What happened on the Kasur front in the 1965 war?

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What happened on the Kasur front in the 1965 war?
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Saleem Akhtar Malik |

In this sector, Pakistan’s 11 Division (21, 52, and 106 Brigade), with under command 15 Lancers and 32 TDU* were pitted against Indian 4 Mountain Division (7and 62 Mountain Brigade) with under command Deccan Horse. XI Corps reserve comprised 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (2x armour regiments).

TDU or Tank Delivery Unit was a euphemism for “armour regiment” to circumvent the ceiling on raising of new armour regiments through U.S funding. These were not tank- destroyer units, as erroneously reported by the Indian authors.

Though Pakistan Army suffered heavily In the Kasur Sector, in the final analysis, Indian attack to capture Kasur was not only repulsed, Pakistan Army took the war inside the Indian territory

Indians attacked all along the front on night 5th/6th September. Whereas Pakistan’s 52 Brigade and 106 Brigade were to defend the Kasur Sector along the BRB canal, 21 Brigade was located at Luliani (northwest of Kasur along Road Lahore-Kasur) and was 11 Division reserve for the counter-attack. At around 0500 hours, 11 Division units hurried up to occupy their defensive positions along the BRB canal just as the Indian offensive was unfurling itself.

Read more: What led to 1965 war? – Part 1

To the south of Ballanwala, Indian 62 Mountain Brigade (18 Rajputana Rifles, 9 J&K Rifles, and 13 Dogra) supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse captured Sehjra Salient and Rohi Nullah bund. To the north, 7 Mountain Brigade (4 Grenadiers, 7 Grenadiers, and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles), also supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse, failed to capture its assigned objectives – Ballanwala and the bridges to its north.

Fighting went on throughout the day. Counter-attacking all along the front, 11 Division regained balance, threw back the Indians and recovered the area on the far bank of BRB, including Sehjra Salient. During the battles on 6th September, Indian 7 Grenadiers (7 Mountain Brigade) and 13 Dogra (62 Mountain Brigade) suffered such heavy casualties that they ceased to exist as cohesive units. Meanwhile 4 Mountain Division managed to withdraw to general area Asal Uttar. According to Chakravorty (2014):

The combat power of Pakistani armour was further degraded by the channelized terrain where Indian armour had transitioned into a defensive posture

“The withdrawal took place on September 07, and our troops were able to dig defences and lay mines. The three field companies laid the mines and the areas to the south and west of the defences were flooded. Pakistan allowed the division to prepare its defences methodically by not disturbing it on September 07”.

Pakistan’s 11 Division could not interfere because it was haltingly attempting to establish a bridgehead across Rohi Nullah.

Read more: How Pakistan planned and prepared for the 1965 war against a…

The Battles of Asal Uttar
Facing 1 Armoured Division (4 Cavalry, 5 Horse, 6 Lancers, 24 Cavalry, 19 Lancers, and 12 Cavalry) were Indian 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (3 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry) and 4 Mountain Division (2x mountain brigades and Deccan Horse). As for the infantry complement, 7 FF and 10 FF, were mechanized infantry battalions whereas 1FF was plain infantry.

It should be kept in mind that mechanized infantry provides intimate infantry support to tanks. It assaults and clears the enemy defences over- run by tanks. If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armoured division a value of 3, and the independent armoured brigade a value of 2. Using Lanchester’s equation, we square each side’s combat power and get 6.25 for India and 9 for Pakistan or a 1.44 to 1 Pakistani superiority in Kasur sector.

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What happened on the Kasur front in the 1965 war?

 

[Signalian]

Khem Karan salient and Pakistan 1st armoured Division thrust showed the importance of many factors:

1. Combined arms warfare.
The german pioneered the blitzkrieg using panzers, stukas, infantry and artillery in WW2. The balance between all formations should be such that they can operate independently inflicting heavy damage on the enemy. Pakistani Infantry had to play an important part in flushing out the Indian infantry operating RR guns from the sugar cane vegetation. Proper use of artillery to bombard enemy positions and even aircraft support is vital in achieving goals of a mission.

2. Reconaissance element.
Recon by fast and light vehicles or in todays world by UAV's has become very important. Its always foolish to throw in heavy armour to spearhead an assault without proper recon element in place which can send proper reports of enemy position. The tanks of 1st armoured div drove away straight into a set trap by indians.

3. Terrain knowledge.
Tank friendly terrain is to be exploited by tanks and any other terrain which can bog down tanks can be maneuvered by dismounted infantry. The muddy terrain restricted movement of tanks and they became easy targets for indian RR operators.