no iraqi force not decimated when Saddam unilaterally pulled back of kuwait not when they were attacking or were in defensive position well if you call 90 armor out of several thousand iraqi armored vehicle decimation and operation was done with some already damaged divisions . for Saddam it was nothing but propaganda tool
Really? This is patently FALSE.
Defeat of Iraqi forces in the Battle of Khafji
Iraqi General Salah Aboud Mahmoud is credited for Iraqi invasion and capture of the Saudi city Khafji in a surprising move. This operation was well-planned and executed from Iraqi standpoint but US Marine Corps and British Navy made it impossible for the Iraqi troops to defeat Saudi forces in this sector and hold their ground in Khafji for long.
Head, W. P. (2013). The Battle for Ra's Al-Khafji and the Effects of Air Power January 29-February 1, 1991 Part I. Air Power History, 60(1), 4-15.
An official U.S. source claimed that 300 Iraqis lost their lives, and at least ninty vehicles were destroyed. Another source suggested that sixty Iraqi soldiers were killed and at least 400 taken prisoner. It also believed that eighty armored vehicles were destroyed. No matter which numbers the reader might accept, what is clear is that the battle in and around Al-Khafji was an Allied victory that eviscerated three Iraqi heavy armor divisions.
Head, W. P. (2013). The Battle for Ra's Al-Khafji and the Effects of Air Power, January 29-February 1, 1991 Part II. Air Power History, 60(2), 22-33.
Iraqi Air Force losses to the Coalition Air Power*
By 23 August, approximately 500 attack combat aircraft were deployed in the crisis area, of which 450 were from the United States. They included F-111 long-range bombers and aircraft from the USS Independence and USS Eisenhower, with two other aircraft carriers, the USS Saratoga and the USS Kennedy, en route to the Mediterranean and Gulf respectively.
The arrival of combat aircraft in the Gulf in less than 24 hours seriously complicated any plans President Saddam Hussein may have entertained for further southward expansion, and reassured neighbouring Arab states with a demonstration of Western military and political commitment.
Mason, R. A. (1991). The air war in the Gulf. Survival, 33(3), 211-229.
Over six weeks the allied air forces flew 110,000 sorties. A total of 60 allied aircraft were lost to all causes. An estimated 141 IAF aircraft were destroyed and 138 fled to Iran. A total of 285 cruise missiles and 140 Patriots were launched. By comparison, RAF Bomber Command flew 387,416 sorties in the whole of World War II. In Vietnam, B-52s flew 41,000 sorties over several months in the Linebacker offensives, losing 75 aircraft in the process. The allied loss rate in this campaign was 0.03% per sortie. In 1991 one F-l 17A aircraft with two bombs could destroy a hardened target which 20 years previously would have required 95 F-l05s dropping 190 bombs. The Gulf war marked the apotheosis of twentieth-century airpower.
Mason, R. A. (1991). The air war in the Gulf. Survival, 33(3), 211-229.
American plan of attack on Iraqi armed forces on the ground
American General Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. came up with following attack plan:
"The US making up 73% of the Coalition’s forces, the American Army General Norman Schwarzkopf was authorised as the
Commander of Coalition Forces in the Gulf theatre. His plan was to erode Iraqi command and control, and to dislocate the forces immediately in and around Kuwait from their support. Rather than a frontal attack on Kuwait, he would launch an attack into Iraq, swinging round into the flank and rear of the Iraqi defenders whom he would distract by a fixing action from the expected direction. This distraction was to be made more effective through the use of deception in the build-up phases. The US Marine Central Command and exiled Kuwaiti forces were to provide the distraction while the VII (US) Army Corps, containing the first (UK) Armoured Division, would execute the sweep, hooking through Iraq and then turning towards the Persian Gulf to cut off and destroy the Iraqi occupiers of Kuwait. The British Armoured Division would create a route just to the north of the Kuwaiti capital, Kuwait City. The Allied open flank would be screened and protected by the XVIII (US) Airborne Corps and the sixth (FR) Light Division operating to the west in largely empty desert."
Carmichael, E. B., & Anderson, Q. (2021). The First Gulf War: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (17 January-28 February 1991). British Dental Journal, 230(7), 435-443.
Iraqi army equipment losses to the Coalition Air Power*
The Allied bombing campaign was not designed to kill people, per se. Its primary purpose was to destroy Iraqi equipment, which it did extremely well. Using the most accurate missiles and bombardier systems yet devised, it destroyed more than 1,600 Iraqi tanks, 900 armored personnel carriers, and 1,400 artillery pieces. As Iraqi troops watched their equipment blow up in their faces, they burrowed into makeshift bunkers and shelters. Even there, the coalition could have killed them with fuel-air explosives, but those and other weapons of mass destruction were mainly used against minefields and other uninhabited areas.
Heidenrich, J. G. (1993). The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?. Foreign Policy, (90), 108-125.
Throughout February, various aircraft performed myriad tasks from B–52s stationed at Diego Garcia carpet bombing Iraqi positions in redoubts to fighter-bombers using PGMs shutting off oil leaks and extinguishing oil fires purposely started by the Iraqis. Air Power eradicated whole Iraqi brigades arrayed in combat formations in the open desert and prevented effective Iraqi resupply to forward deployed units engaged in the actual fighting. It also stopped hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops from achieving the force concentration essential for anything approaching victory in the upcoming land battle.
Head, W. P. (2013). The Battle for Ra's Al-Khafji and the Effects of Air Power, January 29-February 1, 1991 Part II. Air Power History, 60(2), 22-33.
By the time the allied ground forces launched their offensive on 24 February, Iraqi troops had been subject to incessant air attack, with seldom more than two hours between raids, for nearly three weeks. No army in history had suffered such a lengthy bombardment, accompanied by destruction of food, water and other supplies. Iraqi commanders were unable to respond swiftly either by co-ordinating counter-offensives or by bringing artillery fire to bear on coalition forces penetrating the minefields. Their communications were shattered and their access to tactical intelligence non-existent.
The inability of the Iraqi commanders to acquire information about allied deployments and concentrations, because of their lack of aircraft and the allies' absolute command of the air, was a significant factor in Gen. Schwarzkopf s confident adoption of a strategy which involved deception in the east, large-scale redeployment in the centre, and high-speed envelopment and penetration in the west.
Mason, R. A. (1991). The air war in the Gulf. Survival, 33(3), 211-229.
Iraqi army equipment losses and KIA in clashes with US-led ground forces
The 2,162 Iraqi tanks destroyed in the ground war were largely Soviet-made: four-man T-55s, four-man T-62s, and three-man T-72s. Multiplied by 3.7 (the average number of crew-men per tank), the maximum casualties total nearly 8,000. Five-hundred twenty-five Iraqi armored personnel carriers (APCs) were also destroyed in the ground war, of which the Soviet-made BMP and BTR-60 were typical. Those vehicles normally have crews of three men, with room for eight passengers. Multiplied by eleven (crew and passengers), the maximum possible casualties was about 5,800. Without passengers, the maximum among crewmen was less than 1,600. The average Soviet-made artillery piece has a crew of eight. Multiplied by 1,500 (the approximate number of guns destroyed in the ground war), the maximum casualties equal 12,000.
Heidenrich, J. G. (1993). The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?. Foreign Policy, (90), 108-125.
-----
SUMMARY -----
| Iraqi army equipment losses in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 | To Coalition Air Power | To US-led ground forces |
| Tanks | 1600 | 2162 |
| Armored vehicles | 900 | 555 |
| Artillery pieces | 1400 | 1500 |
Iraqi infrastructure suffered an estimated 250 billion USD damage in just 45 days.
*American Air Power was FAR more capable at striking enemy positions in 1991 in comparison to what it could do in earlier years. The US used its incredible Air Power to clear Iraqi minefields and destroy a chunk of Iraqi armed forces in a matter of days. Ukraine does not have this capability, not even close.
Chinese are sharp observers and they disclosed in their records that the Persian Gulf War in 1991 was ten times the intensity of the Korean War and four times the intensity of the Vietnam War. Imagine this.
my country did. not wanted to take over iraq , not in 1975 , not in 1980 and not in 1991 certainly not in 2003
Really? Khomeini-led setup of Iran aimed to topple Saddam-led setup of Iraq in 1982 after Iranian forces had managed to liberate a part of Iranian territory that was under occupation of Iraqi forces in 1981:
Within Iran itself, an intense debate raged about whether to stop at the border or to press its military advantage with an attack into Iraq. In the end, the hardliners won the day. Immediately following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in early June 1982, Iran announced that its forces were "going to liberate Jerusalem, passing through [the holy city of Karbala]" in Iraq. Shortly there after, Iran launched the first of a series of massive offensives intended to breakthrough Iraqi defenses, cut Iraqi supply lines between the south and the capital, and bring down the regime of Saddam Hussein.
Sick, G. (1989). Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War. Middle East Journal, 43(2), 230-245.
However, fighting to defend your territory can be a significantly different experience than attempting to occupy another fairly large country. Iran could not even come close to toppling Saddam-led setup of Iraq:
Iranian forces attempted to capture Basra in the (December 1986 - April 1987) period with 60,000 troops
but Iraqi Republican Guards prevented fall of Basra to Iranian forces:
After two weeks of ferocious shelling by Iranian forces, Iraq's besieged southern port city of Basra is becoming a ravaged wasteland of damaged buildings and pockmarked streets. Toxic gas has engulfed an area south of the city where Iranian artillery barrages set fire to a petrochemical complex. Demoralized and frightened, thousands of the city's 1 million residents have reportedly fled north to the capital of Baghdad in cars, on bicycles and on foot. Said a U.S. official: "If there is a victory in this for the Iranians, it is that they have been able to create the impression that Basra is not a functioning city anymore."
Still, Iraqi defenders last week fought the Iranian offensive to a blood- drenched standstill. Some 60,000 Iranian troops remained dug in six miles east of the heavily fortified earthenwork defenses, known as the "wall of steel," that surround the city. The Iranian attackers were under constant bombardment by the superior air- and fire-power of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's forces. The wounded were said to number 15,000 for the Iraqis and 45,000 for the Iranians. Since Iran began its latest series of attacks on Christmas Eve, an estimated total of 30,000 combatants have perished.
The Long Siege of Basra Iraqi defenders stall an Iranian assault on a strategic city
content.time.com
By the winter 1987 Karbala campaign, the Guards' reconstitution and expansion program had greatly progressed. During the campaign, the Guards played a significant role in the defense of Basra, for the first time under the auspices of a separate command rather than as a mobile reserve attached to a Regular Army command. With the expansion, the Guards' units were organized under a corps command structure, as were other Regular Army units. Nonetheless, they remained tied to the security apparatus. When they were not actively engaged in tactical operations, the Guards continued to report to the State Special Security Apparatus, rather than to the Ministry of Defense. In effect, the Guards fell under the dual umbrellas of defense and intelligence/security. The corps structure allowed the Guards to be fully integrated into the army, while the link to the security apparatus ensured that ultimately the Guards answered to Hussein. In other words, the Guards' structure allowed them to function on an operational level with the army and on a political plane for Saddam Hussein. The Guards performed exceptionally well during the defense of Basra, leading Hussein to order a second expansion, increasing their numbers from sixteen to 25 brigades. The metamorphosis was complete. The number and location of armored units are considered determining factors in locating the gravitational center of an army. After the expansion, the number of Republican Guards armored brigades surpassed the number of Regular Army armored brigades. Thus, the Republican Guards came to occupy the dominant position in the army. Moreover, the number of "mechanized" Republican Guards divisions actually he number of Regular Army mechanized divisions.
Huggins, W. D. (1994). The Republican Guards and Saddam Hussein's Transformation of the Iraqi Army. The Arab Studies Journal, 2(1), 31-35.
The most significant offensive during that period was the campaign to capture Basra in January 1987. The vigorous and successful Iraqi defense of Basra against Iran's best military efforts was probably instrumental in persuading the Iranian leaders that their original hopes of winning the war were no longer realistic, thereby contributing to a further decline in morale.
Sick, G. (1989). Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War. Middle East Journal, 43(2), 230-245.
Iranian forces could not capture Basra let alone topple Saddam-led setup of Iraq. This is not a jab at Iran but a reminder that a regional power might find it impractical to dominate the other in conventional war.
Related information in following posts:
Saddam at the time had the strongest Arab army, no other Arab army came even close, but his army wasn't a match for Pakistan. Saddam had the 4th most powerful military in the world. It's the other way around. Pakistan's military was no match for Saddam's military.
pdf.defence.pk
An Iranian nuclear facility is so deep underground that US airstrikes likely couldn’t reach it By JON GAMBRELL May 22, 2023 GMT https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-natanz-uranium-enrichment-underground-project-04dae673fc937af04e62b65dd78db2e0 DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Near a peak...
pdf.defence.pk
in iraq it was Iran and its allies who stopped isil advancement and drove them back not USA and co. the only thing they managed to do was postpone the capture of Mosul .
Really? This is patently FALSE.
Obama administration withdrew American troops from Iraq in 2011 after defeating elements that were responsible for the Iraqi civil war in the (2004 - 2008) period. ISIL movement started in Syria and spread to Iraq with support of Iraqi ex-military officers who were loyal to Saddam Hussein in 2014. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has written a book on this subject.
Jon speaks with Dr. Haider al-Abadi, an Iraqi politician who served as prime minister while Iraq was battling the Islamic State about his decision making as prime minister.
www.csis.org
www.bitebackpublishing.com
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi joins Intercepted to discuss the U.S. government’s legacy after years of occupation.
theintercept.com
But an author tells an account from his perspective.
Independent observers are supposed to uncover facts from multiple sources.
The new Iraqi army was unable to handle ISIL movement on its own and ISIL captured Mosul in 2014
In June 2014, an estimated 1500 fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized control of Mosul, Iraq’s second city. Although many residents fled, others stayed behind, enduring the restrictive civil and social policies of ISIS. In December 2016, the military activity, known as the liberation campaign, began in east Mosul, concluding in west Mosul in June 2017.
Lafta, R., Cetorelli, V., & Burnham, G. (2018). Living in Mosul during the time of ISIS and the military liberation: results from a 40-cluster household survey. Conflict and health, 12(1), 1-8.
On June 10, 2014, the international community was stunned by a blitzkrieg-like takeover of Mosul, the main city of northern Iraq. The operation was planned and executed by a small number of people from various factions opposed to the Iraqi government but primarily and popularly attributed to the forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).1 For most observers, it was hardly believable that the Iraqi Army, trained and supplied by the United States, could crumple when faced with such seemingly minuscule opposition. Indeed, initial reports claimed that a few hundred to around a thousand men put an entire Iraqi military division to flight.
Abdulrazaq, T., & Stansfield, G. (2016). The enemy within: ISIS and the conquest of Mosul. The Middle East Journal, 70(4), 525-542.
US-led forces liberated Mosul in 2017
The Battle of Mosul: A Modern Day Verdun
The effort to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq began in the western desert of Iraq with a slow but successful campaign, including a devastating battle in Ramadi, fought in Anbar Province. Success in Anbar provided the government of Iraq and the Coalition the opportunity to transition its focus to the Islamic State strong-point in Mosul by the fall of 2016. The Battle of Mosul, viewed as the centerpiece of the campaign, began in earnest in October 2016.
For the Islamic State, engaging the Iraqi and U.S.-led Coalition in open warfare was a nonstarter, as doing so would ensure certain destruction. On the other hand, Mosul, the Islamic State’s de facto Iraqi capital, provided an excellent location to meet Iraqi and Coalition forces. It was ideal because its dense urban area offered the outmatched Islamic State the opportunity to offset its military shortcomings through a layered positional defense. This allowed the Islamic State to intensify the cost of war for the Iraqis and Coalition, thereby breathing a degree of parity into battle and providing them with a chance at victory. With this in mind, the Islamic State massed its army in Mosul and prepared its defenses. Their numbers there ranged between 5,000 and 12,000 soldiers. Conversely, the government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government fielded a combined force totaling 94,000 soldiers, with an additional 14,000 partisans, for a total of 108,000 combatants.
The battle for Mosul raged white-hot for nine months, with both sides teetering on the cusp of culmination by the summer of 2017. Eventually, the combined industrial might of the Iraqi-Coalition partnership won out, resulting in control of the city slipping from the Islamic State’s grasp and its army all but destroyed. Prime Minister Haider Abadi declared victory in Mosul in July 2017, but the fighting carried on at a low simmer until August, when the Islamic State’s final holdouts were defeated.
In retrospect, it is easy to suggest that defeat was inescapable for the Islamic State. However, the battle was not decided in advance. Defeating the Islamic State in Mosul required the combined effort of Iraq and the U.S.-led Coalition for a sustained nine months and four days. To put that point in context, World War I’s Battle of Verdun, the longest battle of that war, lasted nine months, three weeks and six days. It annihilated several French villages, as well as French and German divisions, relegating them to footnotes in history books. The Battle of Mosul created 10 million tons of detritus, drove out 44 percent of the city’s population of 1.8 million and generated a $2 billion reconstruction bill.
Modern technology such as drones, robots and precision strike did not save the day in Mosul. Brute force, willpower and attrition won the day. The battle’s interval and ferocity suggest a struggle more tenuous than the one that the Mosul Study Group’s glowing account suggests. Above all else, this is what it missed in its report.
Read the full report
www.ausa.org
The battle for Mosul provides a blueprint for future large-scale combat operations in dense urban environments. The authors provide five observations from that battle that should guide the operational approach to the next urban fight.
www.armyupress.army.mil
en.wikipedia.org
US did
not dispatch a large army to fight against ISIL
but used its incredible Air Power to bomb and destroy ISIL positions across Iraq and Syria while American troops on the ground collaborated with LOCAL ALLIES to recapture lands under ISIL control and develop a system for handling ISIL captives. I have written a detailed account of this saga and posted its link in my previous response but your problem is that you do not even bother to open links and read contents.
Below are examples of American air strikes on ISIL positions ahead of troops on the ground as they advanced towards them:
US conducted
thousands of air strikes on ISIL positions across Iraq and Syria:
THIS is how ISIL movement was defeated.
THIS is how Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) were able to liberate lands under ISIL control.
THIS is something that they will not tell you in Iran because it contradicts Iranian state narrative.
Now I am one of the members who has openly accepted and acknowledged Iranian clashes with ISIL, this is apparent in my posting record. My point is simple: ISIL movement was too large for Iran to tackle on its own and even with its militias. Different countries have a role in fight against ISIL. Pakistan also provided some intel to Iraqi authorities in relation to ISIL.
But American role is most significant and undeniable in fight against ISIL. Literally no country could attack ISIL positions across Iraq and Syria like American Air Power. Not even close.
Your lack of knowledge about military conflicts is astounding.
I seem to know Iranian military exploits better than you.
I have written about Iranian military operations in this forum:
Belligerents: IRAN vs. IRAQ Battle type: Air - Naval - Commando Year: 1980* *In connection with the Iran - Iraq War. ------ [1] Outcome: decisive Iranian victory (destroyed much of Iraqi naval capability in a single day) - a masterstroke. BRIEF "Despite the destructive effect of the...
defence.pk
minus purposefully hitting indian ships on ocean while rescuing MV Suez in 2010...... :lol: Very mature of them...... Anyways i would like to see that IQ transpire in the real world first for the benefit of the country then i will give them marks. Right now Baloch terrorists r using sea route...
pdf.defence.pk
You are posting on a defense forum on a regular basis.
Stop embarrassing yourself and read for a change.
I share my knowledge in good faith but my time is precious.
Do not waste my time with lack of thought and reading. This is unfair to me and frustrating to deal with.
don't recall any Taliban fighter in Iran and no they were in Afghanistan fighting Karzai and USA
Sure.
Iran has hosted a large number of Afghan refugees much like Pakistan. Scores of Afghan Taliban and even some of the Al-Qaeda operatives found refuge in Iran as it opened its door to Afghan refuge. It is not written on someone's face that he is working for a jihadi network or a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, Iranian intelligence was able to identify some of the shady characters but continued to host them including Osama Bin Laden's family.
A daughter of Osama bin Laden took refuge in the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, and family members are trying to leave Iran for Saudi Arabia or Syria, one of Mr. bin Laden’s sons said.
www.nytimes.com
Mullah Akhtar Mansour entered Pakistan from Iran at Zero Point in Taftan, sources say
tribune.com.pk
Israeli agents shot Abu Muhammad al-Masri on the streets of Tehran at the behest of the U.S., officials said, but no one — Iran, Al Qaeda, the U.S. or Israel — has publicly acknowledged the killing.
www.nytimes.com
US eliminated most wanted Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Some in Yemen as well.
that's the problem , you guys think you can fight an ideology with gun
Al-Qaeda Network is defeated because its masterminds are dead.
Al-Qaeda leftovers posit no threat to American interests like in the past.
WE do not see Al-Qaeda Network proudly taking responsibility for attacking American infrastructure, ships, and embassies in other countries anymore.
damn what a retard. Hezbollah doesn't have more than 3000 fighters with experience, and that experience is limited to small arms fights against enemies with no thermal vision, no drones, no tanks, no jets, no AI. Anyway, we will flatten Lebanon along with those 40,000 fighters.
It can deal with many simultaneous missiles.
