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In 2011, the IAF managed to get the government to revise its sanctioned combat squadron strength upwards to 42 from the previous 39.5. This decision was taken in light of the need to factor in the rising presence of the Chinese Air force (CAF) in Tibet supported by the creation of new ground infrastructure as well as aerial refuelling while simultaneously continuing to maintain an advantage over the Pakistani Air force (PAF) along India's western flank.
Besides dealing with a two front operational scenario the IAF is also required to expand its presence in peninsular India as well as in the island territories in anticipation of a stability role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Be that as it may, for the period spanning the twelfth plan (2012-17), the IAF says that the number of operational squadrons has 'stabilized' at 34. And the new sanctioned strength according to the IAF would be attained only during the 14th plan (2022- 2027).
But to reach that figure in a smooth manner while accounting for risks such as an unforeseen decline in operational reliability of legacy aircraft, the IAF's current transformation has to remain on course with proposed inductions in the 'light', 'medium' and 'heavy' categories occurring as planned. And if the higher figure of 55-60 squadrons that are apparently needed for India to completely dominate the IOR are considered then both the Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) and Tejas programs need to be pursued more vigorously.
The IAF, it was revealed earlier this year, still flies up to 235 Mig 21s (it had 264 in 2013) including over a hundred with the Bison upgrade package. While there is no denying that this fighter is still quite capable when armed with jammers and upgraded radar in the point defence role, it is after all long in the tooth now. Now on account of the delays in finalizing the MMRCA contract some Mig-21s are likely to labour on till 2019 instead of the earlier 2017 retirement date for the last planes still in frontline service at that point. A similar story may play out for the remaining 70-80 Mig-27s, half of which have been modernized, which were also scheduled for retirement by 2017.
Nevertheless the fact remains that a large proportion of 315 odd Mig-21s and Mig-27s currently in the IAF's order of battle are no longer going to be part of the active force structure of the IAF by 2020. Some of the numbers will be made up by some 80 odd domestically produced Su-30MKIs in the 'heavy' category that will join the force by 2017-18 in addition to the 180-190 already in service. Till that same period about 40 HAL Tejas Mk-Is in the 'light' category are also expected to be inducted into the force. But that still leaves the IAF in a situation wherein it will have to perhaps bring in another 150 new fighters by 2020 to compensate for scheduled retirements, assuming that a few squadrons of Mig-21 and Mig-27 upgraded versions labour on even beyond 2019.
Given that the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) which is in the heavy category is likely to begin entering IAF service only towards the tail end of the 13th plan (2017-2022) other fighters will have to make up for a reduction in the Mig inventory. One obvious way would be to continue domestic production of the Su-30 MKI in the proposed Super 30 configuration featuring better radar and weapon versatility. But given HAL Ozhar's current performance this would likely yield another couple of squadrons by 2020. Although that could change with the right kind of governmental will.
The same could be said of the Hal Tejas programme. Even as this is written, the second phase of the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC-2) for the Tejas Mk-I is nearing completion with 40 Series production (SP) units on order by the IAF. Tejas MK-I development is now basically over and the fighter will receive final operation clearance (FOC) in 2014. Tejas MK-II development is progressing concurrently and is projected to be wrapped up by 2017-18. The IAF at the moment has a projected requirement of some 124 Mk-IIs. HAL is believed to have set up a slightly manpower heavy production line that can deliver 8-16 Tejas Mk-IIs annually from a new facility.
If we assume that Mk-II development timelines can be kept we are most likely to see another 30 plus Tejas Mk-II inducted into the IAF by 2020.
But clearly inductions beyond the heavy and light category are needed to make up for planned retirements. While it is often pointed out that the IAF is inducting much more capable and multi-role aircraft as replacements of legacy Mig series, the fact is that the IAF's tasking environment has also expanded in scope as have its adversaries' capabilities.
While the PAF's new inductions at the moment are not that impressive, consisting in the main of JF-17s and some more F-16s from West Asia with the acquiescence of the United States, it is difficult to say what the future will look like. This is because the Chinese have started fielding fourth generation fighter aircraft themselves and have two fifth generation programmes in the form of the J-20 and J-31 underway. Heading later into the decade J-10Bs which are upgraded versions of the J-10A and feature an airborne electronically scanned array (AESA) will find their way into the CAF and very likely into the PAF as well despite the purchase of old F-16s by the PAF.
Incidentally CAF J-10As and Su-30 MKKs already conduct routine patrols over Tibetan airspace. China's base infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau has also been modified to facilitate year round basing of a modest fighter force. New refuelling capability in the form of converted H-6U aircraft is also being fielded by the CAF.
While its posture at the moment isn't that threatening for the IAF, the CAF has the margins to increase deployments in Tibet. Moreover, if the J-20 development programme turns out to be successful, this fighter will also be deployed in the Tibetan theatre by 2020-2022.
If one adds the IAF's need to support the Indian Navy in its role as a net provider of security in the IOR, it is clear that leave alone one-for-one replacement of retiring strength, the IAF actually needs to augment numbers as evidenced by even the government's approval for raising its sanctioned strength in 2011. It is here that the IAF's projected requirements in the 'medium' category gain significance.
Assuming a continuing SU-30 MKI production line till 2020 and timely induction of Tejas Mk-II units, it is clear that the IAF will need to bring in at least another 70-80 odd new fighter aircraft by 2020 assuming at least one for one replacement of retiring Migs as outlined above. When the Dassault Rafale was finally selected as the IAF's choice for the MMRCA requirement in 2012, it was expected that this would be realized more or less smoothly, with 18 aircraft delivered off the shelf by 2014-15 and series production beginning at HAL subsequently.
However, things have not turned out as planned. It is clear that the delivery contract for the Dassault Rafale will not be signed in 2013-2014. Only a new government at the centre will do so now perhaps in 2014-15. The delays have both been on account of Dassault's issues with HAL and the depreciation of the rupee which has made this buy at least 20 percent more expensive than earlier projected. The UPA's election year freebie dissemination has also meant that various other expenditure heads are being curtailed to keep the fiscal deficit at manageable levels. Indeed the parliamentary standing committee on defence pointed out in April that the amount allocated to the IAF falls well short of what it needed to execute the MMRCA contract.
However, even if the MMRCA contract is finally signed in 2014-15 it would still give a fillip to the IAF's 42 squadron build-up by 2027, even if the numbers in the 13th plan are made up by better SU-30 MKI and Tejas Mk-2 production numbers. The Dassault Rafale actually is a good fit for the IAF's emerging force posture since it is known to be rather capable in the air to ground role as demonstrated by its performance in air campaign over Libya.
Now even as the IAF has to look carefully at its strategy for enhancing combat potential in this decade, it will certainly have to move forward on the MMRCA requirement to field a two front deterring force in the 2020s. While the IAF has invested heavily to upgrade 100 odd Mig-29s and Mirage 2000s which will keep them from obsolescence till the early 2030s and is strengthening its ground support fleet by fitting new engines in about 125 Jaguars, it has to move forward on its planned induction of the MMRCA to manage a smooth rise to a 42 squadron force by 2025 given the FGFA's production schedule.
The Dassault Rafale will help even out the induction process in terms of timing and availability since its basic development is complete and the issue is one of manufacturing it quickly enough here in India. However it must be said that any purchase of the Dassault Rafale must happen with full transfer of technology in key areas such as radars and propulsion. The Rafale is being brought in not just for combat potential but also to take India's aerospace sector to the next level through offset requirements especially given the massive costs involved. If the French stick to promised terms and conditions the option clause for 63 more aircraft will probably get exercised.
By the 2020s, with a much bigger economy and trading interests than now, India will look more closely at the 55-60 squadron force that the IAF was once envisaged to grow into. At such a time hot Tejas and MMRCA lines will certainly be an asset. While these fighters may lack 'all aspect' stealth their overall characteristics in an electronic support environment will keep them more than competitive against most enemy aircraft. It is perhaps time to bite the bullet on higher numbers for both with a view to properly exploiting economies of scale.
Source:- Saurav Jha's Blog : Why the Dassault Rafale will be purchased by the Indian Air Force
Besides dealing with a two front operational scenario the IAF is also required to expand its presence in peninsular India as well as in the island territories in anticipation of a stability role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Be that as it may, for the period spanning the twelfth plan (2012-17), the IAF says that the number of operational squadrons has 'stabilized' at 34. And the new sanctioned strength according to the IAF would be attained only during the 14th plan (2022- 2027).
But to reach that figure in a smooth manner while accounting for risks such as an unforeseen decline in operational reliability of legacy aircraft, the IAF's current transformation has to remain on course with proposed inductions in the 'light', 'medium' and 'heavy' categories occurring as planned. And if the higher figure of 55-60 squadrons that are apparently needed for India to completely dominate the IOR are considered then both the Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) and Tejas programs need to be pursued more vigorously.
The IAF, it was revealed earlier this year, still flies up to 235 Mig 21s (it had 264 in 2013) including over a hundred with the Bison upgrade package. While there is no denying that this fighter is still quite capable when armed with jammers and upgraded radar in the point defence role, it is after all long in the tooth now. Now on account of the delays in finalizing the MMRCA contract some Mig-21s are likely to labour on till 2019 instead of the earlier 2017 retirement date for the last planes still in frontline service at that point. A similar story may play out for the remaining 70-80 Mig-27s, half of which have been modernized, which were also scheduled for retirement by 2017.
Nevertheless the fact remains that a large proportion of 315 odd Mig-21s and Mig-27s currently in the IAF's order of battle are no longer going to be part of the active force structure of the IAF by 2020. Some of the numbers will be made up by some 80 odd domestically produced Su-30MKIs in the 'heavy' category that will join the force by 2017-18 in addition to the 180-190 already in service. Till that same period about 40 HAL Tejas Mk-Is in the 'light' category are also expected to be inducted into the force. But that still leaves the IAF in a situation wherein it will have to perhaps bring in another 150 new fighters by 2020 to compensate for scheduled retirements, assuming that a few squadrons of Mig-21 and Mig-27 upgraded versions labour on even beyond 2019.
Given that the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) which is in the heavy category is likely to begin entering IAF service only towards the tail end of the 13th plan (2017-2022) other fighters will have to make up for a reduction in the Mig inventory. One obvious way would be to continue domestic production of the Su-30 MKI in the proposed Super 30 configuration featuring better radar and weapon versatility. But given HAL Ozhar's current performance this would likely yield another couple of squadrons by 2020. Although that could change with the right kind of governmental will.
The same could be said of the Hal Tejas programme. Even as this is written, the second phase of the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC-2) for the Tejas Mk-I is nearing completion with 40 Series production (SP) units on order by the IAF. Tejas MK-I development is now basically over and the fighter will receive final operation clearance (FOC) in 2014. Tejas MK-II development is progressing concurrently and is projected to be wrapped up by 2017-18. The IAF at the moment has a projected requirement of some 124 Mk-IIs. HAL is believed to have set up a slightly manpower heavy production line that can deliver 8-16 Tejas Mk-IIs annually from a new facility.
If we assume that Mk-II development timelines can be kept we are most likely to see another 30 plus Tejas Mk-II inducted into the IAF by 2020.
But clearly inductions beyond the heavy and light category are needed to make up for planned retirements. While it is often pointed out that the IAF is inducting much more capable and multi-role aircraft as replacements of legacy Mig series, the fact is that the IAF's tasking environment has also expanded in scope as have its adversaries' capabilities.
While the PAF's new inductions at the moment are not that impressive, consisting in the main of JF-17s and some more F-16s from West Asia with the acquiescence of the United States, it is difficult to say what the future will look like. This is because the Chinese have started fielding fourth generation fighter aircraft themselves and have two fifth generation programmes in the form of the J-20 and J-31 underway. Heading later into the decade J-10Bs which are upgraded versions of the J-10A and feature an airborne electronically scanned array (AESA) will find their way into the CAF and very likely into the PAF as well despite the purchase of old F-16s by the PAF.
Incidentally CAF J-10As and Su-30 MKKs already conduct routine patrols over Tibetan airspace. China's base infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau has also been modified to facilitate year round basing of a modest fighter force. New refuelling capability in the form of converted H-6U aircraft is also being fielded by the CAF.
While its posture at the moment isn't that threatening for the IAF, the CAF has the margins to increase deployments in Tibet. Moreover, if the J-20 development programme turns out to be successful, this fighter will also be deployed in the Tibetan theatre by 2020-2022.
If one adds the IAF's need to support the Indian Navy in its role as a net provider of security in the IOR, it is clear that leave alone one-for-one replacement of retiring strength, the IAF actually needs to augment numbers as evidenced by even the government's approval for raising its sanctioned strength in 2011. It is here that the IAF's projected requirements in the 'medium' category gain significance.
Assuming a continuing SU-30 MKI production line till 2020 and timely induction of Tejas Mk-II units, it is clear that the IAF will need to bring in at least another 70-80 odd new fighter aircraft by 2020 assuming at least one for one replacement of retiring Migs as outlined above. When the Dassault Rafale was finally selected as the IAF's choice for the MMRCA requirement in 2012, it was expected that this would be realized more or less smoothly, with 18 aircraft delivered off the shelf by 2014-15 and series production beginning at HAL subsequently.
However, things have not turned out as planned. It is clear that the delivery contract for the Dassault Rafale will not be signed in 2013-2014. Only a new government at the centre will do so now perhaps in 2014-15. The delays have both been on account of Dassault's issues with HAL and the depreciation of the rupee which has made this buy at least 20 percent more expensive than earlier projected. The UPA's election year freebie dissemination has also meant that various other expenditure heads are being curtailed to keep the fiscal deficit at manageable levels. Indeed the parliamentary standing committee on defence pointed out in April that the amount allocated to the IAF falls well short of what it needed to execute the MMRCA contract.
However, even if the MMRCA contract is finally signed in 2014-15 it would still give a fillip to the IAF's 42 squadron build-up by 2027, even if the numbers in the 13th plan are made up by better SU-30 MKI and Tejas Mk-2 production numbers. The Dassault Rafale actually is a good fit for the IAF's emerging force posture since it is known to be rather capable in the air to ground role as demonstrated by its performance in air campaign over Libya.
Now even as the IAF has to look carefully at its strategy for enhancing combat potential in this decade, it will certainly have to move forward on the MMRCA requirement to field a two front deterring force in the 2020s. While the IAF has invested heavily to upgrade 100 odd Mig-29s and Mirage 2000s which will keep them from obsolescence till the early 2030s and is strengthening its ground support fleet by fitting new engines in about 125 Jaguars, it has to move forward on its planned induction of the MMRCA to manage a smooth rise to a 42 squadron force by 2025 given the FGFA's production schedule.
The Dassault Rafale will help even out the induction process in terms of timing and availability since its basic development is complete and the issue is one of manufacturing it quickly enough here in India. However it must be said that any purchase of the Dassault Rafale must happen with full transfer of technology in key areas such as radars and propulsion. The Rafale is being brought in not just for combat potential but also to take India's aerospace sector to the next level through offset requirements especially given the massive costs involved. If the French stick to promised terms and conditions the option clause for 63 more aircraft will probably get exercised.
By the 2020s, with a much bigger economy and trading interests than now, India will look more closely at the 55-60 squadron force that the IAF was once envisaged to grow into. At such a time hot Tejas and MMRCA lines will certainly be an asset. While these fighters may lack 'all aspect' stealth their overall characteristics in an electronic support environment will keep them more than competitive against most enemy aircraft. It is perhaps time to bite the bullet on higher numbers for both with a view to properly exploiting economies of scale.
Source:- Saurav Jha's Blog : Why the Dassault Rafale will be purchased by the Indian Air Force
