muse
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I would invite Indian and Chinese forum members to read critically - and begin a debate, don't count on Pakistani members, they have neither the grey matter power nor courage of conviction - but they can be made to limp along -- while he title indicates that such a "Trilateral" dialogue is unusal, it must be made usual:
Unusual trialogue
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.
Recent years have seen a profusion of Track II meetings between former officials and scholars from Pakistan and India aimed at finding common ground on contentious issues in an effort to help the formal dialogue. Many of these informal discussions have had western sponsorship.
A Track II round-table organised last week in Dubai by the Delhi-based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies was in a genre of its own. The meeting had no external participation. It assembled experts from the strategic community of China, India and Pakistan in a trilateral security dialogue to discuss nuclear and security issues, assess the challenges posed by developments in Iran and East Asia as well as take stock of global disarmament developments.
The discussion was instructive in highlighting how the three countries conceptualise strategic stability in different ways and identify varying elements as being necessary to achieve this. A common strategic vocabulary remains elusive among them.
The proceedings showed that strategic stability could be defined in narrow terms as the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first and engage in an arms race. Or it could be envisioned more broadly as the absence of armed conflict between nuclear weapon states.
It emerged from the discussions that minimum credible deterrence meant different things to participants from the three countries. But there were also commonalities in several areas and agreement on the need to establish sustainable stability especially when the most profound power restructuring was unfolding in Asia since the end of the Second World War. As one speaker put it Asia was at an inflection point. This urged critical choices on all three nations.
Reduction of mistrust and building mutual confidence was deemed crucial to each countrys internal progress. Participants agreed that in coming years all three nations will be preoccupied by domestic issues and challenges. A Chinese delegate also pointed out that for all the recent turbulence in East Asia, it remained more peaceful than other regions in the world and retained strong dynamics and incentives for economic development and cooperation.
The session on nuclear doctrines and policy produced a lively if inconclusive debate about the extent to which technology was driving doctrines but more importantly how changes in the regional and global landscape were shaping nuclear policy and postures. That all three countries nuclear posture rested on a de-mated and de-alert and thus a delayed response status was seen by participants as a factor for deterrence stability and providing a degree of reassurance about nuclear safety. This posture avoided the hair-trigger alertness of the Cold War but needed to be supplemented by commitment from these countries to abjure nuclear competition, arms racing and other behaviour associated with a bygone era.
Chinese and Pakistani speakers voiced concerns about the development and deployment of missile defence systems in Asia. A Chinese participant pointed out that if India joined the US-led Asia-Pacific missile defence system this would have significant influence on Chinas nuclear modernisation plans.
A key conclusion to emerge from the meeting was that discussion on nuclear issues and CBMs in this sphere could not be divorced from the wider context of lack of political trust and unresolved disputes among these nations, which remained the cause of recurring tensions. Unless strategic matters were discussed as part of overall relations they could not be meaningfully addressed, said a Chinese speaker. Indian participants concurred and urged broadening of the trialogue agenda. Others agreed that the underlying causes of tensions had to be addressed to establish the political foundation for nuclear confidence building and strategic stability.
The opportunity to listen to the views of Chinese scholars on the sidelines of the conference turned out to be equally instructive. It became evident from this engagement that views in China of global developments and Sino-US relations are much more diverse and nuanced than media accounts suggest. One of the Chinese scholars I spoke to about the US pivot or rebalancing to Asia-Pacific had interesting perspectives to offer. Yes, he said, China was concerned and was following a hedging policy on the rebalancing. But there were indications of a more cooperative US approach at the start of President Obamas second term. His choice of secretaries of state and defence signalled seriousness about engagement with China, even if the US had fuelled Beijings suspicions by relocating military resources to East Asia in previous years. For now, he said, China had adopted a wait-and-see approach.
He said there was open debate in China about whether Beijings own confrontational conduct during 2009-2010 had prompted certain rebalancing moves by the US. As an example he cited Chinas official silence or ambiguity on the South China Sea issue for 15 months prior to October 2011, when Beijing finally clarified that it did not claim all of these waters. No country after all can accept Chinas control of all of South China, he added.
I asked him what he thought of a recent article by another Chinese academic, in which he argued that China today lacked a foreign policy (International Herald Tribune, March 18, 2013). He said he agreed with the proposition, as China was too domestically preoccupied to think coherently and consistently about foreign policy. Chinas economic and trade interests today dictated its external policy. There was no longer any values-based foreign policy. He characterised this as an opportunist strategy. The only exception to this, he said, were relations with Pakistan, which was regarded as a country that had always stood by China and remained vital for Beijings own balancing strategy in Asia.
Was the world moving towards a G-2 arrangement between China and the US? No, he said, the global landscape is still marked by a weakened G-One. US power had drained as a result of its economic problems. This weakening was accelerated by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it had not yet been replaced by any G-2 configuration, because China remained hesitant to shoulder the burden of international responsibility.
Did that mean that western criticism was justified of China being eager to reap the benefits of its new global power status without undertaking any obligations? His answer was revealing. The US and its western allies wanted China and everyone else to play by the international rules they had set themselves, a process in which China was excluded. China could not be expected to play by rules that hurt its interests. Beijing could not accept rules over which it had no sense of ownership or if it felt it was not being treated fairly or equitably. Responsibility came with rights.
The concerns voiced by these scholars about Chinas inability, at a time of intense domestic focus, to conduct a predictable and coherent foreign policy seems to mirror a view expressed by many in the US strategic community about Americas foreign policy.
In a recent article by David Rothkopf in Foreign Policy, the author critiques President Obamas light footprint diplomacy for its dangerous potential to invite tomorrows problems. He depicts Obamas international approach to be bereft of a strategy, as well as lacking political will to take risks in many important parts of the world.
This has produced a telling absence of American leadership in the international arena and doing too little to address global problems. This is captured in the popular description of leading from behind This seems to reinforce Ian Bremmers characterisation of the present era as a world without leadership a G-Zero world where there is no single power or alliance of powers able to take on the challenges of global leadership.
Unusual trialogue
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.
Recent years have seen a profusion of Track II meetings between former officials and scholars from Pakistan and India aimed at finding common ground on contentious issues in an effort to help the formal dialogue. Many of these informal discussions have had western sponsorship.
A Track II round-table organised last week in Dubai by the Delhi-based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies was in a genre of its own. The meeting had no external participation. It assembled experts from the strategic community of China, India and Pakistan in a trilateral security dialogue to discuss nuclear and security issues, assess the challenges posed by developments in Iran and East Asia as well as take stock of global disarmament developments.
The discussion was instructive in highlighting how the three countries conceptualise strategic stability in different ways and identify varying elements as being necessary to achieve this. A common strategic vocabulary remains elusive among them.
The proceedings showed that strategic stability could be defined in narrow terms as the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first and engage in an arms race. Or it could be envisioned more broadly as the absence of armed conflict between nuclear weapon states.
It emerged from the discussions that minimum credible deterrence meant different things to participants from the three countries. But there were also commonalities in several areas and agreement on the need to establish sustainable stability especially when the most profound power restructuring was unfolding in Asia since the end of the Second World War. As one speaker put it Asia was at an inflection point. This urged critical choices on all three nations.
Reduction of mistrust and building mutual confidence was deemed crucial to each countrys internal progress. Participants agreed that in coming years all three nations will be preoccupied by domestic issues and challenges. A Chinese delegate also pointed out that for all the recent turbulence in East Asia, it remained more peaceful than other regions in the world and retained strong dynamics and incentives for economic development and cooperation.
The session on nuclear doctrines and policy produced a lively if inconclusive debate about the extent to which technology was driving doctrines but more importantly how changes in the regional and global landscape were shaping nuclear policy and postures. That all three countries nuclear posture rested on a de-mated and de-alert and thus a delayed response status was seen by participants as a factor for deterrence stability and providing a degree of reassurance about nuclear safety. This posture avoided the hair-trigger alertness of the Cold War but needed to be supplemented by commitment from these countries to abjure nuclear competition, arms racing and other behaviour associated with a bygone era.
Chinese and Pakistani speakers voiced concerns about the development and deployment of missile defence systems in Asia. A Chinese participant pointed out that if India joined the US-led Asia-Pacific missile defence system this would have significant influence on Chinas nuclear modernisation plans.
A key conclusion to emerge from the meeting was that discussion on nuclear issues and CBMs in this sphere could not be divorced from the wider context of lack of political trust and unresolved disputes among these nations, which remained the cause of recurring tensions. Unless strategic matters were discussed as part of overall relations they could not be meaningfully addressed, said a Chinese speaker. Indian participants concurred and urged broadening of the trialogue agenda. Others agreed that the underlying causes of tensions had to be addressed to establish the political foundation for nuclear confidence building and strategic stability.
The opportunity to listen to the views of Chinese scholars on the sidelines of the conference turned out to be equally instructive. It became evident from this engagement that views in China of global developments and Sino-US relations are much more diverse and nuanced than media accounts suggest. One of the Chinese scholars I spoke to about the US pivot or rebalancing to Asia-Pacific had interesting perspectives to offer. Yes, he said, China was concerned and was following a hedging policy on the rebalancing. But there were indications of a more cooperative US approach at the start of President Obamas second term. His choice of secretaries of state and defence signalled seriousness about engagement with China, even if the US had fuelled Beijings suspicions by relocating military resources to East Asia in previous years. For now, he said, China had adopted a wait-and-see approach.
He said there was open debate in China about whether Beijings own confrontational conduct during 2009-2010 had prompted certain rebalancing moves by the US. As an example he cited Chinas official silence or ambiguity on the South China Sea issue for 15 months prior to October 2011, when Beijing finally clarified that it did not claim all of these waters. No country after all can accept Chinas control of all of South China, he added.
I asked him what he thought of a recent article by another Chinese academic, in which he argued that China today lacked a foreign policy (International Herald Tribune, March 18, 2013). He said he agreed with the proposition, as China was too domestically preoccupied to think coherently and consistently about foreign policy. Chinas economic and trade interests today dictated its external policy. There was no longer any values-based foreign policy. He characterised this as an opportunist strategy. The only exception to this, he said, were relations with Pakistan, which was regarded as a country that had always stood by China and remained vital for Beijings own balancing strategy in Asia.
Was the world moving towards a G-2 arrangement between China and the US? No, he said, the global landscape is still marked by a weakened G-One. US power had drained as a result of its economic problems. This weakening was accelerated by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it had not yet been replaced by any G-2 configuration, because China remained hesitant to shoulder the burden of international responsibility.
Did that mean that western criticism was justified of China being eager to reap the benefits of its new global power status without undertaking any obligations? His answer was revealing. The US and its western allies wanted China and everyone else to play by the international rules they had set themselves, a process in which China was excluded. China could not be expected to play by rules that hurt its interests. Beijing could not accept rules over which it had no sense of ownership or if it felt it was not being treated fairly or equitably. Responsibility came with rights.
The concerns voiced by these scholars about Chinas inability, at a time of intense domestic focus, to conduct a predictable and coherent foreign policy seems to mirror a view expressed by many in the US strategic community about Americas foreign policy.
In a recent article by David Rothkopf in Foreign Policy, the author critiques President Obamas light footprint diplomacy for its dangerous potential to invite tomorrows problems. He depicts Obamas international approach to be bereft of a strategy, as well as lacking political will to take risks in many important parts of the world.
This has produced a telling absence of American leadership in the international arena and doing too little to address global problems. This is captured in the popular description of leading from behind This seems to reinforce Ian Bremmers characterisation of the present era as a world without leadership a G-Zero world where there is no single power or alliance of powers able to take on the challenges of global leadership.