probably less than a quarter, for the $6.5 billion figure reflects commitments (amounts budgeted by the US), not disbursements (amounts actually given to Pakistan). The United States Government Accountability Office reports that only 12 percent of the $1.5 billion in economic assistance to Pakistan authorized for 2010 was actually disbursed that year. Independent calculations by the Center for Global Development suggest that $2.2 billion of civilian aid budgeted for Pakistan is currently undisbursed, meaning that total economic assistance actually received from the US over the past nine years is in the vicinity of $4.3 billion, or $480 million per year. (By comparison, Pakistanis abroad remit $11 billion to their families in Pakistan annually, over twenty times the flow of US economic aid.)
Pakistan is a large country, with a population of 180 million and a GDP of $175 billion. Average annual US economic assistance comes to less than 0.3 percent of Pakistans current GDP, or $2.67 per Pakistani citizen. Here in Lahore, thats the price of a six-inch personal-size pizza with no extra toppings from Pizza Hut.
The alliance between the US and Pakistan is thus predominantly between the US and the Pakistani military. To enter the US as a Pakistani civilian ally now (a Herculean task, given ever-tighter visa restrictions) is to be subjected to hours of inane secondary screening upon arrival. (Have you ever had combat training, sir?) For a decade, meanwhile, successive civilian Pakistani finance ministers have gone to Washington reciting a mantra of trade not aid. They have been rebuffed, despite a WikiLeaked 2010 cable from the US embassy in Islamabad strongly supporting a free trade agreement with Pakistan and citing research showing that such an arrangement would likely create 1.4 million new jobs in Pakistan, increase Pakistani GDP growth by 1.5 percent per year, double inflows of foreign direct investment to Pakistan, and (because Pakistani exports would come largely from textile industries that US-based manufacturers are already exiting) have no discernible impact on future US employment.
Perhaps the vast majority of Pakistanis with an unfavorable view of the United States simply believe their annual free pizza is not worth the price of a conflict that claims the lives of thousands of their fellow citizens each year.
Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain, in The Scorpions Tail, his examination of the rise of militants in Pakistan, makes clear that both sides of the alliance between the US and the Pakistani military share blame for the violence currently afflicting Pakistan. A long series of mutual policy missteps led to the present bloodshed.
As Hussain reminds us, the US and the Pakistani military together backed the Afghanistan guerrilla campaign against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, thereby bequeathing to the world unprecedented international networks of well-trained jihadist militants. For the US, as in its previous alliance with the Pakistani military in the 1950s and 1960s, the primary objective was to counter the Soviets. For the Pakistani military, as ever, the primary objective of the alliance was to lessen Indias superiority in conventional arms. The US gained a proxy fighting force in the form of the Afghan Mujahideen (literally: people who do jihad). The Pakistani military gained access to advanced US-made weapons, the most important of which were forty F-16 fighter aircraft: too few, obviously, to resist any full-blown Soviet air assault, but enough to strengthen meaningfully the Pakistan air force against its Indian rival.
With the Soviet withdrawal, America turned abruptly away from the region and washed its hands of its militant cocreations; in the ensuing power vacuum Afghanistan descended into a bloody civil war among former Mujahideen. The US also severed its alliance with the Pakistani military, cutting off supplies of spare parts for Pakistans American weapons and withholding delivery of further F-16s that Pakistan had paid for but not yet received.
The outraged Pakistani military was seriously weakened as a conventional fighting force vis-à-vis India. But it now, as Hussain shows, had enormous experience of projecting power through jihadist militants and two opportunities to continue doing so. One was in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir (the divided Muslim-majority territory at the center of the IndianPakistani conflict, claimed in its entirety by both Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan), where an insurgency against Indian troops had broken out in 1989 following a disputed election.
The other was in Afghanistan, where the largely ethnic-Pashtun, Pakistan-backed Taliban were battling the largely non-Pashtun, India-backed Northern Alliance, consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others. During the 1990s, Hussain writes,
the jihadist movement in Pakistan was focused entirely on supporting the regional strategy of the Pakistani military establishment: to liberate Kashmir from India and install a Pashtun government in Afghanistan.
But following the terrorist attacks of September 11, linked to members of al-Qaeda living under Taliban protection in Afghanistan, the US returned to the region in force and demanded that Pakistan choose sides. President Pervez Musharrafs subsequent decision to align Pakistan with the US was perceived by many militants as a betrayal. Still, Musharraf hoped the Pakistani militarys conflict with its infuriated, jihadist offspring could be circumscribed, that it might be possible to drive a wedge between the Pakistani militants and the al-Qaeda foreigners.
This plan, besides denying the extent of the militant threat to Pakistan, was also undermined by US strategy, a strategy that suffered from the outset from what Hussein identifies as two fundamental flaws. The first of these was a failure to understand that unless Pashtun grievances were addressedparticularly their demand for a fair share of powerthe war in Afghanistan would become a Pashtun war, and that the Pashtuns in Pakistan would become strongly allied with both al Qaeda and the Taliban.
As the US campaign in Afghanistan began, Hussain writes, Musharraf warned the United States not to allow the [Northern] Alliance forces to enter Kabul before a broad-based Afghan national government was put in place. But the US ignored this advice, and later, at the Bonn conference of December 2001, Hamid Karzai was installed as chairman (and subsequently president) as Pashtun window dressing, while the Northern Alliance took over the most powerful sections of the government.
By backing the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and then failing to include a meaningful representation of Pashtuns in a power-sharing deal in Kabul, the US not only sided with India in the IndianPakistani proxy war in Afghanistan, it also elevated a coalition of Afghanistans smaller ethnicities above its largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. Conflict was inevitable, and since twice as many Pashtuns live in Pakistan as in Afghanistan, it was also inevitable that this conflict would spill over the border.
The results for Pakistan were catastrophic. Over the following decade, as Hussain describes in detail, the Pakistani militarys attempts to separate good militants from bad foundered. Instead, strong networks developed between radical groups in Pakistans Punjabi east and those in its Pashtun west. With each move of the Pakistani military against them, the frequency and lethality of counterattacks by terrorists inside Pakistan, on both military and civilian targets, intensified. Pakistani casualties soared.
The only way out of this trap, in which an unwinnable Pashtun war threatens to swamp an essential Pakistani program to neutralize militants, Hussain suggests, is to address the second fundamental flaw in US strategy: the failure to appreciate that combating the militant threat required something far more than a military campaign, namely a political settlement with the insurgents, requiring direct talks with the Taliban.
Equally vital, it must be added, is a push toward political settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This simmering conflict fuels the IndianPakistani proxy war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban in Afghanistan, encourages the Pakistani militarys embrace of militants, and helps subordinate Pakistani civilian governments to the Pakistani military (by allowing a near-perpetual state of security crisis to be maintained in Pakistan). The outlines of a deal on Kashmir were reportedly secretly agreed upon in 2007, but progress has been frozen since Musharrafs fall from power in 2008 and the terrorist attacks on Mumbai that same year.
As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama acknowledged Kashmirs central role. The most important thing were going to have to do with respect to Afghanistan is actually deal with Pakistan, he said in October 2008.
We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India, and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they can stay focused not on India but on the situation with those militants.
Once he was elected, however, talk of Kashmir and peace between India and Pakistan receded from President Obamas official pronouncements, and he embarked upon an Afghanistan policy that might be described as shoot first, talk later. US drone strikes in Pakistans Pashtun belt intensified, with more53in 2009, Obamas first year in office, than during the entire Bush administration42followed by a further sharp increase in 2010, to 118. This unmanned assault was accompanied by a tripling of US military manpower in Afghanistan, which in turn resulted in a fourfold increase in the American fatality rate, with more deaths there of US soldiers in twenty-nine months under Obama (974) than in eighty-seven months under Bush (630).
Obama has now begun to reverse his Afghanistan escalation. His June 22 speech announced that 33,000 US forces (described as those of his surge, but more accurately representing the second of his two roughly equal-sized surges) would begin withdrawing this summer and be gone by the end of the next. There will then, he said, be a steady pace of further reductions until by 2014 the change of mission from combat to support will be complete. He also stated that America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban.
The following day, in an interview with the Voice of America, Obama acknowledged a US focus shifted to Pakistan and declared:
I think whats happened is that the [USPakistan] relationship has become more honest over time and that raises some differences that are real. And obviously the operation to take out Osama bin Laden created additional tensions, but I had always been very clear with Pakistan that if we ever found him and had a shot, that we would take it. We think that if Pakistan recognizes the threat to its sovereignty that comes out of the extremists in its midst, that theres no reason why we cant work cooperatively .
The tone of Obamas underlying message to Pakistan is certainly much improved from that of the US in September 2001, when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly told Pakistan to cooperate with the imminent US campaign in Afghanistan or be prepared to be bombed back to the stone age. But implicit in Obamas words, and explicit in his actions, is a continued willingness to escalate US armed intervention in Pakistan should Pakistani cooperation prove insufficient. The alliance between the US and the Pakistani military remains, therefore, a relationship between parties viewing one another through gunsights. Each side blames the other for putting its citizens in grave danger, and each is correct to do so.
A gunsight is not, however, the primary lens through which Kings College professor and former London Times journalist Anatol Lieven sees Pakistan. Quite the opposite: his Pakistan: A Hard Country, by far the most insightful survey of Pakistan I have read in recent years, reflects sensitivity and considerable, if clear-eyed, affection. Lieven has traveled extensively through Pakistan (dismayingly atypical for a contemporary foreign commentator), exploring all of its provinces and speaking with Pakistanis from a very broad range of backgrounds. He has also immersed himself in written sources, including pertinent anthropological research produced over a period of some two hundred years.
Pakistans is a diverse society, so diverse, in fact, that observers who deal best in generalizations are bound to get the country horribly wrong. Lieven recognizes this diversity and makes it central to his analysis. For him, Pakistan is a place of competing and overlapping clans, sects, tribes, beliefs, and practices. Its society, in order to function, has evolved powerful mechanisms to deal with rivalries inside shared localities. As a result, Lieven argues, Pakistan is characterized by structuresmilitary, bureaucratic, social, political, spiritual, judicialthat are profoundly Janus-faced, in the manner of the two-faced Roman deity who gazes and speaks in opposite, contradictory directions. These structures, at once predatory and protective, operate to make the country both (frustratingly for reformers) very difficult to change and (bafflingly for forecasters of its demise) remarkably resilient.2
At the heart of Lievens account of Pakistan is kinship, pervasive networks of clans and biradiris (groups of extended kin) that he identifies as the most important force in society, usually far stronger than any competing religious, ethnic, or political cause. Several millennia of invasions, occupations, colonizations, and rule by self-interested states resulted in a collective solidarity for interest and defense based on kinship becoming paramount in the area that is Pakistan. It now, as Lieven points out, is a cultural system so strong that it can persuade a father to kill a much-loved daughter, not even for having an affair or becoming pregnant, but for marrying outside her kinship group without permission. Moreover it is enduring, having survived, for example, more than half a century of transplantation of Pakistani immigrants to the very different climes of Britain. It has done much the same in the far less dislocating shift to Pakistans cities, sustained, as in Britain, through constant replenishment by newly migrating kin from the countryside.
The effects of kinship on Pakistani politics are profound. Most of Pakistans leading political parties are dynastic, including the Bhutto familys PPP and the Sharif familys PML-N; even individual members of parliament are often elected on the basis of clan alliances and support. Politics is therefore about patronage far more than ideology. Furthermore, the Pakistani state is relatively weak, collecting taxes that amount to less than 10 percent of GDP.
As a consequence, Lieven notes, Pakistani governments follow a predictable pattern. They are elected (usually as coalitions, Pakistans many divisions making absolute majorities exceedingly rare) on general promises of higher living standards for the population and individual promises to particular politicians, families, and districts. The governments lack the resources to keep many of these promises (which are, in any case, often conflicting); their majorities ebb away; they lose power and await another turn.
Yet because of patronage, much of what politicians extract financially from official positions circulates among their kinship groups, which cut across class. Lieven believes this system, while hugely ineffective at driving real change, helps explain Pakistans remarkably low inequality rating according to the Gini Co-efficient, measuring the ratio of the income of the poorest group in society relative to the richest. By that measure in 2002 the figure for Pakistan was 30.6, compared with 36.8 for India, 40.8 for the US, and 43.7 for Nigeria.
The role of religion in Pakistan, a source of much hand-wringing in policy think tanks, is similarly complex. As Lieven points out: the Islam of the Pakistani masses contains very different traditions. Moreover, unlike in Saudi Arabia or Iran, where an oil-bankrolled state has tried to impose one monolithic version of Islam, the Pakistani state is too weak to achieve this even if it wanted to. Lieven describes the theological divisions among Sunnis sustained by Pakistans clan and kinship diversity. The Ahl-e-Hadith, heavily influenced by Wahabism, loathe saintly traditions. The Deobandis may praise saints but object to worshiping them. The Barelvis, Pakistans most numerous (and fissiparous) school, tend to embrace the intercession of saints with God. Veneration of saints is also central to Pakistans Shias. Because saintliness can be inherited, the heads of Pakistans powerful landowning pir families remain of immense political importance. They can actively create bridges among religious groups and they serve as major bosses in several mainstream political parties, especially the secular PPP.
Religiosity thus fuses with kinship networks and politics to reinforce Pakistans existing elite. But it also helps marginalize Pakistans Islamist parties, drawn primarily from the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi schools, which struggle to capture more than a few percent of the countrys vote. (Away from politics and hardly noticed outside the country, Lieven believes Pakistans religiosity also softens the misery of Pakistans poor by contributing to an astounding level of charitable donation, which, at almost 5 percent of GDP, is one of the highest rates in the world.)
Throughout his analysis, Lieven rejects the notion that Pakistan fits somehow in a category apart from the rest of the South Asian subcontinent, a sui generis nuclear-armed failed state on the verge of collapse. Rather, he writes,
Pakistan is in fact a great deal more like Indiaor India like Pakistanthan either country would wish to admit. If Pakistan were an Indian state, then in terms of development, order and per capita income it would find itself somewhere in the middle, considerably below Karnataka but considerably above Bihar.
Indeed, even in the violent challenges confronting its state authority, Pakistan is like its subcontinental neighbors: All of the states of this region have faced insurgencies over the past generation, Lieven notes, and by comparison to the Taliban conflict in Pakistan, Sri Lankas Tamil rebellion caused proportionally far more casualties and Indias Naxalite Maoist insurgency controls a far greater proportion of India.
Lieven has evident sympathy for the Pakistani military (indeed there are points when, in referring to a uniformed ancestor who served during British rule in what is now Pakistan, one suspects Lieven may have his own feelings of kinship with the Pakistan army). But he is clear about the role the army has played in fomenting militancy, and about the deadly threat militants now pose to Pakistan, especially the potential for far worse bloodshed if the remaining militant groups that have not yet turned on the military and are therefore being kept in existence on the shelf including Pashtun militants focused on Afghanistan and Punjabi militants focused on Indiawere to do so.
Still, despite the ineffectiveness of much of the Pakistani state, he believes Pakistans kinship groups and its stabilizing and antireformist social structures give the country a combination of diversity and toughness that makes successful revolution highly unlikely. He also writes that the Pakistani army, as it demonstrated in the brutal but in the end brutally effective operation to liberate Swat from militant control in 2009, is fully capable of routing guerrillas who seize territory when it sets its mind to doing so.
A key question, therefore, is whether the army itself could split. Lieven thinks not (and we must fervently hope that he is right). The army, he explains, is an all-volunteer institution with a strong shared ethos, nationalistic rather than pan-Islamic in outlook, and increasingly vigilant against Taliban sympathizers withinafter all, we are not suicidal idiots, an officer tells him. The real risk, which Lieven argues must be avoided at all costs, is of open intervention of US ground forces in Pakistan. For if ordered by their commanders not to resist, parts of the Pakistani army would mutiny in order to fight the invaders, and in such an eventuality Islamist upheaval and the collapse of the state would indeed be all too likely.
In passages such as this, Lieven comes close to describing Pakistan as if through a gunsight; but the gunsight belongs to an American decision-maker on the hunt, with Lieven playing the role of preservationist guide. The best Western strategy, he counsels, would stem from a recognition that Pakistans goals in Afghanistan are in part legitimateeven if the means with which they have been sought have not beenand would seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute, despite all the immense obstacles in both India and Pakistan. For in the end, not even the greatest imaginable benefits of USIndian friendship could compensate for the actual collapse of Pakistan, with all the frightful dangers this would create not just for the West but for India too.
Lievens is a vital book, with much wisdom in its advice for the West. But equally importantly, this detailed and nuanced survey offers Pakistanis a mirror in which to look hard at their country and themselves. Pakistans resilience is bound up with its resistance to reform, yet reform will be essential for facing the great challenges ahead, including the potentially devastating impacts of climate change on a dry and overpopulated land that is dependent on a single river and its tributaries. Pakistanis, and above all members of Pakistans military, would do well finally to reject their countrys disastrous embrace of militants. Pakistan must urgently mend its relationships in its own neighborhood and refocus on taking care of itself. Time is not on its side.
SEPTEMBER 29, 2011
Mohsin Hamid
Nearly ten years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the commencement of the US-led war in Afghanistan, the alliance between the US and Pakistan is on shaky ground. The killing of Osama bin Laden by US special forces this May in Abbottabad, Pakistan, has incensed officials on both sides: on the American side because bin Ladens hiding place appears to suggest Pakistani perfidy; and on the Pakistani side because the US raid humiliatingly violated Pakistans sovereignty.
As Ted Poe, a Republican congressman on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, puts it: Unless the State Department can certify to Congress that Pakistan was not harboring Americas number one enemy, Pakistan should not receive one more cent of American funding. Dramatic words,1 for Pakistan has been allocated quite a few cents of American funding. Yet this money has bought little love. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, only 12 percent of Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of the United States, and only 8 percent would like to see US troops stay in Afghanistan until the situation has stabilized. Why might this be the case?
The past decade has been devastating for Pakistan. The countrys annual death toll from terrorist attacks rose from 164 in 2003 to 3,318 in 2009, a level exceeding the number of Americans killed on September 11. Some 35,000 Pakistanis, including 3,500 members of security forces, have died in terror and counterterror violence. Millions more have been displaced by fighting. It is difficult to convey how profoundly the country has been wounded. In 1989, my Lahore American School classmates and I (including children from Pakistan, America, Canada, Sweden, Germany, and Korea) were able to go to the beautiful valley of Swat by bus for a weeklong field trip with no security arrangements whatsoever. In 2009, the battle to retake Swat from Taliban militants involved two full divisions of the Pakistani army and hundreds of casualties among Pakistani soldiers. (Similarly, until a few years ago, there had never been a suicide bombing in Lahore. Now one occurs every three or four months.) The Pakistani government puts direct and indirect economic losses from terrorism over the last ten years at $68 billion.
Of the $20.7 billion in US funding allocated to Pakistan from 2002 to 2010, $14.2 billion was for the Pakistani military. On paper, economic assistance came to $6.5 billion, less than a third of the total. In reality the civilian share was even smaller, probably less than a quarter, for the $6.5 billion figure reflects commitments (amounts budgeted by the US), not disbursements (amounts actually given to Pakistan). The United States Government Accountability Office reports that only 12 percent of the $1.5 billion in economic assistance to Pakistan authorized for 2010 was actually disbursed that year. Independent calculations by the Center for Global Development suggest that $2.2 billion of civilian aid budgeted for Pakistan is currently undisbursed, meaning that total economic assistance actually received from the US over the past nine years is in the vicinity of $4.3 billion, or $480 million per year. (By comparison, Pakistanis abroad remit $11 billion to their families in Pakistan annually, over twenty times the flow of US economic aid.)
Pakistan is a large country, with a population of 180 million and a GDP of $175 billion. Average annual US economic assistance comes to less than 0.3 percent of Pakistans current GDP, or $2.67 per Pakistani citizen. Here in Lahore, thats the price of a six-inch personal-size pizza with no extra toppings from Pizza Hut.
The alliance between the US and Pakistan is thus predominantly between the US and the Pakistani military. To enter the US as a Pakistani civilian ally now (a Herculean task, given ever-tighter visa restrictions) is to be subjected to hours of inane secondary screening upon arrival. (Have you ever had combat training, sir?) For a decade, meanwhile, successive civilian Pakistani finance ministers have gone to Washington reciting a mantra of trade not aid. They have been rebuffed, despite a WikiLeaked 2010 cable from the US embassy in Islamabad strongly supporting a free trade agreement with Pakistan and citing research showing that such an arrangement would likely create 1.4 million new jobs in Pakistan, increase Pakistani GDP growth by 1.5 percent per year, double inflows of foreign direct investment to Pakistan, and (because Pakistani exports would come largely from textile industries that US-based manufacturers are already exiting) have no discernible impact on future US employment.
Perhaps the vast majority of Pakistanis with an unfavorable view of the United States simply believe their annual free pizza is not worth the price of a conflict that claims the lives of thousands of their fellow citizens each year.
Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain, in The Scorpions Tail, his examination of the rise of militants in Pakistan, makes clear that both sides of the alliance between the US and the Pakistani military share blame for the violence currently afflicting Pakistan. A long series of mutual policy missteps led to the present bloodshed.
As Hussain reminds us, the US and the Pakistani military together backed the Afghanistan guerrilla campaign against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, thereby bequeathing to the world unprecedented international networks of well-trained jihadist militants. For the US, as in its previous alliance with the Pakistani military in the 1950s and 1960s, the primary objective was to counter the Soviets. For the Pakistani military, as ever, the primary objective of the alliance was to lessen Indias superiority in conventional arms. The US gained a proxy fighting force in the form of the Afghan Mujahideen (literally: people who do jihad). The Pakistani military gained access to advanced US-made weapons, the most important of which were forty F-16 fighter aircraft: too few, obviously, to resist any full-blown Soviet air assault, but enough to strengthen meaningfully the Pakistan air force against its Indian rival.
With the Soviet withdrawal, America turned abruptly away from the region and washed its hands of its militant cocreations; in the ensuing power vacuum Afghanistan descended into a bloody civil war among former Mujahideen. The US also severed its alliance with the Pakistani military, cutting off supplies of spare parts for Pakistans American weapons and withholding delivery of further F-16s that Pakistan had paid for but not yet received.
The outraged Pakistani military was seriously weakened as a conventional fighting force vis-à-vis India. But it now, as Hussain shows, had enormous experience of projecting power through jihadist militants and two opportunities to continue doing so. One was in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir (the divided Muslim-majority territory at the center of the IndianPakistani conflict, claimed in its entirety by both Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan), where an insurgency against Indian troops had broken out in 1989 following a disputed election.
The other was in Afghanistan, where the largely ethnic-Pashtun, Pakistan-backed Taliban were battling the largely non-Pashtun, India-backed Northern Alliance, consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others. During the 1990s, Hussain writes,
the jihadist movement in Pakistan was focused entirely on supporting the regional strategy of the Pakistani military establishment: to liberate Kashmir from India and install a Pashtun government in Afghanistan.
But following the terrorist attacks of September 11, linked to members of al-Qaeda living under Taliban protection in Afghanistan, the US returned to the region in force and demanded that Pakistan choose sides. President Pervez Musharrafs subsequent decision to align Pakistan with the US was perceived by many militants as a betrayal. Still, Musharraf hoped the Pakistani militarys conflict with its infuriated, jihadist offspring could be circumscribed, that it might be possible to drive a wedge between the Pakistani militants and the al-Qaeda foreigners.
This plan, besides denying the extent of the militant threat to Pakistan, was also undermined by US strategy, a strategy that suffered from the outset from what Hussein identifies as two fundamental flaws. The first of these was a failure to understand that unless Pashtun grievances were addressedparticularly their demand for a fair share of powerthe war in Afghanistan would become a Pashtun war, and that the Pashtuns in Pakistan would become strongly allied with both al Qaeda and the Taliban.
As the US campaign in Afghanistan began, Hussain writes, Musharraf warned the United States not to allow the [Northern] Alliance forces to enter Kabul before a broad-based Afghan national government was put in place. But the US ignored this advice, and later, at the Bonn conference of December 2001, Hamid Karzai was installed as chairman (and subsequently president) as Pashtun window dressing, while the Northern Alliance took over the most powerful sections of the government.
By backing the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and then failing to include a meaningful representation of Pashtuns in a power-sharing deal in Kabul, the US not only sided with India in the IndianPakistani proxy war in Afghanistan, it also elevated a coalition of Afghanistans smaller ethnicities above its largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. Conflict was inevitable, and since twice as many Pashtuns live in Pakistan as in Afghanistan, it was also inevitable that this conflict would spill over the border.
The results for Pakistan were catastrophic. Over the following decade, as Hussain describes in detail, the Pakistani militarys attempts to separate good militants from bad foundered. Instead, strong networks developed between radical groups in Pakistans Punjabi east and those in its Pashtun west. With each move of the Pakistani military against them, the frequency and lethality of counterattacks by terrorists inside Pakistan, on both military and civilian targets, intensified. Pakistani casualties soared.
The only way out of this trap, in which an unwinnable Pashtun war threatens to swamp an essential Pakistani program to neutralize militants, Hussain suggests, is to address the second fundamental flaw in US strategy: the failure to appreciate that combating the militant threat required something far more than a military campaign, namely a political settlement with the insurgents, requiring direct talks with the Taliban.
Equally vital, it must be added, is a push toward political settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This simmering conflict fuels the IndianPakistani proxy war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban in Afghanistan, encourages the Pakistani militarys embrace of militants, and helps subordinate Pakistani civilian governments to the Pakistani military (by allowing a near-perpetual state of security crisis to be maintained in Pakistan). The outlines of a deal on Kashmir were reportedly secretly agreed upon in 2007, but progress has been frozen since Musharrafs fall from power in 2008 and the terrorist attacks on Mumbai that same year.
As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama acknowledged Kashmirs central role. The most important thing were going to have to do with respect to Afghanistan is actually deal with Pakistan, he said in October 2008.
We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India, and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they can stay focused not on India but on the situation with those militants.
Once he was elected, however, talk of Kashmir and peace between India and Pakistan receded from President Obamas official pronouncements, and he embarked upon an Afghanistan policy that might be described as shoot first, talk later. US drone strikes in Pakistans Pashtun belt intensified, with more53in 2009, Obamas first year in office, than during the entire Bush administration42followed by a further sharp increase in 2010, to 118. This unmanned assault was accompanied by a tripling of US military manpower in Afghanistan, which in turn resulted in a fourfold increase in the American fatality rate, with more deaths there of US soldiers in twenty-nine months under Obama (974) than in eighty-seven months under Bush (630).
Obama has now begun to reverse his Afghanistan escalation. His June 22 speech announced that 33,000 US forces (described as those of his surge, but more accurately representing the second of his two roughly equal-sized surges) would begin withdrawing this summer and be gone by the end of the next. There will then, he said, be a steady pace of further reductions until by 2014 the change of mission from combat to support will be complete. He also stated that America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban.
The following day, in an interview with the Voice of America, Obama acknowledged a US focus shifted to Pakistan and declared:
I think whats happened is that the [USPakistan] relationship has become more honest over time and that raises some differences that are real. And obviously the operation to take out Osama bin Laden created additional tensions, but I had always been very clear with Pakistan that if we ever found him and had a shot, that we would take it. We think that if Pakistan recognizes the threat to its sovereignty that comes out of the extremists in its midst, that theres no reason why we cant work cooperatively .
The tone of Obamas underlying message to Pakistan is certainly much improved from that of the US in September 2001, when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly told Pakistan to cooperate with the imminent US campaign in Afghanistan or be prepared to be bombed back to the stone age. But implicit in Obamas words, and explicit in his actions, is a continued willingness to escalate US armed intervention in Pakistan should Pakistani cooperation prove insufficient. The alliance between the US and the Pakistani military remains, therefore, a relationship between parties viewing one another through gunsights. Each side blames the other for putting its citizens in grave danger, and each is correct to do so.
A gunsight is not, however, the primary lens through which Kings College professor and former London Times journalist Anatol Lieven sees Pakistan. Quite the opposite: his Pakistan: A Hard Country, by far the most insightful survey of Pakistan I have read in recent years, reflects sensitivity and considerable, if clear-eyed, affection. Lieven has traveled extensively through Pakistan (dismayingly atypical for a contemporary foreign commentator), exploring all of its provinces and speaking with Pakistanis from a very broad range of backgrounds. He has also immersed himself in written sources, including pertinent anthropological research produced over a period of some two hundred years.
Pakistans is a diverse society, so diverse, in fact, that observers who deal best in generalizations are bound to get the country horribly wrong. Lieven recognizes this diversity and makes it central to his analysis. For him, Pakistan is a place of competing and overlapping clans, sects, tribes, beliefs, and practices. Its society, in order to function, has evolved powerful mechanisms to deal with rivalries inside shared localities. As a result, Lieven argues, Pakistan is characterized by structuresmilitary, bureaucratic, social, political, spiritual, judicialthat are profoundly Janus-faced, in the manner of the two-faced Roman deity who gazes and speaks in opposite, contradictory directions. These structures, at once predatory and protective, operate to make the country both (frustratingly for reformers) very difficult to change and (bafflingly for forecasters of its demise) remarkably resilient.2
At the heart of Lievens account of Pakistan is kinship, pervasive networks of clans and biradiris (groups of extended kin) that he identifies as the most important force in society, usually far stronger than any competing religious, ethnic, or political cause. Several millennia of invasions, occupations, colonizations, and rule by self-interested states resulted in a collective solidarity for interest and defense based on kinship becoming paramount in the area that is Pakistan. It now, as Lieven points out, is a cultural system so strong that it can persuade a father to kill a much-loved daughter, not even for having an affair or becoming pregnant, but for marrying outside her kinship group without permission. Moreover it is enduring, having survived, for example, more than half a century of transplantation of Pakistani immigrants to the very different climes of Britain. It has done much the same in the far less dislocating shift to Pakistans cities, sustained, as in Britain, through constant replenishment by newly migrating kin from the countryside.
The effects of kinship on Pakistani politics are profound. Most of Pakistans leading political parties are dynastic, including the Bhutto familys PPP and the Sharif familys PML-N; even individual members of parliament are often elected on the basis of clan alliances and support. Politics is therefore about patronage far more than ideology. Furthermore, the Pakistani state is relatively weak, collecting taxes that amount to less than 10 percent of GDP.
As a consequence, Lieven notes, Pakistani governments follow a predictable pattern. They are elected (usually as coalitions, Pakistans many divisions making absolute majorities exceedingly rare) on general promises of higher living standards for the population and individual promises to particular politicians, families, and districts. The governments lack the resources to keep many of these promises (which are, in any case, often conflicting); their majorities ebb away; they lose power and await another turn.
Yet because of patronage, much of what politicians extract financially from official positions circulates among their kinship groups, which cut across class. Lieven believes this system, while hugely ineffective at driving real change, helps explain Pakistans remarkably low inequality rating according to the Gini Co-efficient, measuring the ratio of the income of the poorest group in society relative to the richest. By that measure in 2002 the figure for Pakistan was 30.6, compared with 36.8 for India, 40.8 for the US, and 43.7 for Nigeria.
The role of religion in Pakistan, a source of much hand-wringing in policy think tanks, is similarly complex. As Lieven points out: the Islam of the Pakistani masses contains very different traditions. Moreover, unlike in Saudi Arabia or Iran, where an oil-bankrolled state has tried to impose one monolithic version of Islam, the Pakistani state is too weak to achieve this even if it wanted to. Lieven describes the theological divisions among Sunnis sustained by Pakistans clan and kinship diversity. The Ahl-e-Hadith, heavily influenced by Wahabism, loathe saintly traditions. The Deobandis may praise saints but object to worshiping them. The Barelvis, Pakistans most numerous (and fissiparous) school, tend to embrace the intercession of saints with God. Veneration of saints is also central to Pakistans Shias. Because saintliness can be inherited, the heads of Pakistans powerful landowning pir families remain of immense political importance. They can actively create bridges among religious groups and they serve as major bosses in several mainstream political parties, especially the secular PPP.
Religiosity thus fuses with kinship networks and politics to reinforce Pakistans existing elite. But it also helps marginalize Pakistans Islamist parties, drawn primarily from the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi schools, which struggle to capture more than a few percent of the countrys vote. (Away from politics and hardly noticed outside the country, Lieven believes Pakistans religiosity also softens the misery of Pakistans poor by contributing to an astounding level of charitable donation, which, at almost 5 percent of GDP, is one of the highest rates in the world.)
Throughout his analysis, Lieven rejects the notion that Pakistan fits somehow in a category apart from the rest of the South Asian subcontinent, a sui generis nuclear-armed failed state on the verge of collapse. Rather, he writes,
Pakistan is in fact a great deal more like Indiaor India like Pakistanthan either country would wish to admit. If Pakistan were an Indian state, then in terms of development, order and per capita income it would find itself somewhere in the middle, considerably below Karnataka but considerably above Bihar.
Indeed, even in the violent challenges confronting its state authority, Pakistan is like its subcontinental neighbors: All of the states of this region have faced insurgencies over the past generation, Lieven notes, and by comparison to the Taliban conflict in Pakistan, Sri Lankas Tamil rebellion caused proportionally far more casualties and Indias Naxalite Maoist insurgency controls a far greater proportion of India.
Lieven has evident sympathy for the Pakistani military (indeed there are points when, in referring to a uniformed ancestor who served during British rule in what is now Pakistan, one suspects Lieven may have his own feelings of kinship with the Pakistan army). But he is clear about the role the army has played in fomenting militancy, and about the deadly threat militants now pose to Pakistan, especially the potential for far worse bloodshed if the remaining militant groups that have not yet turned on the military and are therefore being kept in existence on the shelf including Pashtun militants focused on Afghanistan and Punjabi militants focused on Indiawere to do so.
Still, despite the ineffectiveness of much of the Pakistani state, he believes Pakistans kinship groups and its stabilizing and antireformist social structures give the country a combination of diversity and toughness that makes successful revolution highly unlikely. He also writes that the Pakistani army, as it demonstrated in the brutal but in the end brutally effective operation to liberate Swat from militant control in 2009, is fully capable of routing guerrillas who seize territory when it sets its mind to doing so.
A key question, therefore, is whether the army itself could split. Lieven thinks not (and we must fervently hope that he is right). The army, he explains, is an all-volunteer institution with a strong shared ethos, nationalistic rather than pan-Islamic in outlook, and increasingly vigilant against Taliban sympathizers withinafter all, we are not suicidal idiots, an officer tells him. The real risk, which Lieven argues must be avoided at all costs, is of open intervention of US ground forces in Pakistan. For if ordered by their commanders not to resist, parts of the Pakistani army would mutiny in order to fight the invaders, and in such an eventuality Islamist upheaval and the collapse of the state would indeed be all too likely.
In passages such as this, Lieven comes close to describing Pakistan as if through a gunsight; but the gunsight belongs to an American decision-maker on the hunt, with Lieven playing the role of preservationist guide. The best Western strategy, he counsels, would stem from a recognition that Pakistans goals in Afghanistan are in part legitimateeven if the means with which they have been sought have not beenand would seek a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute, despite all the immense obstacles in both India and Pakistan. For in the end, not even the greatest imaginable benefits of USIndian friendship could compensate for the actual collapse of Pakistan, with all the frightful dangers this would create not just for the West but for India too.
Lievens is a vital book, with much wisdom in its advice for the West. But equally importantly, this detailed and nuanced survey offers Pakistanis a mirror in which to look hard at their country and themselves. Pakistans resilience is bound up with its resistance to reform, yet reform will be essential for facing the great challenges ahead, including the potentially devastating impacts of climate change on a dry and overpopulated land that is dependent on a single river and its tributaries. Pakistanis, and above all members of Pakistans military, would do well finally to reject their countrys disastrous embrace of militants. Pakistan must urgently mend its relationships in its own neighborhood and refocus on taking care of itself. Time is not on its side.
