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Why Rafale is a Big Mistake

Bang Galore

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Bharat Karnad

Why would India buy the Rafale combat aircraft rejected by every other interested country—Brazil, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Singapore, and even the cash-rich but not particularly discriminating Saudi Arabia and Morocco?

The French foreign minister Laurent Fabius’s one-point agenda when he visited New Delhi was to seal the deal for Rafale, a warplane apparently fitting IAF’s idea of a Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) in the service’s unique typology, which includes “light” and “heavy” fighter planes as well, used by no other air force in the world. Alas, the first whiff of corruption led the previous defence minister, A K Antony, to seize up and shut shop, stranding the deal at the price negotiation committee stage. It is this stoppage Fabius sought to unclog.

France’s desperation is understandable. Absent the India deal, the Rafale production line will close down, the future of its aerospace sector will dim, and the entire edifice of French industrial R&D sector based on small and medium-sized firms—a version of the enormously successful German “Mittelstand” model—engaged in producing cutting-edge technologies could unravel, and grease France’s slide to second-rate technology power-status.

More immediately, it will lead to a marked increase in the unit cost of the aircraft—reportedly of as much as $5-$10 million dollars to the French Air Force, compelling it to limit the number it inducts. With no international customers and France itself unable to afford the pricey Rafale, the French military aviation industry will be at a crossroads. So, for Paris a lot is at stake and in India the French have found an easy mark, a country willing to pay excessively for an aircraft the IAF can well do without.

Consider the monies at stake. Let’s take the example of Brazil, our BRICS partner. For 36 Rafales the acquisition cost, according to Brazilian media, was $8.2 billion plus an additional $4 billion for short-period maintenance contracts, amounting to nearly $340 million per aircraft in this package and roughly $209 million as the price tag for a single Rafale without maintenance support. Brazil insisted on transfer of technology (ToT) and was told it had to pay a whole lot extra for it, as also for the weapons for its Rafales. But the Brazilian air force had doubts about the quality of the AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar enabling the aircraft to switch quickly from air-to-air to air-to-ground mode in flight, and about the helmet-mounted heads-up-display. Too high a price and too many problems convinced the government of president Dilma Rousseff that the Rafale was not worth the trouble or the money and junked the deal, opting for the Swedish Gripen NG instead.

During the Congress party’s rule the Indian government did not blink at the prospective bill for the Rafale, which more than doubled from $10 billion in 2009 to some $22 billion today, and which figure realistically will exceed $30 billion, or $238 million per aircraft, at a minimum. But India, unbeknownst to most of us, is apparently a terribly rich country, with money to burn! Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, an apparently poorer state or at least one more careful with its money, is blanching at the $190 million price tag for each of the 60 Lockheed F-35Bs (vertical take-off, technologically more complex, variant of the air force model)—a full generation ahead of the Rafale—ordered for the first of the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class 65,000-tonne aircraft carriers.

The prohibitive cost of the French aircraft supposedly made finance-cum-defence minister Arun Jaitley apprehensive. He did the right thing, as is rumoured, of revising the order downwards from 126 aircraft to 80 or so Rafales. The IAF headquarters pre-emptively acquiesced in the decision to save the deal. However, if this change was affected in the hope of proportionately reducing the cost, it will be belied. Because in contracts involving high-value combat aircraft, the size of the order does not much affect the unit price, the cost of spares and service support, and of ToT! This is evident from the rough estimates of the per aircraft cost to Brazil of $209 million for 36 Rafales compared with the $238 million for 126 of the same aircraft to India!

Because New Delhi has been inclined to make India a military “great power” on the basis of imported armaments—a policy that’s a boon to supplier states as it generates employment and new technologies in these countries, and sustains their defence industries, a confident French official told me with respect to another deal that “India will pay the price”. Considering the various negatives of the proposed deal and the long-term national interest Jaitley would do well to nix the Rafale transaction altogether.

The bureaucratic interest of the IAF prompts it to exaggerate wrong threats and talk of declining fighter assets. But it will not tell the defence minister about the logistics hell routinely faced by frontline squadrons in operations owing to the mindboggling diversity of combat aircraft in its inventory, a problem only the Rafale acquisition will exacerbate and, hence, about the urgent need to rationalise the force structure, ideally to Su-30s, the indigenous Tejas Mk-1 for short-range air defence, Tejas Mk-II as MMRCA, and the Su-50 PAK FA as fifth-generation fighter. Nor will the department of defence production officials disclose to Jaitley that the ToT provisions in arms contracts are a fraudulent farce because, while the foreign suppliers pocket billions of dollars, no core technologies, such as source codes (millions of lines of software) and flight control laws, are ever transferred. And that the local defence industry monopolised by defence public sector units (DPSUs) is incapable of absorbing and innovating even such technology as is, in fact, relayed to it because it only assembles aircraft from imported kits.

Terminating the Rafale deal will be disruptive but sending the message to the military, the DPSUs, the defence ministry bureaucracy, and foreign companies salivating for rich, one-sided, contracts that the Narendra Modi government is determined to make a new start and conduct defence business differently, is more important.

The author is professor at the Centre for Policy Research

Why Rafale is a Big Mistake -The New Indian Express
 
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The price is going to be a major concern. We'll have to wait for the final figure.
 
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Eurofighter even if not more capable but was a much better choice than rafale anyday.

India Should not expect the delivery of first rafale before 2018(Those delivered by France) and atleast not before 2020 for the HAL assembled Rafale.In the end,the order will be completed around 2027-29
 
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Eurofighter even if not more capable but was a much better choice than rafale anyday.

India Should not expect the delivery of first rafale before 2018(Those delivered by France) and atleast not before 2020 for the HAL assembled Rafale.In the end,the order will be completed around 2027-29

Wo Kaise Bhai...? :what:
 
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Eurofighter even if not more capable but was a much better choice than rafale anyday.

India Should not expect the delivery of first rafale before 2018(Those delivered by France) and atleast not before 2020 for the HAL assembled Rafale.In the end,the order will be completed around 2027-29

one of the reason why india chose rafale is it wants to cut pakistan from European market for defence procurement. Had India chosen any other platform would have made Pakistan to obtain French technology like upgrades for JF-17 and Naval weapons.
 
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MOU signed in august 2006 for EFT by KSA,Later even after some problem related to the deal,they recieved the first EFT by june 2009.


Eurofighter Typhoon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

EFT is either comparable or even better than RAFALE(Everyone know this,But i don't want to stretch this subject
I am gonna go with what the IAF our Air force said rather than some Armchair analyst

one of the reason why india chose rafale is it wants to cut pakistan from European market for defence procurement. Had India chosen any other platform would have made Pakistan to obtain French technology like upgrades for JF-17 and Naval weapons.

Fail again,Eurofighter comes from 4 nations we could have cut you off from 4 nations arms market rather than 1
The world does not Revolve around you man
 
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In case India cannot afford rafale at that price, we should buy 60- 70 UAE and Quatar mirages as stop gap..
For the next 5 years, until LCA mk 2 and FGFA makes through..

Since we have facilities for upgraded mirages , and weapons package bought with 500 Mica already,
It wouldn't be that expensive, may be it's my imagination.. Considering now much France charges,,.

My wishful speculation is..
Used mirages at 15 million $ + French charges 5 million $ = 20 million $ per craft
70 * 20 = 1400

Not a bad deal if we get it at that price ...
Add another 2.5 billion dollars for weapons... Say 1000 Mica..

Btw I firmly supported buying brand new rafale instead of upgrading mirages at 2.4 billion dollars when France was closing down mirage facility..
 
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The bureaucratic interest of the IAF prompts it to exaggerate wrong threats and talk of declining fighter assets. But it will not tell the defence minister about the logistics hell routinely faced by frontline squadrons in operations owing to the mindboggling diversity of combat aircraft in its inventory, a problem only the Rafale acquisition will exacerbate and, hence, about the urgent need to rationalise the force structure, ideally to Su-30s, the indigenous Tejas Mk-1 for short-range air defence, Tejas Mk-II as MMRCA, and the Su-50 PAK FA as fifth-generation fighter. Nor will the department of defence production officials disclose to Jaitley that the ToT provisions in arms contracts are a fraudulent farce because, while the foreign suppliers pocket billions of dollars, no core technologies, such as source codes (millions of lines of software) and flight control laws, are ever transferred. And that the local defence industry monopolised by defence public sector units (DPSUs) is incapable of absorbing and innovating even such technology as is, in fact, relayed to it because it only assembles aircraft from imported kits.

I think price is paid only for this purposes, The Transfer of Technology (TOT) is how useful is really concerned, merely under head of TOT if we paid more price dont seems better, Whether after TOT we are free to make such weapons our own, like Su-30 and Rafale, whether we are interested for such? China just copy and paste by gathering the details, and we are unnecessarily paid for such. Someone clear the picture plz. :(
 
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Excellent article and I agree completely with it.

All potential conflicts are easily be avoided by buying another set of upgraded 150 SU MKI & 100 LCA.

Rest of the money should be ploughed back into R&D into AMCA.

Sadly Logic do not guide our decisions. That is what happens when decisions that are taken under the shadow of FEAR.
 
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MOU signed in august 2006 for EFT by KSA,Later even after some problem related to the deal,they recieved the first EFT by june 2009.


Eurofighter Typhoon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

EFT is either comparable or even better than RAFALE(Everyone know this,But i don't want to stretch this subject)

Article Thora Vadda hai...But Mast Hai...It will Open your eye....You will understand why India is behind this French Maal...Foy You too @Chinese-Dragon

Because the only 5th generation fighter in service yet is, as of today, the F-22 Raptor – the Russian PAKFA and the Chinese J-20 and J-31 haven’t entered service yet – the era of Generation #4+ fighters hasn’t ended yet, and these fighters will still be quite useful until then. Indeed, these fighters will retain military utility (absent double-digit SAMs) for some time even after the eventual introduction of the PAKFA, J-20, and J-31.

And among these aircraft, the French Dassault Rafale is, without doubt, the most capable and most lethal one. This post will look at this interesting airplane briefly and then compare it to its foreign competitors.

Introduction

The Rafale (French: squall) program was initiated in the late 1970s by the Giscard d’Estaing administration as a replacement for the Super Etendard, Mirage F1, Mirage III, and Mirage V aircraft already in service and the Mirage 2000 multirole fighters which were in the advanced design and production phase (they entered service in 1984). The Rafale first flew in 1986 and entered service in 2001.

The Rafale is designed to meet the needs of two services. The French Air Force, the world’s oldest (established in 1909), needs an affordable multirole fighter to protect national airspace and conduct strikes against a variety of ground targets: fixed structures as well as moving targets – ranging from enemy tanks and APCs to air defense system batteries and ballistic missile launchers to insurgents.

The French Navy wants an aircraft capable of the same range of ground strikes, but also one capable of defending the fleet from air attack and winning air superiority in environments where the French Air Force does not have access to any airfields.

Additionally, both services want an aircraft capable of carrying the ASMP and ASMP-A stealthy cruise missile with a nuclear warhead – currently the TN-88, and later the TNA (Tete Nucleaire Aerienne, i.e. Aerial Nuclear Warhead), as a part of France’s nuclear deterrent – France’s only defense against the most catastrophic threats.

Barack Obama’s drive to unilaterally disarm the United States, confirmed last week in Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate, shows that America’s nuclear umbrella can no longer be counted upon by anyone, because Obama and his extremely leftist party base are determined to scrap it unilaterally. Yet, there is zero chance of there ever being a world without nuclear weapons. In fact, Obama’s legacy will be a world with more nuclear weapons (but not American ones) and more nuclear-armed states in it.

This means that France cannot, under any circumstances, afford to scrap its nuclear arsenal or to cut any further. If anything, France will need to increase it. Hence, the need for a French national nuclear deterrent.

France is very, very fortunate that it has an independent nuclear deterrent, produced entirely in France of French components by French hands. France would’ve been in a terrible situation if she were dependent on the United States for any of these components like the UK is. Obama’s America could’ve simply denied France such components, just like the Kennedy Administration initially did to the UK by cancelling the Skybolt missile. But even the pro-British Reagan Administration was initially reluctant to supply Trident-II SLBMs to Britain in the 1980s.

France, on the other hand, produces all of the components for its nuclear deterrent – the warheads, the missiles, the planes, and the submarines – itself. And the Rafale is one of those components.

Combat performance

The Rafale has already proven itself in three different wars. In Afghanistan, it performed numerous ground strikes against the Taleban, sometimes with GBU-12 Paveway II bombs used against Taleban caves. In Libya, it successfully evaded Qaddafi’s woefully obsolete 1960s-vintage Soviet air defense systems and led the fight against his regime. Most recently, in Mali, the Rafale flew long distances to perform strikes against Islamic insurgents.

Thus, the Rafale is a veteran of three wars despite entering service only a little more than a decade ago, a stark distinction to all of its competitors except the Super Hornet, none of which have seen any combat whatsoever, even against obsolete Soviet air defense systems or insurgents unable to contest control of the air.

Armament, sensors, powerplant, aerodynamic and kinematic performance

The Rafale can carry more ordnance than any of its competitors, hands down. The Air Force variants (B and C) have 14, and the Navy (M) variant, 13 hardpoints. By contrast, the F-35 can carry only 4 munitions (e.g. missiles) while in its stealthy mode; the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the F-16 can carry only 11, and the Su-35 twelve.

For air-to-air combat, the Rafale’s two principal missiles are the MBDA’s MICA (Missile d’Interception, de Combat et d’Autodefense) and Meteor. The MICA is intended for short and medium range combat, with a nominal range of 80 kms, and has both electromagnetic and infrared seekers. The Meteor, with a 160 km range, is a radar-guided long-range (Beyond Visual Range) ramjet-powered missile similar to the American AIM-120D AMRAAM. The principal difference, of course, is the Meteor’s ramjet engine. The French MOD has already ordered 200 such missiles.

This diversity of missiles and seekers will allow a Rafale pilot to saturate his opponent in combat with a salvo of 3 different missiles at once (and remember, the Rafale can carry 13-14 missiles in total). This means his opponent, forced to duck one of the missiles, would be detected by another missile’s seeker, and thus be shot down.

Furthermore, the Rafale has the biggest gun on the market (ex aequo with Sukhoi aircraft): a hefty 30mm GIAT gun firing incendiary rounds. This makes the Rafale an excellent choice for both air to air and air to ground combat, as its 30mm rounds would provide excellent support for troops on the ground. 30mm is the caliber of the guns of most APCs and IFVs.

For air to ground combat, the Rafale can carry the GBU-12 and GBU-49 Paveway II, the GBU-24 Paveway III, the Sagem AASM bomb (with a range of 55 meters and a CEP of less than 1 meter, designed to attack both static and mobile targets), the MBDA Apache and Scalp-EG cruise missiles (designed for attacking targets such as the runways of heavily defended airfields from a distance outside the range of their air defense systems), the Exocet AM39 anti-ship transonic cruise missile, and the forementioned ASMP and ASMP-A stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

In short, the Rafale can carry a wide range of weapons, and perform air to air, air to ground, and air to sea combat well.

In particular, its Exocet missiles would, in any anti-ship battle, prove very deadly, as they did when launched by Argentine A-4 Skyhawks against British warships during the 1982 Falklands War. The warships of virtually all navies of the world are currently poorly prepared for the ASCM threat.

The Rafale’s two principal sensors are the Thales RBE2 ESA radar and the Thales/SAGEM OSF (Optronique Spherique Frontal) infrared search and tracking system (IRST system).

The Dassault Rafale is a relatively small, light airplane. Therefore, it isn’t surprising that its wing loading ratio (the ratio of its weight compared to its wingspace) is just 306 kg/sq m, the second lowest ratio on the market after the JAS-39 Gripen. Its combat radius is also impressive – 1,852 kilometers, again, the second-best in the market trailing only the F-15C/D. The Rafale also has an excellent rate of climb – 304 m/s, i.e. 60,000 ft/min. This means the plane can climb to its service ceiling (55,000 ft) in a minute.

The plane’s two SNECMA MM-2 turbofan engines provide a dry thrust of 50.4 kN each, or 75.62 kN (17,000 lbf) each on afterburner. This gives the plane a very good thrust/weight ratio of 0.988:1 in full combat load – unheard of for a modern fighter, and fully competitive even with 5th generation American, Russian, and Chinese fighters.

The one thing that somewhat lets the Rafale down – other than its 55,000 ft ceiling – is its speed of Mach 1.8, compared to Mach 2 or more for most other fighters. However, its principal competitor, the F-35, is worse at just Mach 1.61 and 43,000 ft. Moreover, it is not a mechanical flaw, but rather the product of a deliberate design aimed to optimise the Rafale for the by far predominant type of aerial combat – namely, close, within visual range combat. In that regime of A2A warfare, neither speed nor ceiling would be a significant issue; the predominant factors are agility, pilot visibility, sensors, gun caliber, and the quality and quantity of WVR, infrared-guided missiles.

And by these factors, the Rafale is the best, with a superlative wingloading ratio, excellent pilot visibility in all direction, superlative radar and IR sensors, a 30 mm gun (the biggest fighter gun caliber in the market), and a load of up to 14 (but usually 10-12) MICA infrared- and electromagnetically-guided missiles with a range of up to 80 kms.

IR-guided WVR missiles typically have a Probability of Kill of 74%, according to research by Air Power Australia. Therefore, if a Rafale fighter begins a mission armed with 2 Meteor and 12 MICA missiles, then, even if its 2 Meteors hit nothing, its 12 MICA missiles will kill 8 enemy aircraft.

Comparison with the competitors

In comparison with the Dassault Rafale, all of its Generation 4+ competitors, with the limited exception of the Typhoon, look miserably.

The F-35 Lightning II – marketed by Lockheed Martin as a stealthy multirole fighter that can do everything and meet the needs of three US Services and many allied countries – fails the test miserably. Its wing loading ratio is 481 kg/sq m even at a 50% combat load, and 529 kg/sq m in full combat load, making it way too heavy for close combat. Its speed of Mach 1.61 and ceiling of 43,000 ft are decisively inferior to that of the Rafale (and all other Generation 4+ and 5th generation fighters in the world), as is its maximum combat load (in stealthy mode) of 4 missiles. Even in nonstealthy mode, it can carry only 8 missiles.

Moreover, the F-35 is “stealthy” only in the X-band, and only from the front and the up. From the belly and the rear, it isn’t stealthy at all, due to its deeply sculpted belly and its round, nonstealthy, muffin-shaped engine (which could be destroyed with a single round from the Rafale’s 30mm gun, thus bringing the F-35 down).

The F-35 program, in short, is nothing but a Ponzi scheme designed to earn Lockheed Martin money at the expense of US and overseas taxpayers.

The F/A-18E/F Super Bug, sometimes touted in the US and Canada as an alternative to the F-35, also fails the comparison miserably, with its aerodynamic and kinematic performance also decisively inferior to the Rafale’s. It has a wing loading ratio of 459 kg/sq m even with a mere 50% combat load; a T/W ratio (at full load) of just 0.93:1, well below the 0.99:1 of the Rafale. Its service ceiling is only 50,000 ft – 5,000 less than for the Rafale. Its rate of climb is a pathetic 228 m/s, and its combat radius a paltry 722 kms. And it can withstand only 7.6 Gs, while the Rafale can withstand a full 9Gs, the most a human pilot can withstand.

In short, both the F-35 and the F/A-18E/F Super Bug are decisively inferior to the Dassault Rafale. Buying either of these aircraft is a recipe for military inferiority and for losing control of the air. Both of them also have a tinier gun – only 20mm caliber.

The JAS-39 Gripen can compete with the Rafale only in the close combat regime, with a wingloading ratio of 283 kg/sq m (the lowest on the market) and a T/W ratio of 0.97:1 at full load (still inferior to the Rafale). It also has a decent max speed of Mach 2. However, its combat radius is very small, at just 800 kms, and it can carry only 8 missiles – as opposed to the Rafale’s 13-14. This means that, in combat against the Gripen, a Rafale pilot would get as many as 5-6 freebie shots at the Gripen.

Most troublingly of all, the Gripen, like the Super Bug, has a ceiling of only 50,000 ft – it can fly no higher than that. This makes it a non-player in the BVR regime, like the previous two competitors. Their missiles, to hit a Rafale, would have to climb steeply uphill, while the Rafale’s superior max ceiling would add to the nominal range of its missiles.

The next competitor is the F-15SE Silent Eagle. This aircraft, however, is not a development from the F-15C/D air superiority Eagle, but rather, the F-15E Strike Eagle, and has mostly the same performance parameters. It has decisively inferior thrust/weight (0.93:1) and rate of climb (254 m/s, 50,000 ft/min) ratios. Its gun’s caliber is only 20mm. Its service ceiling, at 60,000 feet, is not much better than the Rafale’s, and its combat radius, 1,840 kms, is essentially the same as the Rafale’s.

The only significant advantage it has over the French fighter is speed: over Mach 2.5+. This, by itself, however, is not enough to make it a better fighter, nor to make it a good air superiority fighter. This is no surprise, because, as its name says, the Strike Eagle is intended to be a strike jet, not an air superiority fighter.

The next rival is the Sukhoi Flanker family, the most capable member of which is the newest one – the Su-35. Like the F-15E/SE, its only significant advantage over the Rafale is speed – and at only Mach 2.25, it’s even less pronounced than with the F-15E/SE. Its service ceiling (59,100 ft) is not much better than the Rafale’s (55,000 ft).

Meanwhile, its wingloading ratio, at 408 kg/sq m, is disastrously inferior to the French fighter’s 304 kg/sq m, making the Su-35 a non-player in within visual range combat where any Rafale is present, and an inferior rate of climb at 280 m/s. Its stated thrust/weight ratio of 1.13:1 refers to a 50% combat load only, not to a full combat load, the data for which is unavailable but may very well be inferior to the Rafale’s. The only criteria in which the Su-35 has parity with the Rafale are those of armament – 14 hardpoints and a 30mm gun, exactly as with the Rafale.

And so we come to the Rafale’s last rival, the Eurofighter Typhoon. This aircraft has a good thrust ratio (1.07:1) at a full fuel and armament load, but it’s not much more than the Rafale’s 0.99:1. Its rate of climb (315 m/s, i.e. 62,000 ft/min) and top speed (Mach 2) are also only slightly better than the Rafale’s and do not justify the Typhoon’s much higher cost (£125 mn per copy). The Typhoon’s service ceiling, 55,000 ft, is the same as the Rafale’s, the wing loading ratio (312 kg/sq m) is slightly inferior, and its combat radius is decisively inferior: just 601 km for a lo-lo-lo mission, and 1,389 km for a hi-lo-hi mission – better than the former, but still much less than the Rafale’s 1,800+ kms.

The Typhoon’s 27mm gun caliber is slightly smaller than the Rafale’s, and it can carry 13 missiles – the same as a Rafale M, one missile less than the Rafale B/C variants.

So the Typhoon is slightly better than the Rafale on 3 parameters, slightly inferior two, equivalent on two others, and decisively inferior on one. In other words, by most criteria, the Typhoon is either inferior or barely keeps parity with the Rafale – hardly a justification for the Eurofighter’s much higher cost.

Another advantage the Rafale has over the Typhoon, the Gripen, the F-15E/SE, and so far also over the unproven F-35C (which has suffered notorious tailhook problems and has never taken off from a carrier) is the fact that the Rafale can operate from aircraft carriers and has done so since 2001. The Typhoon, the F-15, and the Gripen don’t have a naval variant and the first two never will, as they are too heavy to operate from carriers.

So why has the UK never purchased the Rafale for its two new aircraft carriers undergoing construction?

Because of purely political issues: pressure by the Lockheed Martin Corporation and the British aerospace lobby. The former has successfully lobbied the UK government to stay in the F-35 program at a high cost to the British taxpayer, even though not a single F-35 will enter Royal Navy (or RAF) service for many years, if ever. The latter, for its part, was lobbying the British government to develop a navalized Typhoon variant, even though such an aircraft is not feasible without substantial changes to the Typhoon’s design, as the aircraft is simply too heavy for carriers.

This is why repeated French proposals to sell the Rafale to the UK have been rejected despite the significant warming of British relations since 2006 and especially since 2007 under President Sarkozy. Had the UK accepted the French offer in 2006 – at the same time when British ministers were begging the US to make the F-35′s development codes available to London – the Rafale would’ve been available for RN (and RAF) service by now. (And had the UK not delayed the construction of its two new carriers, the Rafale would’ve been flying off their decks by now.)

The Rafale was rejected for purely political, not military, reasons.

The reality confronting all nations that don’t have cozy relations with Russia or China is simple. They will either procure the Rafale – the best Generation #4+ fighter in the world – or they will see their air forces emasculated and rendered impotent, irrelevant, and useless. This applies, inter alia, to Canada, Australia, the UK, the UAE, South Korea, Poland, Spain, and others. For the time being, it also applies to nations that have friendly relations with Moscow and Beijing, such as Malaysia, Brazil, and Italy, because their PAKFA, J-20, and J-31 fighters won’t be available until later in this decade. While the Dassault Rafale is available right now.
 
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I think price is paid only for this purposes, The Transfer of Technology (TOT) is how useful is really concerned, merely under head of TOT if we paid more price dont seems better, Whether after TOT we are free to make such weapons our own, like Su-30 and Rafale, whether we are interested for such? China just copy and paste by gathering the details, and we are unnecessarily paid for such. Someone clear the picture plz. :(

No core tech will be transferred. Only the tech to manufacture 50% of the parts and assemble the rest.

In effect the money is to keep the HAL employed for the next 15 years.
 
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Excellent article and I agree completely with it.

All potential conflicts are easily be avoided by buying another set of upgraded 150 SU MKI & 100 LCA.

Rest of the money should be ploughed back into R&D into AMCA.

Sadly Logic do not guide our decisions. That is what happens when decisions that are taken under the shadow of FEAR.

Please do not consider this deal as a buying selling deal of some aircraft..... Here what India will get with deal is high technical advancement ...This deal is having capability to change the face of Indian Aviation Industry.
 
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