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The Abbottabad Commission report reads more like a mere cover up of the entire event with the military taking the blame on itself for its weakness
Imagine a situation: on May 2, 2011, US forces together with the Pakistani military and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) raided the Abbottabad house of Osama bin Laden, and took him out after a decade-long hunt.
While the event would have internationally vindicated Pakistan and its security forces, especially the ISI from all its misgivings, imagine the domestic repercussions of the event. Massive protests against the government and the military would have probably inspired something dramatic. Why? Because Osama bin Laden, according to a survey I conducted on political figures last year, has far more positive approval in Pakistan than any Pakistani politician or a military general.
In a country where the street power is with the Islamists, would the Pakistani military, even if it helped the US to get to bin Laden, have outrightly owned it? Never! The military would have put itself under a serious security threat from the Islamists in Pakistan by giving even a hint about its involvement in the entire bin Laden fiasco.
So what was the best option for the military? Play the protest game, and which it did for the next couple of months.
Do we have an analogy to support this argument? Yes, we do! For years the drone strikes have been helping the Pakistan army and the ISI in reducing the terrorist attacks in the country. In fact, drones have practically fractured the terror network in the tribal regions. Interestingly, what many people do not realise is that the Pakistani military authorised the drone strikes, something that General Pasha only recently acknowledged in the media. However, the military and the government chose to protest the drone strikes on the record in the media, and for a very good reason.
As one of the brigadiers that I talked to suggested, Pakistan is a nation in the making, and acceptance of drone strikes on our lands by the Americans with our permission, or a raid on a celebrity figure like Osama bin Laden would only fuel civil war and eventual fragmentation of the country. Having talked to several Pakistan military men of all ranks, I feel they are convinced that Pakistan, especially with its nuclear arsenal, does not face a direct external threat. It is the threat from within that defines the security strategy of the Pakistani military. Now, whether that threat from within is locally influenced or a product of foreign involvement, the military entertains both possibilities.
So, how does the Abbottabad Commission report fit into all this? Like any commission report throughout the world, the Abbottabad Commission report reads more like a mere cover up of the entire event with the military taking the blame on itself for its weakness. The Pakistani military would be better off proving itself as weak, rather than owning up to the drone strikes or the bin Laden killing.
At the same time it is understandable if we look at it from the perspective of the military. The last thing they want is to own up to the bin Laden case. And those with a sharp eye might find the key to this entire puzzle by listening to the speech of President Barack Obama the night bin Laden was shot dead.
In his speech President Obama proudly appreciated Pakistan for its efforts in helping the US in its search for bin Laden. The president was very specific, and unlike the speeches of our politicians here in Pakistan, the US presidents speech is very carefully worded, drafted, and vetted several times to bring it in line with the US foreign policy strategy. However, as soon as the speech was delivered, the Pakistani military went into silence, and slowly distanced itself from the speech. And in a few days time, from thanking Pakistan, the US governments tone changed to Why was Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and blaming the Pakistani military for its dubious role. Was the US administration really criticising the Pakistani military with whom it shares extraordinary and strategic relations? Perhaps it was only helping the Pakistani military in creating an illusion for the Pakistani people who were fuming against the military that the military had no role in the entire episode. The military knew that people in Pakistan would forgive weakness to protect Pakistan from US incursions, but would not let go of any Pakistani involvement in the Osama bin Laden raid.
Needless to say, it is a stretch to believe that the entire military and the ISI had complete knowledge about the raid. It did not. It was a covert operation after all and very few people were in the loop. But to believe that nobody in the military and the ISI had any clue about the raid in advance is almost absurd. Sometimes, an intelligence agency launches self-criticism and propaganda against itself in the media to pacify a bigger threat that often comes with a successful operation that is needed for the country, but may not be wanted by the people.
The Abbottabad Commission report reads more like a mere cover up of the entire event with the military taking the blame on itself for its weakness
Imagine a situation: on May 2, 2011, US forces together with the Pakistani military and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) raided the Abbottabad house of Osama bin Laden, and took him out after a decade-long hunt.
While the event would have internationally vindicated Pakistan and its security forces, especially the ISI from all its misgivings, imagine the domestic repercussions of the event. Massive protests against the government and the military would have probably inspired something dramatic. Why? Because Osama bin Laden, according to a survey I conducted on political figures last year, has far more positive approval in Pakistan than any Pakistani politician or a military general.
In a country where the street power is with the Islamists, would the Pakistani military, even if it helped the US to get to bin Laden, have outrightly owned it? Never! The military would have put itself under a serious security threat from the Islamists in Pakistan by giving even a hint about its involvement in the entire bin Laden fiasco.
So what was the best option for the military? Play the protest game, and which it did for the next couple of months.
Do we have an analogy to support this argument? Yes, we do! For years the drone strikes have been helping the Pakistan army and the ISI in reducing the terrorist attacks in the country. In fact, drones have practically fractured the terror network in the tribal regions. Interestingly, what many people do not realise is that the Pakistani military authorised the drone strikes, something that General Pasha only recently acknowledged in the media. However, the military and the government chose to protest the drone strikes on the record in the media, and for a very good reason.
As one of the brigadiers that I talked to suggested, Pakistan is a nation in the making, and acceptance of drone strikes on our lands by the Americans with our permission, or a raid on a celebrity figure like Osama bin Laden would only fuel civil war and eventual fragmentation of the country. Having talked to several Pakistan military men of all ranks, I feel they are convinced that Pakistan, especially with its nuclear arsenal, does not face a direct external threat. It is the threat from within that defines the security strategy of the Pakistani military. Now, whether that threat from within is locally influenced or a product of foreign involvement, the military entertains both possibilities.
So, how does the Abbottabad Commission report fit into all this? Like any commission report throughout the world, the Abbottabad Commission report reads more like a mere cover up of the entire event with the military taking the blame on itself for its weakness. The Pakistani military would be better off proving itself as weak, rather than owning up to the drone strikes or the bin Laden killing.
At the same time it is understandable if we look at it from the perspective of the military. The last thing they want is to own up to the bin Laden case. And those with a sharp eye might find the key to this entire puzzle by listening to the speech of President Barack Obama the night bin Laden was shot dead.
In his speech President Obama proudly appreciated Pakistan for its efforts in helping the US in its search for bin Laden. The president was very specific, and unlike the speeches of our politicians here in Pakistan, the US presidents speech is very carefully worded, drafted, and vetted several times to bring it in line with the US foreign policy strategy. However, as soon as the speech was delivered, the Pakistani military went into silence, and slowly distanced itself from the speech. And in a few days time, from thanking Pakistan, the US governments tone changed to Why was Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and blaming the Pakistani military for its dubious role. Was the US administration really criticising the Pakistani military with whom it shares extraordinary and strategic relations? Perhaps it was only helping the Pakistani military in creating an illusion for the Pakistani people who were fuming against the military that the military had no role in the entire episode. The military knew that people in Pakistan would forgive weakness to protect Pakistan from US incursions, but would not let go of any Pakistani involvement in the Osama bin Laden raid.
Needless to say, it is a stretch to believe that the entire military and the ISI had complete knowledge about the raid. It did not. It was a covert operation after all and very few people were in the loop. But to believe that nobody in the military and the ISI had any clue about the raid in advance is almost absurd. Sometimes, an intelligence agency launches self-criticism and propaganda against itself in the media to pacify a bigger threat that often comes with a successful operation that is needed for the country, but may not be wanted by the people.
