What Pakistan's spies say

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

What Pakistan's spies say​

By David Ignatius, Washington Post
In Print: Tuesday, September 29, 2009

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan

The headquarters of Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate is a black-ribbed stucco building in the Aabpara neighborhood of the capital. Its operatives, described by wary Pakistanis as "the boys from Aabpara," play a powerful and mysterious role in the life of the country. Their "tentacles," as one ISI officer terms the agency's spy networks, stretch deep into neighboring Afghanistan.

The ISI agreed to open its protective curtain slightly for me last week. This unusual outreach included a long conversation with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the agency's director general, as well as a detailed briefing from its counterterrorism experts. Under the ground rules, I cannot quote Pasha directly, but I can offer a sense of how his agency looks at key issues — including the Afghanistan war and the ISI's sometimes prickly relationship with America.

At an operational level, the ISI is a close partner of the CIA. Officers of the two services work together nearly every night on joint operations against al-Qaida in Pakistan's tribal areas. Information from the ISI has helped the CIA plan its Predator drone attacks, which have killed 14 of the top 20 targets over the past several years.

But on the political level, there is mistrust on both sides. Washington worries that the ISI isn't sharing all it knows about Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis, meanwhile, view the United States as an unreliable ally that starts fights it doesn't know how to finish.

A test of this fragile partnership is the debate over the new Afghanistan strategy proposed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The ISI leadership thinks the United States can't afford to lose in Afghanistan, and it worries about a security vacuum there that would endanger Pakistan. But at the same time, the ISI fears that a big military surge, like the up to 40,000 additional troops McChrystal wants, could be counterproductive.

ISI officials believe the United States should be realistic about its war objectives. If victory is defined as obliteration of the Taliban, the United States will never win. But Washington can achieve the more limited aim of rough political stability, if it is patient.

In the ISI's view, America makes a mistake in thinking it must solve every problem on its own. In Afghanistan, it should work with President Hamid Karzai, who, for all his imperfections, has one essential quality that American strategists lack — he's an Afghan. ISI officials suggest that Karzai should capitalize on the postelection ferment by calling for a cease-fire so that he can form a broadly based government that includes some Taliban representatives.

ISI officials say they want to help America with political reconciliation in Afghanistan. But they argue that to achieve this goal, Washington must change its posture — moving from "ruler mode" to "support mode" — so that Afghan voices can be heard.

The American suspicion that ISI is withholding information about the Taliban, or is otherwise "hedging its bets," makes ISI leaders visibly angry. Pakistanis have the most to lose from a Taliban victory in Kabul, they argue, because it would inevitably strengthen the Taliban in Pakistan, too.

As for American allegations that the ISI maintains direct links with Siraj Haqqani, a key ally of the Taliban, the ISI officials insist it isn't so. They do have a network of agents within the insurgent groups and tribes, but that's part of a spy agency's job.

One ISI analyst loudly calls my name at the end of a briefing and then recites a summary of Pakistani casualties since Sept. 11, 2001, from terrorism. The list totals 5,362 dead and 10,483 wounded. "Trust us," says another ISI official, referring to this casualty toll. "Do not interfere in a way that infringes on our sovereignty and makes us look bad in the eyes of the public."

Talking with ISI leaders, I am reminded of something you see around the world these days. People want to help America more than we sometimes think. But they want to be treated with respect — as full partners, not as useful CIA assets.

Trust is always a conditional word when you are talking about intelligence activities, which are built around deception. But in this case, where America and Pakistan share common interests, the opportunities are real.

David Ignatius' e-mail address is davidignatius@washpost.com.

© Washington Post Writers Group

What Pakistan's spies say - St. Petersburg Times

----------------------------

All this BS floating around from armchair generals and hacks pretending to be journalists with their 'sources' - nothing like information straight from the horses mouth.

It is also quite interesting to hear the views about Karzai, which are in sync with Pasha's comments several months ago in an interview with Der Spiegel, in which he pointed out the efforts at rapprochement with the Afghan Intelligence director.

 

[fryndfire]

self deleted

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

As for American allegations that the ISI maintains direct links with Siraj Haqqani, a key ally of the Taliban, the ISI officials insist it isn't so. They do have a network of agents within the insurgent groups and tribes, but that's part of a spy agency's job.

For all the speculation and media reports about the ISI supporting the Taliban, if the above is not sufficient, let me point out another quote (that I often reference) from Gen. Petraeus that shows how little support allegations of "ISI supporting the Taliban" have.

BAIER: A big part of this strategy is the Pakistan side. Do you see evidence that the Pakistani military or the intelligence service — the ISI — is assisting the Taliban and Al Qaeda?

PETRAEUS: Well, let's remember the history. The intelligence services, the ISI, with our money and equipment and resources back during the days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, built many of these Mujahideen organizations that sadly have now turned on Pakistani forces and authorities, assassinated Benazir Bhutto, and have killed hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilians.

There are some relationships that continue. It is not as clear as one would like. There's certainly additional focus on that. Obviously, we've had these conversations with our counterparts, with the head of ISI, Lieutenant General Pasha, and others. There is a case in the past year or so that we think was unambiguous. There appears to have been a warning prior to a Pakistani operation.

The others though are a little bit less clear in the sense that any intelligence organization has contacts with extremist groups because they're trying to recruit sources among them. And we do the same thing.

Exclusive: General David Petraeus Discusses Mission in Afghanistan - Special Report w/ Bret Baier - FOXNews.com

Note 'ONE unambiguous case' and 'we do the same thing'.

Next to nothing supporting this canard of 'ISI supporting the Taliban'.

 

[jeypore]

The American suspicion that ISI is withholding information about the Taliban, or is otherwise "hedging its bets," makes ISI leaders visibly angry. Pakistanis have the most to lose from a Taliban victory in Kabul, they argue, because it would inevitably strengthen the Taliban in Pakistan, too.

My question is how so? Isn't these good talibans afterall!!!! Where is the fear of India taking over in Afganistan, or that is put behind now?

As far as I know the good talibans are still in favor, or did I loss control of the current issues.

Lets put the most interesting word "hedging its bets," What is ISI not doing the same as putting Talibans in there back pockets.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

My question is how so? Isn't these good talibans afterall!!!! Where is the fear of India taking over in Afganistan, or that is put behind now?

As far as I know the good talibans are still in favor, or did I loss control of the current issues.

Lets put the most interesting word "hedging its bets," What is ISI not doing the same as putting Talibans in there back pockets.

I think your questions are answered in the article - its a more nuanced position than just 'bring the good Taliban back to power in Afghanistan'.

From the Pakistani perspective, intelligence and military resources are going to be primarily focussed on the threat to Pakistan, which would be the Pakistani Taliban, and Al Qaeda and other groups that might try to 'export terrorism'. And even then it took a lot of effort, time and cooperation to get Baitullah Mehsud.

Mullah Fazlullah is still at large, despite the best efforts of the Pak Military to net him and the capture and death of a significant part of the TTP-Swat leadership - so it would be fallacious to argue that just because you don't see the dead bodies of XYZ leadership regularly, that the 'ISI is supporting them'.

 

[fatman17]

this is the first article from none other than the WP actually saying a few +ve things about the ISI. the key message IMO is about "trusting each other" and the US not acting like "big brother". create a partnership of "equals" even though the US is the sole super=power in this post cold-war era. the ISI will always keep Pakistan's interests as its top priority and so will the CIA (US) and if we are co-operating successfully at the operational level (read low-level cadres), then this should also permeate to the Top level (where the fog of war is the greatest).

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The ISI’s view​

​

Dawn Editorial
Thursday, 01 Oct, 2009

David Ignatius, in his latest op-ed column for The Washington Post, ‘The view from Pakistan’s spies,’ has made a number of observations that should be heeded by American policymakers. Granted access to top officials at the ISI, including Gen Shuja Pasha, Ignatius has zeroed in on the existing operational/strategic dichotomy: ‘At an operational level, the ISI is a close partner of the CIA. Officers of the two services work together nearly every night on joint operations against Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas…. But on the political level, there is mistrust on both sides. The United States worries that the ISI isn’t sharing all it knows … The Pakistanis, meanwhile, view the United States as an unreliable ally that starts fights it doesn’t know how to finish.’

Given that, as Ignatius notes, Pakistan and the US ‘share common interests’ this is self-defeating and both sides are to blame. The ISI’s claim that after 9/11 ‘everything changed,’ policies of old were discarded overnight and the intelligence apparatus has never looked back is questionable and there is a mountain of circumstantial evidence to suggest otherwise. But that does not mean that the ISI, which takes its cue from the army high command, is as rigid on and ideologically wedded to militancy as the Americans often claim. Indeed, Ignatius’s column makes a remarkable revelation that indicates the extent of the army high command/ISI’s pragmatism: ‘In the ISI’s view …. In Afghanistan, it should work with President Hamid Karzai, who, for all his imperfections, has one essential quality that American strategists lack — he’s an Afghan.’ This is the same Karzai who has been one of the ISI’s foremost critics, accusing it of all sorts of crimes against the Afghan government and people. For the ISI to suggest that the Americans work with an avowed enemy of the ISI suggests that its primary goal in Afghanistan is indeed to achieve ‘the limited aim of rough political stability’ and it is willing to work with whatever forces that can help achieve that.

Moreover, the access granted to Ignatius is part of a wider attempt by the ISI to get across Pakistan’s genuine strategic concerns, indicating its awareness of the need to improve ‘optics’ and building a case for the fact that it is not a hidebound agency reflexively clinging to the past in a changed strategic environment. This should be reflected in the US’s public stance. As Ignatius points out: ‘People want to help America more than we sometimes think. But they want to be treated with respect — as full partners, not as useful CIA assets.’

DAWN.COM | Pakistan | The ISI?s view