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Why going ' MAD ' won't work for India ?

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New govt needs new nuclear policy and posture - Rediff.com India News


The Bharatiya Janata Party's election manifesto has triggered a long-overdue discussion of India's decade-old nuclear weapons doctrine.

Some analysts interpreted the BJP's undertaking that it would "revise and update" the doctrine as an intention to revisit India's "no first use" commitment.

Narendra Modi, the BJP's prime ministerial candidate, quickly denied any such intention.
33503843486c4e6553626741415a4856

The debate, however, has come alive.



Last fortnight, this column had urged reconsidering NFU and also India's commitment to "massive retaliation", which binds New Delhi to respond to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons attack on Indian targets anywhere with all-out nuclear strikes on the aggressor's cities that could kill tens of millions.

Since both India's regional adversaries, Pakistan and China, possess a robust second-strike capability, or a nuclear arsenal that would survive an all-out Indian attack, equal retaliation should be expected across India.

Instead of this mayhem, which Indian policymakers would probably shrink from triggering anyway, I argued that New Delhi should opt for a "flexible response" that would allow decision makers more credible options.

I pointed out that American doctrine had graduated from massive retaliation to flexible response in the 1950s and 1960s after US strategists realised the inherent credibility shortfall in a threat that consigned both sides to "mutual assured destruction", appropriately shortened to MAD.
On April 23, Shyam Saran, the National Security Advisory Board chief, weighed in on these pages, flatly rejecting doctrinal change.

He declared that nuclear bombs were not weapons of war, but of mass destruction.

A tactical nuclear strike on, say, a tank column (counter-force targeting) that killed a few dozen soldiers was, he suggested, in the same league as a strategic strike on a city that killed millions of civilians (counter-value targeting).

He quoted a 1950s American game theory expert who postulated that even the smallest nuclear strike would inevitably escalate to an all-out nuclear conflagration.

While rightly averring that doctrine must be in line with a country's nuclear forces and command structures, Saran questionably concluded that the configuration of our nuclear assets -- the strategic triad of land, sea and airborne nuclear forces -- made doctrinal change difficult.

It is hard to agree with that; were force structures to shape doctrine, it would be the tail wagging the dog.
In this column, I shall point out that India's NFU declaration sits uneasily with the understanding that China constitutes a growing security threat.

India's nuclear deterrent -- its last defence against a massive conventional attack by China -- becomes unusable with a declared NFU policy.

The country, weaker in conventional forces, has always used a nuclear deterrent to hold off the stronger. India's declared NFU devalues our nuclear deterrent against Chinese attack.
The choice between massive retaliation and flexible response is more complex and relates mainly to Pakistan.

Massive retaliation is a simple policy, requiring standard weapons and simple but secure command structures.

Since flexible response requires a broader menu of weapons and structures, which create options for decision makers, it also arouses non-proliferation concerns.

Advocates of massive retaliation forget -- in their understandable wish, perhaps, to portray India as a "responsible nuclear power" -- that India's basic deterrence objective against Pakistan must be to ensure that our superior conventional forces have the time window they need for punishing serious Pakistani provocation (for example, another Kargil, a big terror strike, a political assassination).

Pakistan's deep fear of being overrun by Indian conventional forces causes it to position low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons with its military reserve formations; one of these might be used to warn India to halt an otherwise unstoppable conventional offensive.

Instead of immediately escalating to a mutual holocaust, India's escalation should be gradual, allowing conventional operations to continue until conflict termination objectives are achieved.

The nuclear deterrent must be refashioned to ensure dominance at each rung of the escalation ladder, with massive retaliation always a lingering threat.
Like with America in the early 1950s, India's massive retaliation doctrine faces a credibility deficit.

A Pakistani threat to use a TNW on its own soil against Indian military targets -- killing at the most a few tens of our soldiers -- would be obviously more plausible than the Indian counter-threat of "massive retaliation", which involves destroying multiple Pakistani cities and the deaths of millions of civilians.

With Pakistan's second-strike capability likely to cause equal damage in India, India's obviously rational (and historically ultra-cautious) decision makers are unlikely to prevail in a MAD chicken game with Islamabad.
New Delhi's commitment to massive retaliation also has much to do with keeping the military out of nuclear policymaking.

Flexible response, which involves complicating the calculus of potential opponents, would require our civilian decision makers to master a broader range of technicalities, and our military to play a larger role in shaping and manning the deterrent.

Instead, our civilian decision makers content themselves with a nuclear doctrine so simple -- even simplistic -- that the military itself is largely superfluous.

By sticking doggedly to massive retaliation, India's leadership successfully keeps the military out of nuclear strategising.
In the final balance, our nuclear weapons doctrine remains unconvincing because decision makers fail to separate ideology from realism.

India's pioneering role in global disarmament is well known; but war is not a United Nations General Assembly debate or a Conference on Disarmament meeting.

Phrases like "Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war; they are weapons of mass destruction" are useful debating gambits in these forums.

Yet, it would be self-defeating to be fooled by our own rhetoric.

Away from the seminar rooms, especially during the feverish decision making in any conflict, both sides get to vote on whether nukes are usable weapons of war.

If Pakistan decides they are -- and the addition of TNWs into its arsenal suggests exactly that -- then New Delhi's fervent insistence that nuclear weapons are unusable is mere wishful thinking.

The new government must initiate a comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons doctrine and posture.
 
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New govt needs new nuclear policy and posture - Rediff.com India News


The Bharatiya Janata Party's election manifesto has triggered a long-overdue discussion of India's decade-old nuclear weapons doctrine.

Some analysts interpreted the BJP's undertaking that it would "revise and update" the doctrine as an intention to revisit India's "no first use" commitment.

Narendra Modi, the BJP's prime ministerial candidate, quickly denied any such intention.
33503843486c4e6553626741415a4856

The debate, however, has come alive.



Last fortnight, this column had urged reconsidering NFU and also India's commitment to "massive retaliation", which binds New Delhi to respond to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons attack on Indian targets anywhere with all-out nuclear strikes on the aggressor's cities that could kill tens of millions.

Since both India's regional adversaries, Pakistan and China, possess a robust second-strike capability, or a nuclear arsenal that would survive an all-out Indian attack, equal retaliation should be expected across India.

Instead of this mayhem, which Indian policymakers would probably shrink from triggering anyway, I argued that New Delhi should opt for a "flexible response" that would allow decision makers more credible options.

I pointed out that American doctrine had graduated from massive retaliation to flexible response in the 1950s and 1960s after US strategists realised the inherent credibility shortfall in a threat that consigned both sides to "mutual assured destruction", appropriately shortened to MAD.
On April 23, Shyam Saran, the National Security Advisory Board chief, weighed in on these pages, flatly rejecting doctrinal change.

He declared that nuclear bombs were not weapons of war, but of mass destruction.

A tactical nuclear strike on, say, a tank column (counter-force targeting) that killed a few dozen soldiers was, he suggested, in the same league as a strategic strike on a city that killed millions of civilians (counter-value targeting).

He quoted a 1950s American game theory expert who postulated that even the smallest nuclear strike would inevitably escalate to an all-out nuclear conflagration.

While rightly averring that doctrine must be in line with a country's nuclear forces and command structures, Saran questionably concluded that the configuration of our nuclear assets -- the strategic triad of land, sea and airborne nuclear forces -- made doctrinal change difficult.

It is hard to agree with that; were force structures to shape doctrine, it would be the tail wagging the dog.
In this column, I shall point out that India's NFU declaration sits uneasily with the understanding that China constitutes a growing security threat.

India's nuclear deterrent -- its last defence against a massive conventional attack by China -- becomes unusable with a declared NFU policy.

The country, weaker in conventional forces, has always used a nuclear deterrent to hold off the stronger. India's declared NFU devalues our nuclear deterrent against Chinese attack.
The choice between massive retaliation and flexible response is more complex and relates mainly to Pakistan.

Massive retaliation is a simple policy, requiring standard weapons and simple but secure command structures.

Since flexible response requires a broader menu of weapons and structures, which create options for decision makers, it also arouses non-proliferation concerns.

Advocates of massive retaliation forget -- in their understandable wish, perhaps, to portray India as a "responsible nuclear power" -- that India's basic deterrence objective against Pakistan must be to ensure that our superior conventional forces have the time window they need for punishing serious Pakistani provocation (for example, another Kargil, a big terror strike, a political assassination).

Pakistan's deep fear of being overrun by Indian conventional forces causes it to position low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons with its military reserve formations; one of these might be used to warn India to halt an otherwise unstoppable conventional offensive.

Instead of immediately escalating to a mutual holocaust, India's escalation should be gradual, allowing conventional operations to continue until conflict termination objectives are achieved.

The nuclear deterrent must be refashioned to ensure dominance at each rung of the escalation ladder, with massive retaliation always a lingering threat.
Like with America in the early 1950s, India's massive retaliation doctrine faces a credibility deficit.

A Pakistani threat to use a TNW on its own soil against Indian military targets -- killing at the most a few tens of our soldiers -- would be obviously more plausible than the Indian counter-threat of "massive retaliation", which involves destroying multiple Pakistani cities and the deaths of millions of civilians.

With Pakistan's second-strike capability likely to cause equal damage in India, India's obviously rational (and historically ultra-cautious) decision makers are unlikely to prevail in a MAD chicken game with Islamabad.
New Delhi's commitment to massive retaliation also has much to do with keeping the military out of nuclear policymaking.

Flexible response, which involves complicating the calculus of potential opponents, would require our civilian decision makers to master a broader range of technicalities, and our military to play a larger role in shaping and manning the deterrent.

Instead, our civilian decision makers content themselves with a nuclear doctrine so simple -- even simplistic -- that the military itself is largely superfluous.

By sticking doggedly to massive retaliation, India's leadership successfully keeps the military out of nuclear strategising.
In the final balance, our nuclear weapons doctrine remains unconvincing because decision makers fail to separate ideology from realism.

India's pioneering role in global disarmament is well known; but war is not a United Nations General Assembly debate or a Conference on Disarmament meeting.

Phrases like "Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war; they are weapons of mass destruction" are useful debating gambits in these forums.

Yet, it would be self-defeating to be fooled by our own rhetoric.

Away from the seminar rooms, especially during the feverish decision making in any conflict, both sides get to vote on whether nukes are usable weapons of war.

If Pakistan decides they are -- and the addition of TNWs into its arsenal suggests exactly that -- then New Delhi's fervent insistence that nuclear weapons are unusable is mere wishful thinking.

The new government must initiate a comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons doctrine and posture.

It is about time that we relook at our nuclear policy, but many of the arguments in this article aren't really valid.

India is in the unenviable position of being the only country in the world that faces three different kinds of credible nuclear threats. As a result, creating a single nuclear policy that can respond all the different threats is a highly complex challenge.

India's nuclear threats come from 3 different actors -
China:
The most rational player in the Indian nuclear stage. China's nukes are mainly a lever against US aggression but will at a pinch be used against India. China will nuke India either as a reprisal against Indian strike or to stop Indian conventional movement into too much of Chinese territory. Or it can nuke military or civilian targets as a precursor to a full scale invasion (despite its avowed No First Use policy - but who cares about policy in wartime?). Given the fact that currently China is superior to India in conventional strength, the first case is unlikely. And India's MAD based massive retaliation posture actually is a decent foil against potential Chinese first strikes.
India would actually be "mad" :-) to abandon NFU - any preemptive strike against China would invite a devastating retaliation.
Pakistani Army:
The nuclear goal for the Pakistani army is to protect against a massive incursion of Indian conventional forces into Pakistani territory. This is where MAD falls short - because a countervalue Indian strike in response to a Pakistani tactical nuke is overkill and I don't think the Indian politicians have the balls to authorize such a strike. There is an additional problem with massive retaliation - the moment there is a Pakistani nuclear attack on Indian forces, the global diplomatic community will definitely go into overdrive to pressurize the Indian gov to not retaliate. So here we need a graded response mechanism - you baby nuke us, we baby nuke you and so on. But there needs to be one more critical addition - any response to Pakistani (army) nuclear attack will invite a Counter Force response. So the Indian nuke will target to cause disproportionate damage to armed forces installation. This disincentivizes the Pakistani army from attacks.
Pakistani Terrorists:
The biggest wildcard in the equation. The terrorists (unless stopped by there ISI minders) are not likely to even respond to MAD. They would actually want to provoke a massive Indian attack - this gets them to their martyrdom faster and gets a bunch of innocent Pakistanis & Indians killed to boot. Also, the terrorists are also likely to use dirty bombs when they can't get their hands on a nuclear device. There is not much we can do to here (except for catching them before the attack), but the graded Counter Force response is a workable option - the Pakistani army is incentivized to control the crazies (for whatever that's worth).

So for TL/DR - abandon MAD for a Graded Counter Force response, but retain NFU.

PS: Why the hell does the author think that a tactical nuke will kill "at the most a few tens of our soldiers"?
 
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It is about time that we relook at our nuclear policy, but many of the arguments in this article aren't really valid.

India is in the unenviable position of being the only country in the world that faces three different kinds of credible nuclear threats. As a result creating a single nuclear policy that can respond all the different threats is a highly complex challenge.

India's nuclear threats come from 3 different actors -
China:
The most rational player in the Indian nuclear stage. China's nukes are mainly a lever against US aggression but will at a pinch be used against India. China will nuke India either as a reprisal against Indian strike or to stop Indian conventional movement into too much of Chinese territory. Or it can nuke military or civilian targets as a precursor to a full scale invasion (despite its avowed No First Use policy - but who cares about policy in wartime?). Given the fact that currently China is superior to India in conventional strength, the first case is unlikely. And India's MAD based massive retaliation posture actually is a decent foil against potential Chinese first strikes.
India would actually be "mad" :-)p:) to abandon NFU - any preemptive strike against China would invite a devastating retaliation.
Pakistani Army:
The nuclear goal for the Pakistani army is to protect against a massive incursion of Indian conventional forces into Pakistani territory. This is where MAD falls short - because a countervalue Indian strike in response to a Pakistani tactical nuke is overkill and I don't think the Indian politicians have the balls to authorize such a strike. There is an additional problem with massive retaliation - the moment there is a Pakistani nuclear attack on Indian forces, the global diplomatic community will definitely go into overdrive to pressurize the Indian gov to not retaliate. So here we need a graded response mechanism - you baby nuke us, we baby nuke you and so on. But there needs to be one more critical addition - any response to Pakistani (army) nuclear attack will invite a Counter Force response. So the Indian nuke will target to cause disproportionate damage to armed forces installation. This disincentivizes the Pakistani army from attacks.
Pakistani Terrorists:
The biggest wildcard in the equation. The terrorists (unless stopped by there ISI minders) are not likely to even respond to MAD. They would actually want to provoke a massive Indian attack - this gets them to their martyrdom faster and gets a bunch of innocent Pakistanis & Indians killed to boot. Also, the terrorists are also likely to use dirty bombs when they can't get their hands on a nuclear device. There is not much we can do to here (except for catching them before the attack), but the graded Counter Force response is a workable option - the Pakistani army is incentivized to control the crazies (for whatever that's worth).

So for TL/DR - abandon MAD for a Graded Counter Force response, but retain NFU.

PS: Why the hell does the author think that a tactical nuke will kill "at the most a few tens of our soldiers"?

May be he wanted to say tens of thousands of soldiers

Or in his attempt to dilute impact of tactical nuke ..he arrived at this ridiculously small number ...

I personally feel ..India has to keep policy of Massive retaliation ....India will survive any Pakistani nuclear attack ....but Pakistan will be completely wiped out fro world map .

I would still support sticking to NFU ....
 
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Well .MAD will happens when our enemy is China.
Pakistan I dont think so.Missiles enter in to Indian air space only after a screening through our ABM,long range SAM.
So you need a massive ripple firing to overcome it .If we can continue developemnt of our present ABM system it can counter more than 20 missiles in same time.
So China will be our worthy opponent.They can do that.
 
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Well .MAD will happens when our enemy is China.
Pakistan I dont think so.Missiles enter in to Indian air space only after a screening through our ABM,long range SAM.
So you need a massive ripple firing to overcome it .If we can continue developemnt of our present ABM system it can counter more than 20 missiles in same time.
So China will be our worthy opponent.They can do that.

Even if one out of 20 missiles fired ...hits Bombay
It will create an instant havoc .

10 million immediate causalities ...

and another 10- 20 million subsequently .

Bombay generates 25% of national revenue alone .

Imagine implications to financial market and economy ....

No matter how robust ABM may be ..it does not guarantee protection against massive first strike

India's best option is MAD .

If Pakistan knows that massive response fro India will wipe out it from face of world ....and India will survive although severely crippled after its first massive strike ....Pakistan won't dare to undertake such step.

MAD has still relevance in India-pakistan scenario ....
 
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This article, like most others, and like most Pakistani members here, makes the unwarranted assumption that India's leadership is more scared of Pak's nukes than Pakistani leadership is scared of India's.

Once a nuke has been launched, all such assumptions vaporize in a huge mushroom cloud.

...
If Pakistan knows that massive response fro India will wipe out it from face of world ....and India will survive although severely crippled after its first massive strike ....Pakistan won't dare to undertake such step.

MAD has still relevance in India-pakistan scenario ....
What if Pakistan has or will have the capability to finish India as well? (And get finished too, of course.) Then will the calculations change?
 
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Even if one out of 20 missiles fired ...hits Bombay
It will create an instant havoc .

10 million immediate causalities ...

and another 10- 20 million subsequently .

Bombay generates 25% of national revenue alone .

Imagine implications to financial market and economy ....

No matter how robust ABM may be ..it does not guarantee protection against massive first strike

India's best option is MAD .

If Pakistan knows that massive response fro India will wipe out it from face of world ....and India will survive although severely crippled after its first massive strike ....Pakistan won't dare to undertake such step.

MAD has still relevance in India-pakistan scenario ....

But until next 2 decades Pakistan cant threat us .We dont even heard about their missile tests like we did or doing.
But if they can boost up their economy then they will be emerge as a threat to us because their defence development will spike considerably .And i think for that they need at least 2 decades.
 
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This article, like most others, and like most Pakistani members here, makes the unwarranted assumption that India's leadership is more scared of Pak's nukes than Pakistani leadership is scared of India's.

Once a nuke has been launched, all such assumptions vaporize in a huge mushroom cloud.


What if Pakistan has or will have the capability to finish India as well? (And get finished too, of course.) Then will the calculations change?

Given mere geographical size and extent of India and Pakistan's current missile capabilities ....It's not easy for Pakistan to finish India ....

India is likely to survive Pakistani nuclear attack ....although severely crippled , however massive the first Pakistani strike may be . But ensuing Indian retaliation can possibly almost finish Pakistan .

This will remain so ...even if Pakistan improves its missile capabilities to pan India range and increases its nuclear arsenal several folds.
Even if Pakistan has to take out all major Indian metro cities alone ...number of nukes required to be launched to achieve that will be massive . Pakistan may not have enough time to do so if ( and which is likely ) India retaliates swiftly .

In my opinion the outcome of Nuclear exchange between India-Pakistan still favors India .

Pakistan will be wiped out - India will be severely crippled ( but can recover from it slowly )
 
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May be he wanted to say tens of thousands of soldiers

Or in his attempt to dilute impact of tactical nuke ..he arrived at this ridiculously small number ...

I personally feel ..India has to keep policy of Massive retaliation ....India will survive any Pakistani nuclear attack ....but Pakistan will be completely wiped out fro world map .

I would still support sticking to NFU ....

Premature and childish statements coming from someone who has no idea what his country is capable of. Yes Pakistan has its own problems but mind you it doesn't take much for its people to become one when the time comes.
 
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Erstwhile is the word .

Russia even today has the second largest nuclear arsenal and means to deliver it ..and it's only country which can pulverize US to ashes .

The only country which US can possibly fear from .

The MAD still works for US and Russia .
 
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Premature and childish statements coming from someone who has no idea what his country is capable of. Yes Pakistan has its own problems but mind you it doesn't take much for its people to become one when the time comes.
Does it matter, whether the peope are united as one or not? The topic is nuclear weapons, and those will kill people whether they stand united or fight among each other.

The question here is not whether Pak can unite against India or not, it is whether India's nuclear doctrine needs to be revised. I'd like to know your opinion on that.
 
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Premature and childish statements coming from someone who has no idea what his country is capable of. Yes Pakistan has its own problems but mind you it doesn't take much for its people to become one when the time comes.

My statements may have hurt your feelings . My intention is to state likely possibility that only thing that can dissuade Pakistani leadership from taking drastic step of launching nuclear attack will be assured destruction of Pakistan due to massive retaliation from India .

I am no way suggesting that this should happen .

Nuclear weapons for the last 6 decades remained weapons of peace ....due to MAD doctrine

I hope that this will remain so in case of India- Pakistan too .

I have already stated why I feel that India will likely survive Nuclear exchange but Pakistan won't .

Sheer size of country and population, economy , over seas population favors India . This is a cold fact in my opinion .
 
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