From The TimesMarch 17, 2009
What worked in Iraq won't help Afghanistan
Rory Stewart has witnessed both our major conflicts. Here, in an extract from a speech at Chatham House, he suggests a new way forward
The situation in Afghanistan is somewhat aggravating and a little surreal. We have been there now for seven years - but I don't know if the British Government knows why. Do we have a policy? Or are we simply waiting to discover what the Obama Administration wishes to do and go along with it?
This year the US is expected to spend more than $50 billion on military and civilian aid. We are talking big sums but we don't have a clear account of what we are doing.
When the US invaded in 2001, its objective was to ensure that al-Qaeda could never again build training camps in Afghanistan. That was achieved with relative ease and with a limited number of special forces and intelligence operatives.
By 2002 we were beginning to talk about development. We launched national solidarity programmes, gave money to villages. But over the next two years it became fashionable in policymaking circles in Britain and the US to say that there was no point in focusing on Afghanistan as an arena for counter-terrorism or a recipient of charity - we should be building a state.
This was when Britain and Nato decided to deploy more troops. Britain has increased the numbers in Helmand province from 250 to 5,000. The belief then was that they were there to help state-building, not to fight the Taleban, which was why John Reid, the Defence Secretary, said to much mockery that he hoped that the British troops would return without a shot fired. There was little sign then of any overt Taleban presence, and it was relatively safe for Westerners to travel through Helmand.
I sat down in Kabul with a senior member of the British Embassy and the No2 of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in 2005 and asked: Why are you deploying British troops to Helmand?
They said: To improve economic development, to improve governance and eliminate corruption, to improve road security and, in particular, to deal with the narcotics problem.
I said: You'll provoke an insurgency. They replied: No, you're traumatised by Iraq. Opinion polls show that in Helmand British and American troops are very popular. I asked: What type of timeframe are you looking at to see improvements? They said six months.
I had just come from Iraq, where I had been an administrator of a province in the south and I said: This is nonsense; will you write on a piece of paper that these are the kinds of improvements you're going to see, and if you don't see them, will you agree not to say: We didn't have enough troops or enough helicopters' or We are where we are, it is too humiliating to withdraw'. Will you accept that if these improvements don't come in six months the policy was wrong? They agreed.
From that moment on, I have become increasingly frustrated. A Taleban insurgency has exploded but policymakers will not acknowledge that their original objectives have not been achieved. Instead, they blame implementation, the type of helicopters or previous commanders. Now policymakers have moved on from development, state-building and counter-insurgency to preserving the credibility of Nato and regional stability: We are in Afghanistan to hold Pakistan together.
Enter General Petraeus and his surge of 17,000 troops. There is good evidence that by deploying a further 30,000 troops King David turned the situation around in Iraq. I was in Baghdad this month, and walked streets I would not have been able to walk three years ago. I was not wearing a helmet, nobody was shooting or throwing rocks at me. So can General Petraeus conclude that by deploying more troops to Afghanistan he will be able to pull off the same thing?
There are two different accounts of what he hopes to do by deploying more troops in Afghanistan. One is straight from the counter-insurgency manual: clear/hold/build. Clear out the Taleban, secure populated areas and allow the forces of sustainable economic development to flourish, good governance to come and the Afghan police and security services to back us so we can go home.
The more cynical explanation is that the surge is an attempt to whack the Taleban round the head because they will not negotiate unless they are hurting. This is, broadly speaking, what Henry Kissinger believed of the Vietcong in 1968. The US increased troop numbers to drive them to the table to make concessions.
Neither approach will work. The Afghan groups do not resemble the Vietcong or the Sunni tribal groups in Iraq. The Shia-run Government in Baghdad could cut a deal with the Sunni groups because they are both relatively powerful and coherent factions backed by mass politics. Go to any southern Iraqi town and you will find a man in a buttoned-up shirt without a tie who says: I am the head of this party and who can mobilise thousands.
Go to a town in Afghanistan and ask who is in charge and you find six or seven figures with varying sorts of power - perhaps a tribal chief, maybe the police chief or sub-district commander. They do not have mass movements behind them. When we talk about driving the Taleban to the table, we forget that these groups are more insubstantial and fragmented than we acknowledge. The Kabul Government lacks political depth or legitimacy; the Taleban is elusive.
But I'm not a radical pessimist. Being realistic about our limitations does not mean that Britain must accept the status of a third-rate power. We can achieve many things in Afghanistan that are worthwhile for us and for the Afghans. We have made serious progress in education, health and rural development; Afghans are asking for simple things such as roads, electricity and irrigation and we have the skills to provide them. We should focus on the progressive, pro-Western centre and north, rather than pouring almost all our resources into the insurgency zones of the south and the east where schools are often destroyed as soon as they are built.
We need a much lighter military footprint. We cannot afford to keep 80,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan for a decade. US and European voters won't support it, it is an extravagant distraction from more important strategic priorities, including Pakistan and as long as we are seen as an occupying power, there will be Afghans who want to fight us.
We should plan now to reduce the size of our military commitment and decide what we can do with fewer troops. This does not mean abandoning Afghanistan entirely. The US and its allies should use special forces and intelligence operatives to ensure that al-Qaeda never again finds Afghanistan a safe and comfortable environment in which to establish training camps. Even a few thousand international troops and US air support would be a serious deterrent to civil war. But most importantly we must continue to provide generous long-term financial support to the Afghan Government and its military.
Policymakers are now more cautious about Afghanistan and say that their only objective is stability.
But even this is implausible. Pakistan is 20 years ahead of Afghanistan on almost every indicator and is yet to achieve the kind of stability we dream of in Afghanistan. Instead, we must think in terms of containing and managing a difficult, poor and unstable country without sinking too much into this difficult task. We must husband our resources for the many other crises already erupting - from the British banking sector to Pakistan.
There are many small simple things we can do to help Afghan society. All require us to forge a long-term engagement with the country. But such a policy is only possible if we reduce our investment in money and troops and develop a lighter, more affordable and ultimately more sustainable relationship with Afghanistan.
What worked in Iraq won't help Afghanistan | - Times Online
What worked in Iraq won't help Afghanistan
Rory Stewart has witnessed both our major conflicts. Here, in an extract from a speech at Chatham House, he suggests a new way forward
The situation in Afghanistan is somewhat aggravating and a little surreal. We have been there now for seven years - but I don't know if the British Government knows why. Do we have a policy? Or are we simply waiting to discover what the Obama Administration wishes to do and go along with it?
This year the US is expected to spend more than $50 billion on military and civilian aid. We are talking big sums but we don't have a clear account of what we are doing.
When the US invaded in 2001, its objective was to ensure that al-Qaeda could never again build training camps in Afghanistan. That was achieved with relative ease and with a limited number of special forces and intelligence operatives.
By 2002 we were beginning to talk about development. We launched national solidarity programmes, gave money to villages. But over the next two years it became fashionable in policymaking circles in Britain and the US to say that there was no point in focusing on Afghanistan as an arena for counter-terrorism or a recipient of charity - we should be building a state.
This was when Britain and Nato decided to deploy more troops. Britain has increased the numbers in Helmand province from 250 to 5,000. The belief then was that they were there to help state-building, not to fight the Taleban, which was why John Reid, the Defence Secretary, said to much mockery that he hoped that the British troops would return without a shot fired. There was little sign then of any overt Taleban presence, and it was relatively safe for Westerners to travel through Helmand.
I sat down in Kabul with a senior member of the British Embassy and the No2 of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in 2005 and asked: Why are you deploying British troops to Helmand?
They said: To improve economic development, to improve governance and eliminate corruption, to improve road security and, in particular, to deal with the narcotics problem.
I said: You'll provoke an insurgency. They replied: No, you're traumatised by Iraq. Opinion polls show that in Helmand British and American troops are very popular. I asked: What type of timeframe are you looking at to see improvements? They said six months.
I had just come from Iraq, where I had been an administrator of a province in the south and I said: This is nonsense; will you write on a piece of paper that these are the kinds of improvements you're going to see, and if you don't see them, will you agree not to say: We didn't have enough troops or enough helicopters' or We are where we are, it is too humiliating to withdraw'. Will you accept that if these improvements don't come in six months the policy was wrong? They agreed.
From that moment on, I have become increasingly frustrated. A Taleban insurgency has exploded but policymakers will not acknowledge that their original objectives have not been achieved. Instead, they blame implementation, the type of helicopters or previous commanders. Now policymakers have moved on from development, state-building and counter-insurgency to preserving the credibility of Nato and regional stability: We are in Afghanistan to hold Pakistan together.
Enter General Petraeus and his surge of 17,000 troops. There is good evidence that by deploying a further 30,000 troops King David turned the situation around in Iraq. I was in Baghdad this month, and walked streets I would not have been able to walk three years ago. I was not wearing a helmet, nobody was shooting or throwing rocks at me. So can General Petraeus conclude that by deploying more troops to Afghanistan he will be able to pull off the same thing?
There are two different accounts of what he hopes to do by deploying more troops in Afghanistan. One is straight from the counter-insurgency manual: clear/hold/build. Clear out the Taleban, secure populated areas and allow the forces of sustainable economic development to flourish, good governance to come and the Afghan police and security services to back us so we can go home.
The more cynical explanation is that the surge is an attempt to whack the Taleban round the head because they will not negotiate unless they are hurting. This is, broadly speaking, what Henry Kissinger believed of the Vietcong in 1968. The US increased troop numbers to drive them to the table to make concessions.
Neither approach will work. The Afghan groups do not resemble the Vietcong or the Sunni tribal groups in Iraq. The Shia-run Government in Baghdad could cut a deal with the Sunni groups because they are both relatively powerful and coherent factions backed by mass politics. Go to any southern Iraqi town and you will find a man in a buttoned-up shirt without a tie who says: I am the head of this party and who can mobilise thousands.
Go to a town in Afghanistan and ask who is in charge and you find six or seven figures with varying sorts of power - perhaps a tribal chief, maybe the police chief or sub-district commander. They do not have mass movements behind them. When we talk about driving the Taleban to the table, we forget that these groups are more insubstantial and fragmented than we acknowledge. The Kabul Government lacks political depth or legitimacy; the Taleban is elusive.
But I'm not a radical pessimist. Being realistic about our limitations does not mean that Britain must accept the status of a third-rate power. We can achieve many things in Afghanistan that are worthwhile for us and for the Afghans. We have made serious progress in education, health and rural development; Afghans are asking for simple things such as roads, electricity and irrigation and we have the skills to provide them. We should focus on the progressive, pro-Western centre and north, rather than pouring almost all our resources into the insurgency zones of the south and the east where schools are often destroyed as soon as they are built.
We need a much lighter military footprint. We cannot afford to keep 80,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan for a decade. US and European voters won't support it, it is an extravagant distraction from more important strategic priorities, including Pakistan and as long as we are seen as an occupying power, there will be Afghans who want to fight us.
We should plan now to reduce the size of our military commitment and decide what we can do with fewer troops. This does not mean abandoning Afghanistan entirely. The US and its allies should use special forces and intelligence operatives to ensure that al-Qaeda never again finds Afghanistan a safe and comfortable environment in which to establish training camps. Even a few thousand international troops and US air support would be a serious deterrent to civil war. But most importantly we must continue to provide generous long-term financial support to the Afghan Government and its military.
Policymakers are now more cautious about Afghanistan and say that their only objective is stability.
But even this is implausible. Pakistan is 20 years ahead of Afghanistan on almost every indicator and is yet to achieve the kind of stability we dream of in Afghanistan. Instead, we must think in terms of containing and managing a difficult, poor and unstable country without sinking too much into this difficult task. We must husband our resources for the many other crises already erupting - from the British banking sector to Pakistan.
There are many small simple things we can do to help Afghan society. All require us to forge a long-term engagement with the country. But such a policy is only possible if we reduce our investment in money and troops and develop a lighter, more affordable and ultimately more sustainable relationship with Afghanistan.
What worked in Iraq won't help Afghanistan | - Times Online
